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Abstract 
In this thesis I offer a theological analysis of biomedical efforts to extend the healthy 
human lifespan by attenuating the aging process, situating this project within the 
Christian quest to holiness. The potential of even modestly extended life spans has 
profound social, familial, political, economic, religious, and environmental 
implications, and warrants considerable theological reflection, hitherto largely absent 
from contemporary ethical discussion. Hence, I critique the biomedical attempt to 
extend human life via aging retardation by considering the historical attitudes 
towards one’s aging body and longevity within the Christian tradition, paying 
particular attention to shifts in attitude regarding aging and decay, and by examining 
the Christian discipline of fasting as practiced by the Desert Fathers, who believed 
that an attenuated rate of aging was one physiological outcome (among others) 
subsumed under a larger moral project of character transformation. While the 
concept of a normative lifespan as derived from Scripture is highly tenuous, a 
relationship between finitude and a wisdom that recognizes one’s bodily limits does 
emerge. While key figures in the history of the Church have acknowledged both the 
difficulties of earthly life and the promise of bodily resurrection leading to a general 
ambivalence concerning the length of life and its extension, such attitudes were 
challenged by Francis Bacon and mirrored during the theological upheavals of the 
Great Awakenings in America. Drawing upon the work of Charles Taylor and 
Thomas R. Cole, I discuss the theological shifts whereby spiritual growth was 
segregated from physical aging via an increasingly instrumental stance towards aging 
and its mutability, increasing one’s fear of death. In the remainder of the thesis I 
examine St. Antony’s ascetic regime which enabled him to ‘remake’ his body as part 
of reordering and refining his soul to be the leader of his body, a regime which 
entailed an attenuated rate of aging. Drawing upon Karl Barth’s christological 
anthropology who locates the unity and order of soul and body in the person of Jesus 
Christ, I demonstrate how current attempts to retard aging exacerbate the ‘disorder’ 
and segregation of body and soul, described as ‘sloth’ and ‘care,’ negating the role of 
the body and its limitedness in the formation of one’s soul, and failing to mitigate the 
fear of death occasioned by such a disorder. Finally, I situate the Christian discipline 
of fasting as an alternative to life extension within the context of the practices of faith 
communities, understood minimally as baptism and the Lord’s Supper.  
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Introduction 
We are living longer. Over the last century the average life expectancy for both 
males and females has increased thirty years.1 Children born in the most developed 
nations during this decade can expect to reach 75 or 80 years and beyond even as 
increasing numbers are living into their eighties and even nineties, in many cases 
doubling the lifespan of their forebears living at the turn of the twentieth century. 
These tremendous gains in life expectancy can be attributed primarily to the effective 
treatment of acute illnesses and diseases like tuberculosis and smallpox, the 
reduction of the infant mortality rate, and improvements in sanitary conditions. 
Despite these increases in longevity however, there has been no substantial change in 
the maximum human lifespan of approximately 120 years, highlighting the fact that 
we have not altered the rate of the human aging process itself. Thus, while the last 
century has witnessed unprecedented increases in life expectancy, there is general 
agreement between the medical and scientific communities that we are approaching 
our biological limits to longevity, with the recognition that these conventional 
approaches to medicine which attempt to mitigate individual diseases will continue 
to yield only marginal gains in the overall human longevity within these biological 
limits.2  
 
As life expectancy continues to rise, so too has the incidence of chronic illness and 
disease associated with aging. The near abolition of acute infectious diseases like 
tuberculosis, rheumatic fever, and smallpox, has precipitated the rise of chronic 
diseases associated with and related to aging such as Parkinson’s, Alzheimer’s, 
arteriosclerosis, arthritis, adult onset diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
cancer, and cirrhosis of the liver.3 Hence, marginal gains in life expectancy in many 
                                                 
1 See http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/~andrew/1918/figure2.html and 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html as quoted in Francis Fukuyama, Our 
Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2002), 57. In the United States the life expectancy for babies born in 2000 was 79.6 and 73.5 
years for females and males respectively. 
2 S. Jay Olshansky, “Duration of Life: Is There a Biological Warranty Period?” The President’s 
Council on Bioethics, Dec. 12, 2002. http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/dec02/session2.html. See 
also President’s Council, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (Washington, 
D.C., 2003), 166. 
3 James F. Fries, “Aging, Natural Death, and the Compression of Morbidity,” The New England 
Journal of Medicine 303 (1980): 132. 
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cases result in a prolonged state of decline. Though life is becoming longer, it is not 
necessarily healthier. It has been reported that America is on the verge of a “mass 
geriatric society,”4 as those eighty-five and older currently represent the fastest 
growing segment of the population. The President’s Council on Bioethics has 
recently noted that 
the defining characteristic of our time seems to be that we are both 
younger longer and older longer; we are more vigorous at ages that 
once seemed very old and we are far more likely to suffer protracted 
periods of age-related disability and dependence because we live to 
ages that few people reached in the past.5  
Hence, in America  “a growing percentage of the elderly are living through longer 
periods of dependence and disability,”6 meaning that many are now far more likely 
to die after a period of protracted illness and progressive diminishment in 
physiological and cognitive abilities. People in the United States on average suffer 
two years of severe disability prior to death, a figure that is likely to increase.7 Thus, 
the very medical advances that have extended the period of youth are likely to extend 
the period of decline, the very scenario most would rather avoid.  
 
Certainly, the idea of a prolonged period of decline with diminished capacities is 
most unpalatable in Western cultures that place a high value on autonomy and 
productivity, where the specter of death is increasingly concealed from public view 
in hospital wards and intensive care units, and obscured in daily life by the increased 
pace of living.8 When forced to recall one’s own impending demise, most would 
                                                 
4 President’s Council, Taking Care: Ethical Caregiving in Our Aging Society (Washington, D.C., 
2005), xvii, 11. 
5 President’s Council, Taking Care, 6-7; see also 22. 
6 President’s Council, Taking Care, 11, 19-20.  
7 President’s Council, Taking Care, 12. Moreover, Ronald Klatz has observed that ninety percent of 
healthcare expenditures are spent on care for those in the last two to three years of life, “Anti-Aging 
Medicine,” 61.  
8 William F. May, “The Sacral Power of Death in Contemporary Experience,” in Perspectives on 
Death, ed. Liston O. Mills (New York: Abingdon Press, 1969): 168-196. See also Ray S. Anderson, 
Theology, Death and Dying (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); Philippe Ariès, The Hour Of Our Death, 
trans. Helen Weaver (London: Penguin Books, 1981); Zygmunt Bauman, Mortality, Immortality and 
Other Life Strategies (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992); Ernst Becker, The Denial of Death (New 
York: The Free Press, 1973); Jacques Choron, Death and Western Thought (New York: Collier 
Books, 1963); Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences: God, Medicine, and the Problem of Suffering 
(Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1990); Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, On Death and Dying (New York: 
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prefer to die suddenly, or in one’s sleep—largely free from the debilities and frailty 
of old age and the diseases associated with it—than to witness the progressive 
decline and painful betrayal of a body no longer able to accommodate the desires that 
outpace it. Despite the tremendous increases in longevity over the last century, death 
remains an affront to intelligence and scientific capabilities, and a reminder of our 
limited ability to control nature. Indeed, the fear of death is a key motivating factor 
of the modern biomedical project that seeks to delay death as long as possible. While 
technology has enabled us to conceal the death of others and avoid our own death by 
putting it off for several years, our fear of decline and death has not abated. Given 
the advances in medicine, the probability of experiencing the scenario we most fear 
increases with each new technological breakthrough.  
 
Until recently, there was little real hope of living healthier longer lives apart from 
conventional methods in medicine involving a continued battle against the diseases 
commonly associated with aging. Over the last two decades however, scientists and 
researchers have made substantial inroads in uncovering the biological processes of 
aging itself, suggesting that aging may not be as intractable as once thought. The 
search to live greatly extended lives has moved from the realms of myth, magic and 
quackery to legitimate medicine. Recent advances in the relatively young field of 
biogerontology—the study of the biology involved in the human aging process—
have offered promising insights into the prolongation of healthy life, leaving some 
scientists optimistic that human aging may soon become the latest process to yield to 
technological manipulative effort. Techniques like selective breeding, dietary 
restriction, and genetic manipulation, have already demonstrated that the aging 
process is mutable, extending the life spans of mammals and multicellular organisms 
well beyond previously unattainable biological limits. Researchers have extended the 
lifespan of the nematode worm seven-fold by altering a single gene.9 The lifespans 
of laboratory mice have been increased by seventy percent by utilizing a combination 
of genetic alteration and caloric restriction.10 One of the most promising avenues of 
                                                                                                                                          
Collier Books, 1969); Jessica Mitford, The American Way of Death (Harmondsworth, Eng. Penguin 
Books, 1963). 
9 L. Partridge and D. Gems, “Mechanisms of Ageing: Public or Private?” Nature Reviews Genetics 3 
(2002): 165-175. The lifespan was increased from thirty one days to just under two hundred days.  
10 A. Bartke et al., “Extending the Lifespan of Long-lived Mice,” Nature 414 (2001): 412. 
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aging research involves the link between dietary or caloric restriction and the specific 
genes activated by a reduced food intake. Most significant is the fact that these 
extensions have also lengthened the period of health and vitality. If such advances 
can be translated into human therapies, this might assuage the fear of prolonged 
physiological decline so vividly depicted in the myth of Tithonus or the Struldbruggs 
of Jonathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels. 
 
In this climate of increased life expectancy and rising expectations of more years of 
health, the possibility of slowing down the aging process itself has become extremely 
attractive. That people might have an additional thirty to fifty years of health to 
pursue numerous athletic, artistic, and intellectual projects, or to live long enough to 
see one’s great great grandchildren is an alluring thought. Members of the scientific 
community, all too familiar with the intransigent nature of aging, are not immune to 
this temptation.  For a growing number of researchers and scientists, the ultimate 
enemy is not death but the aging process itself, insofar as battling aging represents 
the best means of ensuring a longer and healthier life.11 Though historically aging 
has not been considered a disease, it is increasingly considered as a ‘treatable’ 
disorder, amenable to clinical therapy. While not everyone within the gerontological 
establishment is intent on understanding the human aging process for the explicit 
purpose of manipulating it, the project of life extension via aging retardation is now 
garnering more mainstream medical support.12
 
Among those who desire to manipulate the aging process, there is however no 
widespread agreement as to the goal of aging retardation apart from the near 
universal agreement that a prolonged period of physiological decline is the least 
desirable scenario. Some argue that aging should be retarded in hopes of mitigating 
the diseases associated with old age in order to reduce or compress the period of 
                                                 
11 This statement was made by S. Jay Olshansky during a presentation to The President’s Council on 
Bioethics, “Session 2: Duration of Life: Is There a Biological Warranty Period?” 12 December, 2002, 
http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/march03/session2.html. Olshansky asserts that “. . . aging should 
be the enemy, not death. Going after the aging process itself, I think is fundamental.” 
12 Several have noted the current battles for legitimacy and ‘orthodoxy’ within the field of 
gerontology. See Eric T. Juengst, et al., “Biogerontology, ‘Anti-aging Medicine,’ and the Challenges 
of Human Enhancement,” Hasting Center Report 33 (2003): 21-30. 
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decline or ill health before death, arguing that aging retardation ought to add life to 
years, rather than years to life. Those adopting this approach argue that the proper 
goal of retarding aging “is for all of us to lead long lives free of chronic disease and 
disability, and then die rather quickly as we reach the limits of the human life span, 
‘worn out’ from the fundamental processes of aging.”13 Hence this model of 
prolongevity has been described as the compressed morbidity approach,14 given that 
the primary goal is perceived as improving one’s later years in life, allowing for an 
increase in life expectancy apart from concerns over increasing the maximum fixed 
lifespan. This is motivated in part by increasing medical costs in caring for the 
elderly, where the most common age associated diseases like cancer, heart disease, 
and stroke, currently account for fifty percent of the United States healthcare budget, 
(and where a very high proportion of expenditure is devoted to the last two years of 
life).15 Proponents of a compressed morbidity however, do not rule out the 
possibility that aging retardation may actually extend life beyond current biological 
limits.  
 
Others are primarily interested in greatly surpassing current biological lifespan limits 
in hopes of delaying the onset of age associated pathologies as long as possible as 
well as compressing the period of morbidity, while denying the possibility of earthly 
immortality.16 Currently however, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that 
slowing the aging process itself would do anything more than push back the period 
of physiological decline. Thus, while there are conflicts regarding the overall goal of 
longevity medicine, it is difficult to maintain the distinction between slowing aging 
                                                 
13 Juengst et al., “Biogerontology, ‘Anti-aging Medicine,’” 25. See also The President’s Council on 
Bioethics, “Adding Years to Life: Current Knowledge and Future Prospects,” where Steven Austad 
admits the desire to die ‘in the pink of health’ as the ideal, though there is no way to know whether 
this indeed will be the case.   
14 Stephen G. Post and Robert H. Binstock, “Introduction,” in The Fountain of Youth: Cultural, 
Scientific, and Ethical Perspectives on a Biomedical Goal, ed. Stephen G. Post and Robert H. 
Binstock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 2. This term can be traced back to James F. Fries, 
“Aging, Natural Death,” 130-135. 
15 Ronald Klatz, “Anti-Aging Medicine,” 61. 
16 There is a movement known as transhumanism or posthumanism that aspires towards earthly 
immortality, or life as long as one wants it. See The Scientific Conquest of Death: Essays on Infinite 
Lifespans, ed. Bruce J. Klein (Buenos Aires: Libros en Red, 2004). 
   5
for the compression of morbidity and slowing aging for an extended life. Indeed, 
Juengst et al. have astutely observed that  
if suffering is inimical to human flourishing, as so much of the 
biomedicine tacitly assumes, then delaying age-associated illnesses as 
long as possible before death is the obvious goal, whether within or 
beyond the historical life span.17
Regardless of these internal conflicts, the idea of a significantly prolonged healthy 
life has captured the public’s imagination, as demonstrated by an increased 
willingness to pay homage to the cult of youth by investing in cosmetic surgery in 
the attempt to at least appear younger. 
 
While the availability of any life extending technique is likely several decades away, 
numerous start-up biotech companies have now focused their collective empirical 
gaze on creating pharmaceuticals that mimic the life extending effects afforded by 
dietary restriction and genetic manipulation. Thus, while those in the scientific and 
research communities are concerned about the potential implications of greatly 
extended lives, the concerns are typically those of safety, regulation, and 
democratization, betraying an air of inevitability regarding the future implementation 
of aging retardation regimes. That a majority of the ethical discussions in relation to 
this project concern the potential consequences of longevity via aging retardation 
also bears witness to this fact. And yet it is difficult to deny that the effects of even 
modestly extended life spans raise fundamental moral issues about the nature and 
ends of the human condition. Immediate questions arise concerning the aging 
population, the effects life extension might have on intragenerational relationships, 
and the welfare of the biosphere. Many other question have been raised in the 
literature on life extension including the following: the potential for increased 
intragenerational conflict; altered expectations concerning the age of retirement and 
the cost of extended pension benefits; the nature of human identity and the brain’s 
capability to store memories over an increased period of time; when individuals 
might commence or end aging retardation regimes; potential links to assisted suicide 
and euthanasia; and the economic threat of an increasingly aging society.  
 
                                                 
17 Juengst et al., “Biogerontology, ‘Anti-aging Medicine,’” 26.  
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The technological and ethical discussions of aging retardation put forward by the 
medical and scientific communities are currently outpacing the moral reflection from 
philosophers, ethicists and especially theologians. Moreover, most of this moral 
reflection presupposes consequentialist or utilitarian commitments, focusing almost 
exclusively on the projected outcomes of life extension as the determinant of its 
rightness. Such debates are often marked by their interminable character, a key 
feature of contemporary moral debates.18 This is not to say that the consequences of 
life extension have no role in moral reflection. But a focus on consequences obscures 
more fundamental moral questions like whether aging itself a problem that ought to 
be mitigated by our technological expertise. Other questions to consider are what the 
quest for life extension reveals about the modern understanding of embodiment and 
death, and what the impact of such a pursuit might have on one’s character or moral 
formation. These questions have yet to be considered from within a Christian 
perspective informed by the creation, reconciliation, and redemption of humankind, 
and the person upon whom our redemption rests. In this thesis I attempt to address 
this deficiency.   
 
In this thesis I offer a theological analysis of the biomedical project of life extension 
via aging attenuation. While some of the interventions may turn out to be genetic, it 
is important to emphasize that this theological treatment is not motivated from a 
genetic essentialist conception of humanity which affords DNA a privileged role in 
determining what is constitutive of human nature or personal identity. Later on 
however I will address one of the more promising techniques of manipulating aging 
in the form of pharmacological interventions which mimic the aging retardation 
achieved by fasting, as it places the goals of fasting from within the Christian 
tradition as practiced by the Desert Fathers in sharp relief to the modern scientific 
project, exposing some of its dangers. Before outlining the basic approach of this 
thesis, it will be helpful to briefly touch upon one approach that I will not follow.  
 
                                                 
18 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (London: Gerald Duckworth & 
Co., 1985), 6. While MacIntyre argues that these debates involve systematic disagreement and conflict 
over ends—a key feature of liberal societies lacking agreement on ends in the absence of a common 
overarching narrative in which to situate the good(s) necessary to flourish—the life extension debate 
between consequentialists illustrates too that the interminable character of such debates need not stem 
solely from the conceptual incommensurability of moral presuppositions. 
   7
The enigmatic character of aging itself poses problems for one common approach to 
bioethical dilemmas that depends on the distinction between therapy and 
enhancement, a distinction frequently undertaken in religious approaches to 
bioethical dilemmas. One weakness of this distinction is its reliance upon some 
conception of ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ in order to distinguish therapy from 
enhancement. While the vast majority of scientists and medical practitioners would 
not classify aging as a disease, few would deny that aging and disease are linked, 
though the relationship is a highly complex one. Thus, if aging is considered 
‘natural’ or ‘normal,’ then retarding aging process to compress the period of 
morbidity and delay the impact of age associated diseases might be characterized as 
enhancement for therapeutic purposes, even while allowing for a significant 
extension in the maximum lifespan.19 Yet, as science continues to uncover the 
biological mechanisms of aging at the genetic level, it is becoming increasingly 
difficult to distinguish these mechanisms from the etiologies of disease, and hence to 
distinguish between biological and pathological aging.20  
 
This is not to say however that the distinction is entirely invalid or beyond use, even 
though I remain skeptical about its usefulness with regards to the aging/disease 
distinction. Though Robert Song’s suggestion that enhancement might be better 
construed as an attempt to transcend (rather than recognize) the conditions of human 
limitedness is helpful,21 he seems to realize that some underlying structure or 
narrative is required in order to make the therapy/enhancement distinction more 
intelligible. Song essentially does this when he makes reference to the resurrection 
                                                 
19 As Gerald P. McKenny notes, this scenario may also be described as a distinction between 
therapeutic and non-therapeutic techniques. See “Religion and Gene Therapy: The End of One 
Debate, the Beginning of Another,” in Companion to Genethics, ed. Justine Burley and John Harris 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), 291. While McKenny sees little value in this distinction, 
Robert Song presents one of the strongest cases for maintaining this distinction, though not without 
modification. See Human Genetics: Fabricating the Future (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 
2002), 74-78. 
20 Herman T. Blumenthal, “The Aging-Disease Dichotomy: True or False?” Journal of Gerontology: 
Medical Sciences 58A (2003): 138-145. 
21 Robert Song, Human Genetics: Fabricating the Future (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 
2002), 76-77.  
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body as having considerable determinative force in discerning therapy from 
enhancement.22  
 
Moreover, while it might be argued that my thesis turns on such a distinction—as 
indeed I will offer criteria in Chapter 1 which are commonly employed to distinguish 
aging from disease—I am not entirely convinced that my critique of the current 
attempts to slow the aging process has suffered by failing to reference the distinction 
between therapy and enhancement. To note that there is still a widely-acknowledged 
difference between treating aging as a disease and treating diseases associated with 
aging need not imply that the therapy/enhancement distinction must be used in a 
theological critique of anti-aging science. That aging might one day be labeled a 
disease by the scientific community will have little impact on the 
therapy/enhancement distinction if such a distinction is grounded in a narrative 
which takes as its bearings the person of Jesus Christ as attested in Scripture.23 While 
Song is rightly concerned that we maintain a distinction between identifying with 
one’s body and separating oneself from one’s body, I think that there are other ways 
to do this without having to appeal to therapy and enhancement. Thus, while I am not 
entirely opposed to using therapy and enhancement to discern where lines might be 
drawn (even if somewhat tenuously), I believe it to be too blunt an instrument in this 
case to do the necessary work here.  
 
An equally unhelpful approach involves an appeal to a normal lifespan. Though such 
a thing can be statistically measured, and though there is general agreement that the 
upper limits of longevity are around one hundred and twenty years of age,24 it is 
                                                 
22 Song, Human Genetics, 76. 
23 This by no means simplifies things. Any appeal to the Christian narrative as inscribed by scripture is 
fraught with difficulties. John Feinberg, for instance, effectively attempts to draw a line between 
therapy and enhancement by suggesting that genetic technology can be rightly used to overcome the 
effect of the fall. Yet, since he believes physiological death followed the fall, anti-aging technology 
suddenly has theological warrant. See John S. Feinberg, “A Theological Basis for Genetic 
Intervention,” in Genetic Ethics: Do the Ends Justify the Genes? ed. John F. Kilner, Rebecca D. Pentz, 
and Frank E. Young, (Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 1997), 183-192. 
24 At least one Old Testament Scholar has suggested that the 120 year span mentioned in Genesis 6:3 
is a limitation imposed by God in response to humanity deliberately intermarrying with the Nephilim 
to extend the human life span. See Oswald Loretz, Schöpfung und Mythos: Mensch und Welt nach den 
Anfangskapiteln der Genesis (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1968), 43-44. 
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difficult to establish why a particular norm should be taken as a given. Moreover, the 
concept of a normal life span seems foreign to both the writers of scripture and the 
Church Fathers.25 It would be wrong however to conclude that the writers of 
scripture were indifferent to long life. Long life is often mentioned as the result of 
living in obedience to God’s commands (Exodus 20:12, Deuteronomy 5:16; 6:2; 
22:7; 32:47, 1 Kings 3:11, 14, 1 Chronicles. 29:28, 2 Chronicles 1:11, Job 12:12, 
Psalm 91:16, Proverbs 3:16; 10:27; 28:16, Ecclesiastes 7:15). But there is also a link 
between the brevity of life and wisdom (Psalm 90). Generally speaking, if long life is 
a gift from God, then it is not necessarily wrong to want a long life, even if scripture 
enjoins no concept of a ‘normal’ life span.  
 
Rather than pursue an analysis along these lines, I will consider how the scientific 
quest for longevity fits within “the Christian struggle to holiness”26 and the practices 
of character formation involved in becoming Jesus’ disciples informed by the 
narrative of the birth, life, death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ as 
recorded in scripture. Such a struggle for holiness will necessarily entail assumptions 
about the human body and its role in character formation. Posing the problem of life 
extension in this manner gives rise to questions that might otherwise be suppressed 
by ethical approaches concerned exclusively with utility, consequences, or the 
‘categorical imperative,’ including some forms of Christian ethics whose advocates 
seek to apply particular passages of Scripture in a literalist fashion to specific 
problems in condoning or condemning particular practices. In this regard I join those 
who reject the separation of Christian ethics from theology,27 a notion scarcely 
                                                 
25 “Special Gift and Special Burden: Views of Old Age in the Early Church,” in Growing Old in 
Christ, ed. Stanley Hauerwas et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 2003), 19-37, at 21-22. 
Augustine could not reconcile the claims of the verse with his experience, having observed 
“wonderfully vigorous” octogenarians, and therefore abandoned a literal interpretation for a spiritual 
one, Expositions on the Psalms, Psalm 90:6-9, NPNF First Series, vol. 8, 442 f. 
26 H. Tristam Engelhardt Jr., “Genetic Enhancement and Theosis: Two Models of Therapy,” Christian 
Bioethics 5 (1999): 197. See also Samuel Wells, Improvisation: The Drama of Christian Ethics 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004), 14-15; Bruce C. Birch and Larry L. Rasmussen, Bible and 
Ethics in the Christian Life, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Press, 1989), 46-62. 
27 See Karl Barth, CD II/2, 509-551; Stanley Hauerwas, “On Doctrine and Ethics,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Christian Doctrine, ed. Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 21-40; “On Keeping Theological Ethics Theological,” in Revisions: Changing 
Perspectives in Moral Philosophy, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 16-42; Stanley Hauerwas and Samuel Wells, “Why Christian 
Ethics Was Invented,” in The Blackwell Companion to Christian Ethics, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and 
Samuel Wells (Oxford: Blackwell Press, 2004), 28-38. 
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conscionable to the Church Fathers. Moreover, situating life extension within the 
Christian struggle to holiness also enables key figures within the history of Christian 
thought to contribute to the discussion, voices which tend to be muted or completely 
ignored in some ‘decisionist’ forms of Christian ethics, but which may prove 
surprisingly relevant for their ability to “grasp facets of the gospel that modern 
sensibilities too often overlook.”28 Hence, I will consider what it means to ‘remake’ 
the human body for longevity in light of the Christian discipline of fasting as 
practiced by St. Antony and promulgated by Athanasius, whose ascetic regime 
enabled him to attenuate the aging process and thus extend his life in relative health. 
However, an historical approach that attends to key voices in the history of Christian 
thought by no means precludes an historical investigation into the origins of the 
modern scientific search for longevity and changes in attitudes towards aging which 
have contributed to the current situation. Scientific and theological developments do 
not exist in isolation from each other. On the contrary, I will show that modern 
attitudes concerning aging and its mutability are related to changing attitudes with 
regards to death and immortality in the history of Christian thought, particularly 
since the Reformation. Thus, I will develop my thesis along the following lines. 
 
Chapter 1 begins with an elaboration of the issues surrounding contemporary 
research on human aging and the developments and conflicts within the field of 
biogerontology, and as such will deal with definitions concerning longevity and 
lifespan, the difficulties of defining aging, and the underlying theories of aging. The 
work of caloric restriction and the genes implicated in retarding aging will be 
situated among other possible avenues of longevity research. Finally, I briefly 
discuss scientific attitudes towards aging and the aging body engendered by such 
research.  
 
In the second chapter I consider how aging has come to be perceived as a problem to 
be solved by medicine, the ‘whence’ of the increasingly instrumental stance toward 
the aging body. This question is enormously important lest ethical discussions are 
                                                 
28 Christopher A. Hall, Reading Scripture with the Church Fathers (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1998), 38. See also Michael Casey, Sacred Reading: The Ancient Art of Lectio Divina (Ligouri, 
MO: Triumph Books, 1995). 
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uncritically conducted under the assumption that the reigning moral standards and 
assumptions concerning aging are the norm. Rushing to scripture or theological 
discourse apart from understanding where particular underlying notions of 
embodiment and aging come from may produce moral guidelines or judgments that 
are unacceptably reactive or too far removed from where people live. Moreover, 
there is the risk of unwittingly underwriting practices and underlying assumptions 
that ought to be challenged. Thus, I trace the beginnings of the modern quest to 
attenuate aging to Francis Bacon, whose program entailed a shift toward a more 
instrumental stance toward the aging body, a stance he inscribed in the Christian 
drama of creation, fall, and final resurrection. I draw upon the work of Charles 
Taylor who examines the relationship between Bacon’s program and Calvinistic 
strands of the Reformation and beyond, and more extensively on the work of cultural 
historian Thomas R. Cole who, in his examination of the relationship between 
cultural and religious thought, notes a general shift toward viewing aging as a 
problem requiring a medical solution. While Cole’s analysis suggests that the 
contemporary view of aging as a problem for medicine has resulted from the loss of 
theological worldview (a worldview which he has no desire to recapture or 
rehabilitate), Bacon’s construal of aging as a problem for medicine demonstrates 
how easily medicine can be theologically underwritten. I conclude that Bacon’s 
vision of attenuating human aging as a return to Eden does not give adequate space 
to the incarnation, and that Cole’s desire to recapture the existential integrity of aging 
and death inherent in the theology of the New England Puritans requires something 
more than postmodern narratives can supply.  
 
In Chapter 3 I survey the ethical treatments of life extension, with particular 
reference to the concerns highlighted in Chapter 2. That is, I consider various 
arguments regarding life extension with particular regard to the moral significance of 
the body, and with regard to underlying narratives in which the moral significance is 
grounded. In particular, I note that consequentialist arguments either for or against 
suffer from failing to account for the body, and more substantially from a 
consideration of character development as it relates to aging, taking instead one’s 
wants and desires as ‘givens.’ Moreover, those ethical treatments which rightly 
recognize the moral force of embodiment by attempting to ground morality in either 
nature or the body are better accounted for within a Christian metanarrative. Finally, 
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I consider the theological responses to life extension thus far, which, while broadly 
situated within the Christian metanarrative inscribed by creation and redemption, are 
nevertheless are disappointing for failing to reflect with any depth on the nature of 
embodiment in light of the incarnation. My thesis addresses this oversight.  
 
In Chapter 4 I begin a theological response to life extension by examining both the 
nature of death and the desire for long life, given that life extension as a project 
entails some understanding of death. I will do this by surveying Christian theologians 
who lived at pivotal moments in the development of Christian theology. Specifically, 
I investigate death and long life as understood by Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and 
Kierkegaard. While their treatments are not identical, common themes which should 
inform any attempt to attenuate aging from a Christian perspective emerge, including 
a considerable grasp of sin and its impact on human existence, and the promise of a 
resurrection body. Certainly the weight of Augustine can be detected amongst these 
thinkers as the desire for a long life, while readily acknowledged, was considerably 
tempered by human sinfulness and a longing to be rid of the body of sin. Yet, not all 
of the Church Fathers took as pessimistic a view of embodiment and longevity as did 
Augustine. In fact, in the East, Athanasius believed that the practice of fasting 
enabled the Christian to ‘put on’ a little of the resurrection body to be enjoyed at the 
general resurrection. Thus, in the final two chapters I discuss the early Christian 
belief that the body’s aging could indeed be attenuated, even as such a possibility 
took seriously both the reality of sin and the future resurrection.  
 
Before describing the final two chapters of my thesis however, it will be helpful to 
further explain why I have chosen Athanasius over Augustine. While some ethicists 
have presented the mature Augustine’s affirmation of the human body in matters 
relating Christian ethics to technology and contemporary moral problems, it is right 
to question whether theological accounts of embodiment are best served by attending 
primarily to Augustine’s understanding of embodiment, for it seems that the body is 
often ‘left behind’ in his appropriation of Platonic and Neoplatonic thought. In 
particular, it has been noted that in discussing spiritual development his focus is 
nearly exclusively on attaining contemplative silence in the ‘inner self’ where one 
can refine one’s soul, unencumbered by the clamoring desires of the body. Margaret 
Miles has noted “Augustine’s characteristic and continuing emphasis on the body 
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and bodily practices as significant only because of their effects on the soul.”29 
However it might be more accurate to say that Augustine gave just enough attention 
to the body so as to minimize its effect on the soul. Indeed, in light of the incarnation 
of Christ others have asked Augustine more pointedly: “What is the meaning and 
power of Christ’s Flesh? . . . Why should we want to turn to our inner selves if God 
is to be found in something external, in the flesh?”30
 
It seems clear that Augustine did rely on Platonic metaphors in speaking of the soul’s 
refinement. For instance, he exhorts Christians to take the journey inward, for “it is 
in the inner self that Truth dwells.”31 Indeed, while the soul loves the body through 
‘force of habit,’ in his On the Morals of the Catholic Church, Augustine makes an 
apparent allusion to Phaedo in speaking of the mind’s growth through love as a flight 
heavenward: 
And when the mind is carried up to God in this love, it will soar above 
all torture free and glorious, with wings beauteous and unhurt, on 
which chaste love rises to the embrace of God.32
Elsewhere Augustine notes that he is able to apprehend ‘Unchangeable Light’ with 
the eye of his soul by withdrawing to the recesses of his heart.33 Augustine retains 
the Platonic notion of intelligibility with the assumption that there is a deep kinship 
between the soul and the divine, while at the same time drawing a distinction 
                                                 
29 Margaret R. Miles, Augustine on the Body (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979), 54.  
30 Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), x.  
31 True Religion 39.72, in The Works of St. Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century, ed. John E. 
Rotelle et al., Volume I/8, On Christian Belief, ed. Boniface Ramsey, trans. Matthew O’Connell 
(Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2005), 78. Charles Taylor has noted that Augustine believed that the 
soul marked the realm where one could know oneself and know the God who both created us and lies 
within, the God who “is closer to me than I am myself,” yet who is infinitely above me. See especially 
ch. 7, “In Interiore Homine,” in Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 127-142, at 136. 
32 On the Morals of the Catholic Church XXII.41, NPNF First Series, vol. 4, 53; City of God Against 
the Pagans XI.26.  
33 Confessions VII.10.16; On the Trinity VIII.2.3. 
   14
between the soul and God,34 enabling him to affirm that “the chief good of the body, 
then, is not bodily pleasure . . . but simply the soul.”35
 
One might assume that he uncritically borrowed elements of Platonic philosophy in 
his understanding of the human body. This however would hardly be a fair 
assessment, for his appropriation of Platonic and Neo-Platonic thought is 
considerably nuanced. For instance, he criticizes ‘the philosophers’ for asserting that 
the soul is only truly blessed when ‘denuded of the body.’36 While Augustine says 
that the body is opposed to the soul, he nevertheless insists that the body is not alien 
to the nature of man in the same sentence.37  In his work On Continence he says, 
“The flesh, then, is not our enemy; when its vices are resisted, it itself is loved 
because it is cared for.”38 Augustine frequently referred to Paul in Ephesians 5:29—
“no one ever hated his body.”39 Indeed, it has been noted that the reality of bodily 
resurrection played an increasing role in the development of his mature theological 
understanding of embodiment.40  
 
Augustine nevertheless regularly speaks of ‘leaving the body behind’ in his 
moral/ascetical treatises. He asserts that it is a ‘well known fact’ that the body is, “by 
God’s most righteous laws, for the sin of old, man’s heaviest bond,” when speaking 
in contexts of moral development.41 This is not because the soul needs to be free 
from the turpitudes of sensation in order to properly apprehend the world of Forms, 
but because the body has suffered the punishment of sin in the fall. Thus, 
                                                 
34 Cary, Augustine’s Invention, 55, traces the development of this distinction from earlier, more 
Neoplatonic statements. This distinction is clear in City of God XI. 26 and Morals of the Catholic 
Church I.18; XX; XXI. 
35 Morals of the Catholic Church V.7, in NPNF First Series, vol. 4, 43. See also I.27; I.33. 
36 City of God XIII.17. 
37 On Continence 26 
38 Miles, Augustine on the Body, 65, translating Augustine, On Continence 19.  
39 The Usefulness of Fasting 4.  
40 Cary, Augustine’s Invention, 118-119. See for instance City of God XXII.24. See also John M. Rist, 
Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge, Eng. Cambridge University Press, 1994), ch. 4.  
41 Morals of the Catholic Church XXII.40, in NPNF First Series, vol. 4, 53; The Usefulness of Fasting 
2. He regularly cites Wisdom of Solomon 9:15 when making such assertions.  
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It is not the body, but the corruptibility of the body, which is a burden 
to the soul. . . . The word corruptible is added to show that the soul is 
burdened, not by any body whatsoever, but by the body such as it has 
become in consequence of sin.42  
Augustine entertains no notion of the soul’s descent into the body as either taught by 
Plotinus or Origen.43 It is not embodiment itself then that is a sin, for sin originated 
in the will.44 Nevertheless, the body is one locus of the punishment of sin, and indeed 
is further implicated in the propagation of sin as well.45 Any program in moral 
refinement thus requires that the body be subdued so that reflection on God in one’s 
inner self is unencumbered by bodily desires. This is particularly evident in 
Augustine’s understanding of fasting, where he routinely speaks of subduing the 
body so that one may attend to the work of refining one’s soul, a theme which could 
easily have been ascribed to Athanasius’ work on St. Antony. 
 
Augustine was aware of St. Antony and the anchorite movement taking place in 
Egypt, and spoke of this movement as superior to the fasting of the Manichees.46 
Though some believed these monks to have “abandoned human things more than 
they ought,” Augustine affirms that “they work with their hands in such occupations 
as may feed their bodies without distracting their minds from God.”47 This statement 
captures Augustine’s view on fasting: to subdue the body enough to focus one’s 
mind/soul on God. Augustine’s understanding of the purposes of fasting involved 
distancing the body from the soul as one turned ‘inward.’ Fasting meant “the entire 
subjugation of the body.”48 Unlike the heretics, Christians “subdue the body, that the 
                                                 
42 City of God XIII.17, in NPNF First Series, vol. 2, 252; Confessions VII.17.23; Marriage and Desire 
I.31.35; On the Trinity VIII.2.3.  
43 Plotinus, Ennead IV.8; V.1.12; Origen, De Principiis I.7.1-5. 
44 Evil arose from a perversion of the will, Confessions VII.16.22. 
45 City of God XIII.14-15. The body is indicted in the spread of sin through both our seminal 
involvement in Adam (reatus) and through biological transmission (vitium).  
46 On Christian Doctrine, “Preface,” in NPNF First Series, vol. 2, 519. 
47 Morals of the Catholic Church XXXI.66, 67, NPNF First Series, vol. 4, 59. Fasting however was 
not harm one’s health, On the Good of Widowhood 26. Augustine was however uneasy over the 
possibility of creating a ‘Christian elite’ among believers in general. See Conrad Leyser, Authority 
and Asceticism from Augustine to Gregory the Great (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 4-19. 
48 On Man’s Perfection in Righteousness VIII.18, in NPNF First Series, vol. 5, 164; Reply to Faustus 
the Manichaean XVI.31. Augustine also acknowledged social elements in fasting—fasting in ways 
that not tempt or offend a weaker brother, On the Morals of the Manichaeans XIV. Miles sees 
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soul may be more humbled in prayer.”49 In his On the Usefulness of Fasting, 
Augustine described fasting as “the strengthening of the soul” and “the cheating of 
the flesh.”50  
Why, therefore, is it of benefit to us to abstain somewhat from food 
and from carnal pleasure? The flesh draws one to the earth. The mind 
tends upward; it is caught up by love, but it is slowed down by 
weight.51
In an apparent allusion to the charioteer in Plato’s Phaedrus (253c), he likens his 
flesh to a beast of burden able to ‘prance about’ and throw its rider headlong off the 
path leading to the heavenly city of Jerusalem. He asks rhetorically, “shall I not 
restrain my flesh by fasting when it becomes unmanageable in this fashion?”52 When 
one withdraws from the joys of the flesh, joy of the mind is gained.53
 
More specifically, Augustine believed that fasting as the subjugation of the body 
allowed one to check concupiscence.54 In his dispute with the Pelagians Augustine 
even enjoins Basil’s assertion that fasting was the rule in paradise before the fall 
(Genesis 2:17), and thus marks the way by which we may return:   
Saint Basil says to you that we have contracted the disease of sin 
because Eve refused to fast from the forbidden tree. He adds that we 
fell from paradise because we did not fast and he prescribes fasting in 
order that we may return there.55
Unlike subsequent thinkers like Athanasius in the East however, Augustine never 
really reflects on the implications for the human body in returning to the garden. 
                                                                                                                                          
Ambrose’s ‘Porphyrian asceticism’ and Stoicism as contributing factors to Augustine’s ambivalence 
toward the body, Augustine on the Body, 48, 59.  
49 Reply to Faustus XXX.5, in NPNF  First Series, vol. 4, 233.  
50 The Usefulness of Fasting 1, in The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, ed. Roy J. Deferrari, 
trans. Mary Sarah Muldowney et al., vol. 16, Treatises on Various Subjects (Washington, D. C.: 
Catholic University of America Press, 1952), 403. See also Robert P. Kennedy, “Fasting,” in 
Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, ed. Allan D. Fitzgerald (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. 
Eerdmans, 1999), 354-355.  
51 Usefulness of Fasting 2, in Fathers of the Church, vol. 16, 406.  
52 Usefulness of Fasting 3, in Fathers of the Church, vol. 16, 407-408. 
53 Usefulness of Fasting 5. 
54 Perfection in Righteousness VIII.17. Augustine however gave little by way of instruction regarding 
fasting. See Miles, Augustine on the Body, 76. 
55 Answer to Julian I.32, in Works of St. Augustine, vol. I/24, Answer to the Pelagians II, ed. John E. 
Rotelle, trans. Roland J. Teske (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1998), 291.  
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Indeed, fasting as a ‘return to paradise’ was never a theme for him, much less the 
possibility of putting on a little of that bodily incorruption Adam and Eve enjoyed 
before they sinned. The mature Augustine preferred to emphasize the resurrection of 
body to come.56 Thus, any notion of remaking of the body apart from the radical 
transformation of our bodies at the resurrection is not considered.  
 
Thus, in Chapter 5 I consider the beliefs surrounding the fasting practices of St. 
Antony as expounded by Athanasius. To be sure, it will be equally necessary to 
extricate Athanasius’ theology from Platonic and Neoplatonic doctrines, as 
Athanasius, like Augustine, alluded to Greek metaphors. I will show that Antony’s 
ascetic discipline of fasting allowed him to ‘remake’ his body by heightening the 
body’s defense against the corruption natural to it, thereby attaining the aging 
retardation effects confirmed by contemporary science. However, while Antony was 
aware of bodily benefits achieved by such a regime, his fasting was subsumed under 
the primary goal of reestablishing the proper order of body and soul where his Word-
guided soul rightly ruled over his body, a condition enjoyed in part by prelapsarian 
Adam. Yet, Antony also engaged in fasting with a view to that final incorruptibility 
to be enjoyed at the resurrection, demonstrating that his regime was inscribed by the 
drama of creation, fall, and redemption. As such, fasting may serve as a particular 
Christian practice, which, while offering the possibility of an extended life by 
retarding aging, is nevertheless subsumed under the Christian “struggle to holiness.”  
 
In Chapter 6 I balance Athanasius’ discussion of the longevity in reference to the 
first Adam with a more focused Christological on the second Adam, the real man 
Jesus Christ. Here I draw upon the theology of Karl Barth, whose reflections on the 
nature of human limitedness take a heavy Christological focus. I discuss how 
Antony’s model of fasting and its relationship to the disorder experienced in body 
and soul provide the basis for evaluating the current attempts to modulate human 
aging, with a particular emphasis on current attempts to pharmacologically mimic the 
effects of caloric restriction. The shortcomings of the scientific approach are thrown 
into sharp relief by interacting with Barth’s conceptions of ‘sloth’ and ‘care’ 
                                                 
56 City of God XIII.16-17; XXII.26.  
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construed as a disorder of body and soul—the very disorder addressed by Antony’s 
ascetic regime—a disorder leading to the fear of death and a dissatisfaction with 
one’s limited temporal existence. Hence, I conclude that fasting, though not without 
the dangers of abuse, can be practiced as a discipline which is important for the 
development of character, a discipline with also entails the possibility of attenuating 
the aging process. Finally, I situate the Christian discipline of fasting within the 
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Chapter 1: The Science of Aging 
 
“Oh that there were a medicine curing age . . .”1
Regimen of Health of Salerno 
 
“For my part I would rather not be old so long than be old before my 
time.”2
Cicero  
    
Prolongevity theories, if not viewed as pure legend, have typically been regarded as 
an admixture of pseudoscience and spirituality, conjuring up images of the alchemist 
laboring over a concoction which might result in that elusive elixir vitae. Though 
theories for prolongevity still persist, they seldom escape criticism.3 While attempts 
to greatly extend human life are not new, the hope of achieving a significantly longer 
life through science is no longer considered ridiculous. Aging researcher Steven N. 
Austad appears equally optimistic. “After centuries of hokum and false hope, aging 
finally may be ready to yield to scientific manipulation.”4 Others conclude that “the 
unquestioned conviction that we cannot alter aging and the cellular underpinnings of 
the diseases that accompany the aging process is no longer strictly tenable.”5 
Researchers have taken note of a conceptual shift in our understanding of aging, 
observing that “the possibility of extending the maximum human lifespan has gone 
from legend to laboratory,”6 leading many scientists in the fields of gerontology and 
                                                 
1 Regimen sanitatis Salernitanum, in The School of Salernum: Regimen sanitatis Salernitanum, ed. F. 
R. Packard and F. H. Garrison, trans. John Harrington (New York: Hoeber, 1920), 112. 
2 Cato maior de Senectute X, 32, trans. W. A. Falconer (London: William Heinemann, 1923), 41. 
3 See for instance Gerald J. Gruman, “A History of Ideas About the Prolongation of Life: The 
Evolution of Prolongevity Hypotheses to 1800,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 
56 (1966): 10-13; 20-28; 49-74.  
4 Steven N. Austad, Why We Age: What Science is Discovering About the Body’s Journey Through 
Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1997), 221.  
5 Banks and Fossel, “Telomeres, Cancer, and Aging,” 1348. 
6 Dwayne A. Banks and Michael Fossel, “Telomeres, Cancer, and Aging: Altering the Human Life 
Span,” Journal of the American Medical Association  278 (1997): 1345. 
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molecular biology to acknowledge that, while the prospects of retarding aging are 
extremely difficult, the idea is more than a dream.  
 
Within the last several years scientists have been able to significantly extend the 
maximum life spans of mice and other multi-cellular organisms.7 Two researchers at 
the University of Chicago claim that 
the quest for immortality has now moved from folklore to legend to a 
frenetic scientific search for biochemical keys that will unlock the 
secrets of aging. . . . Some of these chemical compounds will probably 
be available during the lifetimes of most younger people alive today.8  
While most shy away from claims of earthly immortality, the possibility of greatly 
extended life spans appears possible through aging research.9 However, increasing 
the maximum life span will likely involve more than reengineering a few genes. 
Many researchers acknowledge that since the aging process is stochastic, influenced 
by genetic, epigenetic, and environmental factors, that any progress in extending the 
human life span will be the results of an interdisciplinary effort.10 Nevertheless, these 
laboratory successes have lead to the formation of several start-up research 
companies devoted to uncovering and ultimately slowing the human aging process, 
including Elixir Pharmaceuticals, Juvenon, Biomarker Pharmaceuticals, and 
Centagenetix. 11 Though there are numerous anti-aging products on the market today 
in the form of anti-oxidants, vitamins, and hormone replacement therapies—none of 
                                                 
7 Two such studies of multicellular species, the Drosophila melanogaster and Caenorhabditis elegans 
are cited in Banks and Fossel, “Telomeres, Cancer, and Aging,” 1345-1348. Others include B. 
Lakowski and S. Hekimi, “Determination of lifespan in Caenorhabditis elegans by four clock genes,” 
Science 272 (1996): 1010-1013; J. J. Ewbank, et al., “Structural and functional conservation of the 
Caenorhabditis elegans timing gene clk-1” Science 275 (1997): 980-983; and P. L. Larson, P. S. 
Albert, D. L. Riddle, “Genes that regulate both development and longevity in Caenohrabditis 
elegans,” Genetics 139 (1995): 1567-1583. 
8 S. Jay Olshansky and Bruce A. Carnes, The Quest for Immortality: Science at the Frontiers of Aging 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2001), 148. Not all scientists are convinced. Leonard 
Hayflick, co-founder and name bearer of one of the most significant scientific discoveries in 
molecular biology this century, the Hayflick Limit, is dubious that retarding the aging process is 
attainable or desirable. How and Why We Age (New York: Ballantine Books, 1994), 6. 
9 See Austad, Why We Age, 221; Banks and Fossel, “Telomeres, Cancer, and Aging,” 1348. 
10 S. Michal Jazwinski, “Longevity, Genes, and Aging,” Science 273 (July 1996): 54-59. 
11 Daniel Callahan notes that The Alliance for Aging Research reported the existence of 25 firms 
devoted to aging research, or ‘gero-techs’ in 2000. See Daniel Perry, “The Rise of the Gero-Techs,”  
Genetic Engineering News 20 (2000): 57-58. 
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which have been proven effective—these companies are devoted to change this by 
developing pharmaceuticals to retard the aging process.12  
Life-Extension and Anti-Aging Technology 
In looking at the current state of affairs in human longevity, it is clear that we are 
living longer. It will therefore be critical to understand exactly what is meant by life 
extension, and how it differs from the events and developments that have lead to 
greater life expectancies over the last century. To this end, some terminology is in 
order. 
 
Life Expectancy and Life Span 
In the United States the average human life expectancy has steadily increased from 
46.3 years in 1900 to nearly 80 years today.13 Life expectancy is a highly complex 
statistical figure that measures the average lifespan for a population based upon the 
number of people alive at each age and the probability of survival for another year.14 
It is generally agreed that this increase is due in large part to the successful treatment 
of numerous diseases, improvements in sanitation and general living conditions.15 
Indeed, The President’s Council on Bioethics points out that these figures do not 
represent a conquest of aging, but rather reflect “an overcoming of the risks of dying 
young, and especially the dangers of infancy.”16 There is no real evidence that 
science has done anything to alter the aging process itself. Scientists observe that 
“we live longer now not because we have altered the way we age but because we 
                                                 
12 S. Jay Olshansky, Leonard Hayflick, and Bruce A. Carnes, “No Truth to the Fountain of Youth,” 
Scientific American 286 (2002): 78-81. 
13 See http://www.demog.berkeley.edu/~andrew/1918/figure2.html and 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html as quoted in Francis Fukuyama, Our 
Posthuman Future, 57. Olshansky notes that the life expectancy for babies born in 2000 is 79.6 and 
73.5 years for females and males respectively, in Quest, 81. 
14 Olshansky, Quest, 80-81. For a complete listing of The Life Table, see 239-242. English actuary 
Benjamin Gompertz is generally recognized for discovering a mathematical formula for aging and 
longevity statistics. See “On the Nature of the Function Expressive of the Law of Human Mortality 
and on a New Mode of Determining Life Contingencies,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society of London 115 (1825): 513-585. 
15 Olshansky, Quest, 72-73. 
16 President’s Council, “The Promise and Challenge of Aging Research,” December 2002, 
http://bioethicsprint.bioethics.gov/background/agingresearch.html.  
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have altered the way we live.”17 Thus, while the average life expectancy has been 
increasing, the maximum human life span—the greatest span of time between one’s 
birth and death, around 120 years—has not. Several years ago it was observed that 
“unlike life expectancy, the span of life does not seem to have increased noticeably 
during the course of history.”18 As life expectancies continue to rise—albeit very 
slowly—a larger proportion of people living longer, approaching the biological limit 
of life. This phenomenon is referred to as a rectangularization19 of the life 
expectancy curve—a compression in the distribution of life expectancy nearer the 
unchanging maximum life span of 120 years.20 This rectangularization is visible in 
the following cumulative distribution where the percentage individuals surviving to 










Figure 1: The Increasingly Rectangular Survival Curve 
 
                                                 
17 Olshansky, Hayflick, and Carnes, “No Truth,” 79. 
18 Louis I. Dublin, “Outlook for Longevity in the United States,” Newsletter Gerontological Society 4, 
no. 2 (1957): 3.  
19 Banks and Fossel, “Telomeres, Cancer, and Aging”, 1348; William R. Clark, A Means to an End: 
The Biological Basis of Aging and Death (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9, 11, 197, 204. 
Hayflick, How and Why, 84-85, 330-331; Fries, “Aging, Natural Death” 130-135. Not all agree 
however that life expectancy is approaching a maximum limit. See Jim Oeppen and James W. Vaupel, 
“Broken Limits to Life Expectancy,” Science 296 (2002): 1029-1032.  
20 Jeanne Calment, born in Arles, France, lived to be 122 years old. 
21 Taken from Fries, “Aging,” 131. 
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This sharpness with which this curve falls between 80 and 90 years represents a 
compression or a notable ‘rectangularization’ in the overall population survival rate 
as a larger percentage of the population lives closer to the biological limit. The 
aforementioned advances in medicine, hygiene, and a reduction of the infant 
mortality rate show the dramatic affect from the curve at the turn of the century. The 
probability distribution function of death thus would represent a ‘spike’ somewhere 
around 80 to 85 years of age, though this spike may actually occur at a later age, 
closer to the biological limit. Figure 2 represents a hypothetical probability 











Figure 2: Mortality According to Age in the Absence of Premature Death 
While Figure 1 empirically demonstrates an increasing rectangularization over time, 
current data suggests that degree of compression in individual morbidity has not 
materialized to the extent predicted. Rather, increased life expectancies have been 
accompanied by increased periods of decline, providing one motive for aging 
retardation research. While there has obviously been some compression in morbidity, 
many believe that only limited increases in life expectancy are possible. S. Jay 
Olshansky and other gerontologists contend that even marginal increases in life 
expectancy would require the infant mortality rate to continue to fall at a fast pace.23 
                                                 
22 Taken from Fries, “Aging,” 134. 
23 Olshansky, Quest, 86; “Practical Limits to Life Expectancy in France,” in Longevity: To the Limit 
and Beyond, ed. Jean-Marine Robine, James W. Vaupel and Michael Bernard Jeune (Berlin, NY: 
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They assert that even “a life expectancy at birth of 100 years requires that almost 
every cause of death that exists today would have to be reduced dramatically or 
eliminated altogether.”24 If a longer healthier life is to be achieved, some other 
means must be developed.25  
 
Hence, waging a war against human aging itself appears to be one possible way to 
significantly extend human life beyond maximum limits. Olshansky and Carnes 
assert that “additional significant increases in life expectancy can only come from 
advances in biomedical technology that alter the course of aging itself.”26 Steven 
Austad agrees: “The only hope for a dramatic increase in human longevity is new 
insight into the nature of aging itself and the development of treatments to slow the 
overall process.”27 However, Zhores A. Medvedev observes: 
One thing is certain, however: even a cursory review of what we know 
about the structural basis of aging reveals that such an extension will 
not be as easy and as straightforward as the procedures available to 
control single-cause diseases. It is, therefore, not surprising that 
conventional health care (which by its very nature is limited to 
prevention or cure of single cause diseases) can only bring about an 
increase of average but not of maximum life expectancy of 
individuals.28
It is also evident that any form of life extension must be accompanied by an 
acceptable quality of life. Gerald J. Gruman, who coined the term ‘prolongevitivism,’ 
conceded that “nearly all prolongevitists have had in mind not merely an increase in 
time per se but an extension of the healthy and productive period of life.”29 
Olshansky and Carnes put it more forcefully:  
                                                                                                                                          
Springer Press, 1997): 1-10. See also John R. Wilmoth, “The Future of Human Longevity: A 
Demographer’s Perspective,” Science 280 (1998): 395-397. 
24 Olshansky, Quest, 98. For a more detailed report, see S. J. Olshansky, B. A. Carnes, and C. Cassel, 
“In Search of Methuselah: Estimating the Upper Limits to Human Longevity,” in Science 250 (1990): 
634-640. They conclude: “Barring major advances in the development and use of life-extending 
technologies or the alteration of human aging at the molecular level, the period of rapid increases in 
life expectancy in developed nations has come to an end,” 637. 
25 Olshansky, Quest, 86. 
26 Quest, 135. 
27 Austad, Why We Age, 14. 
28 Z. A. Medvedev, “The Structural Basis of Aging,” in Life Span Extension: Consequences and Open 
Questions, ed. Frédérick C. Ludwig (New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1991), 10-11. 
29 Gruman, “A History of Ideas,” 8. 
   25
The primary goal of biomedical research and efforts to slow aging 
should not be the mere extension of life. It should be to prolong the 
duration of healthy life.30
 
Certainly, no one is interested in prolonging the period of physical decline, or 
increasing the period of dependency on medical equipment, though this outcome is 
far from guaranteed. Hence, an increasing amount of research devoted to identifying 
the mechanisms of human aging, in hopes that they one day might be under our 
discrete control. Therefore, the term life extension, as employed in this thesis, means 
the attempt to increase human longevity by retarding the human aging process, in 
distinction from treating discrete diseases and disorders. As will become evident 
however, the aging process is enormously complex, generating numerous theories 
that reveal anything but a consensus among the scientific community.  
 
Aging, Senescence, and Disease 
Part of the problem in defining aging is that the aforementioned advances in the 
health care, hygiene, the working and living environmental and medical advances 
have made growing old a rather recent phenomenon. Prior to the nineteenth century, 
not many lived long enough to experience significant aging, yet everyone ages. “It is 
ironic that such a ubiquitous phenomenon as aging is so controversial regarding its 
definition and measurement.”31 Many believe that aging begins when one reaches 
reproductive maturity. Perhaps the most obvious thing that may be said of aging is 
that it occurs over time, though aging is more than simply a chronological 
phenomenon.32 Gerontologist Tom Kirkwood prefers John Maynard Smith’s 
definition as satisfactorily succinct: “Aging is a progressive, generalized impairment 
of function resulting in an increasing probability of death.”33 Zhores Medvedev’s 
                                                 
30 Olshansky, “No Truth,” 80. See also Clark, Means, 205. “Almost everyone would agree that what 
we would really like to do is extend the middle years of life, when we are still vigorous and able to 
experience life at its fullest.” 
31 Donald K. Ingram, “Is Aging Measurable?” in Life Span Extension: Consequences and Open 
Questions, ed. Frédérick C. Ludwig (New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1991), 18. 
32 Even on this point there is not agreement. See Robert Arking, Biology of Aging: Observations and 
Principles, 2nd ed. (Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates Inc., 1998), 11-12.  
33 Tom Kirkwood, The Time of Our Lives (London: Phoenix, 1999), 35. He does not provide the 
specific source for Maynard Smith’s definition. 
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definition is also apposite—“the inability of individual organisms to maintain their 
integrity through time.”34 Similarly, Leonard Hayflick asserts that “aging represents 
losses in normal function that occur after sexual maturation and continue up to the 
time of maximum longevity for members of a species.”35 Biologist Robert Arking 
has coined an acronym, CPID, in describing aging as cumulative, progressive, 
intrinsic, and deleterious.36 Despite the varying definitions, there is general 
agreement that human aging is a gradual, cumulative process, eventually increasing 
the likelihood of death. Another term used when discussing the aging process is 
senescence. Often aging and senescence are used interchangeably.37 Unfortunately, 
there is as little agreement on the use of senescence as there is with the term aging. 
Scientists generally favor one term to the exclusion of the other, given the 
ambiguities inherent in each.38 William Clark has suggested that senescence be 
employed when referring to the biology of aging, though it is difficult to distinguish 
his definition of senescence—“the increasing likelihood of death of an individual 
with advancing age”—from the aforementioned definitions of aging.39 Given these 
ambiguities, I will use the terms interchangeably. 
 
Adding to the ambiguities and complexities surrounding aging is the relationship 
between aging and disease. Though the vast majority of those working in the fields 
of aging and gerontology would not consider aging a disease, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to distinguish one from the other as knowledge of pathologies 
and disease etiologies increase.40 While some have argued that aging should be 
considered as a disease,41 two particular criteria that apply to aging—intrinsicality 
                                                 
34 Medvedev, “Structural Basis,” 9. 
35 Hayflick, How and Why, 15. 
36 Arking, Biology of Aging, 12. 
37 Arking, Biology of Aging, 12.  
38 For example, Hayflick, for instance, avoids the term ‘senescence’ due to its ambiguities, How and 
Why, xix. Arking, Biology of Aging, 11, however observes that Caleb Finch uses the term ‘senescence’ 
exclusively in an effort to avoid the ambiguities inherent in term ‘aging.’  
39 Clark, Means, 8. 
40 See Blumenthal, “Aging-Disease Dichotomy,” 138-145.  
41 See Blumenthal, “Aging-Disease Dichotomy,” 144-145; Arthur L. Caplan, “The ‘Unnaturalness’ of 
Aging—A Sickness Unto Death?” in Concepts of Health and Disease: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, 
ed. Arthur L. Caplan, H. Tristram Englehardt Jr., and James J. McCartney (London: Addison-Wesley, 
1981), 725-737; C. Boorse, “On the Distinction Between Illness and Disease,” Philosophy and Public 
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and universality—still carry enough weight to maintain a distinction.42 That is, all 
human beings, without exception, age, as it is part of our very biological makeup, 
while the same cannot be said of disease. One issue behind this distinction involves 
the battle for legitimacy on the scientific landscape and issues of government 
funding. Aging again underlines the difficulties in drawing a distinction between 
natural and unnatural, or therapy and enhancement in determining what type of 
action is warranted. Classifying or recasting aging as a disease may influence public 
perception, though considering aging as a natural process has done little to prevent 
research on slowing the aging process down.  
 
Though it is still possible to draw a distinction between aging and disease, it is clear 
that they are certainly related. It is generally accepted that aging brings an increase 
susceptibility to certain diseases. Zhores Medvedev offers a helpful insight 
concerning the relationship between aging and disease: 
. . . aging is biologically distinct from disease. In contrast to most 
diseases, its primary processes entail random events that affect 
simultaneously a considerable variety of structures. The more single-
cause diseases are controlled, the more aging becomes the main factor 
determining lifespan.43
It can be said then, that attempts to manipulate aging are tantamount to treating aging 
methodologically as a disease by seeking its underlying causes in hopes of 
mitigating them to a certain degree, even though most in the scientific community 
would assert a fundamental difference between aging and disease. The following 
conclusion of an aging retardation study serves as an example. 
When single genes are changed, animals that should be old stay 
young. In humans these old mutants would be analogous to a ninety 
year old who looks and feels forty-five. On this basis we begin to 
think of ageing as a disease that can be cured, or at least postponed.44
                                                                                                                                          
Affairs 5 (1975): 49-68. Haylick, How and Why, 45, notes that some studies have found that more than 
seventy-five percent of the oldest old—those over the age of 85—have between three and nine 
pathological conditions. 
42 Blumenthal, “Aging-Disease Dichotomy,” 141. 
43 Medvedev, “Structural Basis,” 11. 
44 Leonard Guarante and Cynthia Kenyon, “Genetic Pathways that Regulate Ageing in Model 
Organisms,” Nature 408 (2000): 261. 
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This statement appears innocuous enough, yet as will become evident in the next 
chapter, the aging disease distinction takes on added emotive force in contemporary 
moral debates in attempting to establish a distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate goals of science. Having briefly considered aging, senescence and the 
aging disease distinction, I turn to the theories of human aging.  
 
Theories of Aging 
It has been recently noted that when it comes to the study of aging, “the number and 
range of aging theories indeed rather stupefies the imagination.”45 The ways in 
which aging theories can be grouped appears to be almost as numerous as the 
number of aging theories in existence. Despite the relatively young fields of 
biogerontology and molecular biology, Medvedev observes that “almost every 
important discovery in cellular or molecular biology has stimulated a new family of 
theories of ageing, or new advanced versions of older theories.”46 Highly skeptical of 
any unified, ‘single cause’ theory of aging, and dissatisfied with the common 
demarcation of aging theories—typically along stochastic, programmed, and 
evolutionary lines—Medvedev has recently classified more than 300 aging theories 
based upon methods of study and observation.47 He divides aging theories into seven 
categories: theories based on age changes, primary damage, genetic program, 
evolutionary, tissue-specific, mathematical and physical-mathematical, and unified 
theories.48
                                                 
45 Austad, Why We Age, 53.  
46 Zhores A. Medvedev, “An Attempt at a Rational Classification of Theories of Ageing,” Biological 
Reviews of the Cambridge Philosophical Society 65 (1990): 375. 
47 Some have divided aging theories into damage and programmed theories. See Banks and Fossel, 
“Telomeres, Cancer, and Aging,” 1345. Others have divided evolutionary theories of aging into two 
classes: optimality and deleterious mutation. See L. Partridge and N. H. Barton, “Optimality , 
Mutation and the Evolution of Aging,” Nature 362 (1993): 305-311. Robert Arking classifies fourteen 
basic theories on aging in Biology of Aging, 372-375. Other breakdowns include those by Leonard 
Hayflick, “Theories of Biological Aging,” Experimental Gerontology 20 (1985): 145-149; J. L. 
Esposito, The Obsolete Self: Philosophical Dimensions of Aging (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1987); R. W. Hart and A. Turturro, “Theories of Aging,” in Review of Biological Research in 
Aging, ed. M. Rothstein, vol. 1 (New York: Alan R. Liss, 1983), 5-18. 
48 Medvedev, “Rational Classification,” 378. 
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Theories Based on Age Changes 
Medvedev notes that the first category—theories based on age changes—is by far the 
largest, given the rapid accumulation of knowledge of age changes on different 
levels.49 The problem however, is that the ever-increasing number observations of 
aging tend to be cited as the cause of aging. Medvedev refers to August Weismann’s 
‘wear and tear’ theory of aging, first posited long before the discovery of cellular 
function and DNA.50 This category can be subdivided further, depending upon the 
level at which studies are conducted (e.g. macromolecules, proteins, DNA, 
chromosomes, cellular, or organ and tissue function). Medvedev divides this 
category into seven sub-groups.51 However, while several observations of aging are 
undisputable facts, says Medvedev, the underlying question of why these changes 
occur, often remains unanswered.  
 
Damage Theories 
The most widely-accepted damage theory of aging is Denham Harman’s free radical 
theory.52 This theory associates aging with the accumulation of genetic damage 
caused by these radicals which over time ultimately leads to the failure of cells, 
tissue, organs, and finally the individual.53 Free radicals are the natural by-product 
the a cell’s mitochondria, which functions as the cell’s energy production center. It 
has been estimated that these free oxygen radicals damage the DNA residing in our 
cells around 10,000 times per day.54 Additional support for this oxidative stress 
theory comes from the observed relationship between life span and metabolic rate or 
                                                 
49 For a brief listing, see Table 2, 380-381. 
50 Medvedev, “Rational Classification,” 377. 
51 Medvedev, “Rational Classification,” 378-379. 
52 See Denham Harman, “Aging, A Theory Based On Free Radical and Radiation Chemistry,” Journal 
of Gerontology 11 (1956): 298-300; “The Aging Process,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the USA 78 (1981): 7123-7128; “Free Radical Theory of Aging: Consequences of 
Mitochondrial Aging,” Age 6 (1983): 86-94; “Aging: Overview,” Annals of the New York Academy of 
Science 928 (2001): 1-21; See also Arking, Biology of Aging, 398-413. For a popular level treatment 
of oxidative stress and implications of aging, see Austad, Why We Age, 84, Clark, Means, 155ff; 
Hayflick, How and Why, 244-248; Kirkwood, Time, 114-116; Olshansky, Quest, 155, 196-199. 
53 Olshansky, Quest, 197-198. 
54 Austad, Why We Age, 129. See also Bruce N. Ames, Mark K. Shigenaga, and Tony M. Hagen, 
“Oxidants, Antioxidants, and the Degenerative Diseases of Aging,” Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Science, USA 90 (1993): 7915-7922. 
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the rate of production of free radicals. William R. Clark observes that animals with a 
higher metabolic rate have shorter life spans than those with lower rates.55 Moreover, 
he points to studies that have shown the mitochondria from older cells tend to ‘leak’ 
more radicals per unit of oxygen consumed.56 Even if the accumulation of cellular 
damage has not yet been identified as the cause of aging, it does appear to contribute 
to the degenerative diseases associated with aging, like cancer, cardiovascular 
disease, and immune-system decline.57 Thus, while these damaging effects are 
observable and measurable, Medvedev notes that damage theories in general “cannot 
explain why age changes accumulate, or why the ageing process has so many 
different forms and rates.”58 Attempts to explain these phenomena have been 
undertaken by genetic program theories, Medvedev’s third category. 
 
Genetic Program Theories 
The existence of genetic control in aging, observes Medvedev, is evident in the 
inheritance of longevity traits within populations, and indicates that there is a 
relationship between our genes and aging, though this relationship is extraordinarily 
complex. Here too, are numerous theories. Medvedev notes that many attempts have 
been made to locate genes which directly contribute to aging or longevity. Cell 
biologist William R. Clark for instance, believes that the discoveries of genes which 
lead to progerias59—premature senility in children—suggest that a few 
malfunctioning genes can significantly influence the aging processes in the 
individual. “. . . the incredible spectrum of aging-like phenotypic [observable] 
changes wrought in the single-gene progerias suggests that the actual number of 
genes [associated with aging] may not have to be terribly large.”60 Clark has posited 
the existence of senescence ‘effector’ and ‘resistor’ genes that influence senescence 
                                                 
55 Clark, Means, 156-157. See especially Figure 9.2. Hayflick, How and Why, 247, concurs. 
56 Clark, Means, 157. 
57 Ames, et al., “Oxidants,” 7915. 
58 Medvedev, “Rational Classification,” 383. 
59 Two common progerias are Werner’s Syndrome, and Hutchinson-Gilford Progeria Syndrome 
(HGPS). 
60 Clark, Means, 93. Steven Austad contends that progeria is not the same as aging, but merely 
caricatures it, Why We Age, 46. 
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at the cellular level.61 As an illustration that aging theories are not mutually 
exclusive, Clark believes that oxidative or free radical damage is one of these 
senescence programs that has likely been around since the beginning of the 
evolutionary process.62 Hence, these genetically-driven cellular senescence programs 
lead to programmed cellular death (apoptosis), which in turn leads to a gradual 
deterioration of the tissues and organs composed by these cells, leading eventually to 
the death of the individual by “natural causes.”63 Clark believes that the program for 
cellular senescence is present in every cell—even the apparently ‘immortal’ early 
embryonic cells.64  
 
Of particular interest to Clark are the earliest stages of human cellular formation. He 
notes that in the process of cellular formation from the single cell zygote to the group 
of embryonal stem (ES) cells attached to the uterine wall, that these ES cells 
eventually lose their replicative immortality. These germ cells, capable of indefinite 
replication, eventually become somatic cells—the cells of which our bodies are 
composed—and lose their immortality. Clark notes that “it is of great interest to cell 
biologists that ES cells seem to represent a state of truly inherent immortality.”65 
Clark suspects that this immortality is lost when the growing embryonal cell mass 
implants in the uterine wall.66 Specifically, Clark attributes this ‘gradual’ loss of 
immortality to the decreased efficaciousness of a senescence repressor gene(s). 
Consistent with evolutionary biology then, the repressor genes would effectively 
limit cellular senescence initially as the zygote develops into an embryo achieving 
uterine implantation, and then gradually allow cellular senescence until the organism 
reaches sexual maturity, finally culminating in increased cellular senescence after the 
                                                 
61 Clark, Means, 191. 
62 Clark, Means, 191. 
63 Clark, Means, 33. Elsewhere, Clark defines natural death—“for lack of a better term”—as “death 
that results from purely internal causes such as genetic disease, heart attack, cancer, or other age-
related disorders,” 7. 
64 Clark, Means, 65. Clark also acknowledges the ambiguous and complex relationship between 
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65 Clark, Means, 62. 
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reproductive period has passed. Clark believes this process may hold the key to 
aging. “This increased understanding of the gain and loss of immortality during 
embryonic development provides a possible basis for understanding, at the 
mechanistic level, the relationship of senescence and lifespan in the adult.”67
 
Clark’s theory represents one of many which fit into Medvedev’s genetic program 
theory, yet still leaves questions unanswered. Many remain unconvinced. Biologist 
Steven Austad is skeptical that a few genes could profoundly affect the aging rate of 
humans.68 Others are doubtful of the actual existence of what some call 
‘gerontogenes’69 or ‘virtual gerontogenes,’70 denying the physical reality of aging 
genes yet at the same time acknowledging an “emergent functional property of a 
number of genes which influence ageing.”71 Even if such genes exist, their number 
may be inordinately large. Geneticist George M. Martin has estimated that as many 
as 7,000 of our 100,00072 genes may have an influence on our aging.73  
Evolutionary Theories 
Evolutionary theories of aging ask more than how aging occurs, but rather why aging 
happens. Moreover, evolutionary theories must account for the variation in life spans 
across different species.74 One of the earliest evolutionary aging theories came from 
August Weismann, who asserted that, because reproduction generates new bodies 
which must survive in a hostile environment, death was nature’s way of discarding 
old and worn out bodies.75 Under this scheme, natural selection would favor species 
whose lifespan was becoming too short in a particular environment with lifespan 
                                                 
67 Clark, Means, 66. 
68 Austad, Why We Age, 45, citing G. M. Martin et al., “Genetic Analysis of Ageing: Role of 
Oxidative Damage and Environmental Stresses,” Nature Genetics 13 (1996): 25-34. 
69 Suresh I. S. Rattan, “Ageing and Immortality,” BioEssays 4 (1986): 82-83. 
70 Suresh I. S. Rattan, “Gerontogenes: real or virtual?” The Federation of American Societies for 
Experimental Biology Journal 9 (1995): 284-286. 
71 Suresh I. S. Rattan, “Gene Therapy for Ageing: Mission Impossible?” European Journal of the 
Genetics Society 3 (1997), 27. 
72 More accurate estimates suggest that there are approximately 30,000 genes in the human genome. 
73 Austad, Why We Age, 47.  
74 Medvedev, “Rational Classification,” 376; Partridge, “Optimality,” 305. 
75 Olshansky, Quest, 58. 
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extension while those species displaying excess longevity would eventually succumb 
to the hostile environment.76 British Nobel laureate Sir Peter Medawar later 
developed an aging theory that has since been coined the genetic ‘dust-beneath-the-
cupboard’ theory where natural selection effectively delays the genetic expression of 
harmful diseases into the post-reproductive period of life.77 A few years later, 
George C. Williams developed and modified Medawar’s idea of harmful genes with 
his own theory of antagonistic pleiotropy, where genes beneficial to an organism 
early in life mutate and actually harm the organism in later life.78 But perhaps one of 
the most generally accepted evolutionary theories of aging today is Tom Kirkwood’s 
‘disposable soma theory.’79  
 
Kirkwood claims that his theory best answers why we age.80 We grow old and die, 
says Kirkwood, because we are disposable. That is, once our bodies—composed 
largely of somatic cells—reach sexual reproductive maturity, they are no longer 
needed by our germ cells—the cells that make up eggs in females and sperm in 
males—and hence, become ‘disposable.’ Kirkwood says, “. . . we are disposable. 
And the saddest thing is that this assessment of our disposability is made by none 
other than our very own genes.”81 Olshansky and Carnes largely agree, likening our 
bodies to “genetic transport vehicles” on which our genes have been hitching a 
ride.82 They conclude: “It follows that it is genes which are immortal, not the bodies 
that carry them.”83 Thus, there is a trade off between our somatic cells and germ-line 
cells, between the maintenance of our bodies and germ-line reproduction. According 
                                                 
76 Olshansky, Quest, 58. For complete details, see August Weismann, Essays Upon Heredity and 
Kindred Biological Problems (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1891). 
77 Olshansky, Quest, 59-61; Kirkwood, Time, 78-79. 
78 George C. Williams, “Pleiotropy, Natural Selection and the Evolution of Senescence,” Evolution II 
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81 Kirkwood, Time, 63. 
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to Kirkwood, somatic (bodily) maintenance is very costly, therefore once the germ 
line has had an opportunity to propagate through sexual reproduction, the resources 
required for continued maintenance of the body gradually fall off. Germ-line cells, 
those which are replicatively immortal, no longer need our somas (bodies) once we 
reach reproductive maturity. In the words of Olshansky, “the price we pay for sex is 
death.”84 More importantly, asserts Kirkwood, the disposable soma theory tells us 
about aging itself.  
Above all, the theory tells us that ageing is probably due to the gradual 
and progressive accumulation of damage in the cells and tissues of our 
bodies as we live our lives. It tells us that ageing is unlikely to be 
caused by only a single mechanism . . .85
 
Here again there is an overlap in theories, for Kirkwood also believes that aging is 
stochastic or random, an accumulation of oxidative cell damage produced in 
mitochondria and errors in protein synthesis, thus qualifying as a damage theory. The 
knowledge of these processes lead Kirkwood to conclude that “there is probably no 
single mechanism of ageing.”86 Kirkwood is therefore highly skeptical of any genetic 
program theory of death, asserting that “. . . our genes are not actually programmed 
to cause the breakdown of the body. Our genes are programmed for survival.”87 
While acknowledging the basic biology of cellular senescence and the scientific 
search for genes that might be activated by this process, Kirkwood points out that 
these genes (if discovered) would not necessarily cause aging. Moreover, while 
acknowledging that the accumulation of errors might lead to damage which 
“activates genetic mechanisms that repress cell divisions,”88 he asserts that the 
relationship between cellular senescence (through apoptosis) and aging is far from 
clear. “There is no evidence that ageing is driven by apoptosis, even though 
apoptosis does occur more readily with age in some tissues, probably because 
damage accumulates.”89 Thus, there is some modicum of general agreement upon the 
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basic mechanisms associated with aging, but a wide variance in the theories which 
attempt to assign some level of causality to the various mechanisms.90
Tissue Specific, Mathematical, and Unity Theories 
The final three categories receive considerably less attention from Medvedev. 
Tissue-specific theories of aging focus on the very different patterns of aging noted 
in various organs, and is the most practical of the categories of aging, “because in 
practice doctors do not deal with ageing as a general phenomenon which makes 
individuals mortal, but with specific age-related pathologies.”91 They too fit into the 
overall process of aging, and have their own contribution to make. The mathematical 
models are useful when considering molecular, genetic, and other theories of aging, 
notes Medvedev, but they fail to explain aging in all its complexity.92 Finally, unified 
theories of aging attempt to account for the various mechanisms and process 
associated with aging. The challenge for unity theories is accommodating and 
accounting for the constantly changing research findings and the more recently 
understood processes associated with aging. While not completely against the idea of 
unity theories, Medvedev asserts that “the diversity of different theories of ageing 
which consider different processes of ageing might be quite normal and fruitful.”93 
He contends that unity theories must concentrate on finding areas of overlap between 
competing theories.  
 
Having surveyed various theories of human aging, it is clear that aging research is 
still in its nascent stages. Future discoveries may lead to a greater proliferation of 
aging theories, or it may help scientists move towards a more unified theory. 
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Whichever may prove true, most agree that aging and senescence is a complex 
process with several influencing factors at several different functional and biological 
levels. This fact has allowed theorists to incorporate new scientific findings into their 
own aging theories, and may move us no closer to success against aging. 
Alternatively, the proliferation of aging theories and the complexity of the human 
body offers several different pathways along which life extension might be pursued. I 
turn now to recent laboratory successes in lifespan extension, studies which offer 
more hope that aging may one day be under our control.  
 
Life-extension in the Laboratory 
The subtle shift in attitudes towards the malleability of the aging process has 
certainly been driven by recent success in the laboratory, specifically in reference to 
two multicellular organisms, the nematode worm Caenorhabditis elegans (hereafter 
C. elegans), and the Drosophila melanogaster (hereafter D. melanogaster) or fruit 
fly. I look first at the C. elegans, and the various life-extending techniques carried 
out in the laboratory through genetic manipulation. 
Genetic Manipulation 
The C. elegans has proved an ideal organism for many experiments, given its limited 
cellular make up and short life span. The C. elegans contains exactly 959 cells and 
lives an average of 13 days. Of interest are the 131 cells which, though completely 
absent in the fully developed adult, multiply before entering apoptosis (programmed 
cellular death) over a 6-8 hour period during the organism’s development. 
Researchers are regularly uncovering different genetic pathways and mechanisms 
which influence aging in the C. elegans.94 For example, two such genes which 
appear to control the ‘death program’ in the cells of C. elegans have been identified 
as ced-3 and ced-4.95 If, for instance, either of these genes is mutant, these 131 cells 
do not die, but continue developing into superfluous cells for which the organism has 
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no use. Another gene dubbed ced-9 was discovered to oppose the cellular death 
sequence action of the ced-3 and ced-4 genes in cells. What is striking is that a 
human homologue of the ced-9 gene, entitled bcl-2, has been transferred into the C. 
elegans lacking this gene, successfully blocking the actions of ced-3 and ced-4 
genes.96 Other experiments have shown a doubling in lifespan of the C. elegans by 
genetic manipulation.97 Yet another gene, labeled age-1, has also doubled the life 
span of C. elegans.98 Banks and Fossel note that just two gene mutations created a 
six-fold increase in the lifespan of the C. elegans.99 They go on to note that to a first 
approximation, this genetic manipulation appears to control free radical 
metabolism.100 While the human organism is significantly more complex than the C. 
elegans, these studies show that aging in multicellular organisms can be modified by 
single gene mutations. 
Telomerase Therapy  
Another prospect for longevity comes from the discovery of an enzyme called 
telomerase. Until Leonard Hayflick and Paul Moorhead discovered in 1961 that 
somatic cells replicate a finite number of times,101 it was thought that somatic cells 
could replicate indefinitely in vitro under the correct conditions. But Hayflick and 
Moorhead proved that somatic cells undergo a finite number of replications. Their 
discovery has lead to two terms employed in the fields of molecular biology with 
regularity—replicative senescence, or the “Hayflick Limit.”102 Subsequent research 
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into the mechanisms involved in cellular senescence has attributed this finite number 
of divisions to the shortening of telomers, which are essentially the unencoded tips of 
the open chromosome in a DNA strand composing the double helix. Continued 
cellular division gradually shortens these tips to the point where DNA duplication 
cannot occur, and the cell enters a state where it is no longer capable of replication, 
replicative senescence.103 Cell biologist William Clark notes that with repeated cell 
divisions, telomere shortening can lead to “chromosomal clumping,” where the ends 
of the chromosomes stick together, triggering the cell’s damage control system to 
halt the replication process.104 While telomere damage is distinct from aging, it is 
related to human aging. Clark observes, “like the rest of the DNA in the nucleus, 
telomeres are susceptible to damage, and the ability to repair this damage has been 
shown to decline with age.”105  
 
Of equal interest is the fact that telomere shortening has not been observed among 
germ cells, or so-called immortal cells. This is credited to the presence of an enzyme, 
telomerase, which restores the telomeres. This enzyme is also present in other cells 
that divide throughout the majority of a cell’s life, like hair follicle cells, certain gut, 
and white blood cells.106 Most somatic cells however—the cells of which are bodies 
are composed—undergo telomere shortening and eventually cease replication. But a 
study carried out in 1998, confirms the function of telomerase in human cells, where 
normal somatic cells were transfected with a gene that activates telomerase appeared 
to have escaped replicative senescence.107 These transfected cells “had elongated 
telomeres, divided vigorously, . . . and exceeded their normal life-span by at least 20 
                                                 
103 See Clark, Means, 109-113; Kirkwood, Time, 156-158; Austad, Why We Age, 67-68. Hayflick, 
How and Why, 135-136. 
104 This “chromosomal clumping” can also lead to cancer, is related to cellular aging. As cells 
continue to replicate over their life cycle, the control mechanisms that ensure correct replication 
become impaired themselves, allowing for unsafe division and potentially dangerous mutated DNA. 
See Clark, Means, ch. 7. 
105 Clark, Means, 111. 
106 Clark, Means, 110. 
107 Andrea G. Bodnar, et. al., “Extension of Life-Span by Introduction of Telomerase into Normal 
Human Cells,” Science 279 (1998): 349-352. See also Yang et al., “Human Endothelial Cell Life 
Extension By Telomerase Expression,” Journal of Biological Chemistry 374, no. 37 (1999): 26141-
26148; Hahn, et al., “Inhibition of Telomerase Limits The Growth of Human Cancer Cells,” Nature 
Medicine 5, no. 10 (1999): 1164-1170. 
   39
doublings.”108 The cells modified with telomerase surpassed the Hayflick limit. 
Some have made rather startling claims concerning the promise of telomerase 
therapy. Michael Fossel for instance, boldly claims that telomerase therapy will be 
widely available for life extension by 2015.109 Most are not so optimistic. 
Nevertheless, the Geron Corporation has patented the human gene for telomerase.110
 
There have been recent setbacks as well, specifically concerning the p53 protein, 
which detects damaged DNA and initiates cellular apoptosis—the cell’s death 
sequence. For it appears now that attenuating this enzyme, while thought to slow 
down cellular aging, may actually leave cells more vulnerable to cancer.111 
Moreover, scientists at the Baylor College of Medicine112 in Houston found that 
mice whose p53 gene had become hyperactive, while developing far fewer tumors, 
aged prematurely, raising the possibility that “the same p53 mechanism that protects 
us from cancer early in life may turn around later and accelerate aging.”113 These 
findings, while preliminary, would appear to support Williams’ theory of 
antagonistic pleiotropy. The big question however—how cellular replicative 
senescence relates to the aging of the organism—is still not clear.114 Steven Austad 
correctly contends that this distinction is crucial, “because virtually all research 
gerontologists now agree that what has been called cellular aging is not actually 
aging itself.”115 William Clark observes, “. . . understanding just how replicative 
senescence relates to aging in the entire organism will likely engage researchers for 
many years to come.”116 He does not believe that telomerase is the answer, because 
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“most cells in the body do not divide most of the time.”117 That is, many of our 
somatic cells will reach replicative senescence long before they die. Even more 
troubling however, is the presence of telomerase in over 90% of all cancers, which 
allows the cancer cells to replicate without limit.118 Others also doubt that this 
finding is of any real significance to forestalling the aging process.119  
Caloric Restriction 
The most tested and effective method for life extension is caloric restriction, where 
the emphasis is on undernutrition, as opposed to malnutrition. The link between 
longevity and dietary restriction was first discovered by Clive McCay in 1930.120 
Since then, various studies have been carried out on numerous laboratory animals 
with promising results.121 Animals which were fed 30-50% less then animals fed ad 
libitum experienced an average lifespan increase of approximately one-third, with 
small variations between different species.122 Moreover, the calorically restricted rats 
and mice maintained energy, immune system function, and memory for a longer 
period of time.123 Clark observes that fifty years of research has “demonstrated 
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conclusively that even moderate caloric restriction has a profound inhibitory effect 
on the development of tumors.”124 Clark believes that the most likely biological 
explanation for the aging in fully fed animals is due to increased oxidative stress.125 
Moreover, he believes that the DNA repair of damage caused by oxidative stress is 
more efficient in the calorically restricted animals.126 Austad suggests that caloric 
restriction may reduce a process called “browning” (also known as The Maillard 
Reaction)—where glucose attaches to proteins in unwanted places resulting in 
undesired, and unalterable chemical structures. Thus, “to the extent that browning is 
a central process of aging, the antiaging impact of caloric restriction might be 
partially explained by a reduced browning rate.”127 Suresh I. S. Rattan summarizes 
the beneficial effects of caloric restriction: 
These include increased efficiency of DNA repair, increased fidelity 
of genetic information transfer, more efficient protein synthesis and 
degradation, more effective cell replacement and regeneration, 
improved cellular responsiveness, fortification of the immune system, 
and enhanced protection from free-radical- and oxidation-induced 
damage.128
 
Dr. Leonard Guarente and colleagues at MIT claim to have discovered the genetic 
pathway that effectively mimics the longevity effects produced by caloric restriction 
in yeast.129 Yeast given an extra copy of the gene SIR2—silent information regulator 
No. 2—lived longer. Similarly, disruption of the SIR2 gene resulted in shorter than 
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normal life spans. Gene silencing in general protects cell integrity and prevents the 
activation of other genes which might produce deleterious effects. Geneticist Tomas 
A. Prolla, at the University of Wisconsin believes that if this discovery can be 
translated to animals, it would offer “a starting point in the design of drugs which 
would have a broad effect on human health, including cancer.”130 Moreover, says 
Prolla, there may be no need to restrict the longevity increase to 30-40%. One 
researcher, Dr. Roy Walford at the University of California, is not waiting around to 
see how research turns out with animals, and is preparing experiments on himself.131 
Continued success in uncovering the mechanisms which mimic longevity by caloric 
restriction will continue to draw significant research and interest within the scientific 
community as they represent one of the more immediate pathways to longevity.  
Additional Pathways to Longevity 
Other means of extending life involve the use of enhanced SOD (superoxide 
dismutase) enzymes, which have shown success in extending the lives of the D. 
melanogaster by minimizing accumulative cell damage, though there is doubt over 
whether such a technique would produce similar effects in humans.132 Other 
demonstrable success has occurred through selective breeding. Michael Rose has 
shown how artificial selection of the D. melanogaster has substantially lengthened its 
life.133 Rose artificially selects those genes which favor longer survival by only 
allowing the eggs produced near the end of the D. melanogster’s reproductive period 
to hatch and develop to the next generation.134 Rose has produced fruit flies with 
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three times the initial lifespan.135 Other research avenues involve radio protectors 
which minimize the damaging effects of normal environmental radiation on the 
body.136 One such radio protector, WR-2721, has been shown to lengthen the period 
of time in a cell cycle devoted to repair of genetic damage.137 While it is important to 
highlight that to date, no such technology has been tried on humans, and that not all 
gerontologists and researchers agree on the simplicity or feasibility of life extension, 
the fact that the life span of other multicellular organisms have been extended by the 
manipulation of a single gene is significant. These examples of laboratory success 
are only some of the methods currently under investigation. Other possibilities for 
greatly extended lives involve cryonics, hormone replacement, nanotechnology, and 
organ growth and transplantation. 
Scientific Attitudes towards Prolongevity 
A furious search has begun for the mechanisms that control aging. While there is 
plenty of discussion and disagreement concerning the pathways to longevity, most 
believe that greatly lengthened life spans will one day be reality. Given that many of 
the processes relating to aging are now under constant scientific surveillance, and 
acknowledging that this research presupposes, to some extent, that control over 
human aging is desirable, an examination of the general scientific attitudes towards 
manipulating the aging process is in order.  
 
It is clear that many researchers studying aging are not likely to be content with 
simply understanding the processes that affect aging without turning to manipulation 
and control. As the mechanisms of aging are continually discovered, they become 
targets for manipulation. Steven N. Austad concludes, “now that some processes 
central to aging have been identified, research can finally begin on actually altering 
the aging rate itself by tinkering with these processes.”138 While acknowledging that 
there are philosophical, social, and ethical issues surrounding the retardation of 
aging, Austad appears resigned to a technological determinism.  
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It does seem compellingly apparent, though, that regardless of the 
social desirability of slowing aging, if science uncovers therapies that 
can do it, those therapies will be employed. This is one genie that has 
no chance of being put back in the bottle.139
Similarly, for Tom Kirkwood the question of whether we should try to slow aging 
appears to have already been answered. Kirkwood’s primary concerns are 
methodological—“whether we will use germ-line or somatic gene therapy, and what 
gene delivery system we might use.”140 Several scientists, having recently coined the 
acronym SENS—Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence—are equally 
unperturbed by any potential social upheavals that may result from significant gains 
in life extension, failing to consider the wisdom in pursuing a retardation of the 
human aging process.141
We therefore urge abandonment of the despondency that currently 
prevails with regard to engineering negligible senescence. We acutely 
recognize the social upheavals that such progress may well bring 
about, and join with others in stressing the need to prepare for them as 
best we can. However, apprehension of that transformation must not 
divert us from pursuing a goal that, after millennia of frustration, may 
now be within sight.142
The exhortation to “prepare for them as best we can” appears to have foreclosed any 
discussion concerning prudence, even as it is acknowledging that extending healthy 
life is cause for apprehension. Indeed, there is the underlying assumption that science 
can treat or mitigate any ancillary problems created by the development of such a 
technology.  
 
Even a cursory glance at the potential problems of life extension reveals that they 
would be substantial. “Life extension will wreak havoc with most existing age-
graded hierarchies,” says Francis Fukuyama, with people likely having to work into 
their eighties and nineties to support social security and other pension plans.143 This 
is not to mention the possibility of a greatly extended period of fertility for child-
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bearing and the real possibility of four and five generations co-existing together, let 
alone issues of anti-aging therapy affordability and availability. Others are concerned 
about the potential deleterious effects on the environment. Yet, these consequences 
appear ‘manageable’ when spoken of abstractly, especially when compared to the 
complexities facing the geneticist in the laboratory. Research marches on. 
 
Daniel Perry, director of The Alliance for Aging Research says, “the drive to 
discover the means to produce youthful health and vitality is no less than a matter of 
national necessity.”144 Though opposed to research on and attempts to slow aging, 
Daniel Callahan agrees with Perry’s assessment, although he sees “national 
necessity” as another way of saying “research imperative.”145 Olshansky and Carnes 
speak of the coming biomedical technologies to extend human life as inevitable.146 
Even those with reservations on the wisdom of slowing aging acknowledge that the 
technological imperative to manipulate and control nature will not be deterred. 
Zhores Medvedev for instance, wonders whether indeed slowing the rate of aging 
amounts to a Promethean revolt against the natural order, especially given other more 
pressing societal needs. Yet even he concedes that “in the history of science, the 
pursuit of what is immediately useful has not been the main motive behind progress,” 
and that “efforts in this direction [to understand and retard aging] will continue with 
growing determination.”147 Those opposed to aging research have been dubbed 
“radical mortalists,” guilty of trying to “protect their cramped and limited vision of 
human nature.”148  
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One additional question that defies a definitive answer concerns the length of 
extended life, presupposing that life extension prolongs healthy life and punctuates 
the period decline. How long is long enough? It is somewhat instructive that 
gerontologist Tom Kirkwood, while pointing out the distinction between lengthening 
life by treating disease and lengthening life by treating aging, asks why we should 
not extend life. 
But in terms of ageing, we are all, metaphorically speaking, in sinking 
ships. So if we question the wisdom of extending life by fighting 
ageing, but not by rescuing holiday-makers from drowning, we need 
to agree just when and why extra life is not worth having. And most 
important, we need to agree who is to decide. As a gerontologist, I am 
sometimes asked how long I would personally like to live. My answer 
is this: I want to live as long as my quality of life is good and I can 
look forward to each new day.149
Kirkwood’s sentiments might very well resonate with the masses desiring a greatly 
extended life. Yet it is perhaps not too large a leap from Kirkwood to Thomas 
Nagel’s musings, who chooses living another week over dying in five minutes, 
extrapolating this sentiment to eternity.150 Others have likened attempts to push out 
the boundaries of the human life span as a denial of death itself. Marguerite Shuster’s 
recent comments on aging research are insightful:  
Far from treating death as inevitable, parts of the research and medical 
establishments (not to mention the diet, exercise, and cosmetic surgery 
establishments) proceed almost as if increasing understanding of the 
process of aging and progress in the treatment of disease could 
postpone death indefinitely. It is as if the process of decay we can 
plainly observe is something we should surely be able to learn to 
control: the very idea that we could not is a kind of affront.151
Such a stance towards aging and death is also supported in our wider therapeutic 
culture that “has frequently perpetuated the self-deception that death can be avoided 
if we work hard enough and sufficiently trust our rational scientific abilities.”152
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While it could be argued that life extension itself is a manifestation of the very 
remembrance of our mortality, it is more likely that this project stems from a fear of 
death. One cannot help but wonder “if there is not lurking under this business of 
curing aging some notion of avoiding death altogether.”153 Whether or not one hopes 
for an indefinite deferral of death is another question. While The President’s Council 
On Bioethics has asserted that the implicit desire in life extension is earthly 
immortality,154 it is perhaps more accurate to see life extension as an attempt to 
domesticate death, as most of those involved in aging research acknowledge only 
marginal gains in longevity, while denying the possibility of earthly immortality. 
Given the more realistic scenario of modest gains in longevity, it could be argued 
that a modest lifespan increase would hardly be detrimental to the acquisition of 
wisdom stemming from life’s brevity. 
 
There are of course those who espouse moderate positions concerning the use of 
aging retardation as a means of working within one’s natural lifespan by 
compressing the period of morbidity, as difficult as this may prove to be. Whether 
current biological limits are breached or not however, the ability to manipulate aging 
in order to add healthy years to life represents the latest attempt to address the 
discrepancy between the limited body and one’s limitless desires. Discoveries of the 
mechanisms and processes associated with aging have fostered a new optimism in 
bringing aging under control in hopes of engineering greatly extended healthy life 
spans, even though aging is a complex process explained by numerous conflicting, 
though not entirely exclusive, theories of aging.  
 
Discoveries of the mechanisms and processes associated with aging have fostered a 
new optimism in bringing aging under control in hopes of engineering greatly 
extended healthy life spans, though aging is a complex process explained by 
numerous conflicting, though not entirely exclusive, theories of aging. The advances 
made against aging thus far in fruit flies and nematode worms indicate the potential 
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for extended human lives, though the reality of this vision and the timing are still 
issues under dispute. Before constructing a Christian response to aging attenuation 
however, it will be necessary to first consider the trends which have lead to the 
current situation, lest the response misses the underlying assumptions driving this 
project. While the desire for longer life or even immortality are likely as old as 
humanity itself, it will be worth considering the origins of the search for aging 
attenuators in the history of modern medicine, including the assumptions surrounding 
this search.  Thus, in the next chapter I attempt to trace how aging has become 
increasingly construed as a problem requiring instrumental control. 
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Chapter 2: The Baconian Project and the Development of 
Aging as a Medical Problem 
 
“It is an ancient saying and complaint, that life is short and art long; 
wherefore, it behoveth us, who make it our chiefest aim to perfect arts, 
to take upon us the consideration of prolonging man’s life, God, the 
author of all truth and life, prospering our endeavours.”1  
Francis Bacon 
 
“Instead of finding means to conserve life I have found another, an 
easier and surer one, which is not to fear death.”2  
  Descartes 
 
Having looked at contemporary research to uncover the complex processes of human 
aging, including the attitudes endemic to this research, it is important to pause at this 
point in an attempt to conduct—however provisional and tendentious—a cultural 
analysis by asking how aging has come to be perceived as a problem to be solved by 
medicine, or alternatively, ‘Whence the instrumental stance toward aging?3 This 
question is important because it has been rightly observed that a social or cultural 
analysis is “an indispensable requirement of an adequate Christian ethic,” lest ethical 
discussions are uncritically conducted under the assumption that the reigning moral 
standards and assumptions are “universal rather than parochial.”4 This critique 
certainly applies to the assumptions regarding the nature of aging and embodiment 
                                                 
1 History, Natural and Experimental, of Life and Death, or of the Prolongation of Life, in The Works 
of Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: M. Murphy, 1876), 468. 
2 “Descartes to Chanut, 15 June 1646,” in Philosophical Letters, ed. and trans. Anthony Kenny 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 196. 
3 Carole Bailey Stoneking has argued that even theologians who have recently looked at aging have 
failed in this regard, as if aging were merely a matter of “social policy: unemployment, poverty, 
disease, health care, retirement, and pensions,” and rightly asserts that “Christian theology should 
have something more to offer.” See “Modernity: The Social Construction of Aging,” in Growing Old 
in Christ, ed. Stanley Hauerwas et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 2003), 73.  
4 Birch and Rasmussen, Bible and Ethics in the Christian Life, 78. This is closely related to H. Richard 
Niebuhr’s call to answer the question “What’s going on?” before considering “What should I do?” 
The Responsible Self: An Essay in Christian Moral Philosophy (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 
1963).  
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inherent in the search for longer life. If such analysis is ignored, any forthcoming 
moral guidelines or judgments may lack credibility, be unacceptably reactive or too 
far removed from where people live. Moreover, there is the risk of unwittingly 
underwriting practices and underlying assumptions that ought to be challenged.  
 
It must be immediately admitted that the question as to how and why aging has 
become a problem to be mitigated by technology would require an enormously 
complex answer, and that any attempt to trace the influences within a single chapter 
runs the risk of truncation and over-simplification. Perhaps the most general 
statement regarding aging has been made by historian David. H. Fischer, that “at the 
same time that old age came to be more common, it also came to be regarded with 
increasing contempt,” a sentiment which finds widespread agreement, though many 
disputes remain concerning the contributing factors.5 Even in identifying particular 
trends associated with particular individuals, it must be further noted that I am in no 
way attempting to establish particular chains of causality—though they no doubt 
exist—given again the enormous difficulties involved in establishing such links. 
Though it will become immediately apparent, for instance, that the push for 
prolongevity in modernity was for a time intimately linked with religious and 
theological commitments, determining the degree to which such commitments have 
either contributed to, or detracted from the push to view aging as a problem requiring 
a scientific solution is not easy to determine. Nevertheless, it will be possible to 
make some general assertions in tracing shifting attitudes regarding aging.  
 
In doing so, I will begin with Gerald P. McKenny’s construal the aims of modern 
medicine, appropriately dubbed the ‘Baconian Project,’ in part because Francis 
Bacon put forward a renewed emphasis for the treatment of human aging in calling 
for a different scientific methodology, justifying this call theologically. I couple 
Bacon’s writings with added insights from Charles Taylor, who examines the 
relationship between Bacon’s program and Calvinistic strands of the Reformation 
and beyond.  It will also be useful however to consider the interplay of cultural, 
religious, and scientific currents during the birth of the disciplines which would later 
                                                 
5 Growing Old in America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 114.  
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become known as geriatrics and gerontology in America. Here I will be relying on 
cultural historian Thomas R. Cole, who, in his examination of the relationship 
between cultural and religious thought, identifies a noticeable shift in attitudes 
toward aging amongst New England Protestants during the late eighteenth century, 
shifts which mirrored changes in the wake of the Reformation in Europe. 
 
McKenny traces the origins of contemporary medical practice to Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626), describing such practice as the ‘Baconian Project,’ defined by the twin 
goals of the elimination of suffering and the expansion of choice.6  Bacon’s work is 
particularly relevant to the inquiry concerning shifts in attitudes toward aging for 
several reasons, not the least of which is the central aim of his program: the 
prolongation of human life.7 But Bacon’s agenda included not only the treatment of 
disease, but the forestalling of aging itself. Unlike previous searches for longevity 
however, consisting largely of primitive ‘fountain’ legends, alchemy, and hygienic 
methods, Bacon called for relentless inductive research into the mechanisms of the 
human aging process, aware of its highly-complex, intransigent nature.8 Moreover, 
Bacon’s stress on the use to which this knowledge should be put had a theological 
basis which has been described as more than just a “casual exploitation[s] of the 
familiar religious vernacular.”9 First, it will be useful to look at Bacon’s 
methodology, whose instrumental stance toward nature entailed the removal of 
teleological concerns from scientific inquiry.  
 
                                                 
6 Gerald P. McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition: Bioethics, Technology, and the Body 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997), 2.  
7 Graham Rees, “Introduction,” The Oxford Francis Bacon, vol. 6, Philosophical Studies, ed. Graham 
Rees and Lisa Jardine, trans. Graham Rees and Michael Edwards (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 
lxv. “Bacon wanted to leave no stone unturned in the search for the means to prolong life,” lxviii.  
8 Gerald J. Gruman has chronicled the vast history of prolongevity from various legends and Taoism 
to hygienic methods to alchemy in its Chinese, Hellenistic, and Latin variants, which he describes as 
primitive at worst and proto science at best in that it was believed that longevity had been achieved in 
the past. “History of Ideas,” 74-75.  
9 John Channing Briggs, “Bacon’s Science and Religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, 
ed. Markku Peltonen (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 176.  
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Instrumental Knowledge and the Loss of Teleology 
Throughout Bacon’s writings he stresses the need for this natural knowledge to be 
useful. He expresses his dissatisfaction with older methods of inquiry into the 
operation of the natural order, and argues that inquiry into such knowledge ought to 
be instrumental; it ought to be put to use. In putting forward his theological 
justification for pursuit of instrumental knowledge, he relentlessly criticizes the 
nature of scientific investigation handed down from the Greeks—most notably Plato, 
Aristotle, and Epicurus—for their pursuit of understanding to the near exclusion of 
the use to which such knowledge might be put.10 Medicine too has moved “rather in 
a circle than in progression.”11 Bacon laments that “scarcely one single experiment 
can be culled that has a tendency to elevate or assist mankind.”12 They have erred, 
claims Bacon, in seeking knowledge for itself, and “not for benefit and ostentation or 
any practical enablements in the course of life.”13 In particular, Bacon claims that 
prior efforts to uncover natural knowledge were hindered by wrongly incorporating 
teleological concerns into the investigation of nature itself: “Inquiry into final causes 
is barren, and like a virgin consecrated to God produces nothing.”14 Specifically, 
Bacon asserts that “the handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical 
inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical 
causes, . . . to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery.”15
                                                 
10 Bacon prefers the more ancient Greeks like Empedocles, Democritus, and Heraclitus in that they 
“betook themselves to investigation of truth with greater silence, and with more severity and 
simplicity,” Novum Organum I.71, in The Works of Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England, vol. 
3 (Philadelphia, PA: M. Murphy, 1876), 354. 
11 Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, in Works, vol. 1, 203. In particular, he laments the abandonment 
of the ‘diligence of Hippocrates’ in recording diseases, treatments, and the outcome of treatments on 
patients. See Madeline M. Muntersbjorn, “Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Science: Machina 
intellectus and Forma indita,” Philosophy of Science 70 (December 2003): 1138. 
12 Novum Organum I.73, in Works, vol. 3, 354. Bacon criticizes them for being excessively empirical 
like ants who “heap up their store” or dogmatical like spiders who “spin out their own webs.” Bacon 
prefers the bee which extracts matter from flowers and puts it to use, Novum Organum I.95, in Works, 
vol. 3, 362. 
13 Valerius Terminus, quoted in Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern 
Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 213.  
14 Bacon, Advancement of Learning, quoted in T. F. Torrance, Theological Science (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969), 70 n. 2.  
15 Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, in Works, vol. 1, 198. Bacon is not opposed to the investigation of 
final causes, so long as such an inquiry is restricted to the realm of metaphysics. Moreover, variable or 
respective causes can be pursued in physics, while “fixed and constant causes” are considered in 
metaphysics, Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, in Works, vol. 1, 196. 
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Bacon’s theological justification for the discovery of useful knowledge is nicely 
encapsulated in his criticisms of the ancient Greeks, where he asserts that they have 
“sought in knowledge a couch, whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit,” 
rather than “a rich storehouse, for the glory of the Creator, and the relief of man’s 
estate.”16 In Valerius Terminus Bacon declares that knowledge must “be subject to 
that use for which God hath granted it, which is the benefit and relief of the state and 
society of man.”17 The advancement of knowledge is to be used both to relieve 
suffering and to glorify God. The ordinary ambitions of men ought to be directed 
toward “the amplification of the power and kingdom of mankind over the world.”18 
Elsewhere Bacon calls for an inductive methodology, beginning with questions in 
order that “we may yield up their fortune to mankind . . . from which must 
necessarily follow an improvement in their estate, and an increase of their power 
over nature.”19 Power and utility are to be the new ends of knowledge. If properly 
and humbly pursued, such knowledge “leadeth to the greater exaltation of the glory 
of God,” otherwise, it carries the serpent’s sting, and “maketh the mind of man to 
swell; as the Scripture sayeth excellently, ‘Knowledge bloweth up, but charity 
buildeth up.’”20
 
Bacon is however careful to draw a distinction between moral knowledge—the 
knowledge ‘of good and evil’ which occasioned the fall—from natural knowledge 
wherewith Adam both worked the garden and named the animals, a knowledge 
further expanded through the investigations of Moses, Solomon,21 and even Job.22 
                                                 
16 Advancement of Learning, Bk. I, in Works, vol. 1, 174. 
17 Valerius Terminus, in Works, vol. 1, 83. For instance, Bacon was critical of physicians who 
remained with terminal patients as a matter of ‘a scruple and religion,’ rather than using such 
situations to garner the skill “for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and agonies of death,” 
Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, in Works, vol. 1, 204. 
18 Valerius Terminus, in Works, vol. 1, 84. 
19 Novum Organum Bk. II.52, in Works, vol. 3, 425.  
20 Valerius Terminus, in Works, vol. 1, 83. Elsewhere Bacon declared that ‘scientia inflat,’ 
Advancement of Learning Bk. I, in Works, vol. 1, 162.  
21 Bacon speaks of an imaginary Academy of Science, “Solomon’s House,” wherein several 
medicines to retard aging were developed, including a “Water of Paradise,” Gruman, “History of 
Ideas,” 81.  
22 Valerius Terminus, in Works, vol. 1, 82; Advancement of Learning, Bk. I, in Works, vol. 1, 162.  
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Though man through the fall has lost both his state of innocence and his ‘empire over 
creation,’ both can be partially recovered in this life by religion on one hand and by 
the arts and sciences on the other, given especially that creation has not become 
‘entirely rebellious’ by the curse, but is capable of ‘supplying man’s daily wants,’ as 
evidenced by God’s decree in Genesis 3:19—“In the sweat of thy brow shalt thou eat 
bread.”23 Bacon’s ideas here have been termed ‘the new asceticism,’ where the “new 
men of the God-given science will wear sweat upon their brows rather than hair 
shirts upon their backs.”24 Bacon himself believed that his was the era to witness the 
fulfillment of Daniel 12:4 where knowledge (scientia) shall be increased.25 While 
Bacon largely believed that increased knowledge should relieve the state of 
humankind, one of the main uses to which he believed the advancement of 
knowledge should be put was the retardation of aging, a goal often described in 
biblical terms as a return the garden of Eden.  
 
Longevity and the Return to Eden 
Bacon describes advances in practical knowledge as the way by which we might 
approach our prelapsarian state the garden of Eden. Such knowledge is not to be used 
for raising one’s spirits, wits, satisfaction, ambition, pride, honor, or fame, but for “a 
restitution and reinvesting, in great part, of man to the sovereignty and power . . . 
which he had in his first state of creation.”26 The return to paradise was thus to come 
from an expansion of natural knowledge, ranging from “a discovery of all operations 
and possibilities of operations from immortality, if it were possible, to the meanest 
mechanical practice.”27 Indeed, central to Bacon’s program as a whole was the 
prolongation of life. Once again, his program was thoroughly suffused with his 
understanding of God and the scriptures. For Bacon “the Bible . . . appears no less 
                                                 
23 Novum Organum Bk. II.52, in Works, vol. 3, 425; “Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, 
assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right 
reason and true religion,” Novum Organum Bk. I.129, in Works, vol. 3, 371.  
24 Tovey, “New Understanding,” 574.  
25 Valerius Terminus, in Works, vol. 1, 83. 
26 Valerius Terminus, in Works, vol. 1, 83. 
27 Valerius Terminus, in Works, vol. 1, 83. 
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explicit in its description of the method to be followed for combating the loss of 
Paradise than it is in its description of this loss itself.”28
 
While Bacon believed that a new method of scientific inquiry and medicine would 
lead to longer life, he also called for an expansion of medicine beyond the mere cure 
of disease to include inquiry into the human aging process in hopes that it might be 
retarded, distinguishing death by disease from death by aging, or the “total decay of 
the body.”29 In his History of Life and Death (1622-1623), subtitled The 
Prolongation of Life, Bacon records his hope that physicians will learn to consider 
themselves as instruments of Divine by uncovering the mechanisms of human aging. 
I have one hope, and wish, that it may conduce to a common good; 
and that the nobler sort of physicians will advance their thoughts, and 
not employ their times wholly in the sordidness of cures, neither be 
honoured for necessity only, but that they will be come coadjutors and 
instruments of the Divine omnipotence and clemency in prolonging 
and renewing the life of man.30
 
Though Bacon hoped that increased longevity through the attenuation of aging might 
come from an increase in knowledge, he also recognized that any success would 
come from God as a token of His favor, situating this quest within the Christian 
narrative which looks forward to the ‘land of promise:’ 
For, though we Christians do continually aspire and pant after the land 
of promise, yet it will be a token of God’s favour towards us in our 
journeyings through this world’s wilderness, to have our shoes and 
garments (I mean those of our frail bodies) little worn or impaired.31  
                                                 
28 George V. Tovey, “Toward a New Understanding of Francis Bacon’s Reform of Philosophy,” The 
Philosophical Review 61 (October 1952): 573.  
29 History, Natural and Experimental, of Life and Death, or of the Prolongation of Life, in Works, vol. 
3, 468. 
30 History of Life and Death, in Works, vol. 3, 467. One also sees hints of what is now commonly 
known as the compression of the period of morbidity. Though elsewhere Bacon claimed that he 
personally did not want “one minute added to the incertain date of my years,” he expressed concern 
that he might not “be so long in dying as I was in being born,” An Essay on Death 4, 10, in Works, 
vol. 1, 132, 133 respectively. 
31 History of Life and Death, in Works, vol. 3, 467.  
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He asserts that the Christian should not ‘esteem long life too lightly’ under the 
weight of heaven—even though this life is marred by sin—because it provides the 
believer more opportunities to pursue works of charity. 
For long Life being an increasing heape of sinnes and sorrowes lightly 
esteemed of Christians aspiring to Heaven, should not be despised, 
because it affoored longer opportunity of doing good Workes.”32
Thus, Bacon did not consider longevity of importance because life affords only 
limited opportunities, but argued instead that a longer life meant the possibility of 
accumulating more works of charity. 
 
Bacon also believed that the promise of long life spoken of in the Old Testament was 
becoming an increasing reality ‘after our Saviour’s days,’ citing the beloved disciple 
who outlived his companions and the longevity of ‘holy monks and hermits’ as 
evidence.33 Though he candidly concludes his brief apology with a striking 
confession—“but to esteem of this [long life] as the chiefest good, we are but too 
prone”—he immediately notes that the real difficulty lies in ‘how to attain the same’ 
given that theories of human aging are corrupted with ‘false opinions’ and ‘vain 
reports.’34 Thus, the difficulties of this life and the promise of a better life to come 
presented no theological impediments to the development of an inductive science 
whereby useless opinions and reports might be overcome with useful knowledge into 
the mysteries of aging and its retardation. 
 
While Bacon’s History of Life and Death contributed little by way of knowledge into 
human aging, his call for the inquiry into the retardation of aging supported by the 
notion of stewardship of God’s creation brought considerable prestige to the idea of 
prolonging life through the inductive study of God’s book of nature. It has been 
noted that the general program espoused by gerontologists today contains priorities 
                                                 
32 The Historie of Life and Death: With Observations Naturall and Experimentall for the Prolonging 
of Life (London: Humphrey Mosley, 1638), 1-2. 
33 History of Life and Death, in Works, vol. 3, 468.  
34 History of Life and Death, in Works, vol. 3, 468. Bacon was hardly optimistic concerning the ability 
of contemporary medicine to do much good to the body: “it is a vain and flattering opinion to think 
any medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, as that the receipt or use of it can work any great effect 
upon the body of a man,” Advancement of Learning, Bk. II, in Works, vol. 1, 205. 
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that can be traced back to Bacon.35 Charles Taylor also identifies a connection 
between certain strands of the Reformation and modern science, most notably in “the 
religious outlook which suffuses Bacon’s works,” 36 an outlook reflecting Bacon’s 
Puritan background which essentially “provided a hospitable environment for the 
scientific revolution.”37
  
Taylor has asserted that Baconian science “gains a pious purpose within the 
framework of Puritan spirituality.”38 In particular, Bacon’s emphasis on putting 
natural knowledge to use for God’s glory harmonized nicely with the Calvinistic 
strands of the Reformation which eschewed the church, among other things, as the 
mediator of salvation, relocating it in God’s inscrutable decree issued before the 
foundations of the earth (Ephesians 1), infusing the everyday or ‘ordinary life’ with 
the weight of heaven as the ‘proving ground’ for demonstrating (not earning) one’s 
election.39 To avoid however the sinfulness of idolatry—desiring the things of earth 
as ends in themselves rather than as a means to an end—the Puritans stressed the use 
of nature for the end of glorifying God, lest they succumb to idolatry by becoming 
absorbed in the things of creation.40 Hence, “they do God’s work in labouring to 
complete and preserve the things of creation, and first of all themselves.”41 Thus, 
notes Taylor, instrumentalizing things became an essential spiritual step where 
establishing rational control over ourselves and nature became the means by which 
the Christian could both avoid the sin of idolatry and bring glory to God by relieving 
man’s estate.  
 
Over time however, Taylor notes that the Victorian era brought several cultural 
transformations together which gradually allowed the Baconian project to slip from 
                                                 
35 Gruman, “History of Ideas,” 82. See W. Andrew Achenbaum, Crossing Frontiers: Gerontology 
Emerges as a Science (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 7. 
36 Sources of the Self, 231.  
37 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 230.  
38 Sources of the Self, 232.  
39 Sources of the Self, 215-217. Max Weber defined this mindset as “innerworldly asceticism.”  
40 Sources of the Self, 221-223. See Edmund  S. Morgan, The Puritan Family: Religion and Domestic 
Relations in Seventeenth-Century New England, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 1-16.  
41 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 231. 
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its theological moorings, namely the Enlightenment and Romanticism.42 On the one 
hand, the ideals of the radical Enlightenment43 placed increasing weight on rational 
thought at the expense of revelation, making deism appear as more acceptable 
alternative to a God whose providential activity could be discerned to some degree 
through His interactions with creation.44 A particular example is nominalist 
theology’s eschewal of any reified forms of laws that might be discernable from 
nature itself, a move largely designed to protect the absolute freedom (or potentia 
absoluta) of God.45 However, an ontology which asserts that only particulars exist 
tends to invite experimentation on new generic orderings of nature.46 Moreover, an 
increasingly mechanistic conception of the workings of the universe as put forward 
by Isaac Newton (1642-1727) further diminished the need for God’s providential 
ordering of nature and any teleological approach to it. Taylor also asserts that other 
radical thinkers of the Enlightenment like Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) were able to 
make the relief of suffering a universal goal situated in a hedonic calculus with 
considerable moral force—“the love of humankind”—free from any reference to or 
reliance upon revelation.47 Taylor notes that the relief of suffering became “a new 
standard for all remaining conceptions of religious, moral, and legal order: Do they 
lessen the amount of suffering in the world or contribute to it?”48  
 
Romanticism also contributed to the current situation in what Taylor calls 
‘inwardness,’ understood as an inner conviction of one’s own significance and 
                                                 
42 Sources of the Self, 393-396. Taylor also notes that other factors like the industrial revolution and 
modern naturalism. 
43 Sources of the Self, 321-354. To be sure, René Descartes (1596-1650) deserves mention as well, for 
Descartes believed that increasing knowledge over nature would allow for greatly extended lives. 
Especially significant is his assertion that the mortal body (res extensa) and the immortal soul (res 
cogitans) are effectively independent. See Discourse on Method and Related Writings, trans. 
Desmond M. Clarke (London: Penguin Books, 1999), 6, 54. Descartes’ ideas will be considered later 
in the thesis.  
44 Deism can take several forms. Taylor sees a subtle shift in Locke’s combination of rationality and 
revelation which resists the typical Augustinian-Thomistic pattern, 234-247. 
45 Margaret J. Osler, “Theological Issues in Gassendi’s View of Science,” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 44 (October-December1983): 552. 
46 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics, 2nd ed. 
(Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 1994), 49.  
47 Sources of the Self, 331, quoting Ross Harrison, Bentham (London: Routledge, 1983), 276.  
48 Sources of the Self, 331. 
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fulfillment. If an emphasis on individual autonomy stressed ‘pursuing one’s own 
unique path,’ expressivism emphasized one’s originality.49 The autonomous 
individual is free to look inward to discern one’s desires and then fashion nature to fit 
one’s desires. As briefly mentioned above, Taylor argues that our modern identity 
has been handed down from the Victorian era which brought Enlightenment and 
Romanticist thought together, an identity informed by a notion of moral progress, 
individual autonomy, the relief of suffering, and the belief that the current generation 
has surpassed the former in knowledge and understanding.50 As McKenny notes, 
“the commitment to eliminate all suffering combined with an imperative to realize 
one’s uniqueness leads to cultural expectations that medicine should eliminate 
whatever anyone might consider to be a burden of finitude or to provide whatever 
anyone might require for one’s natural fulfillment.”51 Strands of these are certainly 
visible in the rhetoric surrounding the development of anti-aging technology.  
 
The impact of Bacon’s program is difficult to overestimate. As McKenny observes, 
with Bacon’s program which jettisoned teleological concerns in the investigation of 
the physical universe, “the concepts of nature as ordered by a telos or governed by 
providence are replaced by concepts of nature as a neutral instrument that is brought 
into the realm of human ends by technology.”52 Oliver O’Donovan has noted that 
such abstraction from teleology “creates a dangerous misunderstanding of the place 
of man in the universe.”53 McKenny observes that modern discourse on medicine is 
the natural outflow of Bacon’s program where “moral convictions about the place of 
illness and health in a morally worthy life are replaced by moral convictions about 
the relief of suffering and the expansion of choice”54 While Bacon’s program has 
lead to the relief of much suffering, it would be wrong to blame medicine’s inability 
to discern limits to the loss of teleology alone, much less to the abandonment of 
Bacon’s theological moorings. Here McKenny is as right in his recognition of the 
                                                 
49 Sources of the Self, 375.  
50 Sources of the Self, 393-396. 
51 To Relieve the Human Condition, 20.  
52 McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, 21. 
53 O’Donovan, Resurrection, 52.  
54 McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, 21. 
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good that has come from Bacon’s program as he is in rejecting any notion that a 
return to any supposed ‘golden age’ of medicine is the way forward.55 It is however 
worth asking whether Bacon’s call for the instrumental use of nature to relieve man’s 
estate by curing disease and attenuating aging was sufficiently informed by the 
Christian narrative where God’s activity in the world is discerned more clearly in the 
person of Jesus Christ.   
 
While Bacon situated his call for the inductive investigation of nature within the 
Christian narrative which recognizes the future resurrection body secured by 
Christ’s, it appears that the body itself has been reduced to an object of study and 
manipulation—even when manipulated for the Glory of God. How our very 
corporeality and the limits such corporeality entails might serve our spiritual 
development is severely, if not entirely, muted with Bacon. Moreover, though Bacon 
believed that inductive knowledge of nature should be applied to attenuate the aging 
process in a ‘return to Paradise,’ it appears that he never seriously questioned the 
kind of people we might become along the way, speaking instead of prelapsarian 
man strictly in terms of  ‘sovereignty’ and ‘power.’56 Such a limited construal of 
prelapsarian existence effectively rules out the possibility of bodily suffering and 
limitedness as serving to refine the soul.57 McKenny expresses similar concerns in 
noting that  
the Baconian project not only replaces attitudes and practices 
regarding the moral significance of the body, its pursuit of health, and 
its susceptibility to disease, decay and death, . . . but is itself a set of 
attitudes and practices regarding the body, and one that is pervasive in 
our self-formation.58  
                                                 
55 McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, 21. 
56 Valerius Terminus, in Works, vol. 1, 83; Novum Organum Bk. II.52, in Works, vol. 3, 425. Indeed, 
while Bacon avers that “all knowledge is to be limited by religion,” he also immediately insists that 
such knowledge must “be referred to use and action,” Valerius Terminus, in Works, vol. 1, 81. 
McKenny notes that “the medical wisdom of learning the limits of healing and accepting the mortality 
of the body will yield to Bacon’s admonition to call no disease incurable and, even more presciently, 
to orient medical knowledge to the prolongation of life,” To Relieve the Human Condition, 19.  
57 McKenny too has noted that with Bacon’s program “the body as object of spiritual and moral 
practices is replaced by the body as objects of practices of technological control,” To Relieve the 
Human Condition, 21. 
58 McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, 219. 
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A body so construed tends to view the body as the property of the ‘person’ and hence 
the instrument of one’s desires.59 It would seem then that the terms ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘power’ are in need of some incarnational qualification in light of Jesus Christ, who 
demonstrated sovereignty in servitude and power in weakness.60 Later I will argue 
that Athanasius and St. Antony had such an incarnational understanding regarding 
the moral force of embodiment, even as they too spoke of a similar return to paradise 
which entailed, among other things, an attenuation of aging.  
 
Aging in Early America 
Having traced several developments from Bacon’s call to the instrumentalization of 
knowledge to extend life by slowing the aging process, it will be useful to take a 
closer look at one particular example of the ways in which aging came to be viewed 
as a problem requiring a technological solution. In the remainder of this chapter I 
will look at the shifts in aging in America by considering the work of cultural 
historian Thomas R. Cole. There have been several good studies concerning the 
attitudes regarding aging and the aged in America, most of which detect a noticeable 
shift in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries away from the general veneration of 
old age (or at least a considerable degree of respect) toward the veneration of 
youth,61 though the reasons given for this shift range from cultural, social, legal, to 
religious.62 I have singled out Cole in part for his particular emphasis on the religious 
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dimensions of this shift, most specifically amongst the Americans of New England, 
whose largely Puritan attitude towards aging and death gave way to a Victorian 
morality mentioned above. Moreover, I think that Cole’s recognition of the loss of 
the moral component of aging and his proposed solution to restore ‘existential 
integrity’ to the human aging process are well-founded, though I will suggest that 
such an ‘existential integrity’ requires a Christian metanarrative to sustain the 
tensions inherent in such an integrity.  
 
In his investigation of the cultural history of aging in America, Cole traces the 
theological, cultural, and scientific shifts among Americans in New England from the 
ideals of aging among the Puritans to contemporary attitudes. Cole asserts that the 
current attitudes towards aging and death are dominated by the medical 
establishment, marked by fear, evasion, and hostility. He traces these contemporary 
attitudes to Romantic evangelicals, various health reformers, physicians and the 
authors of advice books on aging, all of whom facilitated an abandonment of a ‘late 
Calvinist’ ideal of aging which entailed an ‘existential integrity’ that allowed for 
reflection on the meaning of aging and death. The collapse of this ‘existential 
integrity’ has “bequeath[ed] science a legacy of fear, evasion, and hostility toward 
aging.”63 While the ‘late Calvinist’ view of death may have sustained the tension of 
physical decay and the hope of heaven, revivalist theology’s stress on a voluntarist 
conception of salvation early in life, coupled with an uncritical appropriation of a 
Victorian morality which entailed a belief in scientific progress, proved a suitable 
spiritual counterpart to a health reform movement that placed unbearable pressure on 
one’s autonomous behavior in accordance with God’s natural laws. This led to what 
Cole has termed a dualistic vision of aging and death, where a long, healthy life 
followed by a good death or a ‘natural death’ was attained by obedience to God’s 
laws, while a bad, early, disease-ridden and drawn out death became associated with 
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sin and disobedience, effectively segregating spiritual growth from aging. With 
increasing scientific advances, a declining belief in the afterlife, and the failure of 
hygienic practices to deliver on its promises, emphasis shifted towards the negative 
pole of aging and death, whether perceived as natural or pathological. Therefore, 
today aging is largely viewed as a problem for scientists and medical researchers, 
having supplanted questions concerning the meaning humans construct in making 
sense of aging and death. Cole identifies three ideals of aging throughout these 
cultural shifts, to which I now turn.   
 
The Late Calvinist Ideal of Aging: ‘Death Without Order’ 
Cole sees the last vestiges of ‘existential integrity’ regarding aging among the ‘late 
Calvinists,’ whose understanding of aging and death reflect the Puritan emphasis on 
the value of what Charles Taylor termed ‘ordinary life,’ which nevertheless still 
recognized aging as an uncertain journey to eternal life.64 While the shortness of life 
took on added significance for the Puritans who valued every day as an opportunity 
to demonstrate one’s eternal election, they shared much in common with the 
understanding of death and aging common to the Middle Ages where the Ars 
moriendi, the deathbed practices of penance, prayer, and the renouncement of 
vices—including the excessive desire to remain on earth—were considered crucial 
given the imminence of divine judgment.65 While it has been generally observed that 
the Puritans “faced death with an intensity virtually unknown in modern American 
                                                 
64 Cole, Journey, 16. See also Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. 
Talcott Parsons (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1930), 157-158.  
65 Jacques Choron observes that in the Middle Ages “the moment of death became of the utmost 
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ready to extend; . . .” Death and Western Thought, 92; Lonnie D. Kliever, “Death in Biblical 
Thought,” in Encyclopaedia of Bioethics, Revised Edition, ed. Warren Thomas Reich, vol. 1 (New 
York: Simon & Schuster MacMillian, 1995): 511. See also Brian Copenhauer, “Ars Moriendi,” ibid.: 
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life,”66 they also shared a sentiment expressed by John Donne (1572-1631), that “our 
critical day is not the very day of our death but the whole course of our life.”67
 
Cole notes however that by the early nineteenth century the stress created by the 
doctrine of God’s inscrutable will with respect to election and eternal security were 
waning under the revivalist preaching of George Whitefield and Jonathan Edwards. 
He locates the last remnants of a Calvinist view of death and aging in the preaching 
Puritan divine Nathaniel Emmons (d. 1840) where “death remained the last bastion 
of Calvinism’s absolute, incomprehensible, and sovereign God.”68 Emmons 
preached a ‘death without order,’ urging a preparation for death. “God discovers no 
order in calling men out of the world. As he gave them life, so he takes it away at his 
pleasure. . . .”69 Cole observes that Emmons had little regard for the health and 
strength of the young, considering any age as one where death may strike, preferring 
instead the sovereignty of a merciful God who inscrutably determines the number of 
one’s days.  
The oldest person on earth cannot give a reason why he did not die in 
infancy, or in childhood, or in any period or circumstance of life in 
which others have died. The living are a wonder to themselves. They 
can assign no reason why they have not, before now, been numbered 
with the dead. They are the monuments of God’s sparing, 
distinguishing and sovereign mercy.70
Because God could ‘take one away’ at any time, expectation of a long life was 
unwise. While one could pray for lengthened lives “as long as they fulfill the design 
of providence”71 Emmons nevertheless considered the hope for a long life the 
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70 Cole, Journey, 61-62, quoting Emmons, “Death Without Order,” 38. 
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“strongest and most fatal practical error” in that it leads to the neglect of spiritual 
concerns.72  
 
Emmons’ nominalist tendencies are also on display in his declaration that God 
routinely counteracts the laws of nature with regards to longevity. Indeed, Emmons 
asserts that God effectively cuts short everyone’s life, allowing perhaps one in every 
million to “reach the bounds of life which nature has set.”73  Hence, piety was the 
only proper response for those fortunate enough to have reached old age, and the 
only compensation to the accompanying physical and mental losses.74 Emmons also 
notes that age in itself was worthy of respect; even those who did not demonstrate 
piety deserved to be treated with “respect and tenderness.”75 Cole finds in Emmons 
an existential integrity which acknowledges both the limitedness of bodily life and 
our seemingly limitless desires: 
Emmons refused to rationalize or evade the most basic and 
irreconcilable conflict of the human condition—the contradiction 
between one’s self and one’s body, between one’s limitless desires, 
dreams, ambitions, and one’s fragile, decaying, physical existence.76  
Later evangelicals were less willing to accept these contradictions leading eventually 
to a dualistic vision of aging. 
 
Revivalism and Health Reform, and the Dualistic Vision of Aging 
Cole asserts that a new “dualistic vision” of aging developed from both the 
theological shifts occurring during the great Awakenings and the advances of the 
health reformers, where a negative ideal of aging marked by decline, dependency, 
and decrepitude, became associated with sinful patterns of life, while a positive ideal 
of aging, marked by autonomy and health right up to the very day of one’s death,77 
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75 Cole, Journey, 65. 
76 Cole, Journey, 63. 
77 Cole, Journey, 106. 
   66
was promulgated by the health reformers as an attainable goal through virtue, self-
reliance, and proper living.78  
 
Cole identifies the seeds of this shift in revivalist theology of the Great Awakenings, 
where longevity came to be seen as the reward for proper behavior. This is 
exemplified in the preaching of revivalist Charles Finney (1792-1875), who believed 
that death was susceptible to a degree of human instrumentality.  
Who does not know that the time of man’s death . . . is a matter of 
entire contingency; that his days may be lengthened or shortened by 
his own conduct; that years, or scores of years, may be added to or 
subtracted from, his life, through the instrumentality of his own 
agency.79
Finney’s theology also significantly compressed the earlier Puritan morphology of 
conversion to Christ, adding a strong voluntarist element. Where the Puritans 
considered conversion as something one gradually learns over time by demonstrating 
one’s election through daily activities, Finney stressed personal conversion as 
necessary to begin one’s spiritual journey, a choice one is more likely to make earlier 
in life.80 David Stannard has also located a similar shift, citing Charles Chauncy 
(1705-1787), who was sharply critical of conversion through stages, averring instead 
that salvation “might well be with the individual from birth.”81 Cole observes, “just 
as salvation had become a matter of personal volition, length of life and quality of 
old age came to hinge on self-discipline.”82 This shift also paved the way for a 
‘natural death,’ or, dying of old age, which “complemented the evangelical certainty 
of supernatural salvation.”83 This new emphasis however carried implications for 
both the young and old alike.  
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79 Cole, Journey, 83, quoting Charles Finney, “Reprobation,” in Sermons on Important Subjects (New 
York: J. S. Taylor, 1836), 242.   
80 Finney also denied any notion of predestination, divine election, or original sin, taking a strong 
voluntarist position with respect to sin and salvation. See Glenn A. Hewitt, Regeneration and 
Morality: A Study of Charles Finney, Charles Hodge, John W. Nevin, and Horace Bushnell 
(Brooklyn, NY: Carlson Publishing Inc., 1991), ch. 2; David L. Weddle, The Law as Gospel: Revival 
and Reform in the Theology of Charles G. Finney (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1985).  
81 Puritan Way, 153.  
82 Cole, Journey, 83. 
83 Cole, Journey, 106. 
   67
 
If this revivalist theology implicitly favored youth in adopting an increasingly 
instrumental stance toward aging, it also had unfavorable implications for the aged. 
Presbyterian minister Albert Barnes (1798-1870) for instance, expressed little hope 
that the aged could be converted: “the chills and frosts of age are about as 
unfavorable to conversion to God as the frosts and snows of December are to the 
cultivation of the earth.”84 At the same time, opponents of Finney’s reforms 
continued to stress the Augustinian linkage of aging and death with sin. One of the 
outcomes of this revival, observes Cole, is an increased correlation between old age 
and death.85 Hence, a sinful lifestyle could easily lead to a ‘bad’ old age, including 
the physical suffering of disease and general infirmity.86  
 
Over time, Cole asserts that later Romantic evangelicals unwittingly embraced a 
‘civilized’ or Victorian morality inherent in Finney’s theology, emphasizing 
“personal responsibility and internalized restraint,” which dovetailed nicely with the 
health reformers’ image of healthy old age, effectively adopting “a hygienic 
utilitarianism that had little room for either the vicissitudes of old age or the glory of 
God.”87 Various health reformers like William Alcott, Sylvester Graham believed 
that disease could be eliminated by employing a ‘Christian’ hygienic program, 
denying that old age must necessarily be accompanied by the wretchedness of 
physiological decline. Alcott asserted that a longer life could be attained by obeying 
the laws of God.  
If Methuselah suffered from what we call the infirmities of age, it was 
his own fault. God, his Creator, never intended it. The very common 
belief, that old age necessarily brings with it bodily infirmities, 
besides being a great mistake, reflects dishonor on God.88
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Conversely, the wretchedness of physiological decline “whenever is made so by 
sin.”89 Sylvester Graham, who began his career as a Presbyterian minister, said “the 
true principles of health and longevity, and the true principles of virtue and religion 
are inseparable,” predicting antediluvian lifespans within a few generations.”90 
Alcott and Graham considered the physical and spiritual as inseparable; spiritual 
welfare entailed bodily welfare.91 In this period there is a moral equivalency between 
long life and morality. As such, there was naturally an accompanying host of 
remedies and strategies for promoting health and longevity, including vegetarianism, 
temperance, sexual restraint, phrenology, fresh air and exercise.  
 
Cole asserts that later ‘Romantic evangelicals’92 reinforcement the bifurcated image 
of later life, where old age became one’s right, where the good man could expect an 
easy passage ‘from glory to glory,’93 while “sinners would not live out half their 
days.”94 Though the ‘late Calvinists’ were burdened by disease and suffering as 
something ineradicable, Romantic evangelicals’ added to that burden by essentially 
holding the infirm elderly responsible for their own ‘bad aging.’ Where earlier the 
doctrine of original sin guaranteed indiscriminate and indeed universal aging and 
decline ending in death, under the Victorian vision of ‘civilized morality’ the 
individual was held responsible for failing to attain the ideal old age; aging thus 
became a sign of personal moral failure.95 As a result, 
piety was transformed into the sum of civilized behavior; longevity 
into the dividend of properly invested physical capital; and death into 
a natural and peaceful transition from old age to eternal youth.96  
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Despite the increasing sense that one’s aging and death could be managed through 
proper spiritual discipline and care of the body, Cole observes that evangelicals’ 
optimism was tempered in large part by the significance of immortality of the soul as 
“the most important element in advice to cultivate one’s spiritual life.”97 Even amidst 
these shifts, Cole still observes the necessary ‘tensions’ which help us discern the 
meaning of aging, tensions between this life and the next, between desiring to mold 
the length of one’s and entrusting oneself to one’s creator in physical decline, and in 
the old Protestant notion of life as a journey towards God. The rapid progress of 
science however, was to undermine this image.  
 
The Rise of Science and the Shift towards the Negative Pole of Aging 
Both Cole and Stannard note that the increasing pace of scientific discoveries 
weakened the romantic vision of control over one’s destiny.98 The rise of science in 
the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries, observes Cole, facilitated a shift 
toward the negative pole of aging, where “scientific investigation now revealed old 
age as an inevitable casualty in the great ‘race of life,’” where “medical expertise 
would provide the appropriate standards of care.”99 As enthusiasm increased for the 
scientific search for the means to extend life, the general attitude towards death and 
decline turned increasingly negative. Cole notes that  
unlike earlier supporters of life extension, prolongevity advocates in 
this period [1890-1925] declared infirm old age (and in some cases, 
death) an unacceptable condition, and they proceeded with the 
struggle to abolish it.100  
Some writers of this period referred to old age as the fixed period, the title of 
Anthony Trollope’s futuristic novel where citizens who reach sixty-seven years of 
age are ‘deposited’ in an honorary college called ‘Necropolis’ for a year where they 
are allowed to live in peace and comfort before being peacefully chloroformed and 
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cremated, departing under “circumstances of honor and glory” by avoiding the 
“imbecility and weakness of human life when protracted beyond its fitting limits.”101
 
Cole traces the beginning of this movement to physician George Miller Beard (1839-
1883) who repudiated the popular sentimental notions of old age, as the first to 
“scientifically legitimate the reduction of human beings to their productive 
capacities.”102 Beard conducted a massive biographical study of the greatest names 
in history, determining that the median age for most discoveries and great work was 
approximately forty, after which productivity fell of rather sharply. He therefore 
concluded that it may actually be “a blessed thing to die young, or at least before 
extreme old age.”103 In February 1905, William Osler (1849-1919), one of the most 
famous physicians in the United States, declared that men over the age of forty were 
comparatively useless and those over sixty completely useless, asserting that “nearly 
all the great mistakes,” whether political, social, artistic, literary, or theological in 
nature, “may be traced back to the sexagenarians.”104 By the end of the nineteenth 
century, Cole asserts that “scientific assessments of efficiency and productivity had 
come to dominate public evaluation of old age.”105
 
Two influential figures of this era sharing similar convictions were C. A. Stevens 
(1844-1931) and Elie Metchnikoff (1845-1916). Stevens’ lament in particular 
appears to capture the zeitgeist of the period: “we live too late to be buoyed and 
comforted by the illusions of religion, too soon to reach the goal and snatch our lives 
from the grasp of death.”106 After begrudgingly abandoning the idea of an afterlife, 
Stevens declared that “immortal life will be achieved by the aid of applied science; it 
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is what the whole scheme of evolution moves forward to.”107 Believing that proper 
nutrition could unlock cellular immortality, Stevens promulgated longevity through a 
proper diet, asserting that it would lead to an increased spiritual life by mitigating 
excessive desire for both food and sex “as the sense of deathlessness grows.”108 
Given this rather utopian view of longevity, it is hardly surprising that his enthusiasm 
for earthly immortality was matched with an equal disgust of the physical decline of 
aging, which he described as “grossness, coarseness, and ugliness.”109  
 
In France, immunologist Elie Metchnikoff, who first coined the term gerontology, 
was supremely confident in the ‘new faith’ of science. Metchnikoff’s new book 
entitled The Nature of Man (subtitled Studies in Optimistic Philosophy), was 
described as offering a ‘new faith:’ 
If it be true that man cannot live without faith, this volume, when the 
age of faith seemed gone by, has provided a new faith, that in the all-
powerfulness of science.110
Metchnikoff did not simply believe in prolonging life alone, but in prolonging the 
period of vitality as well, a tenet still considered crucial among contemporary 
researchers on aging. Unlike Stevens however, Metchnikoff believed in the 
possibility of a ‘natural death,’ asserting that bacteriology was the key to longevity 
through the elimination of disease.111 Though living in Europe, Metchnikoff’s ideas 
received wide circulation in America in 1905, when several writers summarized his 
agenda to counter the pessimism of the enormously popular William Osler. Writing 
for McClure’s Magazine, Arthur E. McFarlane, for instance, captured Metchnikoff’s 
social agenda well, where “longer life would have its highest value in restoring ‘the 
old man to his rightful position in the world.’”112
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Cole suggests that fixed period doctrine was becoming increasingly established, 
shaking the earlier expectations that one could control one’s longevity by proper 
living, further establishing the negative pole of America’s dualistic vision of aging 
and decline.113 He concludes that prolongevity’s  
attack on premature senility and physical degeneration enabled people 
to transfer diffuse anxieties onto a comfortable terrain. The quest for a 
longer, healthier life seemed to resolve troubling existential and 
ideological questions in the familiar terms of bodily economy.114  
Gradually, this quest came increasingly under the domain of the scientific expertise 
and the inductive search for ‘useful’ knowledge, loosed from the strictures of 
teleology. As Cole observes, from the mid nineteenth-century onward, biomedical 
science placed increasing emphasis on how we age, over against why we age.  
 
By the early twentieth century, aging had been largely freed from its religious and 
cosmological moorings, allowing scientists to focus nearly exclusively on the 
biological causes of aging, whether cellular or genetic.115 The development of the 
respective fields of gerontology and geriatrics, which examine the normal and 
pathological causes of aging respectively, reflect the Victorian dualistic vision of 
aging, however with the assumption that biology is ‘value free.’116 The formative 
gerontological and geriatric literature of the period, “helped complete the long-term 
cultural shift from conceiving aging primarily as a mystery or an existential problem 
to viewing it primarily as a scientific and technical problem.”117 Hence, modern 
culture is left with the overwhelming consensus that aging is more of a problem to be 
managed by gerontology and geriatrics than a transcending reality.118  
 
While Cole writes professionally as a cultural historian, he rightly laments the loss of 
‘existential integrity’ regarding aging, and calls for a new integrated version that 
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accepts both decline and decay and hope for a long, healthy life, one which 
recognizes that “aging is a source of wisdom and suffering, spiritual growth and 
physical decline, honor and vulnerability.”119 Though Cole admires the late Calvinist 
ideal of aging—even if his construal of this ideal mutes the intense stress and anxiety 
that often accompanied old age and death among many New England Puritans120—
he nevertheless downplays the theology by which such a tension is maintained. 
Surely Cole is right to see a tension in the late Calvinist ideal, for Calvin urges 
Christians to both cherish this life and despise it, knowing that God may take it at 
any moment.121 Cole however prefers to speak of this late Calvinist tension as one 
between the limited body and one’s unlimited desires. Yet, for Calvin the very 
foundation of this tension is the resurrection of Christ, by which the Christian can 
look forward to her resurrection, establishing a clear tension between this world and 
the next, between this sin- and death-marred existence and the existence where there 
will be no more death (Revelation 21:4). Hence, while Cole sees the loss of this ‘late 
Calvinist’ ideal as contributing to the current situation, it is clear that he has no 
interest in recapturing any Puritan understanding of death as part of the solution, as 
evidenced by his hope to establish more meaningful postmodern narratives of 
aging.122  
 
If recapturing the ‘late Calvinist’ ideal of death is not the way forward, neither are 
the various programs of the health reformers, who, while maintaining some link 
between morality and mortality, placed an unbearable burden of personal 
responsibility on the individual for their own longevity. Cole concludes his work in 
calling for a more integrated version of aging in a postmodern life course stripped of 
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to a ‘death without order’ with a peaceful acceptance of the frailty of the human life, giving 
inadequate attention to the extreme fear of death within Puritanism, generated primarily by the 
question of assurance of one’s election. Where Cole sees an existential integrity, Stannard sees a 
“stress-creating ambivalence,” 75.  
121 Institutes of the Christian Religion Bk. III, ch. IX, para. 1-5, in Calvin: Institutes of the Christian 
Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 
712-717; The Catechism of the Church of Geneva, in Calvin: Theological Treatises, trans. J. K. S. 
Reid (London: SCM Press, 1954), 113. 
122 Cole, Journey, 242 ff.  
   74
any theological residue by emphasizing life as a journey that seeks value in “the 
actual progress of discovery,” says Cole, “rather than in the traditional pattern of 
Christian teleology.”123 Drawing upon Sophocles’ vision of aging and death in 
Oedipus Tyrranus and Oedipus at Colonus, Cole asserts that we must persevere on 
our individual journeys of self discovery as we navigate the unknowns and mysteries 
of the sacred frontier of aging with love and compassion, accepting physical decline 
and mortality.124 Cole is right to challenge the pervasive influence of the underlying 
biotechnological metanarrative and its attendant myopic, reductionist vision of aging 
as ‘problem’ requiring a technical solution, but one wonders if the tensions he rightly 
sees in aging can be adequately sustained by simply any journey of discovery. 
Though Cole seems to recognize that some metanarrative is required to make sense 
of aging and decline in drawing upon Sophocles, the Christian metanarrative should 
not be so easily jettisoned, even if the Baconian or health reformers’ version was in 
need of some repair. 
 
Conclusion 
The modern quest to retard the aging process can be traced back to Francis Bacon’s 
program, whose call for the relief of suffering entailed an inquiry into the causes and 
mechanisms of aging itself, freed from the strictures of teleological explanations in 
favor of the search for instrumental knowledge, a project theologically underwritten 
by the notion of bringing glory to God and the relief of humanity’s estate, described 
with the biblical imagery of a return to the garden of Eden. I asserted that Bacon’s 
terms of power and sovereignty used to describe humanity’s return to Paradise 
through the instrumentalization of aging are in need of Christological or 
incarnational qualification in light of the reality of Jesus Christ, given that Bacon’s 
vision of a return to Eden fails to adequately consider the type of people we might 
become in manufacturing such a return, particularly the role the human body is to 
play in this drama. A Christological qualification therefore will have to consider the 
moral significance of one’s body, and how any attenuation of the aging process 
might impact one’s character. Thus, a theological response to anti-aging science will 
need to account for the role of the body in character formation.  
                                                 
123 Cole, Journey, 242. 
124 Cole, Journey, 243-244. 
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If Bacon’s program demonstrates how easily a program calling for the scientific 
management and attenuation of human aging can be underwritten with theological 
convictions, Cole’s work has traced how the gradual loss of theological convictions 
regarding aging and death have facilitated a move toward aging primarily as a 
problem requiring a medical solution. While Cole likely underestimates the amount 
of fear and anxiety that accompanied death before the development of geriatrics and 
gerontology, he rightly laments the loss of a narrative in which to situate aging, a 
narrative that accounts for both the physical and spiritual elements of aging, 
providing adequate space in which to see aging as both decline and growth. 
However, Cole too hastily jettisons the Christian metanarrative, which, if properly 
told, will provide the framework necessary to give an account of the moral force of 
embodiment, an account capable of sustaining the tensions he rightly identifies. 
 
Before taking up a theological response to life extension via aging attenuation, it will 
be helpful to survey the ethical landscape with regards to the responses of the 
possibility of slowing the aging process thus far, for many of the ethical responses to 
life extension fail to account for the significance of the body, or, if they do, are not 
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Chapter 3: Ethical Responses to Aging Attenuation 
 
“The shortness of the present life is very far from being its most 
unsatisfying feature. And we are left in no doubt as to how much 
interest those who have hoped most for immortality would have 
retained in the prospect of it, had they been told it was to mean only 
an endless prolongation of the common life on earth. So far from 
being elated, they would have been crushed and terrified.”1
John Baillie 
 
“If it is a fearful thing to die, perhaps it will be still more dangerous to 
live longer.”2
Thomas à Kempis 
 
In the last chapter I traced the origins of the modern attempt to attenuate human 
aging to Francis Bacon, claiming that his program, while situated in the Christian 
drama of creation and redemption, did not adequately consider the moral significance 
of embodiment and the body’s limits in construing the advance of instrumental 
knowledge as a return to Eden. Bacon’s emphasis on instrumental knowledge and the 
attenuation of aging considerably muted role the body might play in character 
development. Additionally, I examined Thomas Cole’s analysis of the history of 
aging in America, where he laments the loss of existential tensions inherent in aging 
when construed primarily as a problem for our technological capabilities. I noted that 
Cole seems to recognize some moral force in the aging body in his call for new 
postmodern narratives of aging which account for the possibility of spiritual growth 
in a time of physiological decline. While these are very valid concerns, many of the 
ethical discussions concerning life extension either give little or no consideration to 
character development as it relates to embodiment. Moreover, those which do appeal 
to the body’s limits as being in some way normative generally do so in the absence 
of any grounding metanarrative,3 weakening such appeals. In this chapter then I 
                                                 
1 John Baillie, And the Life Everlasting (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), 204-205.  
2 Thomas à Kempis, quoted in Timothy F. Murphy, “A Cure for Aging?,” 237. 
3 Stanley Hauerwas, of course, has emphasized the importance of narrative for moral thinking. See 
Naming the Silences: God, Medicine, and the Problem of Suffering (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. 
Eerdmans, 1990), esp. 118 ff.  
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show how consequentialist arguments concerning life extension fail to adequately 
address the role of the body and matters of character. Moreover, I examine several 
responses to life extension which rest upon some understanding of the body as 
normative, though struggle to do so in the absence of a compelling narrative. Finally, 
I examine the sparse theological responses offered up thus far, and show how they 
too fail to provide an adequate christological understanding of embodiment as it 
relates to aging attenuation. 
 
Life Extension and Consequentialism  
In order to gain a sense of the arguments both for and against life extension via aging 
attenuation, I will consider the recent debate between bioethicists Walter Glannon 
and John Harris. I will also briefly discuss the largely consequentialist arguments 
outlined in Christine Overall’s monograph devoted to the subject.  
The Walter Glannon and John Harris debate 
The consequentialist perspective among current ethical arguments concerning life 
extension is best captured by examining the recent debate between Walter Glannon 
and John Harris.4 Their debate demonstrates the interminable character of many 
arguments which rest upon predicted outcomes. Notably absent however, are 
discussions surrounding the development of character and the significance of bodily 
for such character development.  
 
Walter Glannon opposes a ‘substantial’ lengthening of the human lifespan (e.g. 200 
years) due to the discrepancy between psychological and biological continuity, and 
the negative collective effects of extended life.5 His arguments rest upon a 
distinction between biological and psychological life—both of which are required for 
personhood—where psychological life “pertains to the capacity of consciousness and 
                                                 
4 Walter Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern, and Extended Lives,” Bioethics 16 no. 3 (2002): 
266-83; John Harris, “A Response to Walter Glannon,” ibid.: 284-91; Glannon, “Reply to Harris,” 
ibid.: 292-97. Glannon’s arguments are also presented in “Extending the Human Life Span,” Journal 
of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (2002): 339-354; “Extending the Human Life Span,” in Genes and 
Future People: A Philosophical Inquiry (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 135-167. 
5 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 266. 
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the connectedness and continuity of mental states in which personhood and personal 
identity consist.”6 Using Jonathan Swift’s Struldbruggs as a negative example, “the 
continued conscious life of the same person is a necessary condition of the rational 
desire for a longer life and of prudential concern about one’s future self.”7 But even 
if indefinite life-extension does not entail a similar fate for us, “it is doubtful that we 
could continuously generate a series of projects that could sustain our desire to go on 
living indefinitely.”8 Basing his claims on evolutionary biology which asserts that 
the brain attempts to maintain equilibrium between anticipation of future events and 
memory of past events, he argues that extended life would adversely affect one’s 
psychological connectedness—the balance of forward-looking desires and backward-
looking memories with respect to the conscious present—tipping the scale in favor of 
the ever-increasing memories of the past at the expense of new projects and 
anticipatory future events. Glannon’s second argument suggests that indefinite life 
extension in a world with limited resources would result in a lower quality of life for 
all. He cites Gregory Kavka’s prediction that one might be offered the choice 
between (1) extending one’s own life, or (2) retaining the right to reproduce, 
foregoing life extension.9 This is an undesirable situation. 
 
In his third argument, Glannon returns to psychological connectedness and prudential 
concern. He believes that this connectedness is what most matters to us: “I assume 
that these states will be mine and that it will be me who exists at that time.”10 But this 
connectedness can only diminish over time. Therefore, not only will our identity fade 
over time, but our prudential concern for the future as well.  
Because any mental states in the distant future would be so weakly 
connected to any present mental states, a substantial extension of 
                                                 
6 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 269. He follows Derek Parfit’s definition of personhood as 
a being who is self-conscious and aware of its identity over time, in Reasons and Persons (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1984), 202. 
7 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 271. 
8 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 273. 
9 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 275, citing Gregory Kavka, “Upside Risks: Social 
Consequences of Beneficial Biotechnology,” in Are Genes Us? The Social Consequences of the New 
Genetics, ed. C. Cranor (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 162. 
10 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 275. 
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one’s biological and psychological lives would not be desirable from 
one’s present point of view.11
Thus, we are left with a ‘Methuselah’s Paradox’, says Glannon, where “I would 
cease to exist and a person distinct from me would begin to exist beyond a certain 
point.”12 Support also comes from evolutionary biology, which sees the primary 
function of memory for the enhancement of survival into the reproductive stage of 
life. Thus, life extension would likely upset the delicate protein balance in the brain 
dealing with long and short-term memory—even should genetic manipulation alter 
the function of these proteins. He concludes: 
Extending the human life span substantially beyond the present norm 
would be undesirable because the person who underwent the genetic 
procedure for all practical purposes would have gone out of existence 
before his biological organism did.13  
 
While not opposed to moderate increases in longevity, Glannon opposes life-
extension to the point where we are left with the “unpalatable consequence” where a 
person could no longer be considered to be the same person. He concludes with a 
moral reference to Psalm 90:12, urging us to make the days we have in our actual 
limited lives count.14  
 
John Harris criticizes Glannon’s “vague claims about the undesirable effects of 
increasing population,”15 labeling his worries about the limited capacity of the brain 
‘defeatist,’ and contrary to the “spirit of empirical enquiry.”16 The respectable 
scientific response is to produce immortals first, and then test the brain hypothesis.17 
Either we create people who live very long lives, says Harris, or no one would exist 
to be harmed because the successive selves would experience normal life spans. His 
                                                 
11 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 276. 
12 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 276; Parfit, Reason and Persons, 313, n. 8. 
13 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 281. 
14 Glannon, “Identity, Prudential Concern,” 282-3. See also John Harris and Søren Holm, “Extending 
the Human Lifespan and the Precautionary Paradox,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (2002): 
355-368. 
15 Harris, “Response to Glannon,” 284. 
16 Harris, “Response to Glannon,” 285. 
17 Harris, “Response to Glannon,” 285. See also 288. 
   80
main criticisms however are leveled against the notion of a psychological 
discontinuity. “Suppose I have no memories earlier than age ten, does it follow that 
my physical body is ten years older than my identity?”18 Moreover, Harris suggests 
that various storage devices could sufficiently supplement one’s memory. With 
regards to prudential concern, Harris offers his own counter-example, concluding 
that “no argument . . .  shows the irrationality of wishing to be Methuselah even if 
Methuselah is a succession of selves and not a single personal identity.”19 Harris 
instead offers a counter narrative: “I could take as much if not more pride and 
interest in my ‘line’ of genetically identical and bodily (spatio-temporally) 
continuous selves as many do in their ‘line’ of descendents.”20 Harris is critical of 
Glannon’s arguments which indefensibly slip from uncertainty to ‘ought not;’ “when 
things are uncertain or doubtful he assumes not only that they cannot be done but 
also that they shouldn’t be done.”21
 
Turning to the collective concerns, Harris charges Glannon with forgetting that the 
‘immortals’ would be productive in society much longer, and thus continue to be 
productive and pay for themselves and for their youthful citizens.”22 Moreover, the 
likely expense of this technology would prevent its wide use for at least a millennia. 
Harris doesn’t flinch in acknowledging that wide spread availability may one day 
force the immortals to choose between continued life or procreation. While this 
choice is ‘unpleasant’ for Glannon, it poses little difficulty for Harris. He opts for the 
freedom to choose over no choice at all. Though he appears troubled by the justice of 
immortals live alongside immortals, he leaves this unresolved.23 Ultimately, Harris is 
not convinced that psychological connectivity and personal identity should inhibit 
scientific enquiry. Rather, “the task will be to learn to live creatively with such 
                                                 
18 Harris, “Response to Glannon,” 286. 
19 Harris, “Response to Glannon,” 287. 
20 Harris, “Response to Glannon,” 287-8. 
21 Harris, “Response to Glannon,” 288. Harris and Holm criticize Glannon’s use of the ‘precautionary 
principle’ in “Extending the Human Lifespan,” 356 ff.  
22 Harris, “Response to Glannon,” 289. 
23 Here, Harris refers his readers to his article entitled, “Intimations of Immortality,” in Science 288 
(2000): 59. 
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immortals as are eventually produced, until we have time to see whether experience 
rather than argument proves Glannon right.”24
 
In his final rejoinder to Harris, Glannon express his concern that longer lives will 
ultimately deplete our resources, especially if extended life resulted in a prolonged 
physical and cognitive decline.25 He asserts the relief of suffering from disease 
carries more moral weight than extending the lives of the healthy, even though life 
extension technology allows us to treat aging as a disease.26 Glannon is equally 
troubled by the issue of distributive justice, a point of which Harris seems largely 
unconcerned.  Hence, “these two moral points provide moral grounds for not 
allowing people to extend their lives beyond the present norm.”27 Glannon also 
restates his concern about longer lives and identity, maintaining that it is rational to 
forego extended life if there is no continuity between selves: 
Just because the life span of a body can be extended into the future 
does not imply that the life span of a person constituted by, but not 
identical to, that body will be extended as well.28
He also remains skeptical of any idea of memory enhancement of the brain, asserting 
that memory enhancement would diminish the ability to learn new things. Finally, 
Glannon criticizes Harris’ scientific spirit given that our moral judgment often lags 
behind biotechnology.29
 
Glannon’s arguments against life extension represent a consequentialist and 
utilitarian appeal of sorts, wedded to biological and psychological conceptions of 
personhood as determinative. Coupled to this appeal is the well-rehearsed argument 
citing the potential further diminishment of natural resources that are likely to come 
with longer lives. On the other hand, Harris’ faith in science to manage and correct 
                                                 
24 Harris, “Response to Glannon,” 291. 
25 Glannon, “Reply to Harris,” 292.  
26 Glannon, “Reply to Harris,” 292-3. 
27 Glannon, “Reply to Harris,” 293. 
28 Glannon, “Reply to Harris,” 294.  
29 Glannon, “Reply to Harris,” 297. 
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any problems, unforeseen or otherwise,30 leads him to reject Glannon’s arguments as 
too conservative. Even if science is unable to ‘solve’ potential brain limitations, 
Harris sees no reason why the possibility of developing multiple sequential identities 
over time should prevent us from trying to slow down the aging process to extend 
human life.   
 
Christine Overall 
Most recently, Christine Overall has examined the prospect of life extension from a 
largely consequentialist perspective, arguing in favor of life extension given that 
many people want longer lives, that this life is the only one we have and that many 
older people have been deprived of life’s goods, and finally because living longer is 
the prerequisite for further opportunities, experiences, and action.31 Though Overall 
presupposes that death represents a surcease of the development of future human 
potential, she discerns no inevitable relationship between one’s spiritual beliefs and 
one’s attitude towards earthly longevity, asserting that a belief in an afterlife “does 
not obviate questions about the value of a longer life before death.”32 While this may 
indeed be true, it is significant that Overall explicitly eschews any reference to 
tradition or any particular religious worldview, insisting that longevity must be 
considered for its own sake. Moreover, her approach deliberately excludes any 
inferences that might be drawn from the very nature of embodiment and the limits 
such embodiment entails. For Overall, current biological restrictions on human 
longevity have neither moral nor normative force.33 While she expresses concern that 
life be wrongly accorded ‘absolute value,’ she also asserts that no one has the right 
                                                 
30 Wendell Berry has quipped that science will be able to “find solutions to all the problems resulting 
from their solutions to all the problems we used to have.” Joel James Shuman, The Body of 
Compassion: Ethics, Medicine, and the Church (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 16, quoting 
Berry, Sex, Economy, Freedom, and Community: Eight Essays (New York, Pantheon Books, 1993), n. 
p.  
31 Christine Overall, Aging, Death, and Human Longevity: A Philosophical Inquiry (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2003), 14, 122. See also “Longevity, Identity, and Moral Character: A 
Feminist Approach,” in Fountain of Youth, 286-303. Overall does reject indefinite extension given the 
earth’s limited resources, the likelihood of enforced limits on procreation, and physical limitations of 
the brain, Aging, 133-173. 
32 Overall, Aging, 14.  
33 Overall, Aging, 35. 
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so say the current average lifespan is ‘long enough,’ for such a notion is “an 
excessively and unjustifiably biologistic view of the nature of human existence.”34  
 
Overall does however express concern over the kinds of people we might become 
with extended lives, conceding that longer lives will necessitate a new morality. She 
advocates a “feminist virtue ethics approach”35 with particular attention to the 
personal and social contexts in making moral decisions, increased attunement to the 
marginalized and oppressed (most notably the aged), and the cultivation of the 
capacity for nurture and the ability to listen.36 Moreover, she advocates an 
‘affirmative prolongevitism’ where efforts at increasing life expectancy are focused 
on the disadvantaged—the poor, native people, those of color, and those whose life 
expectancy is currently lower than that of the more privileged.37 Yet, one wonders 
how realistic this proposal is. Martha B. Holstein has offered her own feminist 
reflections on anti-aging medicine, rejecting such technology because it is likely to 
exacerbate the very prejudices, injustices, and discriminatory behavior already 
prevalent in our society.38 It is interesting to observe that while Overall is concerned 
with the development of virtue, she nevertheless turns her focus away from the body, 
even as she acknowledges that embodiment is what makes us human.39 She strongly 
resists grounding moral claims metaphysically in the human body or the natural, 
locating her claim primarily in the development for future human flourishing. Yet, I 
wonder how one could develop any virtue apart from one’s body, as we shall soon 
see. In this regard Overall’s approach is considerably voluntarist, giving precedence 
to one’s will to either extend life and opportunities for future human flourishing, 
while at the same time not disparaging those who would choose to abstain.  
 
                                                 
34 Overall, Aging, 50. 
35 Overall, “Longevity,” 293. 
36 Overall, “Longevity,” 294-299. 
37 Overall, “Longevity,” 287. 
38 “A Feminist Perspective on Anti-Aging Medicine,” Generations: The Journal of the Western 
Gerontological Society 25 (Winter 2001-2002): 38-43. 
39 Overall, Aging, 182. 
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For the most part, the arguments presented here—either for or against—are heavily 
predicated upon likely outcomes. The most common arguments against life extension 
refer to the potential future impact, from the unknown side-effects, diversion of 
scarce resources, prolonged disability, and ecological imbalances, to boredom, 
pathology, and the virtues of aging.40 The arguments of Glannon, Harris, and Overall 
uncover one of the substantial problems of any consequentialist calculus construed 
largely in terms of costs and benefits, namely, the difficulty in predicting the widely 
diverse potential outcomes of life extension technology. Under a consequentialist 
calculus, a perfectly logical rejoinder to any expressed reservations concerning the 
potential downsides to extended lives is, as Harris argues, to actually do it first, and 
then decide whether the desired or undesired effects are sufficient to take further 
action.  
 
There is a more glaring problem however in considering the likely outcome of 
particular actions as the primary determinant in choosing a course of action. For 
consequentialism entails, in theory, pursuing any means necessary in order to attain 
the desired end—“the end justifies the means”—though in practice most people 
typically place some constraints on the means by which desired ends are attained. 
Consequentialism has been alternately described as simply promoting what one 
values. “Consequentialism is the view that whatever values an individual or 
institutional agent adopts, the proper response to those values is to promote them.”41 
Consequentialism subsumes the ‘right’ under the ‘good,’ where the determination of 
the ‘good’ up to the moral agent. Thus, if one considers a longer healthier life 
good—for whatever reason—then it is right to pursue a longer life by any means 
possible.  
 
Nevertheless, what is noticeably absent in such a calculus are notions of who we are 
as moral agents, and who we might become through getting what we want. There is 
                                                 
40 Harold R. Moody, “Who’s Afraid of Life Extension?” Generations: The Journal of the Western 
Gerontological Society 25 (Winter 2001-2002): 33-37. Daniel Callahan argues that aging retardation 
will most likely extend the period of morbidity. See President’s Council, “Duration of Life,” 
http://www.bioethics.gov/transcripts/dec02/session2.html, and Troubled Dream. 
41 Philip Pettit, “Consequentialism,” in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1993), 231. 
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nothing inherent in consequentialism that gives one pause to consider whether or not 
one’s desires or projects are worth pursuing in the first place. In many cases the 
presupposition that a longer life is the prerequisite for any future goods in life is 
requirement enough to pursue life extension by attenuating the aging process. One’s 
desires are simply taken for granted. Consequentialism invites us to stand outside a 
situation as ‘mere observers.’42 There seems to be little, if any, possibility of being 
refined by the struggle in recognizing that some desires are not worth pursuing. 
Consequentialism substantially mutes words of Paul, who urges us not to be 
conformed to this world but rather to be transformed by the renewing of our minds 
(Romans 12:2).43 There is no room for a reordering of one’s desires within a 
consequentialist framework, a reordering which finds its orientation in the will of 
God as made manifest in the person of Jesus Christ and his redeeming and 
reconciling action with all of creation. Much less is consequentialism able to provide 
an adequate account for situations where one carries out precisely what one doesn’t 
desire, when one knows the good yet doesn’t do it. That is, consequentialism has no 
way of accounting for the sin which often hinders us from doing what we rightly 
desire to do (Romans 7:18-19). This is not to say that consequences are completely 
irrelevant in ethical reflection. Jesus urged his would be disciples to ‘count the cost’ 
(Luke 14:28-32), and Paul warned fellow believers to consider how their actions 
might impact others (1 Corinthians 8:9; Colossians 3:21). Nevertheless, 
consequentialism substitutes a highly reductionist calculus in place of moral 
reflection situated within metanarrative, memory, and tradition, wherein the moral 
significance of the body might be appropriately grounded.  
 
Life Extension and appeals to Nature and Virtue 
While consequentialism largely ignores any controlling metanarrative within which 
the body might be appropriately construed as playing a crucial role in the 
development of character, there are a few thinkers who have given attention to 
character and the significance of embodiment in the context of aging attenuation. 
Indeed, Leon Kass, Hans Jonas, and Daniel Callahan offer a depth of reflection that 
                                                 
42 Banner, Christian Ethics, 95. 
43 Banner, Christian Ethics, 93.  
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transcends the reductionist consequentialist calculus. While these responses move 
beyond those of mere cost-benefit analysis, they demonstrate the difficulties in 




Leon Kass, M.D. and biochemist, first addressed life extension and aging research 
twenty years ago, motivated by the fact that “no other area of present biomedical 
research promises such profound alterations of our way of life, not to say of our 
condition.”44 Research into the control of biological aging embodies aims of modern 
science, says Kass, whose origins may be traced to Bacon and Descartes.45 Both 
founded a science, says Kass, “whose explicit purpose was to reverse the curse laid 
on Adam and Eve, and especially to restore the tree of life, by means of the tree of 
(scientific) knowledge,” a goal in serious need of questioning.46 Like most scientists 
and researchers, he sees a difference between aging and disease, defining aging as 
the basic biological processes whereby the body becomes increasingly less able to 
maintain itself and perform its various functions. Though Kass considers the 
‘biologically determined’ limit on longevity to be between ninety and one hundred 
years, he disavows any notion of finding ‘precise rules of conduct’ which might be 
“deducible from even the fullest knowledge of nature.”47 For the purposes of his 
                                                 
44 Leon R. Kass, Toward a More Natural Science: Biology and Human Affairs (New York: The Free 
Press, 1985), 300. This chapter has been republished with minor alterations as “L’Chaim and Its 
Limits: Why Not Immortality?” in First Things 113 (May 2001): 17-24. It also appears as a chapter in 
his more recent work entitled Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics 
(San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2002), 257-274. Kass’ influence is also evident in President’s 
Council, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness. Many of his arguments 
discussed in this chapter are rehearsed in chapter 4, “Ageless Bodies,” 159-204. 
45 René Descartes, Discourse on the Method, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 1, ed. 
Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 119-
120. For an analysis of Kass’ methodology, see McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, 108-146, 
esp. 128-32. Elsewhere Kass defines the ‘Baconian anthem’ as “Conquer Nature, relieve man’s estate” 
in Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 4. 
46 Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 261. 
47 Toward a More Natural Science, 347.  
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analysis, Kass assumes the most attractive prospect—an increased lifespan of twenty 
or more years matched with an increase in vigor.48
 
He first considers the broader social consequences of such an increase by looking at 
population age distributions, employment patterns and their impact on the retirement 
age, family dynamics, and the possibility of a greatly increased elderly population. 
Granting the notion that the world would be able to adjust soon enough, accepting for 
the moment the idea that longer life is an unqualified good, Kass invokes the slippery 
slope argument in demonstrating how the normative force of the current biological 
life span is undermined in extending life, asking “how much longer life is an 
unqualified good for an individual?”49 For Kass, the only logical answer is that no 
limit should be set, given the simplistic binary thinking of modernity that “life is 
good and death is bad.”50 While he might be accused of caricaturing those who 
support aging research, there are some who are perfectly happy with an indefinite 
prolongation of life, as evidenced in a recent debate between Kass and Rabbi Neil 
Gillmann. When Kass asked Gillman whether it was worth pursuing an indefinite 
prolongation of life, Gillman’s response was an emphatic “Yes, yes, yes.”51  
 
Kass might very well see Rabbi Gillman’s attitude as the embodiment of a much 
larger cultural sentiment: “the attachment to life—or the fear of death—knows no 
limits, certainly not for most human beings. . . . We want to live and live, and not to 
wither and not to die.”52 Kass believes however, that any success against death will 
only make it appear even more untimely, shocking, and unbearable. 
It is highly likely that either a modest prolongation of life with vigor 
or even only a preservation of youthfulness with no increase in 
longevity would make death even less acceptable, and would 
                                                 
48 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 301. 
49 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 305. 
50 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 305. 
51 Ronald Bailey, “Intimations of Immortality Part II,” Reason Magazine, 6 March, 1999. 
http://reason.com/opeds/rb030600.shtml. For another example, see Kass, Life, Liberty, and the 
Defense of Human Dignity, 258-259. 
52 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 306. See for instance, Nagel, View From Nowhere, 224.  
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exacerbate the desire to keep pushing it further away . . . unless, for 
some reason, such life should also prove to be less satisfying.53
More recently, Kass has argued that our very humanity is at stake; “to argue that 
human life would be better without death is, I submit, to argue that human life would 
be better being something other than human.”54 Moreover, says Kass, “confronting 
our own death—or the deaths of our beloved ones—provides an opportunity for the 
exercise of our humanity, for the great and small alike.”55
 
Having suggested that there is no reasonable limit to the amount of years we would 
desire, at least as long as our health remained relatively in tact, Kass argues for the 
virtues of mortality, attending to the fact that we must die. Here he treads more 
cautiously, denying for instance, any virtue in the death of a child, acknowledging 
the pain that accompanies any death. In arguing his case for mortality, Kass observes 
four problems of an extended life span. The first is boredom and tedium56 that would 
likely accompany even a modest increase in life span. The underlying fear of 
boredom, says Kass, is “that sooner or later the world and its objects will fail us.”57 
He notes that in medieval thought boredom was considered a defect within oneself; 
boredom meant that we will have failed the world. “In many ways, perhaps in the 
most profound ways, most of us go to sleep long before our deaths.”58 Over time, 
hopes, ambitions, dreams and aspirations give way and die before we do. The second 
problem concerns life’s seriousness59 or meaningfulness in the absence of limits. “To 
number our days is the condition for making them count, to treasure and appreciate 
all that life brings.”60 While acknowledging that there are some activities that do not 
need finitude as a spur (e.g. understanding), he believes that such activities are rare. 
                                                 
53 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 307. 
54 Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 265. 
55 Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 21. 
56 Kass refers to these as “interest and engagement” in Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 266. 
See Carl Elliott, who speaks of a ‘hardening of the categories’ which is otherwise known as 
‘ontological diminution,’ Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Co., 2003), 276-283. 
57 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 309. 
58 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 317. 
59 Kass adds “aspiration” to seriousness in Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 266. 
60 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 309. 
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Thus, life without limits would give life little meaning. The third problem concerns 
beauty.61 Citing the poet Wallace Stevens who says that death is the mother of 
beauty,62 Kass surmises that Stevens is speaking of the beauty of impermanence, like 
that of a flower or a sunset. He suggests that our appreciation of such things depends 
on our appreciation of our own mortality. “Does not love swell before the beautiful 
precisely on the recognition that it (and we) will not always be?”63 Finally, Kass 
argues that without mortality, we could not cultivate character, virtue, and moral 
excellence that come from rising above that attachment to survival.64 Like 
Odysseus’s refusal of immortality, he concludes that  “to suffer, endure, to trouble 
oneself for the sake of home, family, and genuine friendship, is truly to live, and is 
the clear choice of this exemplary mortal.”65
 
At this point Kass concedes that indefinite life might require no need for 
engagement, beauty or virtue.66 If this however were the case, asks Kass, “why do so 
many teach the promise of life after death, of something eternal, of something 
imperishable?”67 Hence, he considers why humans seek immortality as a question of 
primary importance. The answer lies in the soul’s natural disposition, a longing after 
“some condition, some state, some goal toward which our earthly activities are 
directed but which cannot be attained during earthly life.”68 Thus, “our distress with 
mortality is the derivative manifestation of the conflict between the transcendent 
longings of the soul and the all-too-finite powers and fleshly concerns of the body.”69 
Research on aging is just another manifestation of humanity’s desire for 
transcendence through immortality.70 Kass’ musings here sound distinctly Platonic. 
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Indeed, he agrees with Plato’s Socrates that such longings of the soul—the eros of 
the soul for the noetic vision—cannot be fulfilled: “philosophia, yes, the love and 
pursuit of wisdom, yes, but its possession, no.”71
 
Kass also sees the events in Genesis as an example of human aspiration as well, 
where that first, fateful act of autonomy separated us from God. 
The expulsion from the Garden merely ratifies our estrangement from 
God and testifies to our insufficiency, of which our accompanying 
mortality is but a visible sign—or perhaps even God’s gift to put an 
end to our sad awareness and deficiency.72
These accounts of human aspiration from Socrates to Genesis, attest to certain 
“decisive facts” concerning man’s desire for immortality; namely, that man longs not 
so much for deathlessness, but wholeness, wisdom, and goodness, a longing 
however, that cannot be satisfied in our current embodied, earthly life.73 Hence, “no 
amount of ‘more of the same’ will satisfy our own deepest aspirations.”74 Moreover, 
he notes that such a view finds coherence with the Christian doctrine of the 
resurrection, which is about redemption and wholeness in the presence of God. 
Hence, life extension can only distract the soul from its natural inclinations. Only 
within the context of mortality and finitude can the soul get down to the business of 
living well. “Once we acknowledge and accept our finitude, we can concern 
ourselves with living well, and care first and foremost for the well-being of our souls, 
and not so much for their mere existence.”75 But what if there is no such thing as a 
soul? Kass identifies a biological version of transcendence in reproduction, asking 
“is it not possible that aging and mortality are part of this construction, and that the 
rate of aging and life span have been selected for their usefulness to the task of 
reproduction?”76 In contrast to the narcissistic goal of transcendence through life 
extension, Kass emphasizes perpetuation as an achievable goal, and one in tune with 
                                                 
71 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 313. 
72 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 313. 
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nature. For life extension could be hostile to children, who are themselves a reminder 
of our own mortality.77  
 
In summary, Kass opposes life extension because it adversely affects the aims of a 
dignified human life—engagement, seriousness, beauty, and love—aims which only 
gain their coherence and force within the limits of our own finitude. Thus, death is 
not really the problem, but the soul’s pursuit of transcendence. Hence, it is not 
deathlessness which humankind really seeks, but wholeness and goodness. Kass 
finds the common thread of transcendence, whether one adopts a Platonic-idealistic 
or Aristotelian metaphysic, the Christian doctrine of eternal life, or a material 
worldview in strictly biological terms. Kass’ rhetorical urgency has come in part by 
interacting with a broad range of sources from the Hebrew Scriptures78 to Plato, in 
constructing somewhat of a virtue theory response to life extension by appealing in 
part to the transient nature of embodiment. Kass rightly detects a significant shift in 
science with the loss of teleology inaugurated in the work of Bacon and Descartes,79 
and seeks to resituate the desire for longer life in the tension between the limited 
body and one’s limitless desires. He is considerably aided in this by drawing upon 
Greek philosophy, though he invokes Genesis as well. While Kass remains skeptical 
of deducing any determinative action based on nature itself, he appears to recognize 
that his appeal to virtue is considerably enhanced within a particular metanarrative, 
even if it is not the Christian narrative. Ironically, Kass’ reflection on life extension 
are more profound and reflective than the Christian ethicists I will address later in 
this chapter.  
 
Hans Jonas 
Hans Jonas appears equally wary of the advances in biochemical research, and 
questions the desirability of an extended lifespan, citing Psalm 90:12—“teach us to 
number our days that we may get a heart of wisdom”—as a statement which submits 
                                                 
77 Kass, Toward a More Natural Science, 316. 
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to the reality of finitude, an expression which knows full well that “nothing of this 
was in the realm of doing and effective decision.”80 Jonas claims that in the extreme, 
the abolishment of death would require the abolishment of birth, “for the latter is 
life’s answer to the former.”81 But even moderate life extension threatens youth and 
the newness that comes with each generation, a newness that no accumulation of 
experience can ever match, a newness, which, according to Plato, is the beginning of 
philosophy.  
 
Anthropologically, Jonas has two primary concerns. First, that extended life will 
bring a diminishment in philosophical wonder and an increase in boredom.  
This ever renewed beginning, which is only to be had at the price of 
ever repeated ending, may well be mankind’s hope, its safeguard 
against lapsing into boredom and routine, its chance of retaining the 
spontaneity of life.82  
His second point concerns the individual role of memento morti, and “what its 
attenuation to indefiniteness may do to it.”83 Jonas’ concerns are subsumed under his 
primary desire to metaphysically ground a new ethic which avoids the naturalistic 
fallacy, ever critical of reductionistic materialism, Cartesian dualism and idealism.  
 
Jonas considers human finitude as both a blessing and a burden.84 Death is a burden 
in that man can die, and a blessing in that he must die.85 In arguing against life 
extension, Jonas seeks an ontological grounding for the possibility and the ultimate 
necessity of death. Organisms, says Jonas, are entities whose being is defined by 
their own doing—to be is to do and to cease doing is to cease being. Therefore, 
metabolism is the defining property of life and the basic ontological link between life 
and death, as all living beings must exchange matter through metabolism.86 Through 
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the process of metabolism, life can be said to carry death within itself.87 Yet, life 
itself entails the fear of death. This is what Jonas means when he says that man can 
die. “Life has in it the sting of death that perpetually lies in wait, ever again to be 
staved off, and precisely the challenge of the no stirs and powers the yes.”88 Jonas 
sees mortality as “the narrow gate through which alone value” enters the universe.89 
What then is the reward for this constant threat of non-being? Jonas says that the 
highest value is the capacity for feeling that emerged somewhere in the process of 
evolution.90 What makes survival worthwhile is the awareness of the struggle and the 
feelings accompanying it. “Even the sickest of us, if he wants to live on at all, wants 
to do so thinking and sensing, not merely digesting.”91 Turning to mortality in the 
second sense—that man must die—Jonas focuses on aging, which, he considers 
beneficial, given that evolution has let it arise. Inherent in the term ‘evolution’ is 
what Jonas calls “the creative role of individual finitude, which has decreed that 
whatever lives must also die.”92 Acknowledging that science has enabled more of us 
to die of attrition, he considers whether the indefinite lengthening of life is a 
legitimate goal of medicine by examining the concepts of common and individual 
good.  
 
When discussing the common good, Jonas invokes arguments similar to those 
offered in his earlier work in claiming that humanity’s feats and faults could not even 
come about had we not experienced “the ever-repeated turnover of the 
generations.”93 Drawing upon Hannah Arendt’s concept of ‘natality,’ Jonas asserts 
that without the constant arrival of youth, “the wellspring of novelty would dry up, 
for those grown older have found their answers and gotten set in their ways.”94 
Natality is the means by which creativity and novelty are sustained, avoiding 
boredom and routine. 
                                                 
87 Jonas, “Burden and Blessing,” 35. 
88 Jonas, “Burden and Blessing,” 36. 
89 Jonas, “Burden and Blessing,” 36. 
90 Jonas, “Burden and Blessing,” 36-7. 
91 Jonas, “Burden and Blessing,” 37. 
92 Jonas, “Burden and Blessing,” 38. 
93 Jonas, “Burden and Blessing,” 39. 
94 Jonas, “Burden and Blessing,” 39.  
   94
The ever-renewed beginning, which can only be had at the price of 
ever-repeated ending, is mankind’s safeguard against lapsing into 
boredom and routine, its chance of retaining the spontaneity of life.95
Moreover, says Jonas, the added bonus of natality is the uniqueness of each new 
individual. But natality also gets its scope from death—as new individuals are born, 
older ones must pass out of existence. “The dying of the old makes place for the 
young.”96 Bemoaning the threat of overpopulation by medicine’s advance against 
premature death, Jonas questions whether it is wise to lengthen life further, asking 
whether we should be trying to outwit the “naturally ordained, biological timing” of 
our mortality.97 Jonas strives for a morality grounded in nature. Indeed, he likens the 
search to forestall human aging as “extorting from nature.”98 For Jonas, the answer 
to the aforementioned question is obviously ‘no,’ for the good of humankind. In light 
of the rich cultural harvest of the ages, says Jonas, mortality should be considered a 
blessing. 
 
When turning his attention to the individual good however, Jonas briefly entertains 
the suggestion that a longer lifespan might be valuable to select individuals. He turns 
to Jonathan Swift’s horrific account of those few ‘lucky’ immortals, the Struldbruggs 
of Luggnagg, who, while born immortal, were not immune to the deleterious effects 
of aging. One of the features of these most unfortunate creatures concerns their loss 
memory around the age of ninety where “their Memory will not serve to carry them 
from the Beginning of a Sentence to the End.”99 Jonas asserts that even should 
science significantly retard the process of aging, there are limits to what the brain 
could accumulate and store. We could go on interminably “only at the price of either 
losing the past and therewith our real identity, or living only in the past and therefore 
without real present.”100 Thus, Jonas concludes: 
Not even the fountains of youth, which biotechnology may have to 
offer one day to circumvent the physical penalties of it, can justify the 
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goal of extorting from nature more than its original allowance to our 
species for the length of our days.101
Finally, alluding again to Psalm 90, he speaks of the “non-negotiable limit” which 
should serve as a spur to make our limited days count.102   
 
Jonas argues for the normative force of nature and the aging benefits inherent in the 
evolutionary process which should guard against treating humanity as something to 
be manipulated or manufactured. Though his arguments appear somewhat 
consequentialist in nature, his conception of morality as grounded in natural life itself 
renders this term inadequate.103 Life extension represents not only a direct affront to 
natality, thereby stifling human creativity and ingenuity, but also fails to recognize 
the inherent desire for life of the planet itself, as evidenced by new births. While 
Jonas’ concern over life extension, the brain, and identity reflect Glannon’s to some 
degree, he is most generally concerned that turning technology on ourselves will lead 
us down an irrevocable path whereby we lose the very tensions that make us human, 
tensions which are built in to nature, evolution, and embodiment itself. While Jonas 
rightly recognizes the significance of our very corporeality as a crucial element in 
moral reflection, his appeals to ‘nature’ suffer for the lack of a narrative in which to 
situate the place of the body. As will be shown later, the revelatory Christian 




Daniel Callahan sees life extension research as clear evidence that science has lost its 
way, and, like Jonas, argues for the recovery of nature as determinative of what 
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constitutes a normal lifespan.104 Callahan is not against the idea of longer life per se, 
so long as it is inscribed in the traditional medical goals of treating disease and 
promoting healthy lifestyles.105 The trouble lies in medicine’s vision of human well 
being which increasingly looks upon death “as a correctable biological deficiency,” 
thereby misleading us into thinking that illness, and even mortality itself is not to be 
integrated into a balanced view of life, but resisted.106 Hence, scientific research is 
working against nature’s limit of death to the point where “death has no meaningful 
place within the rationale and goals of scientific medicine, whose latent purpose is to 
overcome death.”107 While death is acknowledged as inevitable in general terms, it is 
coupled with the idea that death in the particular is contingent.108 Callahan does not 
deny that death can be bad, but sees finitude as the primary enemy and “our 
ultimately unrequited longing for more than we have.”109 Thus, he calls for a 
recovery of a ‘mortal self’ that recognizes our own fragility and contingency, things 
the Greeks asserted made life compelling and beautiful.110 The ‘mortal self’ resists 
the temptation to locate one’s identity in the ability to manipulate or control death, 
and foregoes the self-corruption that may occur by obsessive avoidance of pain, 
suffering, and dependency.111 Like Cole, Callahan is anxious to capture the dual 
nature of death, asserting that while death is a part of life, it is also an enemy.112 In 
the current clinical medical climate however, the former has been eclipsed by the 
latter. “The meaning of death, once so troubling and elusive, has now become the 
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scientific problem of death, to be attacked and mastered.”113 Recapturing our mortal 
self frees us from the relentless pursuit of autonomy over biological necessity.114 Not 
surprisingly then, Callahan opposes efforts to extend life by retarding aging. He 
believes that the current lifespan of the mid 70s to low 80s affords us enough time to 
accomplish our goals.115 “More life beyond a certain point seems to offer no 
proportionate gains.”116 In fact, life extension is antithetical to the mortal self, 
leading to fundamental character deficiencies.  
A self obsessed with control—either to remedy the failures of 
medicine to give us a biological domination of death, or to express a 
commitment to the value of self-determination—will be a deficient 
and defective self, less flexible and protean in the face of mortality 
than it ought to be.117  
Callahan believes that current medical practice and research has only distorted our 
understanding of death; death has become a medical failure that will one day be 
under our discrete control. But nature’s current lifespan limits are enough, says 
Callahan, a fact that will be established recapturing the notion of our mortal self 
which will preserve our humanity and guard against our unbridled desire for 
autonomy and life on our own terms.   
 
Critical to Callahan’s arguments are the notion of a ‘natural’ lifespan, though he 
admits that such a span is somewhat fluid within a fixed biological limit. One can 
certainly empathize with Callahan’s critique of medicine and its influence over our 
understanding of death. His conception of the ‘mortal self’ finds resonance with the 
apostle Paul, who proclaimed “I have been crucified with Christ” (Galatians 2:20), 
and spoke of carrying the death of Jesus in his body that Jesus’ life might be revealed 
(2 Corinthians 4:10). Moreover, his comments regarding the loss of wisdom inherent 
in an open-ended future finds theological parallels in Psalm 90. However, he never 
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really deals with the possibility of treating aging itself to enhance the likelihood of an 
additional twenty to fifty years of health. Callahan is more concerned with the 
diseases associated with aging. Thus, while the idea of a normative lifespan is 
somewhat attractive, it is difficult to imagine any widespread agreement on what 
exactly this figure might be or who would ultimately decide, given especially the fact 
that those in the most developed nations are living healthier, longer lives.118 Like 
Jonas, Callahan seeks grounding in the biology of the human body.  
 
The responses by Kass, Jonas, and Callahan present more nuanced moral discussions 
of life extension which transcend the crude cost-benefit calculi of consequentialist 
thought by drawing attention to issues of character and embodiment. Yet, they offer 
differing notions concerning what it is in nature or embodiment in general that ought 
to serve as normative, whether it be evolution (Kass, somewhat), metabolism and 
‘natality’ (Jonas), or one’s ‘mortal self’ (Callahan). While it seems that these thinkers 
are rightly wary of offering a merely voluntarist response to aging attenuation that is 
disconnected from anything that might be discerned from a discernable order in 
nature, they nevertheless struggle to offer any real narrative in which a more 
coherent, compelling account of both nature and the human body might be put 
forward. Certainly, the difficulties of recognizing any moral component to nature are 
more adequately addressed from a Christian perspective which recognizes nature as 
God’s good creation, a creation which carries a distinct christological component.119 
I turn now to consider two such accounts which have been offered within a largely 
Christian framework. 
 
Theological Responses to Life Extension 
To date there has been little serious reflection on life extension via aging attenuation 
from a Christian perspective. Moreover, what little has been written fails to address 
issues of character and the role the body in character formation. While the following 
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two treatments by Ronald Cole-Turner and Michael J. Reiss are offered from within 
a Christian framework, their accounts fail to address the reality of the incarnation and 
the implications for embodiment, which might have otherwise qualified their support 
for research into life extension.  
Ronald Cole-Turner 
Cole-Turner argues that life extension via aging retardation is warranted given God’s 
continuing creative and redeeming activity in the world, a redeeming activity 
inscribed by the Gospels which portray a Jesus who took delight in nature, but also 
altered it to restore it.120 For Cole-Turner, the actions of Jesus provide a framework 
for evaluating genetic defects, defects which are discerned by examining Jesus’ 
activity in the Gospels insofar as they illumine God’s intentions.121 These defects are 
skin diseases, mental and neurological disorders, losses in hearing, sight, the usage of 
limbs among other unnamed diseases.122 It follows then, that “that which is defective 
is that which may be changed or altered” by technology.123 In this way, genetic 
engineering can be viewed theologically as redemptive and creative technology.  
 
Critical to our participation in the created order then, is our assistance in unfolding 
what Cole-Turner defines as “new dimensions of existence.”124 Thus, in the final 
chapter of his The New Genesis, he sets out to explore the logic of genetic 
engineering as a metaphor for God’s creative activity. To do this he relies on the 
notion of the creatio continua, emphasizing God’s control over the evolutionary 
unfolding and ‘calling forth’ of creation and its still uncertain future.125 The main 
question for humanity then is to what extent, through our understanding and 
technological abilities, will we serve God the creator in this ongoing creative 
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creativity.126 “Human work, especially our technology,” asserts Cole-Turner, “may 
be seen as a partnership with God in the continuing work of creation.”127 Wary of the 
dangers associated with the term ‘co-creator’128 however, he modifies it by focusing 
on God’s redemptive purpose in nature129 and the Yahwist creation account which 
authorizes human beings to create in the natural order.130  Cole-Turner asserts that 
“the Yahwist sees the human work of tilling the ground as something upon which 
God’s own creative work depends,”131 allowing our activity of planting to take on 
new meaning whereby “we begin to see ourselves as participating in an activity of 
God.”132 We are thus invited to construe God’s creativity through the metaphor of 
our technological ability to manipulate genetic material.133 This construal of our 
activity resists improper notions of ‘playing God.’ On the contrary,   
Genetic engineering does not encroach upon the scope of divine 
activity. It expands the reach of God’s action, placing a new mode of 
contact, through our technology, between the Creator and the creation. 
God now has more ways [to] create, to redeem, and to bring the 
creation to fulfilment and harmony.134  
 
While acknowledging that humanity can use genetic technology for purposes 
contrary to God’s will, he seems to minimize this possibility. Thus, genetic 
manipulation is an acceptable means of partaking in creative and redemptive activity, 
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Context (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 83. 
131 Cole-Turner, New Genesis, 104. 
132 Cole-Turner, New Genesis, 105. 
133 Cole-Turner, New Genesis, 107-08. 
134 Cole-Turner, New Genesis, 108. 
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acknowledging that God is already at work in natural processes; God works through 
natural process to achieve genetic change and through humans to achieve intentional 
genetic change.135 More recently however, he has appeared more wary of our 
propensity to view genetics as a rejection of creation and Creator.136 Noting recent 
successes on deterring aging in animals, he asks whether or not we will do this with 
our own descendents, and considers (rhetorically?) why we should not enhance 
intelligence, height, skin tone or mood.137 Here Cole-Turner appears somewhat wary 
of life extension and other human genetic modifications. 
No one knows now what we will learn to do, but it is pretty clear what 
we want. We are anxious, competitive, offended by age and decline, 
unable to accept loss. These needs drive our technology, shape its 
agenda, and ultimately pervert is moral meaning. What begins as a 
technology to relieve human pain becomes a technology to relieve the 
pain of being human.138
In revisiting the idea of cocreation, he observes that the real problem is our own 
selfishness.139 Yet, somewhat surprisingly, Cole-Turner looks forward to the fact that 
one day technology will allow us to “add to or alter life on earth” and urges us to use 
this technology not for our own selfish ends but for God’s glory as a matter of 
obedience; “‘Cocreation’ is not so much a matter of doctrine as of obedience.”140 
Thus, while Cole-Turner is wary of the abuses to which extended life may be put, 
they are not so severe as to warrant a ban on aging research. Indeed, in a recent 
debate he argued that life extension would afford more opportunities for spiritual 
growth and understanding, “a kind of blossoming of our humanity that has not yet 
been obtained.”141 In construing human redemptive activity as genetic creative 
activity, Cole-Turner finds warrant for genetic manipulation of the human lifespan as 
a potential “blossoming of our humanity.” 
 
                                                 
135 Cole-Turner, New Genesis, 109. 
136 Ronald Cole-Turner, “Biotechnology: A Pastoral Reflection,” Theology Today 59 (2002):” 42-48. 
137 Cole-Turner, “Biotechnology,” 45. 
138 Cole-Turner, “Biotechnology,” 45. 
139 Cole-Turner, “Biotechnology,” 48. 
140 Cole-Turner, “Biotechnology,” 48. 
141 Vida Foubister, “Immortality Quest Raises Ethical Concerns,” American Medical News, 3  
April 2000. 
   102
One wonders how Cole-Turner’s affirmation of life extension can be reconciled with 
Jesus’ healing activities apart from considering aging as a problem for our 
technological expertise. It seems highly questionable however that Jesus viewed 
aging as something to be overcome, even though he did extend life by healing 
diseases and bringing the dead back to life. Yet Lazarus, the sick girl, and the boy at 
Nain all eventually succumbed to death. It may be that life extension is warranted not 
because it stems from a genetic defect, but because it is part of our task as cocreators. 
But Cole-Turner’s concept of cocreator rests upon a questionable reading of the 
Yahwist creation account. Moreover, it is also unclear how the Elohist account might 
affect Cole-Turner’s construal of cocreator. Stanley Hauerwas is rightly critical of 
the notion, finding no biblical warrant for such a term. Rather, “the good news of the 
creation account is that God completed his creation and that mankind needs do 
nothing more to see to its perfection. That is exactly why God could call it good and 
rest—and more importantly invites us to rest within his completed good creation.”142 
Indeed, Michael Banner has called for a proper Christian interpretation of the created 
order through the Sabbath, noting that Barth began his ‘special ethics’ with just such 
a reflection, grounding subsequent human activity in the facts of creation, 
reconciliation, and redemption.143 For, a proper interpretation of nature and our 
engagement with it  
is learnt by our responding to God’s invitation to share in his Sabbath 
rest, a rest in which, in contemplation of this creation, and in utter 
conviction as to God’s loving purpose in its ordering, we may put 
away anxiety, fear, dread or awe and learn instead a simple enjoyment 
of this order in its complexity, vitality, beauty, and magnificence.144
 
Finally, in considering our cocreative activities, I wonder why the term cocreator 
should be preferred to, or even qualified by, the term coredeemer as reflecting a 
fuller account of God’s activity in creation and specifically though Christ. For it 
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seems to me that the notion of cocreators too closely approximates Bacon’s ideal of a 
return to Eden. The notion of coredeemer might give us appropriate pause on the 
limits of our own making by reflecting on the One who ‘made himself nothing’ in 
submitting himself to God in willingly laying down his life for the world, the One 
who was not created, but begotten.145 While Cole-Turner is not unaware of the 
dangers of our sinful tendencies, it seems that they are not so severe to foreclose the 
idea of fashioning a longer life. Insofar as he relies on the concept of cocreation, his 
support for life extension can be called into question.  
 
Michael J. Reiss  
Reiss asks whether reengineering humans for life spans well beyond ‘three score and 
ten’ is an indication of our technological hubris, or whether it might be better 
construed as a restoration of antediluvian longevities.146 While he predicts that 
manipulating genes related to aging might grant a limited extension (10 to 15 years), 
Reiss believes that the most likely scenario for significant increase in longevity will 
entail full body transplants (excluding one’s head), ‘above-neck’ restorative 
therapies, and ‘localized transplants.’  
 
Given that a ban on research intended to extend human longevity is highly unlikely, 
Reiss asks whether we should forbid people from living very long healthy lives. The 
legitimacy of this question is based on the largely unconvincing arguments against 
life extension, particularly those asserting that it will only contribute to global 
injustice, or those that suggest that an extended life would become tedious and 
boring (e.g. Kass, Jonas, and others). In response to the former argument, Reiss finds 
John Harris’ assertion which requires that “strenuous and realistic efforts be made to 
provide the benefits of the technology justly” as a convincing response to the threat 
of unequal distribution.147 Reiss is equally convinced by Harris’ construal of 
                                                 
145 Philippians 2:7, NIV. 
146 “‘And in the World to Come, Life Everlasting,’” in Brave New World? Theology, Ethics, and the 
Human Genome, ed. Celia Deane-Drummond (London: T. & T. Clark International, 2003), 49. 
147 Reiss, “World to Come,” 56, quoting John Harris’ unpublished lecture, “Intimations of 
Immortality: The Ethics and Justice of Life Extending Therapies,” 6. 
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significant life extension as a ‘side effect’ of treating various illnesses. Under such a 
construal,  
it is difficult to imagine arguments that would be convincing (whether 
ethically or politically) which restrict (let alone prevent) research into 
cancers, heart disease, mental impairments and so on on the grounds 
that such research might lead people to live too long.148  
Yet, to reject life extension via the genetic manipulation of aging or successive 
transplants by no means requires an abandonment of efforts to cure cancer and other 
diseases that would allow for a longer life. Moreover, Harris’ construal is highly 
suspect, given that the search for longevity is motivated in a large part by the 
recognition that curing diseases—even all known diseases—will result in only a 
marginal increase in the lifespan. As noted in the previous chapter, it is already 
widely recognized that any substantial increase in life expectancy and longevity must 
come from treating aging itself or some other means.149
 
In a similar vein, Reiss counters Kass’ arguments by suggesting that numerous new 
projects and undertakings would effectively mitigate the ‘more of the same’ boredom 
forecasted by Kass. Though Reiss acknowledges that greatly extended lives might 
increase the fear of death given that one might have much more to lose, he argues 
that if boredom were to surface over time, one could simply “choose not to postpone 
death much longer.”150 This scenario seems to be at the heart of life extension, where 
death is delayed and domesticated by placing it under the realm of choice, preferably, 
a choice to be made after it has been determined that life no longer has much to offer. 
In the case of boredom however, it remains to be seen why euthanasia would not be a 
preferable option, especially when faced with the possibility of a drawn out death 
likely to follow from a mere abstention from life-extending technology. In all of 
these deliberations, Reiss fails to seriously consider the impact of greatly extended 
lives on one’s character, particularly with respect to the relationship between wisdom 
                                                 
148 Reiss, “World to Come,” 56. 
149 See Austad, Why We Age, 14; Medvedev, “Structural Basis of Aging,” 10-11; and Olshansky, 
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and longevity in Psalm 90, which is slightly ironic given the title of the book in 
which his article has been published.151
 
His discussion does however take a promising turn when he makes a distinction 
between scientific immortality—understood as an indefinite prolongation of life—
and theological immortality whereby one lives forever. Quoting Paul’s discussion of 
the perishable putting on the imperishable in 1 Corinthians 15: 51-55, Reiss candidly 
asks what Paul’s vision of the defeat of death in victorious resurrection has to do 
with the biotechnological vision which can only offer ‘endless transplants’ or 
medicines to prolong life.152 Unfortunately, his answer is less than satisfying. 
Though he briefly concedes that these two visions may indeed have nothing to do 
with one another, he suggests that a greater longevity will afford us more time to 
have a ‘good death,’ though he fails to elaborate on what exactly a good death 
entails. Ultimately, Reiss suggests that “today’s technological advances could, if 
interpreted somewhat optimistically, already be seen to have undone some aspects of 
the original curse.”153 This point is hardly arguable. Yet, it is clear that Reiss’ 
conception of the ‘original curse’ does not rule out the use of technology to greatly 
extend the human lifespan through successive transplants or genetic engineering, 
given that Reiss believes that the curse occasioned a loss of immortality and the 
introduction of physical death into the created order, as well as a gradual reduction in 
the human lifespan.154 Moreover, the implications of resurrection of which Paul 
speaks in 1 Corinthians—particularly how this event might impact a technological 
return to the garden of Eden—are not considered. 
 
Though Reiss speaks of the resurrection to come where death will be defeated, he 
does not appear anxious to link this eschatological fact with the birth, life, death, 
resurrection, and ascension of the One on whom our good future rests. One suspects 
that any limitation on longevity that may come from a consideration of the life and 
death of Christ has been minimized by Reiss’ reliance on John Hick’s rather benign 
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arguments for life after death. Hick acknowledges, but unsurprisingly minimizes the 
significance of Jesus’ claims to everlasting life, offering a second argument where he 
reasons that God will sustain our being beyond death given his desire to hold us in a 
perfect relationship with himself and others.155 Hick goes on to ask however, 
whether “it could be an expression of infinite love to create us with immense 
spiritual potentialities but with so short a career, and often in such inauspicious 
circumstances, that those potentialities are normally destined never to be 
fulfilled?”156 Here Reiss finds a possible justification for life extension, averring that 
“the second reason Hick cites for the life everlasting might even be satisfied by a 
very greatly extended lifespan, let alone immortality.”157 That is, a greatly extended 
life on earth may afford more opportunity for the development of our ‘spiritual 
potentialities.’ Though Reiss acknowledges that technological immortality would 
pose ‘major consequences’ to the exercise of the virtues of patience and hope, he also 
points out that true (theological) immortality—where one cannot die—forecloses the 
development of the virtue of physical courage.158 Reiss’ point here is difficult to 
grasp, for he appears to suggest that eternal life will be somehow deficient in that we 
will no longer need to practice the virtues so instrumental to the formation of our 
character, effectively elevating the virtues themselves over against the particular 
teleoi toward which they are oriented. Lost in his discussion of the development of 
these spiritual potentialities are the claims that Jesus laid upon his would-be disciples 
(Mark 8:34-35), and what these claims may have to say about attempts to secure a 
longer, healthier, life.  
 
Reiss deserves credit for introducing theological themes into his discussion of life 
extension. However, his construal of prelapsarian life in the garden, coupled with his 
reflections on eternal life will not allow him to rule out life extension altogether, 
even though he rightly notes the distinction between a scientific and a theological 
immortality. Moreover, while Reiss considers that a greatly extended life would have 
an impact (what kind of impact, he doesn’t say) on the virtues of hope and courage, 
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he completely omits the relationship between wisdom and longevity in Psalm 90. 
Finally, though Reiss again is right to recognize Jesus’ healing ministry was certainly 
a visible demonstration of God’s in-breaking kingdom, his consideration of life 
extension is weakened by failing to account for the life, death, resurrection, and 
ascension of Jesus, and the life we are called to live in light of these facts. 
 
The following survey of ethical responses to life extension reveals the need for a 
more thorough theological offering which takes into account human activity and 
flourishing in light of God’s activities as revealed in the person and work of Jesus 
Christ. Such an offering will need to address several issues overlooked by some 
ethical systems, namely, issues of character development and holiness, issues that 
consequentialism and utilitarianism fail to address. Moreover, situating life extension 
within the Christian metanarrative which recognizes not only God’s good creation, 
human fallenness, and bodily redemption, but which also considers the impact of 
God becoming man in the person of Jesus Christ, upon whom our redemption and 
reconciliation rests, will provide the grounding necessary to account for the several 
tensions which have been rightly identified by cultural historians and ethicists, 
tensions between our limited bodies and our unlimited desires, between death as a 
friend and death as an enemy. In the remainder of this thesis I address these concerns 
by looking first at a theological treatments of long life and death in the history of the 
Christian tradition, after which I will investigate the theology of Athanasius and Karl 
Barth, who address both longevity and character development in their theologies of 
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Chapter 4: Life, Death, and Longevity in the History of 
Christian Thought 
 
“Nobody wants to go, no matter how ready they think they are. I’ll tell 
you a little story about Methuselah. When he arrived finally at the age 
of nine hundred and sixty-nine, his son began to worry, when would 
he be ready to die? ‘Pa, it’s your birthday today. You’re nine hundred 
and sixty-nine, Pa, so what about it?’ ‘So soon, mein kind?’ the old 
man answered, ‘so soon?’”1
  Moshe 
 
“Each man’s life is but a breath.” 
  Psalm 39:5b NIV 
 
In formulating a Christian response to life extension via aging retardation, it will be 
helpful to consider influential thinkers of the Christian faith with respect to the desire 
for a long(er) life. This chapter will focus on the nature of earthly life, its length, and 
the closely related issue of death by focusing on important figures at pivotal 
moments in the Christian history: Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and 
Søren Kierkegaard. Each of these theologians have reflected on these issues from a 
unique perspective, yet always informed by Scripture. Hence, what follows is a 
consideration of the larger questions surrounding life extension: the nature and length 
of earthly life as well as our desire to extend it, including the implications of more 
time on this earth.  
 
Augustine (354-430) 
Unlike the sentiment embodied in many affluent, western cultures, the sentiment ‘if 
life is good, then more life is better’ is strikingly absent in early Christian thought. 
Two verses which Augustine tended to use in conjunction were Ephesians 5:16 
which speaks of the days as ‘evil,’ and Wisdom 9:15: “For a perishable body weighs 
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down the soul, and this earthly tent burdens the thoughtful mind.”2 Wisdom 9 was 
clearly in view when Augustine spoke of the nature of this earthly life.  
So aren’t the days evil, then, which we spend in this wasting away of 
the flesh, in or rather under this colossal burden of the perishable 
body, among such great trials, such difficulties, where pleasure 
deceives, where there’s no certainty of joy, where fear torments, greed 
is grasping, sorrow makes a desert of life?3
Elsewhere he asserts that man “is in death from the very beginning of his existence in 
this body.”4 He frequently referred to earthly life as just one long process of dying.5 
Life for Augustine is “chockablock with groanings right up till decrepit old age. The 
whole thing is ‘nasty, brutish, and short,’ and yet how people go after it!”6 He speaks 
of the ‘innumerable evils’ that threaten our bodies, from excessive heat and cold, 
storms and lightening, to falling buildings, demons, and rabid dogs.7 Abundant too 
are diseases, “so numerous that all the books of the physicians cannot contain them,” 
leading him to conclude that this “state of life [is] so miserable that it is like a hell on 
earth” from which there is no escape except through Christ.8  
 
It would be a mistake however, to say that the mature Augustine viewed this earthly 
life as evil, and equally incorrect to read his earlier Manichean leanings into these 
negative portraits of embodied life on earth. Though his catalog of the miseries of 
life is oft-quoted, he immediately follows it with a longer chapter on the blessings of 
life, including blessings of the mind to “drink in wisdom” and achieve the virtues of 
“prudence, fortitude, temperance and justice,” giving us “the capacity to live well 
and achieve immortal happiness.”9 Other blessings include medicines and remedies 
                                                 
2 Wisdom of Solomon 9:15, RSV. See for instance Sermon 84.2, in The Works of Saint Augustine: A 
Translation for the 21st Century, ed. John E. Rotelle, Part III, Sermons, trans. Edmund Hill (New 
Rochelle, NY: New City Press, 1991-1997), vol. 3, 389. 
3 Sermon 84.2, in Works, Part III, vol. 3, 389. 
4 City of God XIII.10, 551. 
5 Sermon 305A.8, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 330-331; City of God, XIII, 10, 550-551. 
6 Sermon 108.3, in Works, Part III, vol. 4, 128; Sermon 302.5, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 303; On the 
Trinity XIII.7.10, NPNF First Series, vol. 3, 171.  
7 City of God XXII.23, 1156. 
8 City of God XXII.23, 1156. 
9 City of God XXII. 24, 1159-1161. See also Sermon 280.3, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 73, where 
Augustine acknowledges that though life is short and painful, nevertheless it is sweet. 
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for restoring health, herbal seasonings devised “to whet the appetite and please the 
palate,” rivers of poetry and other writings.10 God’s providence is evident in our very 
bodies, in form, shape, and stature—even those things that have no apparent use, like 
man’s beard or the nipples on his chest.11 Despite these good things in life however, 
this life is still considered difficult and brief. If the promise of an eternal life of peace 
makes true happiness on this earth an unattainable goal, so too does it make this life 
incomparably short. Eternal life not only makes this life seem short by comparison; 
this life actually is short. While life appears short today, the criterion by which such 
an assessment is made falls along the lines adumbrated earlier by Thomas R. Cole; 
this life is short because we have unlimited desires in a limited body. As will be 
evident shortly, Augustine flatly rejects this line of thinking.  
 
In a sermon on Psalm 146 Augustine wonders how anyone could speak of a long life 
on this earth, given the life to come, reasoning that “as long as I live” cannot be 
referring to this temporal life, but eternal life, for no one could truthfully say such a 
thing about this life “in which nothing is long.”12 He likens life to a ‘mist’ and our 
bodies to ‘dust.’13 “From the first moments of infancy to decrepit old age is a very 
short space of time.”14 While Augustine was familiar with death and its imminence, 
given especially that many didn’t survive until adulthood, he considered the 
uncertainty of life’s length as a benefit. He encourages his listeners not to delay in 
turning to the Lord, given especially that God mercifully keeps the last day of our 
death a secret, “in order that every day may be taken seriously.”15 Thus, the 
imminence of death and the resurrection life to come held considerable influence 
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over concern for the length of this life, making this life seem incomparably short.16 
Nevertheless, the difficulty and brevity of life did not dampen the desire for a long 
life, a topic frequently addressed by Augustine.  
 
On Long Life 
Though Augustine viewed this life as short, he too acknowledged the desire for long 
life on this earth, even if no earthly life could be considered long when compared to 
the life to come. Indeed, there is a universal desire, claims Augustine, to have one’s 
life—so long as one is pleased with it—to continue indefinitely.17 Even if this life is 
exceedingly difficult, Augustine acknowledges that we would happily take an 
indefinite extension of this earthly life.  
Certainly this life is miserable enough. And yet, if this miserable life 
could be made eternal for us, wouldn’t we just congratulate ourselves? 
Wouldn’t we just say, “I want to be exactly as I am now, only I don’t 
want to die?”18  
Even if offered an earthly immortality where we could choose non-existence in the 
event that life becomes too burdensome, Augustine asserts that we would choose to 
remain miserable than to not exist at all.19 Yet, “no one wrongly wills immortality, if 
human nature is by God’s gift capable of it.”20 Indeed, he says “all men will to be 
blessed, certainly, if they will truly, they will also to be immortal; for otherwise they 
could not be blessed.”21 Thus, blessedness and immortality are inseparable for 
                                                 
16 Other Fathers echoed this sentiment. Irenaeus argued that Jesus’ sacrifice was that of an ‘old man,’ 
Against Heresies II.22. By the fourth century, several writings suggest that fifty is considered old. 
Greer, “Special Gift and Special Burden,” 23, notes that Gregory of Nyssa, Paulinus of Nola, and 
Prudentius considered themselves old at fifty. Basil the Great who likely died before fifty, also 
considered himself  “burdened with old age.” Lactantius considered the Epicureans foolish for 
wanting to live to one hundred, given that required an ‘immortal’ kind of strength. On the 
Workmanship of God Or The Formation of Man 4. Cyprian saw diminishing life spans as part of a 
world that was slowly decaying in accordance to God’s law, An Address to Demetrianus 3. Gregory of 
Nyssa taught that life is short and that human strength was insubstantial, thus urging his followers to 
live for the future life, given the shortness of this present one, The Great Catechism 1, 5, 13, 40.  
17 On the Trinity XIII.7.10, NPNF First Series, vol. 3, 172. 
18 Sermon 229H.3, in Works, Part III, vol. 6, 298. See also Sermon 297.8, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 
220. 
19 City of God XI.27, 485. 
20 On the Trinity XIII.8.11, NPNF First Series, vol. 3, 173. Also, City of God XIV.25, 628. 
21 On the Trinity XIII.8.11, NPNF First Series, vol. 3, 172. 
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Augustine. Since a man cannot attain earthly immortality, it is impossible to be 
blessed or happy in this life. Such a man cannot be happy, because he cannot live as 
long as he wishes. “In what way does he live as he wishes, then, when he does not 
live as long as he wishes?”22  
 
Augustine reasons that true happiness or ‘blessedness’ consists in obtaining what one 
wills when one wills the right thing—the right kind of immortality. Conversely, 
Augustine the ‘wretched’ either attain what they wrongly will or have not attained 
what they rightly will.23 Either we are wretched because we will earthly immortality, 
or we are wretched in not having obtained the right kind of immortality. In the first 
instance the one who wishes to have his body “safe and sound . . . within his own 
control, or even to have it with an imperishableness of the body itself” is to be pitied, 
because this is unattainable.24 Yet, Augustine that one may be “without absurdity” be 
called happy, even though true happiness is only available in the next life.25 Bonnie 
Kent rightly observes, “Augustine never reduces the present life to some miserable 
waystation on the train route to heaven.”26
 
A large part of the desire to prolong earthly life indefinitely, no matter how 
miserable, says Augustine, is the universal fear of death. Indeed, “nature flees non-
existence.”27 Our nature desires to be “free from death, error, and harm,” and to be 
free from these continually.28 There is something so pleasant to ‘mere existence’ that 
even the miserable don’t want to die. Even those who are in desperate situations and 
long for a hasty death actually recoil at death’s visitation, says Augustine.29 Yet, 
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even when one escapes death, says Augustine, “it only means you’ve been given an 
extra day; you have lived one day more, you’ve got one less left, by my 
reckoning.”30 Yet, a longer life means more opportunities for sin. This theme is a 
common element in the ‘consolatory’ literature of the Fathers, where a premature 
death is spoken of as God’s gracious foreclosure of a life otherwise irrevocably 
headed toward horrific evil, apostasy, and sin.31 Augustine too held that given the 
sin-affected and contingent nature of this life, it is better to die than survive and fear 
innumerable potential deaths.  
And when, under the daily contingencies of this life, every mortal man 
is, so to speak, threatened with innumerable deaths, and it is uncertain 
which one of them will overtake him, is it, I ask, better to suffer one 
and die, or to live and fear them all?32  
However, Augustine is not exhorting his listeners to despise life, but rather to live 
life in such a way that sin doesn’t increase. “We are not blaming anyone, not finding 
fault, even if this life is loved. But at least let this life be loved in such a way that for 
love of it you don’t commit sin.”33
 
Some of Augustine’s more insightful sermons underscoring his views on the nature 
of life and the desire for longevity come from his exposition on Psalm 34: “Who is 
the person who desires life, and loves to see good days? Curb your tongue from evil,                          
and your lips from speaking deceit. Turn aside from evil, and do good; seek peace, 
and attend on her.”34 Augustine acknowledges the rhetorical force of the psalmist’s 
question, yet concludes that the desire for ‘life’ and for ‘good days’ are referring to 
the next life. ‘Good days’ represent “life without end, rest without toil.”35 According 
to Augustine, the psalmist 
                                                 
30 Sermon 229H.2, in Works, Part III, vol. 6, 296-297. 
31 Examples include Gregory of Nyssa, On Infant’s Early Deaths and Chrysostom’s Letter To A 
Young Widow.   
32 City of God I.11, 19. 
33 Sermon 297.4, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 217; Sermon 229H.2, in Works, Part III, vol. 6, 296; City of 
God I.11, 19. 
34 Psalm 34:12-14. Hill’s translation of Augustine’s Latin. See also Sermon 16.1, in Works, Part III, 
vol. 1, 342, Sermon 25.5, in Works, Part III, vol. 2, 84-85, Sermon 108.4, in Works, Part III, vol. 4, 
129, and Sermon 297.4, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 217-218. 
35 Sermon 108.6, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 130; Sermon 346C.2, in Works, Part III, vol. 10, 85. 
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would not have said about that other life [e.g. eternal life] ‘Who is the 
person who desires life?’ and at the same time exhorted us to retain 
and prolong this one by the instructions that follow—although who 
does not desire this one?36  
This conclusion from is influenced by verse 14, where ‘attending on peace’ is taken 
as a promise rather than a command.37 Given that earthly life is troublesome, he 
reasons that the peace of which the psalmist speaks can only mean the peace of 
God’s presence in eternity.38 Secondly, Augustine concludes that the ‘life’ and ‘good 
days’ of which the psalmist speaks are descriptors of life in heaven because the 
command curb one’s tongue from evil and speaking deceit (v. 14) will not 
necessarily prolong one’s earthly life. Indeed, in some instances following these 
precepts may actually hasten death.39 Thus the real problem is that people are in 
search of good days where they are not to be found, and that people are unwilling to 
live their lives in such a way that they might be found.40  
 
While Augustine concedes that it is possible to live a morally good and long life, he 
is quick to temper any desire for a longer earthly life by reminding his listeners just 
how short this life is. A short good life is better than a long, bad one. Moreover, a 
well-lived life results in diminished concern for the length of earthly life. 
You are certainly eager for it to be a long one, even if it’s a bad one. 
Much better to make it a good one, and not be afraid of its being a 
short one. You see, if you take care to lead it well, you won’t care at 
all about its soon coming to an end. It will, after all, be followed by 
eternal life . . .41
For Augustine, longevity is a thoroughly moral question. Augustine exhorts his 
listeners to pursue a good life should they entertain any hopes of having a long life 
on this earth. It is clear however, that seeking out the morally good life is the first 
priority. Our efforts are better spent in securing those good days that will be without 
                                                 
36 Sermon 16.1, in Works, Part III, vol. 1, 342. 
37 Sermon 16.1, 345 n.2; On the Psalms XXXIV.14, 19, NPNF First Series, vol. 8, 77. 
38 Sermon 16.1, in Works, Part III, vol. 1, 342. 
39 Sermon 16.3, in Works, Part III, vol. 1, 343-344. 
40 Sermon 297.9, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 221. 
41 Sermon 16.2, 3 in Works, Part III, vol. 1, 343. 
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toil.42 Though days without toil can be secured by pursuing a morally good life, 
Augustine did speak of prolonging earthly life as well. 
  
On Extending Earthly Life 
Augustine’s thoughts on life extension were heavily influenced by the nature of 
earthly life. Given the difficulty of this life, extending it was considered nothing 
more than ‘death postponement.’ In his City of God, Augustine offers a Stoic-like 
indifference to the length of life: 
I know this: that no one has ever died who had not been going to die 
eventually. The end of life makes a long life the same as a short one; 
for the one is not better and the other worse, and the one is not greater 
and the other lesser, when both no longer exist.43  
This indifference does not come from the finality of death and permanent non-
existence. Augustine fully acknowledges the reality of death, but not its finality. 
Death is not an evil when preceded by a good life—no, death is made evil by what 
follows death.44 Nevertheless, Augustine acknowledged that it is so easy to become 
engrossed in this life, so concerned with daily activities, that we long to put death off 
as long as possible.45 However, while great measures are taken to put off death and 
live a little longer, there is no way to put it off death indefinitely. “Nothing can be 
done to put death away for good, and everything possible is done to put it off for a 
time.”46  
 
Again, Augustine urges his listeners to compare this present life with the life to 
come, chiding his listeners for heavy expenditures in attempts to secure a few more 
days on earth.  
                                                 
42 Sermon 108.6, in Works, Part III, vol. 4, 131. 
43 I.11, 19. 
44 City of God I.11, 19. 
45 Sermon 108.4, in Works, Part III, vol. 4, 130; Sermon 302.5, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 302-303; 
City of God XI.27, 485. 
46 Sermon 280.3, in Works, Part III, vol. 8, 73; see also Sermon 77A.4, in Works, Part III, vol. 3, 329; 
Sermon 84.1, in Works, Part III, vol. 3, 388; Sermon 127.2, in Works, Part III, vol. 4, 282; Sermon 
344.3, in Works, Part III, vol. 10, 51. 
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From your temporal life, which you redeem at such a vast price, in 
order to live a few days more . . . calculate how much the eternal life 
you neglect is worth. . . . So you are redeeming just a few days, and 
these so painfully laborious, lived in such want, amid such trials? How 
much for?47
From the vantage point of eternity with Christ, living a little longer on this earth is 
nothing when faced with the prospect of living forever. A ceaseless striving to 
prolong earthly life was misguided, given the blessings of the life to come.  
 
Our efforts are better spent, says Augustine, in securing eternal life. “If we spend all 
that labor on merely dying a bit later,” asks Augustine, “how much should be spent 
on never dying at all?”48 Augustine did not, however, deny that the pathway to the 
next life involved experiencing one’s own bodily failure leading to death. The first 
death, the death of the body that inspires fear in one’s soul “is to be counted among 
the things to be put up with, and among the things to be tolerated and endured 
patiently.”49 Though we wrestle with the idea of our own death, it is not to be feared. 
Rather, the second, everlasting death is the one we ought to fear.50 Though the first 
death was of penultimate concern for Augustine, he urged his listeners to look to 
Christ in coming to terms with the first death. We have Christ’s example in 
Gethsemane in helping us to overcome our fear of death. Christ’s crucifixion 
impresses upon us a “proper disregard for this life.”51 By his own suffering Christ 
shows us that this life is troublesome, grief-ridden and therefore must run its course. 
Jesus says to us,  
O humanity, why were you afraid of dying? Look, I die; look, I suffer; 
so there, you shouldn’t fear what you were afraid of, because I am 
showing you what to hope for.52  
Augustine concludes that those who are unwilling to ‘despise a few days of life’ in 
order to attain that everlasting day have never taken up their crosses to follow the 
                                                 
47 Sermon 345.2, in Works, Part III, vol. 10, 60. 
48 Sermon 359A.8, in Works, Part III, vol. 10, 215; Sermon 127.2, in Works, Part III, vol. 4, 282. 
49 Sermon 359A.8, in Works, Part III, vol. 10, 215; Sermon 302.4, in Works, Part III, vol. 4, 302. 
50 Sermon 77A.4, in Works, Part III, vol. 3, 330.  
51 Sermon 335H.1, in Works, Part III, vol. 9, 246. 
52 Sermon 229H.3, in Works, Part III, vol. 6, 297. 
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Lord.53 Since the way of the cross is marked by love, he encourages his listeners to 
‘change their kind of love,’ to cease loving life so much that any death becomes 
repugnant to one’s sensibilities, and to love Christ more. 
Certainly, you don’t want to die. Change your kind of love, and you 
will be shown, not a death that will present itself to you against your 
will, but a death which will, if you so will, absent itself altogether.54  
If Christ’s crucifixion reminds us of the sorrows and sufferings in this life, his 
resurrection and ascension remind us of what to hope for. Christians place their hope 
in the One who has gone before, having suffered and conquered death himself, that 
we might be united with him in our own resurrection bodies.55
 
Augustine’s near indifference concerning the length of life and extending it were 
nearly always placed within the context of eternal life presupposed by the general 
resurrection. Thus, the possibility of putting off death for a few more days on this 
earth was considered foolish when one might gain days that do not end. Indeed, 
eternal life with Christ is such a dominant theme with Augustine, that it occasionally 
skews his interpretation of Old Testament texts written in a context where the dead 
were thought to dwell in sheol, in a shadowy, pseudo-existence, cut off from God 
and his people. Though Augustine acknowledged the goodness of embodiment and 
the pleasures of life, he also held that a longer life on earth meant an extended 
struggle against sin. While the length of life appears somewhat relativized in light of 
New Testament hope for resurrection, it is not so insubstantial as to render a desire 
for long life as superfluous. Augustine was concerned that we seek the right kind of 
immortality, which entails following the example of Christ who overcame the fear of 
death and was willing to die. In addition to the weight of eternity, one suspects that 
his conception of sin and the profound effects of the fall only contributed to his dim 
appraisal of earthly life and hopes for extending it. That Adam’s sin introduced both 
physical and spiritual death into the created order, including humanity’s mysterious 
corporeal participation in Adam’s sin, may have influenced Augustine in this regard. 
While Augustine’s later works appear to have shaken off any Manichean residue, he 
                                                 
53 Sermon 344.5, in Works, Part III, vol. 10, 54. 
54 Sermon 344.3, in Works, Part III, vol. 10, 51. 
55 Augustine, Letter CXVIII.3.14, NPNF First Series, vol. 1, 443.  
   118
retained a strong sense that embodied life will always involve a profound struggle 
with sin.  
 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) 
Aquinas considers life from both philosophical (metaphysical) and theological 
perspectives, viewing revelation as that which crowns what can be gained from 
nature. Metaphysically, relies heavily on Aristotle in defining life and human 
personhood as the unity of the physical body and the rational, immaterial soul.56 In 
this sense life “is the very existence of a living thing, which results from a soul 
untied to a body as form.”57 Thus, it is ‘contrary to nature’ for the soul to be without 
a body.58 Following Aristotle, Aquinas states that the soul moves or operates 
(operatur) the heart, infusing life into it, which in turn gives life to all other parts of 
the human body.59 Unlike the body, the soul as an intellectual and immaterial 
substance “is not weakened . . . by old age or any other bodily weakness.”60 Though 
our flesh dies, the soul remains immortal.61 Given this basic relationship between 
body and soul, Aquinas speaks of death as both the privation of life (privatio vitae)62 
and the separation of body and soul (separatio animae a corpore).63  
 
There is however another sense in which humans alone possess a degree of life that 
other living things do not.64 In his Commentary on St. John, Aquinas bases these 
                                                 
56 Aquinas, Summa Theologica [Hereafter ST] IIIa, q. 16, art. 1, ad 1.  
57 Quaestiones disputatae de veritate XIII.4. ad 2, quoted in Jason T. Eberl, “A Thomistic 
Understanding of Human Death,” Bioethics 19 (2005): 31. See also ST Ia, q. 76.  
58 Summa Contra Gentiles [Hereafter SCG] II, 68, 79, 83.  
59 Questions on the Soul [Quaestiones de Anima] IX ad 13, trans. James H. Robb (Milwaukee, WI: 
Marquette University Press, 1984).  See also Questions on the Soul X. ad 4, X. ad 11, XI ad 16. 
Aquinas of course differs from Aristotle over the separability and survival of the rational soul apart 
from the body at death. See Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Book II, Lec. 2, no. 242, 
trans. Kenelm Foster and Silvester Humphries (Notre Dame, IN: Dumb Ox Press, 1951), 79.  
60 SCG II, 79.10. 
61 SCG IV, 55.17.  
62 Questions on the Soul XIV. 8; ST IIaIIae, q. 164. art. 1, ad 8; ST III, q. 53, art. 1, ad 1. 
63 Questions on the Soul VIII.4. 
64 ST Ia, q. 18, art. 2, ad 1; Commentary on the Gospel of St. John 1:4b; 5:21, trans. James A. 
Weisheipl and Fabian R. Larcher (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1980), nos. 97 and 771, 59 and 310 
respectively. Following Aristotle, there are four levels of life: plant life, which is sensate, animal life 
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gradations of life on the knowledge of the Word who is life and the light of men 
(John 1:4). As such, all creaturely life exists with lesser degrees of light. Unlike 
plants, animals, and other living things, only human beings have the light of men, 
“who live, and know, not only truths, but also the very nature of truth itself.”65 
Intellect separates humans from all other living creatures. Thus, 
intellectual life is the first and foremost life, which is the spiritual life, 
that is immediately received from the first principle of life, whence it 
is called the life of wisdom. . . . we share life from Christ, who is the 
Wisdom of God, insofar as our soul receives wisdom from him.66
Thus, while life in one sense is “nothing else than to exist in this or that nature,”67 
life in another sense is any activity into which one throws oneself so that one’s whole 
being is ‘bent’ towards it. The highest form of life involves the contemplation God 
(vita contemplativa) and knowing Him, a life Aquinas describes as ‘life eternal’ (vita 
aeterna).68 Here, ‘life eternal’ speaks not only of God’s life, but also of the ultimate 
perfection of human life.69  
 
The end of this spiritual life is happiness, an end to which all humans naturally 
aspire,70 yet can only be obtained by knowing and loving God.71 Such happiness has 
been appropriately described as “human flourishing, well-being, or happiness in 
                                                                                                                                          
involving only sensation, sensate animal life capable of movement, and intellectual life, the life of 
human beings. 
65 Commentary on John 1:4b, no. 97, 59. Carlo Leget expands on this theme in “The Concept of ‘Life’ 
in the Commentary on St. John,” in Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas: Theological Exegesis and 
Speculative Theology, ed. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering (Washington, D.C.: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 154. See also Carlo Leget, Living with God: Thomas 
Aquinas on the Relation between Life on Earth and ‘Life’ after Death (Louvain: Peeters, 1997).  
66 Commentary on John 5:21, no. 771, 310. 
67 ST Ia, q. 18, art. 2, relying on Aristotle’s De anima II.7 (415b13): “vivere autem viventibus est 
esse.” 
68 ST Ia, q. 18, art. 2, ad 2; ST Ia, q. 18, art. 3 and  4. Aquinas also notes that man is gradually made 
like God and other holy spirits in the pursuit of the vision of God, Commentary on John 3:3, no. 432, 
184. 
69 Carlo Leget, Living with God, 260. 
70 ST IaIIae, q. 2, art. 7; ST IaIIae, q. 2, art. 8; ST IaIIae, q. 5, art. 8. “Consequently to desire happiness 
is nothing else than to desire that one’s will be satisfied. And this everyone desires.” See also SCG III, 
59.1, where Aquinas asserts that “the vision of the divine substance is the ultimate end of every 
intellectual substance [e.g. man].” 
71 SCG IV, 92.4. Aquinas is relying on a Latin translation of Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, 
ch. 5, which renders eujdaimovnia as felicitas.  
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union with God.”72 Following Aristotle, Aquinas states that beatitudo imperfecta or 
felicitas is an activity of the soul in accordance with complete virtue.73 On account of 
sin and man’s perverted will however, God cannot be properly apprehended in this 
life.74 As such, happiness can only be imperfect (beatitudo imperfecta) before our 
glorification.75 While the contemplation of truth begins in this life, it can only reach 
its fulfillment in the next, where one attains ultimate happiness (beatitude perfecta) 
in beholding God’s Divine Essence (1 John 3:2), a happiness enjoyed by the saints in 
heaven (1 Corinthians 2:9).76  
 
Aquinas explicitly rejects the claim that man’s happiness consists in the pleasures of 
the body or soul, or any created good.77 Though some animals surpass man in bodily 
good—elephants in longevity and lions in strength—Aquinas asserts that the final 
end of a thing is not its preservation.78 As a captain does not intend the preservation 
of his ship as its highest end (but rather navigation), so man must employ his will and 
reason (Ecclesiasticus 15:14) to an end higher than mere bodily preservation. 
Nevertheless, the end of man’s will and reason entails the preservation of man’s 
being—body and soul—where the well-being of the body depends on the well being 
of the soul.79 Bodily good adds a certain charm to and perfection to happiness; 
ultimately, the perfect disposition of the body is required for perfect happiness.80 
Given however the nature of happiness and its ultimate fulfillment in God’s 
presence, Aquinas resolutely concludes that happiness is not attainable in this life; 
evils of both body and soul abound.  
                                                 
72 Brian Davies, Aquinas (London: Continuum, 2002), 159.  
73 ST Ia, q. 75, art. 6; ST Ia, q. 89, art. 1-2; SCG II, 50, 55, 79. For Aquinas, the cardinal virtues are 
‘crowned’ by the God-empowered pursuit of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love. ST IaIIae, 
q. 62, art. 1. 
74 SCG III, 48; IV, 92.7. 
75 ST Ia, q. 93, art. 4; see Leget, Living with God, 148 ff. 
76 ST IIaIIae, q. 180, art. 5; ST IaIIae, q. 3, art. 8; q. 5, art. 5; see also ST IaIIae, q. 1, art. 8; SCG III, 
48, 63; SCG IV, 79.11. 
77 SCG III, 26-37; SCG IV, 92.4. 
78 ST IaIIae, q. 2, art. 5.  
79 ST Ia, q. 76, art. 1; ST IaIIae, q. 4, art. 5, 6; ST IaIIae, q. 2, art. 5; SCG II, 69-71.  
80 ST IaIIae, q. 4, art. 6; SCG II, 81.12. Perfection of the body—a spiritual body that will not ‘weigh 
down’ one’s soul—is necessary for the apprehension of the Divine Essence, lest the imperfect body in 
some way hinder this vision. 
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Of course, it is not possible for man in the present state of life to be 
entirely free from evils, not only from corporeal ones, such as hunger, 
thirst, heat and cold, and other things of this kind, but also from evils 
of the soul. . . . . Therefore, no person is happy in this life.81  
Because this life offers no stability, and ultimate happiness means fulfillment, man 
cannot be happy, for such desire is not yet at rest.82 Moreover, given that our time on 
earth is exceedingly short when viewed against eternity, Aquinas asserts that it would 
be “inappropriate and irrational” for the development of happiness in life to be longer 
than the period of happiness’ perfection in eternity. Finally, since there is no freedom 
from death in this life, it is impossible to be happy here on earth. Ultimately, 
beatitudo perfecta is impossible in this life as all human existence is marked by 
death, a topic on which Aquinas has much to say. 
 
On Death 
Unquestionably, Aquinas considers death as privatio vitae as an evil (malum), since 
bodily death extinguishes the means by which one obtains other goods in life. 
Indeed, corporeal death is to be most feared as it deprives us of all other natural 
goods.83 While the soul exists apart from the body after death, Aquinas notes that 
this is contrary to its nature.84 Thus, Aquinas states on the one hand that he is not his 
soul (anima mea non est ego).85 On the other hand, he states that the soul is 
imperfect as long as it is separated from the body.86 These are held in tension by the 
resurrection.87  
 
                                                 
81 SCG III, 48.5; 48.8. 
82 SCG III, 48.3. 
83 ST IIaIIae, q. 123, art. 4. 
84 Commentary by Saint Thomas Aquinas on the First Epistle to the Corinthians 15:19, no. 924, trans. 
Fabian R. Larcher and Daniel Keating, http://www.aquinas.avemaria.edu/Aquinas-Corinthians.pdf. 
See also ST Ia, q. 75, art. 4. 
85 Commentary on 1 Corinthians 15:19, no. 924. 
86 Commentary on 1 Corinthians 15:19, no. 924. 
87 SCG IV, 79.10-12; SCG IV, 82.  
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Though Aquinas speaks of death understood as the separation of body and soul as a 
natural occurrence, death is ultimately a result of sin. Adam’s sin resulted in God 
removing his preternatural gift of grace whereby Adam’s relationship to God and his 
relationship between the soul and body were disordered, his soul losing its intimate 
relationship to God, thereby surrendering its rational control of the body.88 The 
soul’s preserving power against natural bodily corruption was forfeited as Adam’s 
soul abandoned communion with God.89 Sin then disrupts the order of body and 
soul: the rational part of the soul no longer controls and retards the body’s 
corruption, losing its power over the lower parts of the soul (e.g. the irascible soul).90 
Additionally, Adam was denied further access to the tree of life as a second cause of 
immortality whereby the gradual diminishment of active bodily power (aging) could 
otherwise be replenished,91 as “it was not expedient for man to remain longer in the 
unhappiness of this life.”92 Due to the ‘exigencies of matter’ by which a body tends 
towards decay—a condition whose remedy has been removed on account of original 
sin—the decaying body eventually becomes unsuitable for the immortal soul.93 Thus, 
Aquinas could speak of bodily death from old age as a death “from natural causes.”94 
Like Augustine, Aquinas affirms that Adam was potentially immortal before he 
sinned, after which death was introduced into the created order (Romans 5:12).95 
Thus, for Aquinas, physical death and all bodily defects are both the result of God’s 
removal of His gift and punishments for it; privation is punishment (Genesis 3:19).96 
Adam and Eve not only suffer the punishment of death, but are also punished in 
being reminded of their coming death.97 Original sin then has left humanity with no 
remedy for the corruption natural to the body, and ensuing physical death.  
                                                 
88 ST Ia, q. 97, art. 1; ST Ia, q. 95, art. 1; ST IaIIae, q. 82, art. 1, 3; ST IIaIIae, q. 163, art.1, q. 164, art. 
2; SCG IV, 81.1-3. 
89 ST Ia, q. 97, art. 1.   
90 ST IIaIIae, q. 164, art. 1-2. 
91 ST Ia, q. 97, art. 4. 
92 ST IIaIIae, q. 164, art. 2, ad 6.  
93 Questions on the Soul VIII ad 9, XIV ad 13, ad 20. In his Commentary on 1 Corinthians 15:44a, no. 
988, Aquinas lists four ways in which the soul operates on the body: (1) it gives existence, (2) 
conserves from corruption, (3) gives beauty and clarity, and (4) gives movement. 
94 ST Ia, q. 97, art. 4. Aquinas follows Augustine, City of God XIV.26. 
95 ST Ia, q. 97, art. 1; ST IIaIIae, q. 164, art. 1; SCG IV, 79.1. 
96 ST IaIIae, q. 85, art. 6; Aquinas ST Supp., q. 78, art. 2. 
97 ST IIaIIae, q. 164, art. 2.   
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As bad as corporeal death is however, the greater evil is spiritual death, the ‘second 
death’ of damnation, the eternal separation of the soul from God.98 Nevertheless, for 
Aquinas all death is evil (malum). Unlike Ambrose, Aquinas would never entitle a 
treatise de bono mortis.99 Given the nature of death as malum, we naturally shrink 
from it, says Aquinas, doing our utmost to avoid it.100 Like Augustine, Aquinas 
recognized that “man naturally desires to exist forever.”101 That is, “we prefer that 
the soul attain to glory without the body’s being dissolved by death,” for the soul’s 
natural desire is to remain united with the body (2 Corinthians 5:4).102
We moan and moan like doves (Is. 59:11), because it is hard to think 
of death, and yet burdened as with something against our desire, in 
that we cannot attain to glory without the putting off of the body. This 
is so much against our natural desire that, as Augustine says, not even 
old age itself could remove the fear of death from Peter.103
In addition to the natural desire to avoid physiological suffering and death is the 
supernatural desire for a heavenly dwelling (2 Corinthians 5:10), implanted in man 
by God’s Holy Spirit.104 There are thus two ‘contrary’ desires in holy men: the desire 
for a heavenly dwelling and at the same time a wish not “to be despoiled.”105  
 
Yet, death allows for the development of fortitude (fortitudo). Following Aristotle, 
Aquinas asserts that fortitudo is a cardinal virtue related to the fear of death 
stemming from the sensitive part of the soul whereby one sets aside the natural fear 
of death and willingly endures the pain and affliction of death.106 However, Aquinas 
further qualifies fortitudo with the Christian virtues of faith (fides) and love (caritas), 
                                                 
98 ST Supp. q. 75, art. 1, ad 5. Hence, the term ‘mortal sin.’ See also SCG III, 141.4. 
99 Leget, Living with God, 266. 
100 SCG III, 48.6. 
101 SCG II, 79.6. 
102 Aquinas, Commentary by Saint Thomas Aquinas on the Second Epistle to the Corinthians 5:3, no. 
159, trans. Fabian R. Larcher. http://www.aquinas.avemaria.edu/Aquinas-Corinthians-Sec2.pdf. 
103 Commentary on 2 Corinthians 5:4, no. 159. 
104 Commentary on 2 Corinthians 5:5, no. 161. 
105 Commentary on 2 Corinthians 5:6, no. 162. 
106 ST IIaIIae, q. 123, art. 3, following Aristotle, Nicomachaen Ethics, Book II, ch.7; Book III, ch. 9. 
See also ST IIaIIae, q. 124, art. 3. 
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seeing its highest form in martyrdom.107 Thus, the mere endurance of death itself is 
not necessarily praiseworthy. Fortitude motivated by charity however is an act and 
bond of perfection (Colossians 3:14).108 Charity is evident when one foregoes what 
one loves most, life, in order to suffer what one fears most—death accompanied by 
bodily torment.109 Indeed, “the will of God is for virtue by which a man bears death 
bravely, and in charity exposes himself to the dangers of death.”110 Thus,  
A martyr is a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to 
despise things visible for the sake of things invisible . . . . For men are 
wont to despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even to 
suffer bodily pain rather than lose life.”111
In light of Paul’s statement in 2 Corinthians 5:8, ‘we are of good courage,’ we are to 
willingly involve ourselves in the dangers of death without yielding to fear, for it is 
preferable to be in the presence of the Lord. Though the saints naturally fear death, 
“yet they dare to face the dangers of death and not yield because of a fear of 
death.”112 Though the fear of death springs from nature’s desire, good courage 
springs from grace’s desire; therefore, ‘we are of good courage.’ Our supreme model 
is Jesus Christ. Because God willingly took on frail human flesh, we are more 
strengthened in our own hope for immortality.113 Christ’s resurrection assures us of 
this fact, enabling us to expose ourselves to tribulation and affliction.  
 
Aquinas is in general agreement with Augustine in both asserting that Adam’s sin 
introduced death into the created order and acknowledging that it is natural to shrink 
from death and to wish for a longer life. Moreover, the weight of eternity bears 
heavily upon the nature and length of earthly life, not so much because eternity is 
infinitely longer, but because perfect happiness cannot be secured on this earth. 
While Aquinas recognizes the difficult nature of life, he emphasizes that our natural 
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fear of death is justified, as death is unquestionably malum. Though the fear of death 
encourages thoughts of bodily preservation, preservation itself is not the highest end 
for which we were created. Rather, we are to use the fear of death as fuel for the 
development of fortitude, whose supreme example we find in Jesus Christ who 
succumbed to bodily death and was resurrected with a glorified body. So too the 
Christian can look forward to beholding God with a glorified body and soul in 
perfect beatitudo which makes this life incomparably short. 
 
Martin Luther (1483-1546) 
Unlike Aquinas, Luther’s writings on the nature and length of life are less 
metaphysical and more existential in nature, spotted with occasional hyperbolic 
outbursts. He was familiar with suffering, having witnessed the death of two children 
and having experienced numerous health issues. Luther often spoke of life and death, 
of goodness and evil, of joy and sorrow as nearly indistinguishable. Indeed, it was 
faith’s clear vision that enabled one to see how inextricably related these are.  
Thus faith clearly sees how close together good fortune and 
misfortune really are. Just so life and death are closely conjoined, so 
that life is in death, and the two could not be any closer, nay they are 
actually one thing. Thus misfortune lurks in the greatest good fortune 
and in poverty and misery lurk wealth, joy, and delight.114
Thus, we do well to remember that “God has loaded him [man] with a little of the 
sweat with which He burdened Adam.”115 These statements reflect the ambivalence 
with which Luther spoke of life, though he readily speaks of the sorrows of earthly 
life.  
 
Life is sorrowful in part because we are under God’s judgment. Luther asserted that 
the psalmist’s request to number our days aright (Psalm 90) is not a request for God 
to reveal the exact number of our days,116 but to ensure that we not “falsely project 
                                                 
114 Martin Luther, in What Luther Says: A Practical In-Home Anthology for the Active Christian, 
comp. Ewald M. Plass (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1959), 782. 
115 What Luther Says, 782; Lectures on Genesis 3:19, in Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan and 
Helmut T. Lehmann, vol. 1 (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing House, 1958), 214 [hereafter LW 
1]. 
116 Commentary on the Psalms 90:12, in LW 13, 129. This would appear to be the request of the 
psalmist in Psalm 39:4-7 RSV, though here too the idea points to a recognition and acceptance of 
   126
ourselves an endless number of years.”117 But Luther also understood that this psalm 
serves as a prescription to recognize the brevity of our difficult existence and the 
immanence of death under God’s impending wrath: “we should consider how 
miserable and brief our life really is because of death and God’s eternal wrath, which 
threatens us every passing moment.”118 As such, Luther was not particularly 
concerned about the accuracy of seventy or eighty years, noting that “just as Moses 
set down as a general limit seventy years, so we set down for our day forty or fifty 
years.”119 Interestingly, Luther attributed the considerably reduced life span of 
Moses’ time compared to that of ‘the ancients’ to “intemperance in eating and 
drinking,”120 leading him to conclude that “we could probably also attain that same 
age [as Moses] if we were to control the body by practicing the same degree of 
moderation.”121 Thus, Luther recognized a link between moral behavior and 
longevity, suggesting that our eating habits have somehow incurred the wrath of 
God. 
 
Ironically, Luther asserted that the ignorance of God’s wrath makes the heathen’s life 
more enjoyable than the Christian’s, for they think their own death “is not unlike that 
of a cow.”122 Christians, however, are ‘especially wretched’ and suffer more misery 
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given the fear of future judgment and the fire of Hell.123 Thus, Luther concludes that 
life is ‘madness:’ 
Great is the misery of human life. Nothing were better than a blessed 
death [ein gut Stündlein], to pass away and let the world have its 
heartache. . . . In short, human life is madness. When children, we 
were troubled by childish complaints; when young men, we were 
dying of love; when old men, we become worse, that is, we turn into 
misers and worshippers of mammon.124
 
Luther’s letters to his friends in his latter life reveal his struggles with aging, bodily 
disease and decay, which considerably diminished both his enjoyment of life and 
concern over its length, making the prospect of a resurrected body all the more 
attractive. In reply to a eulogium of an additional forty years of life, Luther replied:  
God forbid! Even if God were to offer me paradise in order that I 
might last forty more years in this life, I wouldn’t want it. I’d rather 
hire a hangman to knock my head off.125  
Luther readily concedes that it is better to have a brief life with good health than a 
long life with poor health.126 As his bodily ailments accumulated, he declared that he 
“desired to live no longer,”127 occasionally referring to himself as “more dead than 
alive,” asking for a peaceful passing from this world.128 Just two years before his 
death, Luther tells confidant James Propst, “I have lived long enough, if one may call 
it living,” that he feels like a “useless old man,” and that the time had come for his 
body to be “handed over to decomposition and the worms.”129 He read Ecclesiastes 
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12 as a commentary on “decrepit and useless old age.”130 Indeed, Luther likened 
aging itself to a disease.131  
 
Interestingly, Luther links the fact that we “are old before our time” in part to God’s 
postlapsarian dietary provision of meat.132 Thus, “we hasten our death by the variety 
of our food and by our gluttony.”133 If we ate simpler food, “we would undoubtedly 
enjoy a longer life.”134 Luther charged the monks with hypocrisy for engorging 
themselves with food following a fast,135 endorsing a moderation which avoided 
Epicureanism on one hand and extreme asceticism on the other (Colossians 2:23).136 
Yet, as he grew older, the rotund Luther resolutely refused to bother with physicians 
and dietary restrictions, refusing to further ‘embitter’ his life: “In God’s name I’ll eat 
whatever tastes good to me.”137  
 
If aging and bodily suffering contributed to Luther’s ambivalence regarding the 
length of life, so too did his view of this earth as the realm of the Devil.138 In the face 
of his daughter’s (Margaret) ten-week fever, Luther declared to a friend that he 
would not be angry if the Lord took her “out of this satanic age and world from 
which I, too, desire quickly to be taken, together with all my loved ones.”139 In his 
Large Catechism, Luther exhorts Christians to observe the Sabbath given that we are 
“daily in the dominion of the devil.”140 In light of the resurrection however, Luther 
admonishes us to ‘run into Devil’s spears,’ for by doing so the Christian illustrates 
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the saying that the greater one’s piety, the earlier is one’s death. Luther reasons that 
“if God is to preserve a pious person to grant him a long life, a special power and 
might well be required, a power surpassing that of both man and devil.”141 While 
Luther acknowledged that long life itself comes from obedience to God’s 
commandments,142 he also asserted that Satan could deliberately prolong the lives of 
suffering saints as a way of tormenting faithful followers of Christ.143 If this life 
involves suffering at the hands of Satan, it also entails a relentless battle against 
one’s own sin. Luther draws upon the images of death and resurrection in baptism, 
and likens the life of the Christian to a ‘spiritual baptism.’  
This life is nothing else then a spiritual baptism which does not cease 
till death, and whoever is baptized is condemned to die; . . . . for sin 
never entirely ceases while this body lives, which is so wholly 
conceived in sin that sin is in its very nature. . . . So, then, the life of a 
Christian, from baptism to the grave, is nothing else than the 
beginning of a blessed death, for at the Last Day God will make the 
Christian altogether new.144
 
Though Luther appeared almost entirely indifferent to the length of one’s life on 
account of bodily suffering, wickedness, and the perpetual battle against one’s own 
sin, he also readily asserted that “nothing is more precious than long life,”145 
acknowledging that humans seek immortality.146 Life and bodily health are the 
greatest treasures one has on this earth.147 Elsewhere Luther asserts that “a man’s life 
and the health of his organs and the proper condition of his body are gifts of God, the 
Creator.”148 In his later life Luther eventually found himself able to praise the human 
body. 
Dear God, how wonderful Thou art in the construction of the members 
of the human body! The heart, the best organ and the most essential 
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part of man, is so tender, and yet we place a strain on it as though it 
were a wall six feet thick.149
 
Such statements were likely informed by his emphasis on bodily resurrection in 
acknowledging that the soul apart from the body is deficient. Resurrection involves 
both body and soul.  
But I want to live not only according to the soul but also according to 
the body. I want my body too; I want the body which I now carry 
about on this earth, burdened with sins, miseries, and calamities, to 
return to the soul and to be reunited with it.150
Just as bodily suffering, wickedness and sin decreases the significance of the length 
of life on this earth, so too does the promise and joy of bodily resurrection, even 
should this earthly life span many millennia. 
But the preservation of body and soul will be accomplished solely by 
God . . . The sight of Him will afford more life, joy, and delight than 
all the creatures are able to accord, and you will have to say, ‘I would 
not exchange one moment in heaven for all the world’s goods and 
pleasures, even though the latter endured thousands and thousands of 
years.151
Thus, Christians are to use this life as a preparation for a better life after this life, for 
a kingdom that will not pass away, so that “their hold on this present life is not as 
sure as the hold they have on the life to come.”152 Any consolation we derive in this 
life comes from the life beyond, where “God Himself will be ours . . . who is the life 
and an inexhaustible depth of everything good and of eternal joy.”153
 
 
The resurrection to come is so wonderful that Luther can speak of death as ‘sleep,’ 
while largely affirming the relationship between sin and death as expounded by 
Augustine. Christ’s death is the only ‘real death’ that has devoured all other deaths 
and is therefore the standard against which all other death is to be compared. Death 
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itself has been defeated by Christ’s resurrection, making our death a ‘sleep.’154 In his 
funeral sermon for Duke John of Saxony, Luther asserts that those Christians who 
have died “should not be called dead people but sleeping and henceforth death 
should not be called death but a sleep, and such a deep sleep that one will not even 
dream.”155 The only ‘real death’ that we suffer comes from temptations and assaults 
from the devil and our own conscience, while physical death is only a childish death 
[Kindersterben].156
 
Given the reality of the resurrection which awaits us, Luther asserts that Christians 
are to find two great blessings in death. First, death means that “the whole tragedy of 
this world’s ills is ended.”157 Secondly, death is a blessing because it marks the end 
of our struggle with sin and vice. Luther claimed that “the evils of the soul, namely, 
its sins, are incomparably worse than the evils of the body,” a fact, if only 
recognized, “should make death very desirable.”158 Moreover, the Christian who 
loves righteousness must love death, since God “imposed death on Adam 
immediately after his sin as a cure for sin,” death being imposed “as a penance and 
satisfaction.”159 Yet, Luther’s personal correspondence over his eldest daughter’s 
death reveals just how difficult it can be to view death in this fashion. After 
Magdalen’s death, Luther admonished his son John “to curb that womanish feeling, 
to get accustomed to enduring evil, and not to indulge in that childlike weakness.”160 
In another letter however, Luther concedes that while he and his wife ought to be 
joyful at Magdalen’s death as an escape from the world and the devil, “the force of 
our natural love is so great that we are unable to do this without crying and grieving 
in [our] hearts, or even without experiencing death ourselves.”161
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Despite Luther’s apparent diminishment of the significance of death, he entertained 
no joyful notion of death, for the whole world is afraid of death: “The whole world 
dreads nothing more than death and desires nothing more than life.”162 Even the 
great saints “were not glad to die.”163 Yet, for a Christian to fear death only signals 
that we “love death and sin rather than life and righteousness.”164 Indeed, “the 
greater our sins, the more fearful is death.”165 At the same time however, Luther 
once noted, “I like to see those who tremble and shake and grow pale when they face 
death and yet get through.”166 Even Christ himself approached his own death with 
considerable effort and ‘trembling.’  
There is no one who would not choose to submit to all other evils if 
thereby he could avoid the evil of death. Even the saints dreaded it, 
and Christ submitted to it with trembling and bloody sweat.167
Therefore, Luther enjoined Christians to be mindful of death throughout one’s life, 
especially when death is not imminent. “We should familiarize ourselves with death 
during our lifetime, inviting death into our presence when it is still at a distance and 
not on the move.”168 Contemplation of death teaches us to place the right value on 
the temporal. In his exposition of Psalm 102, Luther reads “Call me not away in the 
midst of my days” (v. 24) as a petition that God “would not take me away from here 
without foreknowledge and preparation, but teach me to think about death and what 
is to come, so that in this way I might become anxious and a despiser of all temporal 
things.”169
 
Luther’s understanding of the difficult nature of life and the perpetual battle against 
sin largely echoes that of Augustine. Though he acknowledged that bodily health is 
one of the greatest gifts given to humankind, he also recognized that the numerous 
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maladies of both body and soul render any excessive concern to extend this life as 
foolish. Life and death are often spoken in the same sentence. Christians are to be 
ever mindful of death, most especially when one is in good health, and to consider 
the suffering and death of Christ when it does draw near, whose resurrection renders 
our death a sleep. 
 
Søren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) 
Kierkegaard’s concern with death can be examined on several levels, as death is a 
theme that runs through nearly all of his work. On one level, he describes death as 
the end of our earthly existence. He takes up the reality of physiological death in his 
imaginary reflection ‘at a graveside,’ described as a discourse about “death’s 
decision.”170 In this work he distinguishes between earnestness and mood.171 
Earnestness strips away all of the devices and deceptions typically deployed in 
denying or sanitizing death’s reality. Earnestness recognizes death as total, decisive, 
final, absolute, and refuses to speculate on soul’s flight to the eternal realm when the 
body dies.172 Such earnestness thinks about oneself as dead and is not deceived but 
reconciled to life while knowing how to fear death.173 Too often however we deceive 
ourselves with mood where we desire a ‘sudden death’ where we “shove away the 
thought of death and shove death out of life as much as possible.”174  Even the 
sorrow attendant upon a child’s death is only a mood, as is depression’s longing for 
one’s own death.175 He continues,  
Likewise, to be wide awake and to think death, to think what surely is 
more decisive than old age, which of course also has its time, to think 
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that all was over, that everything was lost along with life, in order then 
to win everything in life—this is earnestness.176
 
In considering “death’s decision” as it relates to earnestness, Kierkegaard first notes 
that it is decisive in rejecting the consolations of the ‘false flatterer’ of death’s 
postponement, thereby creating the proper momentum for life by relativizing the 
length of life, enabling one “to make a long life as meaningful as in a time of 
scarcity, as watchful as if sought by thieving hands.”177 Death’s decision is also 
indefinable. Death is “the only certainty, and the only thing about which nothing is 
certain.”178 Nothing can really be said of this enigma, Kierkegaard muses, since 
death is an equality of nothingness, of empty space and utter silence. The rich and 
poor, young and old, the powerful and the powerless, the beautiful and the 
wretched—all are made equal in the grave. Earnestness understands that the tree 
bearing no fruit (Matthew 3:10) will be cut down with the tree bearing good fruit.179 
Finally, says Kierkegaard, death’s decision is inexplicable; death explains nothing, 
but rather “discloses the state of the explainer’s own innermost being,”180 giving 
death a ‘retroactive power.’181 Any supposed explanation is like a wise saying in the 
mouth of a fool. Indeed, reticence towards any explanation reveals the beginnings of 
earnestness. It is “death’s earnest warning to the living.”182 One learns in the 
dialectic of the certainty and uncertainty of death’s decision. When the certainty of 
death has destroyed the delusions of the promised years ahead—thoughts like ‘I have 
a long life in front of me’—the uncertainty of death comes as an aid to the earnest 
person, daily ‘watching over’ the learner’s use of her time, whether young or old.183
 
While Kierkegaard speaks of death as a finality, he nevertheless firmly embraces the 
concept of eternity, invoking such terms as ‘heavenly kingdom,’ or ‘other world,’ or 
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‘heaven’ or even ‘paradise’ as the place where ‘every tear shall be wiped away.’184 
Nevertheless, he resolutely rejects immortality as a life ‘indefinitely prolonged,’ as 
such thoughts undermine earnestness.185 Kierkegaard prefers to speak of immortality 
as “the Judgment.”186 Thus, the question regarding one’s immortality is not whether 
or not it can be proven—for faith exists between the extremes of confident assurance 
and utter despair—but “whether I live as my immortality requires me to live.”187 The 
one who is sure of his immortality has forfeited his life in a most horrible way.188 
Better, says Kierkegaard, is uncertainty, the fear and trembling of a sinner before the 
‘Holy One.’189
 
If immortality as Judgment sustains faith’s existence in life, immortality as eternity 
radically punctuates the suffering we experience in this life to the extent that in life 
we suffer but ‘once.’190  Jesus Christ too suffered only ‘once,’ though his whole life 
was suffering.191 “Eternally understood, the temporal is the instant, and the instant 
eternally understood is only ‘once.’”192 Thus, “the youth who stands at the beginning 
of life says with the same justification as does the old man who stands at the end of it 
and looks back over the distance traveled: ‘We live only once.’”193 However, we 
often fail to measure time correctly so that “ten years or forty years seems as an 
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enormously long time.”194 Hence, Kierkegaard urges us to “let eternity help thee to 
be able to suffer but once.”195 So heavy does the weight of eternity bear down on the 
temporal that our sufferings here are a mere illusion, unable to harm the soul any 
more than Daniel was harmed in the lions’ den or the Three Children in the fiery 
furnace.196  
 
Kierkegaard however does not minimize the benefit of temporal affliction, as it 
cultivates one’s soul and recruits hope for eternity, stripping away the distractions 
that prevent the necessary ‘inward turn,’ the very distractions whose “medium of 
communication is . . . the hope of youth.”197 While one might think that the point of 
life is to move through it with as little suffering as possible, Christianity sees that all 
terrors come from eternity which relativizes all earthly suffering, “and that the point 
is therefore not to slip happily and well through this life, but rightly to relate oneself 
to eternity through suffering.”198 Eternity is attractive in part, says Kierkegaard, 
because the Christian life demands a “complete forsaking” of temporality—to suffer 
in the temporal realm is a mark of God’s grace.199 For Kierkegaard the distinction 
between the ‘here’ and the ‘hereafter’ is fundamentally what it is to exist. One 
overcomes the changes of temporality by means of the eternal, even though life 
involves suffering.200  
One lives only once . . . the God of love is in heaven fondly loving 
you. Yes, loving; that is why he would like you finally to will what he 
for the sake of eternity wills for you: that you might resolve to will to 
                                                 
194 “The Moment No. 8: An Eternity for Repenting,” 297. 
195  “Joyful Notes,” 106.  
196 “Joyful Notes,” 107. 
197 “Joyful Notes,” 114. 
198 “One Lives Only Once,” 294; “The Moment, No. 8: What Can Be Recollected Eternally?” 298-
300.  
199 Journals and Papers, vol. 1, no. 843, 385. Kierkegaard considers Judaism’s concept of eternity 
‘weak’ in that it promises too much in this life.  
200 Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1990), 19; Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 506; Journals and Papers, 
vol. 4, nos. 5016-5038, 
589-600. 
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suffer, that is, that you might resolve to will to love him, because you 
can love him only in suffering.201
Temporality can only be rightly judged when considered against eternity, eternity as 
Judgment which sustains our faith and transforms our suffering—though it last a 
lifetime—into a ‘once.’ 
 
Death and Despair 
To only have spoken only of the earnestness of death and the weight of eternity 
however would be to overlook the profound psychological insights Kierkegaard 
developed with regard to faith and one’s authentic relationship to death, a 
relationship which is inextricably related to his anthropology. Kierkegaard regards 
the human being as a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, of the temporal and the 
eternal, of possibility and necessity.202 As such, the human is a trichotomy of soma, 
psyche, and spirit (1 Corinthians 2:14-16; 15:38-49). While the human being can be 
described as a synthesis of the psychical and the physical, Kierkegaard asserts that 
any synthesis is “unthinkable if the two [psychical and the physical] are not united in 
a third,” the spirit.203 The spirit “is precisely that which constitutes the relation” 
between body and soul (psyche).204 Spirit thus constitutes the synthesis between the 
psychical and the physical. Becoming spirit is also the ultimate goal of every human 
being; to become spirit is to become a self.205 Indeed, being spirit is “the absolute” 
that any human can be, whether one realizes it or not.206  
 
It is precisely this synthetic constitution of humanity which gives rise for the 
possibility of despair, an advanced form of anxiety described as a ‘sickness unto 
                                                 
201 “One Lives Only Once,” 294. 
202 Sickness, 13.  
203 Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, 43. See also Sickness, 127-128. 
204 Kierkegaard, Concept of Anxiety, 44. See also 48, 52, 81, 85, 88, 122, 136; The Sickness Unto 
Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening, ed. and trans. Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980), 127-128. 
205 Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, 13, 22, 43.  
206 Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, 13, 22, 43. 
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death.’207 Kierkegaard defines despair as the ‘misrelation in the relation of the 
synthesis’ between the dialectic of the finite and the infinite, of the divine and the 
human, and of possibility and necessity.208 Despair is also highly dialectical; it is 
both an excellence and a defect, a tormentor and the pathway to salvation.209 As 
such, despair is worse than death itself. Death is not the sickness unto death, much 
less is suffering.210 When the greatest danger is death, one instinctively hopes for 
life. When one despairs however, one hopes for death, for there is “infinitely much 
more hope in death than there is in life.”211 Yet, because the human person is spirit, a 
synthesis of the temporal and eternal, one cannot die from despair, even though the 
body must die.212
If a person were to die of despair as one dies of a sickness, then the 
eternal in him, the self, must be able to die in the same sense as the 
body dies of sickness. But this is impossible; the dying of despair 
continually converts itself into a living.213  
This is the torment of despair, says Kierkegaard, that the self is perpetually dying, yet 
unable to die.  
 
 
Moreover, there are various levels of despair, says Kierkegaard, the first being an 
unawareness that one is spirit. The most common form of despair is ignorance over 
having an eternal self, that one is a spirit before God.214 Most move through life’s 
stages—from childhood to old age—in a ‘vegetative-animal process,’ suppressing 
both the consciousness of oneself as spirit and the seriousness of death.215 Other 
forms of despair concern the imbalance in the infinitude/finitude, 
                                                 
207 Kierkegaard refers to anxiety as the “dizziness of freedom,” or “the selfish infinity of possibility,” 
which ‘ensnaringly disquiets,’ Concept of Anxiety, 61, 91.  
208 Journals and Papers, vol. 1, no, 68, 25; no. 749, 347; Sickness, 15.  
209 Sickness, 6, 14-15.  
210 Sickness, 8. 
211 Sickness, 18; 7-9. 
212 Concept of Anxiety, 93. 
213 Sickness, 18; Plato, Republic, X, 608 c-610. 
214 Sickness, 25, 42-46. 
215 Journals and Papers, vol. 1, no. 67, 24-25.  
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possibility/necessity syntheses of the self in varying degrees of consciousness or 
awareness. For instance, despair is infinitude’s lack of the finite.  
Every human existence that presumably has become or simply wants 
to be infinite, in fact, every moment in which a human existence has 
become or simply wants to be infinite, is despair. For the self is the 
synthesis of which the finite is the limiting and the infinite is the 
extending constituent.216  
The same takes place in the realm of possibility/necessity to the extent that 
everything seems possible, and the “abyss swallows up the self.”217 Time for the 
actual grows increasingly shorter as new possibilities appear 
. . . in such a rapid succession that it seems as if everything were 
possible, and this is exactly the final moment, the point at which the 
individual himself becomes a mirage.218
What is missing is the power to submit to necessity, or, one’s own limitations.  
 
However, one can also despair by focusing only on finitude and necessity. Finitude’s 
despair of the infinite occurs when one forgets that one is a self (e.g. is spirit) and is 
thus utterly absorbed in the matters of everyday life in a ‘despairing 
reductionism,’219 which is also akin to losing possibility. Yet another form of despair 
is failing to realize that true despair is a lack of the eternal.220 In this case the 
question of immortality plagues such a person, indicating that she has no self.221 
Kierkegaard describes this particular form of despair, a despair common among the 
young, as ‘immediacy with a dash of reflection.’ Nero serves as an example of this 
kind of despair, as one who as an adult pursued the aesthetic life and perpetual youth 
while remaining a child with regard to anxiety and despair.222 Indeed, faith and 
wisdom need not come with the mere passage of time as do teeth and facial hair.  
 
                                                 
216 Sickness, 30.  
217 Sickness, 36. 
218 Sickness, 36. 
219 Sickness, 30-33. 
220 Sickness, 51. 
221 Sickness, 56.  
222 Either/Or II, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1987), 221 f.; Pattison, Philosophy of Kierkegaard, 55-61. 
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Ultimately, Kierkegaard asserts that all forms of despair are sin, whose remedy is not 
found in virtue, but in faith.223 Faith consists in the proper relating of one’s self to 
one’s self, where the self rests transparently in the power that established the self, 
God himself.224 Thus, because the Christian can despair, she has an advantage over 
the ‘natural man.’225 The natural man is a child, and misinformed about what is truly 
horrifying—despair—and shrinks from what is not horrifying, death. The Christian is 
an adult, knows about what is truly miserable, and considers death as a jest. 226 By 
doing so, the Christian learns how to die. Christianly understood, notes Kierkegaard, 
death as despair “is indeed the expression for the state of deepest spiritual 
wretchedness, and yet the cure is simply to die, to die to the world.”227 To be a 
Christian means to live, and yet to be in a constant state of dying.228
 
Kierkegaard appears to downplay suffering in this life and a concern for longevity 
with his emphasis on eternity, compressing the Christian’s suffering in this life into a 
‘once.’ His concern however is that one learn to use ‘death’s decision’ to produce 
earnestness, a wise use of one’s time in view of the impending judgment. Yet, at the 
same time, he is concerned that the certainty of eternity might also considerably 
damage earnestness; hence, he speaks of immortality as Judgment. Within this 
dialectic one is enabled to live ‘with fear and trembling.’ Indeed, to be a self, to be 
spirit, is to live in the dialectic of despair as both a sickness and a cure, a despair 
which recognizes that one is a synthesis of the physical and the psychical, the finite 
and the infinite. Thus, whether one chooses to focus on death or flee it, whether one 
lives a life resigned to its brevity and brutality, or expends one’s energy in the pursuit 
of perpetual youth, one is in despair. The former wrongly construes death as the 
worst that may befall one, failing to recognize that one is spirit and therefore eternal, 
while the latter becomes lost in possibility, in imagining a never-ending life, failing 
to recognize the limits of the body. The key to rooting out despair which engenders 
                                                 
223 Sickness, 82. See Romans 14:23. 
224 Sickness, 14; Journals and Papers, vol. 1, no. 749, 348. 
225 Sickness, 8, 15. 
226 Sickness, 8-9. 
227 Sickness, 6. Journals and Papers, vol. 3, no. 3423, 566.  
228 Journals and Papers, vol. 1, no. 731, 340.  
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both a rush toward death and a concern for the length of life is faith in the One who 
has created us.  
 
For all of these theologians the weight of eternity considerably both heightens the 
significance of what one does with one’s limited life while at the same time 
relativizing the significance of its length. Moreover, any discussion of death, life, and 
resurrection is considerably informed by the burden of sin, sin which has marred 
embodied human existence and introduced several forms of suffering into the world. 
None are able to speak of the desire for a longer life apart from reflecting on the sin-
affected nature of our existence, even as the desire for long life is readily 
acknowledged. One can sense the tensions between this world and the next, between 
the limited body and one’s limitless desires fully expressed in these theologians, all 
of whom in their own way address these tensions from within the Christian narrative 
which acknowledges the fallen, finite nature of our existence, and the better future to 
come. They remind us that happiness is not to be found in this life, even though it is 
occasionally granted by God. Moreover, one is reminded that one’s finitude and the 
future judgment offers the opportunity to develop virtues (Aquinas), to place the 
right value on the temporal (Luther), and to pursue earnestness (Kierkegaard).  
 
While these theologians reflect a proper indifference to the length of life in light of 
the realities of sin and bodily resurrection, there were other early Christians who 
believed that there was a way to put on the redemption body and effectively undo 
some of the effects of the curse of sin, effectively reordering soul and body to more 
closely approximate the original order enjoyed by Adam and Eve before the fall. 
Moreover, it was believed that this bodily redemption entailed an attenuation of the 
human aging process. This bodily incorruption however was thoroughly subsumed 
under the process of sanctification which involved the practice of fasting. In the 
remainder of this thesis I explore the link between sanctification, fasting, and 
longevity as presented by Athanasius, who saw fasting as a way to return to the 
Adamic state where soul and body were properly ordered under God. These insights 
will be further qualified by interacting with Karl Barth’s discussion of the second 
Adam, the real man Jesus, who is the standard for what it means to be human, with 
soul and body in their proper order.  
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Chapter 5: Longevity, Asceticism, and ‘Re-making’ the Body 
in Athanasius and St. Antony 
  




“For not only are the souls of the saints different from those of 
sinners, but also their bodies.”2
John of Shmūn  
 
While the last chapter revealed that the promise of the resurrection body and the 
weight of sin minimized the significance of a long life on earth, the view that life 
should or could be prolonged is not utterly foreign to Christian thought and practice. 
It is interesting to note however that in the third century in Alexandria, there were 
several key ascetic figures whose longevity far outpaced the life expectancies of 
those around them. There is evidence that the desert ascetics experienced greatly 
extended lives despite living in very harsh conditions. In this chapter I will focus on 
the great desert ascetic St. Antony as found in Athanasius’ Life of Antony, widely 
recognized as “the first and most influential hagiographical text in the Christian 
tradition.”3 This examination of the Life of Antony will reveal the theological 
principles behind the ascetic ideal, principles which gave rise to practices that 
allowed the ascetic to ‘remake’ his own body in a larger process of refining the soul, 
                                                 
1 Paul Montazolli, “Introduction,” The Picture of Dorian Gray (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1995), 
xiii, quoting Oscar Wilde. 
2 John of Shmūn, An Encomium on Saint Antony 19, in The Life of Antony: The Coptic Life and the 
Greek Life, trans. Tim Vivian and Apostolos N. Athanassakis (Kalamazoo, MI: Cisterian Publications, 
2003), 20.  
3 Samuel Rubenson, The Letters of St. Antony: Monasticism and the Making Of a Saint (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1995), 126. Peter R. L. Brown, The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual 
Renunciation in Early Christianity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 213 n. 1 cites a 
work by R. Draguet as a strong case against direct Athanasian authorship. See Rubenson addresses the 
arguments against Athanasian authorship while acknowledging great confusion among scholars over 
the last several years, Letters, 126-132. 
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principles which approximate at least one scientific attempt to arrest the aging 
process.  
 
Athanasius produced his biographical4 account of Antony in response to the request 
of several unnamed monks around 356 CE, portraying Antony as the ideal Christian 
ascetic, as one who attained victory over the impulses of his own body, disease, 
attacks from demonic forces, as well as those learned in Greek philosophy. It should 
therefore not be surprising to find Antony in alignment with Athanasius on certain 
key themes of Nicene Orthodoxy, particularly in Antony’s opposition to the Arian 
and Manichaean heretics, as well as the Meletian schismatics.5 Though this might 
suggest that Athanasius had composed a largely polemical work, it is worth noting 
that one of his contemporaries, Gregory of Nazianzus, remarked that Athanasius had 
“composed a rule for the monastic life in the form of a narrative.”6 Athanasius 
himself introduces his work with the hope that it might inspire imitation of the great 
Antony, as “a sufficient pattern of discipline.”7 His aims were certainly met. The 
influence of the Life of Antony on the development of monasticism can hardly be 
underestimated. It has been noted that in Antony and his flight to the Egyptian desert, 
“the man on the boundary appealed to many in the center. He came to symbolize, 
through Athanasius’ artistry, ‘the type of the Christian, the ideal portrait of the 
human being, as he should be.’”8  
                                                 
4 It is important to understand ‘biographical’ in its ancient sense. It has been observed that The Life of 
Antony shares a similar genre to the Greco-Roman encomium—a work relating the life and deeds of a 
celebrated person who has died. See Khaled Anatolios, Athanasius: The Coherence of His Thought 
(London: Routledge, 1998), 166-167; William Harmless, Desert Christians: An Introduction to the 
Literature of Early Monasticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 68-69; Robert C. Gregg, 
“Introduction,” in Athanasius: The Life of Antony and the Letter to Marcellinus, trans. Robert C. 
Gregg (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 5-6. Similarly, Tim Vivan, “Introduction,” in Life of Antony, 
xxv, has concluded: 
Recent studies have shown that the picture of Antony given to us in the Life cannot be 
written off as ‘mere’ hagiography or dismissed as an implausible glorification of an 
ideal: whether or not the details of Antony in the Life are ‘biographically correct’, the 
Antony who lives and breathes in these pages is, on the whole, true to the way the 
early monks lived, thought, and believed. 
5 Athanasius, Life of Antony 68, NPNF Second Series, vol. 4, 214.  
6 Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 21.5, quoted in David Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of 
Asceticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 201. 
7 Athanasius, “Introduction,” Life, 195.  
8 Gregg, “Introduction,” 6, quoting Hermann Dörries, Die Vita Antonii als Geschichtsquelle, 
Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen 14 (Göttingen, 1949), 389.  
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The Life of Antony records the life of a man who at an early age renounced the 
pleasures of wealth and the world, who, through his gradual flight into the desert, 
fasting and prayer, continually and successfully battled the temptations arising both 
from his own bodily impulses and those of demons, continually renewing and 
redoubling his efforts until his body was explicitly under control of his soul.9 Of 
particular interest however is both Antony’s longevity and manner of death. 
Athanasius reports that Antony lived to the ripe age of one hundred and five, 
suggesting that Antony’s ascetic regime substantially impeded the physiological 
deterioration of his own body.10 Further investigation of this phenomenon of 
prolongevity suggests that there are theological commitments behind Antony’s 
asceticism, commitments which encourage bodily longevity. Indeed, as will be 
evident shortly, there was the belief that specific ascetic practices enabled one to 
‘remake’ his or her body.  
 
Athanasius’ Theological Anthropology 
A proper understanding of Athanasius’ conception of remaking the body is firmly 
rooted in the narrative of creation, redemption, and bodily resurrection. Specifically, 
Athanasius believed that through ascetic discipline, the Christian might approach that 
prelapsarian state enjoyed by Adam and Eve in the garden. But it is important to 
understand what exactly characterizes this prelapsarian state. It is significant to note 
that for Athanasius, immunity from physiological death was not part of man’s 
                                                 
9 For the historical setting surrounding St. Antony’s life, see Peter F. Anson, The Call of the Desert 
(London: SPCK Press, 1964), 13-17; Derwas J. Chitty, The Desert a City: An Introduction to the 
Study of Egyptian and Palestinian Monasticism  under the Christian Empire (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1966), 2-6; James E. Goehring, Ascetics, Society, and the Desert: Studies in Early 
Egyptian Monasticism (Harrisburgh, PA: Trinity Press International, 1999); Charles Kannengiesser, 
“Athanasius of Alexandria and the Ascetic Movement of His Time,” in Asceticism, ed. Vincent L. 
Wimbush and Richard Valantasis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 479-492. 
10 Athanasius, Life 89, 91, NPNF Second Series, vol. 4, 219-221. The influence of the Life of Antony 
is already evident in Jerome’s subsequent attempt to surpass the feats of Antony in the mythical figure 
of Paulus of Concordia. Jerome claims that Paulus was the first hermit, who outlived even Antony, 
surviving to the age of 113. See The Life of Paulus the First Hermit, NPNF Second Series, vol. 6, 
299-303. See also Paul B. Harvey Jr., “Jerome: Life of Paul, the First Hermit,” in Ascetic Behavior in 
Greco-Roman Antiquity: A Sourcebook, ed. Vincent L. Wimbush (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 
357-359. 
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original condition.11 Rather, he reasoned that since man was created ex nihilo, man 
could only be none other than perishable, mortal, subject to bodily decay, tending 
towards dissolution and non-existence. “For man is by nature mortal, inasmuch has 
he is made out of what is not.”12 Thus, the body is mortal by nature, and “lasts but 
for a time.”13 Since the body was, among all other things, created ex nihilo, there 
could be no question of a prelapsarian state whereby the body was free from 
corruption.14
 
Yet, despite this tendency towards bodily decay, Adam and Eve had at their disposal 
the means by which to slow this corruption. Athanasius speaks of God’s gift to 
humankind, making them after his own image, “giving them a portion even of the 
power of His own Word; so that having as it were a kind of reflexion of the Word.”15 
This ‘reflexion’ was most manifest in their rationality, which enabled them to 
contemplate the mysteries of God. It was therefore Adam and Eve’s responsibility to 
continually exercise this rationality in the contemplation of God. In his grace, God 
enabled man  
to see and know realities by means of assimilation to Himself, giving 
him also a conception and knowledge even of His own eternity, in 
order that, preserving his nature intact, he might not ever either depart 
from his idea of God, . . . living the life of immortality unharmed and 
truly blessed.16
As David Brakke aptly observes, “the body was mortal and subject to corruption: 
only constant attention to God prevented it from decaying into non-being.”17 While it 
is not difficult to detect the influence of Origen and certain elements of Neo-Platonic 
philosophy in Athanasius’ description, it must be stressed that this contemplation of 
                                                 
11 Unlike Augustine, for Athanasius there was no initial condition whereby it was possible for man not 
to die. It is worth noting however, that even Augustine believed that aging was a feature of 
prelapsarian man, though successfully muted by the fruit from the tree of life. See City of God Bk. 14, 
Ch. 26, 628. 
12 Athanasius, Incarnation of the Word 3.4; 4.6, NPNF Second Series, vol. 4, 38. 
13 Athanasius, Against the Heathen 32.1; 33.1, 21. 
14 See Against the Heathen 41.2-3, 26; Incarnation 43.4, 59-60. 
15 Athanasius, Incarnation 3.3, 37. 
16 Athanasius, Against the Heathen 2.2, 5. 
17 Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 147. See Against the Heathen 33, 21-22; 
Incarnation 4, 38-39. 
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God in the garden is an embodied contemplation. Unlike Origen, who asserted that 
the original creation of bodiless minds beholding God eventually ‘cooled,’ prompting 
God to create a variety of bodies in which these cooled minds (now, souls) would 
dwell,18 Athanasius asserts that man was created with a body and soul for an 
embodied contemplation in the garden. This life-prolonging, corruption-staying 
activity however, was interrupted when man turned away from his contemplation of 
God and spiritual things towards his body, breaking the ‘law’ that God established in 
the garden, forbidding that he partake from the tree of knowledge. “But men, making 
light of better things, and holding back from apprehending them, began to seek in 
preference things nearer to themselves.”19 Athanasius uses the metaphor of mixing or 
entanglement of the body and soul when describing this shift in contemplation: 
But nearer to themselves were the body and its senses; so that while 
removing their mind from the things perceived by thought, they began 
to regard themselves; and so doing, and holding to the body and the 
other things of sense, and deceived as it were in their own 
surroundings, they fell into lust of themselves, . . . they entangled their 
soul with bodily pleasures, vexed and turbid with all kind of lusts, 
while they wholly forgot the power they originally had from God.20
 
Thus, the mind, having been turned away from God toward bodily desires, “began to 
be habituated to these desires, so that they were afraid to leave them: whence the soul 
became subject to cowardice and alarms, and pleasures and thoughts of mortality.”21 
Hence, the prospect of death became exceeding dreadful. In describing man’s fall 
from his prelapsarian state, one can see Athanasius’ understanding of the proper 
relationship between body and soul. The soul is regarded as the hJgemwvn, or governor 
of the body. Echoing Plato, he likens the soul to the charioteer. The soul that has 
turned away from God drives “the members of the body beyond what is proper.”22
                                                 
18 Origen, On First Principles Bk.2, Ch. 8.3, ANF, vol. 4, 288. See also On First Principles Bk. 3, Ch. 
4-5, ANF, vol. 4, 342-343.  
19 Athanasius, Against the Heathen 3.1, 5.  
20 Athanasius, Against the Heathen 3.2, 5. 
21 Athanasius, Against the Heathen 3.4, 5. It is important to observe that Athanasius uses the terms 
mind and soul to emphasize one’s universal relationship to God and one’s analytical relationship to 
the body, respectively. For a helpful description of Athanasius’ use of the terms nou~", yuvch and 
sẁma, see Anatolios, Athanasius, 61-63. 
22 Athanasius, Against the Heathen 5.2, 6. 
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In addition to a heightened concern over one’s impending death as a result of this 
contemplative detour towards the body, the bodily corruption natural to man was 
actually hastened. “But when this was come to pass, men began to die while 
corruption thenceforward prevailed against them, gaining even more than its natural 
power over the whole race.”23 While keeping the law in the garden meant life 
“without sorrow or pain or care, besides having the promise of incorruption in 
heaven,” a transgression of the law meant that they would incur “that corruption in 
death which was theirs by nature: no longer to live in paradise, but cast out of it from 
that time forth to abide in death and corruption.”24 Had man remained in a proper 
state of contemplation of God, appropriately unhindered by the desires of the body, 
his natural corruption would have been somehow ‘reduced.’ 
For man is by nature mortal, inasmuch as he is made out of what is 
not; but by reason of his likeness to Him that is (and if he still 
preserved this likeness by keeping Him in his knowledge) he would 
stay his natural corruption, and remain incorrupt.25
Brakke has asserted that Athanasius’ portrait of Adam in the garden is one of an 
ascetic from the very beginning. Thus, initially, the Adam of On the Incarnation was 
“not merely a contemplative; he was also an ascetic in full control of his body.”26  
 
However, the possibility of remaining with God in the garden and ‘staying’ that 
corruption natural to man in light of his creation ex nihilo, was closed down after 
man turned his attention from that which is incorruptible [God] to the corruptible [the 
body]. 
But men, having rejected things eternal, and, by counsel of the devil, 
turned to the things of corruption, became the cause of their own 
corruption and death, being, as I said before, by nature corruptible, but 
                                                 
23 Athanasius, Incarnation 5.2, 38. 
24 Athanasius, Incarnation 3.4, 38. See also Incarnation 6.2, 39. 
25 Athanasius, Incarnation 4.6, 38. See also Incarnation 4.4, 38. 
26 Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 147; Anatolios, Athanasius, 59-60. This stands in stark 
contrast to other more allegorical accounts where the prelapsarian Adam was thought not to need 
food. See for instance Ambrose, De paradiso 42, in The Fathers of the Church, vol. 42, Hexameron, 
Paradise, and Cain and Abel (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 320-
321. 
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destined, by the grace following from partaking of the Word, to have 
escaped their natural state, had they remained good.27
Mankind as created then, both body and soul, was not free from bodily decay, though 
they possessed the means by which this decay could be hindered or retarded through 
the contemplation of God. Thus, “stripped of the protective clothing of divine 
contemplation, people were now exposed to the process of corruption and death 
natural to them.”28 Man’s sin hastened this bodily decay, leading to the condition 
where “the rational man made in God’s image was disappearing and the handiwork 
of God was in process of dissolution.”29 Moreover, the death natural to man now had 
a ‘legal hold’ over man since he had violated God’s command (Genesis 2:17). It is 
this condition says Athanasius, which the incarnate Word, Jesus Christ, came to 
rectify.  
 
Christ came to pay the debt of sin and to undo the corruption of human kind, by 
taking on a corruptible body and dying in our stead. While Athanasius speaks of 
Christ’s death as a ransom or satisfaction of debt,30 his primary emphasis on the 
incarnation involves the restoration of mankind; specifically, the restoration of the 
divine image in us. Athanasius is well-known for his concept of man’s deification or 
theosis (qeopoivhsi"). Christ “was made man that we might be made God.”31 
Elsewhere he says “for He has become Man, that He might deify us in Himself.”32 
Athanasius suggests that part of this deification, or theosis, is bodily. 
For therefore did He [Christ] assume the body originate and human, 
that having renewed it as its Framer, He might deify it in Himself [ejn 
eJautw/̀ qeopoihvsh /], and thus might introduce us all into the kingdom 
of heaven after his likeness.33
                                                 
27 Athanasius, Incarnation 5.1, 38. See also J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 2nd ed. 
(London: Adam and Charles Black, 1960), 346-348. 
28 David Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 148. 
29 Athanasius, Incarnation 6.1, 39. See Against the Heathen 8 for a further description of man’s 
‘plunge’ into the darkness. 
30 See Incarnation 20, 38; Four Discourses against the Arians 1.4; 1.60; 2.69; 3.3, NPNF Second 
Series, vol. 4, 332, 341, 389-390, 410 respectively; Defence of the Nicene Definition 14, NPNF 
Second Series, vol. 4, 159. 
31 Incarnation 54.3, NPNF Second Series, vol. 4, 65.  
32 Ad Adelphium 4, NPNF Second Series, vol. 4, 576.  
33 Four Discourses 2.70, 386. 
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Statements such as these pose difficulties to the Western mindset. Certainly, if the 
idea of ‘playing God,’ so frequently invoked in theological discussions concerning 
genetic engineering, is controversial, the idea of ‘becoming God’ appears no less 
striking. Indeed, Athanasius asserts that Christ has appropriated sin and corruption, 
things pertaining to the flesh, and destroyed them. Thus, on account of Christ, 
“having appropriated [ijdiopoioumevnou] what pertains to the flesh, no longer do 
these things touch the body, because of the Word who has come in it, but they are 
destroyed by Him.”34 Athanasius frequently quotes 2 Peter 1:4 which speaks of the 
divine power given us by God enabling us to participate in the divine nature, 
escaping the moral corruption caused by evil desires.35
 
Athanasius invokes language that speaks of Christ’s sanctification of the body,36 
referring to Christ as ‘the Physician and Saviour,’ undoing the corruption internal to 
our bodies by taking on a corruptible body himself, thereby ‘winding life close to the 
body.’37 By ‘undoing’ death, Athanasius repeatedly speaks of a restoration of our 
bodily incorruptibility. 
Whence also, whereas the flesh is born of Mary Bearer of God, He 
Himself is said to have been born, who furnishes to others an origin of 
being; in order that He may transfer our origin into Himself, and we 
may no longer, as mere earth, return to earth, but as being knit into the 
Word from heaven, may be carried to heaven by Him. Therefore in 
like manner not without reason has He transferred to Himself the other 
affections of the body also; that we, no longer as being men, but as 
proper to the Word, may have a share in eternal life. For no longer 
according to our former origin in Adam do we die; but henceforward 
our origin and all infirmity of flesh being transferred to the Word, we 
rise from the earth, the curse from sin being removed, because of Him 
who is in us, and who has become a curse for us.38
Elsewhere Athanasius speaks not only of Christ taking of the affections and sins of 
our bodies into himself, but of ‘clothing us with immortality and incorruptibility.’39 
                                                 
34 Four Discourses 2.69, 386. See also Incarnation 44.6, 60. 
35 See Four Discourses 1.16, 316; Ad Adelphium 4, 576; Life 74, 215. 
36 Incarnation 43.6, 60. 
37 Incarnation 44, 60. 
38 Four Discourses 3.33, 411-412. 
39 Incarnation 9, 40, 41. 
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David Brakke summarizes Athanasius’ understanding of the Word incarnate and the 
implications for human embodiment: 
As the Word perfectly controlled his assumed body and remained 
untouched by its passions, he transformed the body itself, rendering it 
incorruptible, both morally and physically: The Word’s perfect 
guidance divinized the flesh. Moral courage and control of the bodily 
passions were once again possible for human beings because they 
shared a “kinship of the flesh” with the Word’s assumed body.40  
 
While Athanasius is clear that our ultimate incorruptibility will be attained by future 
bodily resurrection,41 it is not entirely clear how exactly one comes to share in 
Christ’s incorruptibility while living on this earth. Often Athanasius speaks as if this 
incorruptibility has been transferred to all humankind, failing to distinguish between 
Christ’s material body and the bodies of individuals. It has been noted that at times 
Athanasius’ Platonism allowed him to speak as if Christ’s taking on flesh has 
affected all humankind consubstantially, while at other times our divinization is more 
a function of the Holy Spirit.42 At other times Athanasius intimates that the means by 
which the Christian inherits this incorruption is through baptism or the eucharist.43 
Still elsewhere Athanasius draws upon the adoption language in reference to our 
incorruptibility: by becoming man himself, Christ has adopted us as sons 
(uiJopoivhsi") of the Father, deifying man himself.44 Nevertheless, while Athanasius 
                                                 
40 Brakke, Athanasisus and the Politics of Asceticism, 150.  
41 Four Discourses 2.61, 381. 
42 Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 379, referring to Four Discourses 2.61, and Ad Serapionem de 
morte Arii 2.6. But Alvyn Pettersen has aptly noted that though the Logos assumed a human body, 
“there is no sense in which Athanasius is so literal in his understanding of the Logos having assumed 
‘our body’ that he believed that all who shared the assumed body were necessarily saved.” Athanasius 
and the Human Body (Bristol, Eng.: The Bristol Press, 1990), 93; 35-39. 
43 Athanasius hints at baptism as one means of inheriting incorruption in Four Discourses 3.33, 412, 
where he says that “for as we are all from the earth and die in Adam, so being regenerated from above 
of water and Spirit, in the Christ we are all quickened; the flesh being no longer earthly, but being 
henceforth made Word, by reason of the God’s Word who for our sake ‘became flesh.’” See Brakke, 
Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 150-151; Carlton Mills Badger Jr., “The New Man Created 
in God: Christology, Congregation, and Asceticism in Athanasius of Alexandria” (Ph.D. diss., Duke 
University, 1990), 71-74. See also Ad Maximum Philosophum 2, NPNF Second Series, vol. 4, 578-
579, where he expresses eucharistic overtones in relation to incorruptibility. “And we are deified not 
by partaking of the body of some man, but by receiving the Body of the Word Himself.” 
44 Four Discourses 1.38; 3.25, 329, 407 respectively. Norman Russell, The Doctrine of Deification in 
the Greek Patristic Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 177, notes that the terms 
“adoption, renewal, salvation, sanctification, grace, transcendence, illumination, and vivification are 
all presented as equivalents to deification.” 
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is not completely clear on how one comes to share in Christ’s incorruption—apart 
from future bodily resurrection—he continually asserts that Christ as God incarnate 
has taken on human flesh in order to undo the bodily corruption natural to humans, a 
corruption increased by Adam’s fateful decision. Yet, several have noted that this 
deification—in principle a deification of all humanity—must still be appropriated by 
individual believers.45 Thus Brakke concludes: 
Despite this systematic confusion, Athanasius’ pastoral writings 
indicate that, even if all human beings receive the incorruption of the 
Word’s assumed body, they must individually appropriate it through 
lives of ascetic discipline within the Church.46
 
Certainly, talk of bodily deification or qevwsi" creates a sense of unease among 
Western listeners. In his study on deification in Greek patristic thought, Norman 
Russell has helpfully noted the various ways in which Athanasius employed the term 
deification. In general, he observes a distinction between ontological deification 
invoking a participatory-type language with God involving transformation, and 
ethical deification that involves becoming like God via imitation. One finds a 
contemporary example of ethical deification in Esther D. Reed’s The Genesis of 
Ethics, who asserts that the goal of Christian ethics is nothing less than theosis, 
“achieving our potential in Christ” by primarily concerning itself with “imitative 
incarnations in daily life of what we know in Jesus Christ of divine love.”47 Russell 
observes that Athanasius develops these two understandings of deification—
ontological and ethical—in parallel.48 Thus, Athanasius speaks of ontological 
deification as involving the objective work of Christ in divinizing human flesh by 
assuming a human body, likely appropriated via baptism and only fully realized 
eschatologically, and he also speaks of ethical deification occurring through the 
                                                 
45 See for instance Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 1-15; 166-188. See also Anatolios, Athanasius, 
135-163; Pettersen, Athanasius, 106-107. 
46 Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 151-152.  
47 Esther D. Reed, The Genesis of Ethics: On the Authority of God as the Origin of Christian Ethics 
(London: Dartmon, Longman and Todd, 2000), xxix. See also x, xiii.  
48 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 184.  
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ascetic and contemplative life.49 Hence, “the eschatological nature of deification 
does not mean that its beginnings are not discernable in this life.”50  
 
Indeed, Antony serves as the ideal model of ethical deification where his features of 
bodily incorruptibility are on display. “Antony is a man in whom we might expect to 
observe the experiential effects of deification.”51 However, notes Russell, Athanasius 
never refers to Antony as qeopoiouvmeno" [one becoming divine]. Rather, the Life of 
Antony displays the ethical approach to deification, “while the ontological approach 
is strictly eschatological.”52 In fact, as will be evident shortly, the ethical deification 
of Antony’s asceticism did not involve an aspiration to Godhood, but a return to a 
proper humanness as exhibited by Adam in the garden before his fall. Antony is 
portrayed as seeking out ethical deification, only to be realized ontologically at the 
resurrection. Athanasius consistently maintains the distinction between God and 
man, a point especially evident in his anti-Arian writings. “Athanasius insists that the 
grace of sonship and deification does not collapse the difference between God and 
creation into a strict equality.”53 In this regard it is important to emphasize that the 
remainder of this study will focus on the ethical deification found in Antony, who 
sought to become more like Christ through his ascetic regime, even as this regime 
afforded him physiological benefits which could nevertheless be couched in 
transformative language.  
 
To summarize Athanasius’ theological anthropology, humans are created by God, 
body and soul, ex nihilo. While the body as initially created tended towards 
dissolution and non-being by its very nature, the immortal, embodied soul enjoyed 
the contemplation of God and things divine, enabling the body to resist the decay 
natural to it. Over time however, the first humans were lured away from the 
contemplation of God toward the needs of the body, engendering a fear of death, 
prompting them to eat from the forbidden tree, bringing a pronouncement of death, 
                                                 
49 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 9, 184. 
50 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 184. 
51 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 184. 
52 Russell, Doctrine of Deification, 184 n. 23.  
53 Anatolios, Athanasius, 131.  
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and hastening bodily decay. Christ has come and taken on a human body, paying the 
debt of sin, conquering death, and restoring our bodies to incorruptibility by sharing 
in our humanity, and at the same time sanctifying or divinizing our bodies, enabling 
us to participate in the divine nature (2 Peter 1:4). The Christian may thus look 
forward to her final incorruption after death at the final resurrection. 
 
Having established the general theological framework within which Athanasius 
situates his anthropology, I consider Athanasius’ treatment of asceticism in the Life 
of Antony, paying particular attention to its relationship to longevity. Despite 
Athanasius’ aforementioned ‘systematic inconsistency’ regarding the relationship 
between Christ’s incorruptibility the means by which humanity shares in this 
‘kinship of the flesh,’ it appears the discipline of the ascetic life provides the means 
by which it is possible to appropriate bodily incorruptibility. In particular, attention 
to the discipline of fasting gives evidence of enhancing the body’s resistance to 
corruption and decay.  
 
Athanasius’ Life of Anthony 
Early on in Athanasius’ portrayal of Antony’s gradual retreat into the desert, it is 
clear that fasting is a critical element in Antony’s asceticism. Indeed, fasting was not 
an activity that weakened the body, but actually strengthened it. When tempted by 
the love of money and “the various pleasures of the table and other relaxations in 
life,” Athanasius observes that Antony continued to “fortify his body with faith, 
prayers, and fasting.”54 Yet Athanasius quickly notes that Antony’s ability to resist 
these temptations of the devil is enabled by Christ, in a synergistic effort. 
For the Lord was working with Antony—the Lord who for our sake 
took on flesh and gave the body victory over the devil, so that all who 
truly fight can say, “not I but the grace of God which was with me.”55
After this first victory over temptation and the devil, Athanasius notes that Antony 
“more and more repressed the body and kept it in subjection,” accustoming himself 
                                                 
54 Athanasius, Life 5, 197. 
55 Athanasius, Life 5, 197. 
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to “a severer mode of life.”56 Antony is said to have eaten once a day, and sometimes 
once every two or four days. He ate only salt, bread and water, abstaining completely 
from meat and wine. He slept on a rush mat, and avoided anointing his body with oil, 
lest he unnecessarily enervate the body.57 Under such disciplines, reasons Antony, 
“the fibre of the soul is then sound when the pleasures of the body are diminished.”58
 
Antony’s second milestone came at the age of thirty-five after he enclosed himself 
for many days in the tombs where he endured the bodily torment of several demons. 
But the Lord helped Antony again, and told him that his name would become known 
everywhere. Thus Antony retreated to the desert, vanishing out of site for nearly 
twenty years (285-305 CE). Athanasius records that when some followers came upon 
Antony in his desert cell, having wrenched the door off his dark dwelling, he 
emerged “as from a shrine.”  
And when they saw him, wondered at the sight, for he had the same 
habit of body as before, and was neither fat, like a man without 
exercise, nor lean from fasting and striving with the demons, but he 
was just he same as they had known him before his retirement. . . . 
abiding in a natural [fuvsin] state.59
His followers were surprised that Antony’s bodily condition had not deteriorated 
during this difficult training—though bread was apparently only brought to him 
twice a year—but had actually improved. His rigorous asceticism had appeared to 
preserve his body in a healthy state longer than anyone could have expected. 
Athanasius continues this trend throughout the remainder of this work. Indeed, Peter 
Brown has observed that after the initial chapters of Life of Antony, Athanasius 
presents a life “that seems to have stood still for a further eighty years.”60 After 
Antony’s discovery the desert is gradually colonized by monks, each living in their 
individual cell.61 Antony’s subsequent exhortations to these monks reveal 
                                                 
56 Athanasius, Life 7, 197. 
57 Athanasius, Life 7, 198. 
58 Athanasius, Life 7, 198. 
59 Athanasius, Life 14, 200.  
60 Brown, Body and Society, 214. 
61 Athanasius, Life 14, 200.  
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Athanasius’ insights to the ascetic life as one requiring a discipline of both body and 
soul.  
 
Antony encourages his followers to daily increase in their earnestness and virtue, 
given that “the kingdom of heaven is within you.”62 The means by which one attains 
virtue is by returning one’s soul to what Antony calls the ‘natural state.’  
For when the soul hath its spiritual faculty in a natural state virtue is 
formed. And it is in a natural state when it remains as it came into 
existence. And when it came into existence it was fair and exceeding 
honest. . . . For rectitude of soul consists in its having its spiritual part 
in its natural state as created.63
It is helpful to recall that Athanasius describes humanity in its prelapsarian or natural 
state as focused on the contemplation of God, enabling the body to repel or slow its 
decay. Antony likens the ascetic’s task as the redirecting of one’s soul to what it once 
was in the garden. Since the soul that has ‘swerved’ away from its natural state is a 
soul of vice, so also a soul that swerves back towards its original state is a soul of 
virtue: “if we abide as we have been made, we are in a state of virtue.”64 Thus 
Antony urges his followers continue seeking pure thoughts, since they have received 
the soul as ‘a deposit.’ He encourages his followers to preserve their souls for the 
Lord “that He may recognize His work as being the same as He made it.”65 Antony 
continues to encourage his fellow desert-dwellers to resist the temptations and 
appearances of the devil and his demons by continual fasting, sleeplessness, 
meekness, quietness, and piety towards Christ, asserting that the demons fear these 
disciplines.66  
 
After Antony’s extended monologue, he again “increased in his discipline” and 
continually “pondered over the shortness of man’s life.”67 Athanasius reports that 
                                                 
62 Athanasius, Life 20, 201, referring to Luke 17:21. 
63 Athanasius, Life 20, 201. 
64 Athanasius, Life 20, 201. Later on he attributes clear-sightedness to the soul in its natural state, 
surpassing the foretelling ability of the demons, Life 34, 205. 
65 Athanasius, Life 20, 201. 
66 Athanasius, Life 30, 204. 
67 Athanasius, Life 45, 208. 
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“he used to eat and sleep, and go about all other bodily necessities with shame when 
he thought of the spiritual faculties of the soul.”68 Indeed, Athanasius records that 
Antony was very uncomfortable with eating in the presence of his brothers, choosing 
at times to eat by himself, or, if in the presence of his brothers, eating though 
“covered with shame . . . yet speaking boldly words of help.”69 When the church was 
suffering under Maximinus’ persecution (303-311 CE) Athanasius asserts that 
Antony increased in his discipline still more. Antony visited the condemned 
Christians in Alexandria in order to contend with and minister to them, desirous to 
suffer martyrdom himself. Having been unsuccessful in this regard however, Antony 
withdrew to his cell “and was there daily a martyr to his conscience.”70 Moreover, 
Athanasius notes that Antony’s “discipline was much severer.”71 This increased 
discipline involved a disregard for hygienic practices, including the donning of a hair 
shirt. 
For he was ever fasting, and he had a garment of hair on the inside, 
while the outside was skin, which he kept until his end. And he neither 
bathed his body with water to free himself from filth, nor did he ever 
wash his feet, nor even endure so much as to put them into water, 
unless compelled by necessity.72
Antony was ever vigilant against allowing the desire for food to cloud one’s mind 
and rule the passions, warning visiting monks not to be “deceived by the fulness of 
the belly.”73  
 
But he gave instructions for the care of the soul as well. He called for continual 
prayer, the singing of psalms, and careful attention to the works of the saints as 
recorded in Scripture, “that your souls being put in remembrance of the 
commandments may be brought into harmony with the zeal of the saints.”74 Further 
suggestions regarding one’s soul involved creating an inventory of thoughts. Antony 
                                                 
68 Athanasius, Life 45, 208. 
69 Athanasius, Life 45, 208. 
70 Athanasius, Life 47, 209. 
71 Athanasius, Life 47, 209. 
72 Athanasius, Life 47, 209. 
73 Athanasius, Life 55, 210. 
74 Athanasius, Life 55, 211. 
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suggested writing the thoughts, actions, and impulses of one’s soul, imagining the 
resulting shame and embarrassment were such records displayed before fellow 
monks. “Wherefore let that which is written be to us in place of the eyes of our 
fellow hermits, that blushing as much to write as if we had been caught, we may 
never think of what is unseemly.”75 Thus, Antony was equally concerned with the 
care of one’s own soul, whose care was inextricably intertwined with the disciplining 
of the body.  
 
If Antony’s life served as for Christians to follow, so too was his death: “for this end 
of his is worthy of imitation.”76 Even though Antony knew his death was near, he 
continued to exhort his followers to “live as though dying daily,”77 and to “zealously 
guard the soul from foul thoughts.”78 Antony gave instructions to have his body 
buried in secret, fearful that it might be mummified and put on display in accordance 
with certain Egyptian funeral rites. He requested that his two assistants bury his body 
somewhere underground, as was the consistent manner of burial for the prophets and 
our Lord Jesus. For, “at the resurrection of the dead I shall receive it incorruptible 
from the Saviour.”79 Yet, there is evidence that Antony had already received a 
portion of the bodily incorruptibility on this earth. As previously mentioned, Antony 
announces that he is nearly “a hundred and five years old.”80 But even at such an 
extreme old age, Athanasius notes that his body 
remained entirely free from harm. His eyes were undimmed and quite 
sound and he saw clearly; of his teeth he had not lost one, but they had 
become worn to the gums through the great age of the old man. He 
remained strong both in hands and feet; and while all men were using 
various foods, and washings and divers garments, he appeared more 
cheerful and of greater strength.81  
                                                 
75 Athanasius, Life 55, 211. 
76 Athanasius, Life 89, 219. 
77 Athanasius, Life 89, 91, 219, 220 respectively. 
78 Athanasius, Life 89, 219. 
79 Athanasius, Life 91, 220. 
80 Athanasius, Life 89, 219. 
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Even the manner of his death was exceedingly peaceful. Here there is a possible 
allusion to the death of Moses in Deuteronomy 34:7 as recorded in the Vulgate, 
where Moses’ general physical well-being was still in tact at the age of 120, his teeth 
remaining ‘unmoved’—nec dentes illius moti sunt.82 When Antony made his final 
visit to the monks in the outer mountain, announcing this visit as his last, Athanasius 
contrasts the sorrow of the monks—“they wept, embraced, and kissed the old 
man”—with the joy of Antony, who “as though sailing from a foreign city to his 
own, spoke joyously and exhorted them ‘Not to grow idle in their labors . . .’”83 
Indeed, Athanasius describes the manner of Antony’s death in biblical language 
befitting of the great patriarchs. Sensing that he was to “go the way of the fathers”84 
when death was imminent, “he lifted up his feet, and as though he saw friends 
coming to him and was glad because of them—for as he lay his countenance 
appeared joyful—he died and was gathered to the fathers.”85 Athanasius presents 
Antony as one worthy of imitation, whose victory over the demons and his own body 
proved a model for all Christians. Antony’s flight into the desert and harsh ascetic 
regime allowed him to slowly remake his body and refine his soul, restoring it to its 
rightful place as governor of this newly formed body. Before a more extensive 
analysis of Antony’s asceticism, I consider the letters written by Antony himself in 
an effort to more fully articulate Antony’s ascetic regime.  
 
Antony’s Letters 
In examining Antony’s letters, I rely primarily on the translation work of Samuel 
Rubenson whose scholarship and attention to the Letters of Antony are unmatched. 
Rubenson offers key insights that will be gleaned throughout this section.86 In 
                                                 
82 John Wilkinson, The Bible and Healing: A Medical and Theological Commentary (Grand Rapids, 
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Antony’s letters, written to unnamed monks and fellow ascetics, one detects similar 
theological themes, indicating a reasonable degree of continuity between Athanasius’ 
portrayal of Antony and the thoughts and teaching of Antony himself.87 These 
theological commonalities are made most clearly in Antony’s first letter, described as 
“a carefully planned treatise on repentance and purification.”88  
 
What is immediately evident in Antony’s letters is the emphasis on the Spirit of God. 
Antony rarely mentions the spirit of man. Rather, it is the Spirit of God who comes 
to the ascetic and instructs him in the course of repentance. In the first letter Antony 
describes the work of the Holy Spirit, the “Spirit of repentance,” on man’s mind, 
soul, and body. The Spirit of repentance, says Antony, “sets for them a rule for how 
to repent in their bodies and souls,” instructing those who wish to follow the way 
back to God, giving them “control over their souls and bodies in order that both may 
be sanctified and inherit together.”89 Echoing the theology of Athanasius, Antony 
proposes that the telos of such repentance is a return to the prelapsarian condition 
experienced by Adam in the garden whereby his bodily movements were guided by 
his soul, free from the intermingling of bodily desires afflicting it. It is this 
intermingling of bodily movements with the soul that must be rectified. Antony 
speaks of the three types of motions to which the human body is subject. The first 
movement is described as a “natural, inherent movement,” and represents Adam’s 
prelapsarian existence where the body is under complete control of the soul. This 
‘natural’ bodily movement is one that “does not operate unless the soul consents.”90 
The second movement however results from greed and the gluttonous stuffing of the 
body with food and drink, which effectively stirs up one’s own body and induces one 
to further gluttony. The third movement, unlike the first two, comes from without, 
                                                 
87 There are of course, key differences as well. See Rubenson, Letters, 132-144. Rubenson, Letters, 9-
10, has observed that Athanasius’ Life of Antony “reveal[s] more about Athanasius’ hagiographical 
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88 Rubenson, Letters, 52. 
89 Antony, Letter I: 20, 22, trans. by Rubenson in Rubenson, Letters, 198. All subsequent references to 
Letter I are from Rubenson’s translation unless otherwise noted. An earlier English translation is 
available in Derwas J. Chitty, The Letters of Anthony the Great, trans. D. J. Chitty (Oxford: SLG 
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from evil spirits who attempt to hinder those who wish to sanctify themselves.91 
Thus, “one is natural, one comes from too much to eat, the third is caused by the 
demons.’”92 Armed with this knowledge of bodily movements, the Spirit teaches 
man to perform acts of repentance, whereby “the work of repentance becomes sweet 
for them.”93  
 
Antony describes the ascetic process of repentance whereby the mind, under control 
of the Spirit, instructs both body and soul. When the mind is under the Spirit’s 
guidance, it leans to “discriminate between them [body and soul] and begins to learn 
from the Spirit how to purify the body and the soul through repentance.”94 Thus, the 
mind under the Spirit’s influence, 
guides us in the actions of the body and soul, purifying both of them, 
separating the fruits of the flesh from what is natural to the body, in 
which they were mingled, and through which the transgression came 
to be, and leads each member of the body back to its original 
condition.95
The goal of the ascetic regime set forth by Antony thus involves a purification of 
both the body and the soul, through the mind’s submission to the teaching of the 
Holy Spirit. Antony asserts that it is only when the mind is under the Spirit’s 
guidance that the mind can effectively discriminate between body and soul, enabling 
one to sanctify one’s bodily members. The first step in the process involves a 
purification of the body by fasting, vigils and prayers.96 Later Antony repeats this 
exhortation, adding “much study of the Word of God.”97 As a result of these 
exercises, observes Antony, “the body is thus brought under the authority of the mind 
and is taught by the Spirit, as the words of Paul testify: I castigate my body and bring 
it into subjection.”98 Thus, when one engages in fasting and prayer through the 
                                                 
91 Antony, Letter I: 41, 199. 
92 Apophthegmata Patrum [hereafter AP], Antony 22, in The Sayings of the Desert Fathers: The 
Alphabetical Collection, trans. Benedicta Ward (Kalamazoo, MI: Cisterian Publications, 1975), 6. For 
an introduction to the AP, see Harmless, Desert Christians, chs. 6-8; Rubenson, Letters, 144-152. 
93 Antony, Letter I: 19, 198. 
94 Antony, Letter I: 27, 199. 
95 Antony, Letter I: 28-30, 199.  
96 Antony, Letter I: 28-30, 199. 
97 Antony, Letter I: 77, 202.  
98 Antony, Letter I: 32, 199, quoting 1 Corinthians 9:27. Antony quotes this verse again in line 40. 
  161
Spirit’s aid, one receives help in purifying the members of one’s body, bringing 
one’s members under the authority of the Spirit-led mind. For when the mind accepts 
this struggle between body and soul, the Spirit develops “a loving partnership” with 
the mind, because the mind “keeps the commandments which the Spirit has 
delivered.”99  
 
Antony continues by describing how the Spirit sets ‘rules’ of purification for one’s 
bodily members: the eyes, ears, tongue, hands, belly, genitals and feet. Though there 
is no elaboration on what these rules are or how they are enacted, the goal is that “the 
whole body may be changed and placed under the authority of the Spirit.”100 
Through such exercises, says Antony, the body begins to take on the nature of our 
spiritual body at the resurrection.101 The Spirit however, does more than help the 
mind to purify the body, but also helps the mind purify one’s soul: 
And the Spirit teaches the mind how to heal all the wounds of the 
soul, and to rid itself of every one, those which are mingled in the 
members of the body, and other passions which are altogether outside 
the body, being mingled in the will.102  
Antony concludes the letter with an acknowledgement that the Spirit also instructs 
the soul itself with its particular afflictions unique to it—pride, hatred, impatience, 
etc. In the practice of all of these disciplines God has mercy on the soul and the body, 
giving aid to both. 
 
Thus, both Athanasius and Antony speak of the disorder of humanity as one of an 
improper relationship between body and soul. This however, can be rectified, in part 
through fasting and bodily discipline. While Antony himself places a stronger 
emphasis on the Holy Spirit’s guidance or the ‘Spirit of Repentance,’ Athanasius’ 
treatment is more christological. Yet both believe that it is possible to return to one’s 
‘natural state,’ as defined by the proper ordering of body and soul, where the soul 
rules over the body. While Antony does not make explicit claims that a return to the 
                                                 
99 Chitty, Letters of Antony, 3; Antony, Letter I: 44.  
100 Antony, Letter I: 70, 201. 
101 Antony, Letter I: 71, 201-202. 
102 Chitty, Letters of Antony, 3; Antony, Letter I: 49. 
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‘natural state’ involves bodily incorruption, for Athanasius it is a notable theme. 
Indeed, his Life of Antony becomes the very example of the bodily incorruptibility 
possible when one engages in fasting in the proper re-ordering of body and soul. For 
not only was Antony able to conquer demons and disease, he was able to conquer 
himself and the desires stemming from his body. According to Athanasius, Antony 
was able to put on that bodily incorruption made possible by the death and 
resurrection of Christ through fasting and harsh treatment of the body.  
 
Having observed these commonalities however, there are several points worthy of 
further discussion. Though an ascetic regime which involves fasting, sexual 
abstinence, and vigils was seen as a way to return to one’s natural state, a state for 
Athanasius that involved a heightened degree of incorruptibility, the Platonic and 
Neo-Platonic themes in both sources raise concerns as to whether these are not really 
dualist accounts of humanity in Christian guise, given the exhortations for harsh 
treatment of the body. It is appropriate then to question whether, or to what extent, 
Athanasius and Antony uncritically appropriate Gnostic, Manichaean, or Neo-
Platonic thought, and where they differ, given especially the philosophical milieu of 
Alexandria at this time. Athanasius’ ascetic program was developed in close 
historical, geographical, cultural, and philosophical proximity to other forms of 
discipline rooted in views of the body, which, while similar to those of Athanasius, 
were nevertheless more pessimistic. Therefore, a brief consideration of these 
competing philosophies are in order. 
 
 
Embodiment in the Philosophical Milieu 
Gnosticism 
Gnosticism represents an extremely dualistic, highly syncretistic religious movement 
espousing salvation through revelatory knowledge (gnw~si"), which proved attractive 
enough to be assimilated by some Christians even as it was simultaneously attacked 
by others, most notably the Church Fathers Irenaeus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian.103 
                                                 
103 For an English translation of the recently discovered Gnostic texts, see The Nag Hammadi Library, 
ed. James M. Robinson (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1977), and The Secret Sayings of Jesus, 
ed.  Robert M. Grant and D. M. Freedman (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960). For secondary 
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While there are numerous strands of Gnostic thought, asceticism is a common theme, 
and warrants an investigation of these practices in order to draw critical distinctions 
between the asceticism espoused by Athanasius, and the asceticism common to 
Gnostic thought in general, as such practices—including especially the purposes for 
which these practices were instituted—were situated within radically divergent 
worldviews. 
 
While the god of Gnosticism is utterly acosmic and transcendent, he is nevertheless 
described as Light, Father, Life, Spirit, or the Good. This god however, did not create 
the earth. Rather, the earth is the creation of an evil, tyrannical, ambitious Demiurge, 
whose existence is the result of a ‘fall’ within the pleroma, the divine realm 
composed of graded hypostases of the Father. There is thus a sharp dualism between 
this world and the Father. As the earth is thus a dungeon of sorts, so too is the human 
body, which is composed of a material body and soul which serve as a prison for a 
portion of divine substance, spirit (pneu~ma). This move is typically attributed to the 
deliberate actions of the Demiurge and his seven archons as a way to keep a portion 
of the divine captive on earth.104  
 
Gnosticism in general teaches the striving for knowledge based upon revelation by 
which man may release the spirit from the fetters of body and soul, and return to the 
Father. Those who are privileged with this knowledge (the pneumatics) have learned 
therefore to cultivate contempt for this world, fashioned as it is by an evil Demiurge, 
including their own bodies, given that the divine spark within, spirit, is held captive 
by the body. In The Book of Thomas the Contender the savior proclaims, “Woe to 
you (pl.) who hope in the flesh and in the prison that will perish . . . . Woe to you, 
                                                                                                                                          
sources in Gnosticism, see Ferdinand C. Baur, Die christliche Gnosis, oder, die christliche Religions-
philosophie in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwiklung (Tübigen: C. F. Osiander, 1835); Charles W. King, 
The Gnostics and Their Remains: Ancient and Mediaeval, 2nd ed. (London: D. Nutt, 1887); Robert M. 
Grant, Gnosticism: An Anthology (London: Collins, 1961), Gnosticism and Early Christianity (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Hans Jonas, The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien 
God and the Beginnings of Christianity, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1963); Robert McL. Wilson, The 
Gnostic Problem: A Study of the Relations between Hellenistic Judaism and the Gnostic Heresy 
(London: A. R. Mowbray, 1958).  
104 In some versions of Gnosticism, the presence of this divine substance or ‘spark’ is attributed to the 
Demiurge himself, in others, it is attributed the higher powers in the pleroma, who secretly implant 
this ‘seed’ in humankind as a means to secure salvation.  
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captives, for you are bound in caverns!”105 This hostile attitude toward the body 
resulted in two responses: libertinism and asceticism. The former indulged the body 
as a paradoxical form of salvation where the soul deliberately opposed the Demiurge 
in recognizing that true spirit is unaffected by the actions of the body, while the latter 
sought to ‘disengage’ the inner person from the body as much as possible by 
abstaining from those practices to which humans are given to excess—eating and 
sex.  The Book of Thomas represents one extreme example of asceticism in the 
promulgation of celibacy. Here the savior issues condemnations against those who 
“love intimacy with womankind and polluted intercourse with them,” including those 
generally “in the grip of the powers of your body.”106 Thus, adherents were 
encouraged to treat the body harshly so that the soul might make its ascent back to 
the Father. 
Watch and pray that you (pl.) not come to be in the flesh, but rather 
that you come forth from the bondage of the bitterness of this life. . . . 
For when you come forth from the suffering and passions of the body, 
you will receive rest from the good one, and you will reign with the 
king, you joined with him and he with you, from now on, for ever and 
ever.107
 
Harsh treatment of the body however must not be overstated. Near the end of The 
Gospel of Truth, adherents are encouraged to impart spiritual knowledge while also 
attending to the seeker’s bodily needs: 
Speak of the truth with those who search for it and (of) knowledge to 
those who have committed sin in their error. Make firm the foot of 
those who have stumbled and stretch out your hands to those who are 
ill. Feed those who are hungry and give repose to those who are 
weary, and raise up those who wish to rise, and awaken those who 
sleep.108
Nevertheless, salvation is a highly self-referential, inward journey which seeks to 
distance the body from the soul as much as possible, where one gradually comes to 
know the true value of one’s soul in ascending to the divine.  
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106 Thomas the Contender 144.10-15, in Nag Hammadi Library, 206.  
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Manichaeism incorporated elements of Zoroastrianism and Buddhism in teaching a 
dualism of good and evil in the coeternal primal principles of Light and Darkness, 
presenting a cosmology and doctrine that proved influential for several Christians, 
including the younger Augustine. The founder Mani (216-277 CE), born in southern 
Mesopotamia, believed that particles of light were trapped in the human body as a 
result of the creative powers of the demonic forces associated with Darkness. When 
Darkness encountered Light, it not only ‘consumed’ light, but also “felt, touched, ate, 
sucked, tasted, and swallowed it.”109 This primordial conflict has ‘given birth’ to a 
mixed substance of both good and evil out of which everything else derives. Human 
bodies are thus a battleground for good and evil; the human soul consists of divine 
‘fragments’ of light, trapped in and susceptible to the affections of material bodies. 
Jesus, sent by Light, appeared to Adam in order to reveal the true nature of his being, 
that of all humankind is composed of fragments of divine light trapped in bodies of 
matter. Revealed to Adam was Jesus’  
own self exposed to all, (to) teeth of panthers, the teeth of elephants, 
devoured by the devourers, consumed by the consumers, eaten by the 
dogs, mingled with and imprisoned in everything that exists, shackled 
in the stench of darkness.110
 
Through this revelation Adam learns that there is a divine substance of light trapped 
in material bodies, and how to rectify this situation. 
 
Adherents were thus enlisted in ascetic practices to free these trapped particles of 
light in evil matter, practices which included abstinence from particular foods and 
marriage. The Elect were required to seven days each month, and abstained from any 
‘ensouled’ food, eating only certain vegetables to avoid any injury to the light 
                                                 
109 Ephrem, Hypatius, in C. W. S. Mitchell, S. Ephraim’s Prose Refutations of Mani, Marcion and 
Bardaisan, vol. 1 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), xliv.  
110 Theodore bar Konai, Scholia, in A. V. W. Jackson, Researches in Manichaeism with Special 
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entrapped within.111 They were also forbidden from marriage and procreation, as the 
propagation of the species only protracted the drama of salvation, further dispersing 
particles of light.  
 
It is clear however—at least according to Augustine’s account of Manichaean 
practices—that the type of fasting encouraged by Mani differed from the fasting 
exhorted by Athanasius in that the former restricted the type of food, and not 
necessarily the quantity, while the latter tended to focus more on the quantity of 
food. Augustine was sharply critical of these Manichaean strictures for the abuse to 
which they might be put; in particular, he implied that one could very well engage in 
gluttony—so long as the right kind of food was consumed—rather than eating any 
kind of food, so long as it is ‘just enough.’112 It has been noted however that the 
concern in Manichaean practice was to separate the good from the evil—the soul 
from the body—which was an internal process.113 Since the body is a composite of 
good and evil, the purity must be internal. Hence, the restrictions on certain kinds of 
food for the light contained therein. It has been rightly noted that in Manichaean 
thought, “the human body stands at the intersection of good and evil, containing the 
richest concentrations of both substances, each attempting to gain ascendancy over 
the other.”114 Thus, while it might appear that the body for Mani is a ‘hopeless case,’ 
it has been pointed out that the practices of Manichaeism are designed to effect a 
separation of the opposing forces in one’s body, a “reconstitution of the defective 
body by the separation of its antagonistic components.”115 While fasting on the one 
hand reduced the influence of dark powers in the body, it was also recognized that 
                                                 
111 According to Augustine, the Manichaeans allowed eating plants and vegetables, but prohibited 
eating any meat as it defiles the one eating it, On the Morals of the Manichaeans XV.36-37, in NPNF 
First Series, vol. 4, 79.  
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115 BeDuhn, Manichaean Body, 99; 121. BeDuhn notes that the separation theme is readily apparent in 
the Sermon on the Light Nous, which has survived in Middle Iranian, Turkic, Chinese (Ts’an-ching), 
and Coptic (Kephalaion 38). 
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food was necessary to sustain and nourish the body, enabling the Elect and the 
auditors to engage in meditation and prayer.116
 
While the cosmologies and cosmogonies of Gnostic and Manichaean thought differ 
somewhat, both encourage ascetic practices based upon a negative construal of 
nature of the material order, created as it is by some malevolent force. Abstinence 
from food and sex as moral practices were thoroughly rooted in the metaphysical, 
and were encouraged not for the love and good of the body itself, but because the 
body was specially created as a ‘tomb’ for the divine substance, whether spirit or 
light.  
 
Much closer, are the parallels between Athanasius’ theology and Plotinus’ 
interpretation of Platonic thought. Given however that Plotinus’ philosophy was 
largely an attempt to understand and clarify Plato, it is important to have some 
understanding of Platonic doctrine regarding the nature of the body and soul before 
turning to Plotinus as an example of a neo-Platonic understanding of Plato.  
 
Plato (427-327 BCE)  
If one were to read Plato’s discussions of the immortality of the soul according to 
Socrates in Phaedo, it would appear that the body’s constant battle against the soul 
renders the former of little use, and perhaps even evil. For Plato occasionally speaks 
of the soul’s relationship to the body in Pythagorean terms where the body (sw~ma) is 
the tomb (shvma) of the preexistent, immortal soul.117 Indeed, death is often spoken 
of as the soul’s release from the body.118 In Phaedo, Socrates asserts that the 
philosopher is to free his soul from the association of the body as much as possible, 
as the soul can better apprehend the world of Forms when unencumbered by the 
body.119  
                                                 
116 BeDuhn, Manichaean Body, 102. 
117 See also Cratylus 400c; Gorgias 493a; Phaedrus 250c 
118 Gorgias 524b; Phaedo 64c, 67d; Timaeus 81d-82. 
119 Phaedo 64c-67d, 72e-77d, 80a-84a, 102d-107b 
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If we are ever to have pure knowledge, we must escape the body and 
observe things in themselves with the soul itself. . . . . While we live, 
we shall be closest to knowledge if we refrain as much as possible 
from association with the body and do not join with it more than we 
must, . . . in this way we will escape the contamination of the body’s 
folly.120
It must be remembered however that the world of sensible, visible things—the 
human body included—is portrayed in a negative light primarily in the context of 
discussing the ascent of the soul.121 The soul is more fully real than the decaying 
body, even though, unlike the world of Forms, it too undergoes changes.122 
Elsewhere however, Plato presents a different picture of the body and soul. 
 
In Timaeus for instance, the universe (kovsmo") is created by the demiurge or divine 
craftsman, who modeled the world after the pattern of the changeless, eternal Forms 
by using preexistent matter, ‘taking over’ the visible elements and bringing order out 
of chaos.123 All of creation—including the human body—is unmistakably beautiful 
and good.124 Human beings were fashioned from preexistent matter with body and 
soul. Lest however, human beings have too much of the divine, the demiurge began 
sowing the seed of an immortal, incorporeal (ajswvmato"), rational soul (toV 
logistikovn) of man before assigning the gods the task of completing man’s 
creation, including the mortal soul, divided into the irascible soul (toV qumikovn) 
seated in the heart, governing things like anger and courage, and the concupiscible 
soul (toV ejpiqumhtikovn) near the liver, dealing with sexual and nutritive desires, 
including generation.125 Here Plato alludes to the notion of the soul’s ascent so 
prevalent in Phaedo, speaking of the rational soul as God’s special ‘guardian spirit’ 
or ‘genius’ (daivmona), “that kind of soul which is housed in the top of our body and 
raises us—seeing that we are not an earthly but a heavenly plant—up from earth 
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toward our kindred in the heaven.”126 Plato likens this rational, immortal soul to a 
charioteer who guides and governs the two lower parts of the soul as horses, the 
irascible soul guided by verbal commands, the concupiscible soul guided by whip 
and goad.127 Thus, in beholding a beautiful boy, the rational soul must pull back on 
the reigns of both horses who desire to have sex with him—the irascible soul 
obeying, the concupiscible soul hurling insults at the rational soul—until the boy’s 
beauty may be properly beheld with reverence and awe.128
 
Plato goes on to describe the creation of the rest of the human body, suggesting at 
various points that the body and soul share some kind of relationship where one may 
affect the other.  Knowing for example, that gluttony would both hinder the pursuit 
of philosophy and harm the body, the gods fashioned the ‘lower abdomen’ to store 
excess food and drink, lest man hasten his demise.129 Indeed, bodies themselves are 
susceptible to disease, and such diseases of the body can affect the soul. Those which 
pose the gravest danger to the soul are ‘excessive pleasures and pains.’ For instance, 
sexual overindulgence can be traced to the ‘stuff’ which flows in the body on 
account of the porousness of the bones.130 People should not be reproached for this, 
says Plato, for no one is willfully evil. On the contrary, “the wicked man becomes 
wicked by reason of some evil condition of body and unskilled nurture.”131
 
When considering the ‘living creature’ understood as “that compound of soul and 
body,” Plato stresses a healthy proportionality between body and soul.132 A soul too 
powerful for the body can ‘churn’ or ‘set fire’ to the body, tricking doctors into 
misdiagnoses, while a body too strong for the soul renders the higher functions of the 
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soul dull, stupid, and forgetful, leading to the most serious disease of all: 
ignorance.133 Thus, Plato warns that one avoid both extremes.  
From both these evils the one means of salvation is this—neither to 
exercise the soul without the body nor the body without the soul, so 
that they may be evenly matched and in sound health.134
 
Thus, Plato hardly sounds suspicious of the body. In Gorgias Plato’s Socrates asserts 
that gymnastics and medicine are ‘mistresses’ over other professions in the city like 
the making of bread, pastries, and wine, for these professions serve the appetite only, 
while the former best serve bodily excellence through discipline.135 While Plato 
considers it a disgrace to require medical attention on account of inactivity,136 
medicine is good if it quickly cures the diseased body, thereby enabling polis-
dwellers to fulfill their roles.137 But Plato also warns against an exaggerated concern 
for the body because it might interrupt the pursuit of virtue; such concern makes a 
man “always fancy himself sick and never cease from anguishing about the body.”138 
Thus, the wise person will engage in learning which benefits the soul, since its 
welfare is more important than that of the body. In giving attention to his body it is 
not for the well-being of the body alone, but for self-discipline: “As he tunes the 
harmony in his body, it is clear that what he has in mind will always be the concord 
in his soul.”139 In considering the importance of physical education in bringing up 
young men to serve in the republic, Plato asserts that a good soul benefits the body 
more than a good body benefits the soul:  
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It’s my opinion that if the body is in good shape, it does not by its own 
excellence make the soul good. On the other hand, a good soul can by 
its own excellence make a body as good as it is capable of being.140
 
Despite the tensions in Plato’s understanding of the human body and its relationship 
to the soul, between the body and soul as good creation on the one hand, and the 
body as a hindrance to the soul’s ascent to the divine on the other, he is comfortable 
in speaking of both the human person as a ‘composite’ of body and soul, and the 
goodness of this relationship, even if something better awaits. While the soul has 
preeminence, one should neither ‘leave the body behind’ in the pursuit of wisdom, 
nor direct inordinate attention to it by either harsh asceticism or overindulgence, but 
rather consider the exercising of both in becoming the type of person worthy of 
citizenship in the polis.  
 
Neo-Platonism  
Plotinus (204-270 CE) considered himself a faithful interpreter of Plato, and sought 
to clarify some of his more opaque teachings regarding the nature of, and 
relationship between, body and soul. Plotinus reflects on his understanding of the 
body and soul in relation to the two worlds in Plato’s doctrine—the immaterial world 
of forms and the world of sense—arguing that the soul is not the body, defending the 
Platonic doctrine of the soul’s immortality against Aristotelian entelechy, and the 
soul’s corporeality as presented in Epicurean and Stoic thought.141 Following Plato, 
Plotinus affirms that man is composed of a temporal body and an immortal soul.142 
Soul gives life to the body, is responsible for the growth and nutritive functions of 
the body, and is also capable of thought, memories, and imagination.143 While the 
soul cannot desert the body until death where the body deserts the soul, the soul 
nevertheless does not depend on the body for existence.144  
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Plotinus however, turns Platonic doctrine on its head, by asserting that there can be 
no body without the soul. This formulation has derived in part from Plotinus’ 
difficulty in reconciling the unity of the Forms (e.g. beauty) with the plurality of 
sensible objects as presented in Plato’s Parmenides (a doctrine also rejected by 
Aristotle [Metaphysics 1.6]).145 To ask whether or not the human body has a soul is 
to ask the wrong question, for the soul is not in the body. Rather, the body is in the 
soul in the sense that the body is dependent on the soul. Indeed, the soul “does not 
belong to the body, but the body belongs to it.”146 Moreover,  
Nothing is without a share of soul. It is as if a net immersed in the 
waters was alive, but unable to make its own that in which it is. . . . 
And soul’s nature is so great, just because it has no size, as to contain 
the whole of the body in one and the same grasp; wherever body 
extends, there soul is. If body did not exist, it would make no 
difference to soul as regards size, for it is what it is.147
This claim becomes more intelligible (somewhat) by considering Plotinus’ 
cosmology.  
 
According to Plotinus, soul is the ‘lowest’ of the three divine hypostases which 
comprise all that exists.148 All that exists emanates (or derives) from the ineffably 
good, yet unknowable, unchanging, utterly transcendent One, beyond being and all 
predication.149 The One emanates Intellect or Mind (toV nou~"), which is one step 
removed from complete singularity. Intellect “is not only one, but one and many,” 
roughly corresponding to Plato’s world of ideas.150 Finally, just as Intellect derives 
from the One, so too Soul derives from the Intellect.151 In Soul there is still more 
multiplicity in unity. Here Plotinus makes a distinction between world-soul (or All-
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soul), from which the universe, “the All” (taV pa~n) emanates, and individual souls 
from which human bodies are derived, even while affirming the unity of Soul.152 
Soul is “indivisibly divided.” It is critical however, to recognize here that Plotinus 
speaks of the activities of the soul with respect to all bodies in both positive and 
pessimistic terms, as Plotinus is all too often accused of disparaging or disvaluing the 
human body in relation to ‘higher realities.’  
 
On the one hand, Plotinus speaks of Soul giving rise to the universe—often described 
as “a single mighty living being”153—as a perfectly natural occurrence, a universe 
which includes individual living bodies, both human and animal. Here, each soul’s 
‘descent’ is described as a result of a ‘natural principle.’ Each soul  
comes down to a body made ready for it according to its resemblance 
to the soul’s disposition. It is carried there to that to which it is made 
like, one soul to a human being and others to different kind of 
animals. The inescapable rule and the justice [which govern the 
descent of souls] are thus set in a natural principle which compels 
each to go in its proper order to that to which it individually tends. . . . 
There is no need of anyone to send it or bring it into body at a 
particular time, or into this or that particular body, but when its 
moment comes to it it descends and enters where it must as if of its 
own accord.154
Shortly thereafter Plotinus describes the soul’s descent as a natural ‘spontaneous’ 
jumping or as a natural, passionate desire for a sexual union.155 Since Soul derives 
from Intellect and ultimately the One, there is beauty and goodness and order in the 
universe as an archetype of the Intellect, for there is no evil in Intellect.156 Moreover, 
there really is no ‘descent’ or fall of the soul into bodies, for in reality, all three 
hypostases—Soul, Intellect, and the One—are in us. “And just as in nature there are 
these three of which we have spoken, so we ought to think that they are present also 
in ourselves.”157
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However, Plotinus also speaks of the emanation of human bodies from soul in 
negative terms, as a “falling away.”158 While individual souls have an impulse to 
return to Intellect from which they came, “they also possess a power directed to the 
world here below.”159 After a short autobiographical account of ‘out of body’ 
experiences enabling him to behold “a beauty wonderfully great,” he describes the 
Soul’s motion toward bodies in a tract entitled ‘The Descent of the Soul into 
Bodies.’160 In this account the ‘lower part’ of Soul gives rise to bodies in its desire to 
‘break away’ in isolation from Intellect and the desire to govern, becoming immersed 
in bodies. Here, Plotinus employs Plato’s metaphor of the ‘molting soul’ in Phaedrus 
(246c). Such souls  
change from the whole to being a part and belonging to themselves, 
and, as if they were tired of being together, they each go to their own. 
Now when a soul does this for a long time, flying from the All and 
standing apart in distinctness, and does not look towards the 
intelligible, it has become a part and is isolated and weak and fusses 
and looks towards a part and in its separation from the whole it 
embarks on one single thing and flies from everything else; . . . it has 
left the whole and directs the individual part with great difficulty; it is 
by now applying itself to and caring for things outside and is present 
and sinks deep into the individual part.161
While the ‘fallen’ soul is now “in the fetters of the body” (ejn desmoi~" toi~" tou~ 
swvmato"), it nevertheless remains transcendent, and to some degree invulnerable to 
change. This is because “even our soul does not altogether come down, but there is 
always something of it in the intelligible.”162
 
When these accounts of soul and the bodies Soul engenders are taken together, 
Porphyry’s suggestion that Plotinus seemed ‘ashamed’ at being in the body, much 
less Emperor Julian’s ‘Neo-Platonic’ admonition to pursue the activities of the soul 
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and to consider the body “more worthless than dirt,” are suspect.163 Certainly, to 
speak of the body as only a fetter of the soul is to ignore Plotinus’ frequent mention 
of the universe—including human bodies—as a ‘unitary living being’ reflectng 
Intellect in which there is no evil. While Plotinus speaks of the body as a fetter to the 
soul, the body itself is not evil. On the contrary, Plotinus equates unformed matter 
(uJvlh) in the world of sense with primary evil (kakovn), understood as the privation of 
the good, absolute negativity, or ‘non-being,’ though not in an absolute sense.164 
Thus, the body (sw~ma) is not ‘evil’ per se, but only to the extent that it participates in 
matter that is resistant to form.165 While human bodies are the result of form coming 
to matter, nevertheless  
bodies have a sort of form which is not true form, and they are 
deprived of life, and in their disorderly motion they destroy each 
other, and hinder the soul in its proper activity, . . . being secondary 
evil.166
Bodies then are evil to the extent that matter does not take on form—“ugliness is 
matter not mastered by form.”167 Yet, Plotinus urges us not to despise undefined, 
‘shapeless’ matter precisely because it is the very ‘stuff’ with which Intellect works 
(through Soul), bringing form in its wake: 
We must say that we should not in every case despise the undefined or 
anything of which the very idea implies shapelessness, if it is going to 
offer itself to the principles before it and to the best of beings.168
Matter is needed for beings that come into existence. Matter, “makes the greatest 
contribution to the formation of bodies.”169 It must be this way, for matter exists in 
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the Intellect, which is utterly devoid of evil, though in Intellect matter is without 
dimension or size.170  
 
Given Plotinus’ basic understanding of body and soul, he give two reasons why the 
“soul’s fellowship [koinwniva] with the body is displeasing.”171 First, the body 
hinders thought or contemplation. The soul is damaged in its ‘reasoning part’ since it 
is ‘fused with matter,’ thereby focusing on becoming (e.g. this world) rather than 
being (Intellect).  
But if the part [of the soul] which is in the world of sense-perception 
gets control, and thrown into confusion [by the body], it prevents us 
from perceiving the things which the upper part of the soul 
contemplates.172
Secondly, the body of sense experience stimulates passions which fill the soul with 
“pleasures, desires, and grief.”173 The soul then becomes ‘ugly,’ loving vice, 
becoming full of lust, and “living a life which consists of bodily sensations,” thereby 
“no longer seeing what a soul ought to see.”174 Plotinus speaks of the ugly soul as 
“getting muddy” by involving itself in ‘alien matter,’ “by mixture and dilution and 
inclination towards the body and matter,” while the perfect soul directs itself toward 
Intellect.175  
 
Plotinus insists however, that “the whole soul perceives the affection in the body 
without being affected by it.”176 He rejects any Stoic doctrine of striving for apatheia 
in one’s soul. “Why, then, ought we to seek to make the soul free from affections 
[ajpaqh~] by means of philosophy when it is not affected to begin with?”177 Plotinus 
attempts to defend this premise by positing a distinction between activity and 
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affection; while the soul can both conduct an activity and be affected without 
changing, the body can’t be affected without changing. He asserts that “sense 
perceptions” (taV" aijsqhvsei") are ‘activities’ (ejnergeiva") or ‘judgments’ of the 
higher part of the soul, while affections (taV paqhvmata) like grief, anger, pleasure, or 
desire, are activities the lower part of the soul.178 In either case, the soul does not 
entail any change in carrying out these functions, even as the body undergoes 
change. Thus, while the soul causes the body to move and grow (and hence, change), 
the soul itself remains free from change in its activity (ejnevrgeia).179 Similarly, while 
the lower part of the soul may form an ‘opinion’ on an approaching evil giving rise 
to fear in the soul, the soul nevertheless forms this ‘opinion’ without changing; the 
accompanying bodily response—‘disturbance and shock’—is also strictly limited to 
the body.180  
 
Moreover, contra Stoicism, Plotinus asserts that if the soul were affected by the body 
it would need to be present “in every part of the body.” One must remember that soul 
transcends body, “for every soul has something of what is below, in the direction of 
the body, and of what is above, in the direction of the Intellect.”181 Yet, the 
individual soul can benefit by ‘plunging into’ the body, insofar as an experience of 
evil gives clearer knowledge of the Good.182 Nevertheless, this benefit—even if it 
can be spoken of as moving the soul from vice to virtue—cannot be properly 
described as change.183  
 
The soul however also cares for the body; all Soul cares for that which is not Soul. 
Plotinus likens the embodied soul as caretaker or gardener to a plant (e.g. the body), 
“concerned about the maggots in the plant and anxiously caring for it.”184 He 
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contrasts a Gnostic understanding of the nature of things (or, Gnosticism as 
understood by Plotinus), whereby “men fly from the body since they hate it from a 
distance,” from his view where the body is likened to a house “built for us by a good 
sister soul.”185 Indeed, Plotinus found the Gnostic notion an evil cosmic demiurge 
who fabricated this world morally repugnant.186 For the soul to be a caretaker of the 
body is not considered a burdensome task. Excessive concern about one’s body 
however—whether it occurs in treating an illness, in a harsh ascetic regime, or 
concern over aging—pulls the soul away from its most proper activity, 
contemplation of Intellect. 
 
There is a clear tension between competing duties of the soul: on the one hand the 
soul is the rightful caretaker of the body (and not necessarily its taskmaster), while 
on the other hand the soul is also to strive toward Intellect, a striving which is 
hindered somewhat by giving inordinate attention to the body. Thus, when the soul 
“looks to what comes before [Intellect] it exercise its intelligence, when it looks to 
itself it sets in order what comes after it [the body] and directs and rules it.”187 This 
tension is maintained, if not strengthened, by Plotinus’ assertion that “man, and 
especially the good man, is not the composite of soul and body; separation from the 
body and despising of its so-called goods makes this plain.”188 While Plotinus and 
Athanasius assert that the soul is benefited in contemplative efforts by first quieting 
the body through various disciplines, Plotinus, unlike Athanasius, allows no room for 
the soul to be changed by the body, much less an interest in the body as the means by 
which one might refine one’s soul. The body and soul are better off if they ‘go their 
separate ways.’ The good man will “gradually extinguish his bodily advantages by 
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neglect,” and at the same time, “take care of his bodily health,” not wishing 
altogether to be deprived of illness or pain.189 As long as the body and soul are 
together however, there will be the tendency “to swing up and down” between 
excessive concern for the body and a longing for communion with Intellect.190 This 
somewhat ambiguous relationship between the soul and the body has been 
appropriately described as a “Platonic insouciance.”191
 
Thus, Athanasius’ account of prelapsarian man in Against the Heathen does share a 
certain affinity with Neo-Platonic thought, particularly in his description of man’s 
‘fall’ from the contemplation of things divine by lending inordinate attention to the 
lure of the body.192 Such statements appear in line with Socrates’ admonitions in 
Phaedo which suggests that the purification of the soul involves distancing it from 
the influences and distractions of the visible, corruptible body, distractions which 
constantly pull one away from the contemplation of things divine.193 Yet, it is clear 
that Athanasius believed that the body itself could be refined, and marked the entry 
point for the refinement of the soul. Thus, while the fall may have been occasioned 
by inordinate attention to things material, the way back to paradise begins by 
attending to the body. While both Plato and Athanasius recognized that a healthy 
body is not an end in itself, Plato appeared uneasy in giving too much attention to the 
body, giving precedence to the soul over the body, even though the latter is also a 
good creation of the gods (Timaeus). 
 
Despite these similarities however, Athanasius’ assertion that the soul is God’s good 
creation ex nihilo ensures a clear ontological distinction between Creator and the 
created, a distinction considerably blurred by Plato and denied altogether by Plotinus, 
as all bodies derive from Soul as an emanation of the One through Intellect. Alvyn 
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Petterson is correct in asserting that while Athanasius speaks of the soul becoming 
divine in Against the Heathen, there is no connaturality between God and 
humankind.194 Athanasius is comfortable in speaking of man as a composite of body 
and soul, the very assertion that Plotinus finds untenable. Even when Athanasius 
speaks of the soul as something ‘other’ than the creaturely body, Pettersen observes 
that Athanasius is making a functional, rather than a substantial, distinction.195 Thus, 
Pure human life for Athanasius lies not in the separation from sensible 
things, but in detachment from a wrong relationship of soul and body. 
The soul was created unadulterated by, but not separated from, its 
body. The one good God is the Creator and Sustainer of both, and the 
created body is then not to be fled. The human soul is not to be 
careless of its body: it is to recognize its God-given relationship to 
it.196
 
Antony too, while adapting a different anthropological emphasis than Athanasius, 
follows something similar to the Platonic doctrine of the tripartite soul of which the 
mind (nou~") is the highest part. Rubenson aptly describes Antony’s anthropology as 
incorporating a pseudo-Platonic dualism with the tripartite division of man as mind, 
soul, and body as embraced by Origen.197 Clearly, Antony’s description of the 
mind’s critical role of discerning the body from the soul shares similarities with 
Plato’s metaphor of a charioteer (nou~") driving a pair of winged horses (toV qumikovn 
and toV ejpiqumhtikovn) where the charioteer represents that highest part of the soul 
struggling to control those two lower parts of the soul.198 Similarly for Antony, “the 
passions originate in a soul no longer guided by reason, and affect man by being 
mingled with the members of the body, or the will.”199 Athanasius too adduces this 
metaphor in Against the Heathen, where he likens the soul that forgets God and 
drives the members of one’s body beyond what is proper to a charioteer who pays no 
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attention to the goal, driving the chariot at will.200 Clearly however, the goal of this 
exercise was for the sanctification of both body and soul. While Athanasius and 
Antony appear to have been influenced by Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy, 
they nevertheless affirm the goodness of the body and the crucial role it plays in the 
refinement of the soul, even as the language employed in describing ascetic regimes 
at times shares an affinity with Gnostic and Manichaean teachings.  
 
Given that the theological underpinnings of Athanasius’ and Antony’s asceticism 
differ from those of Plato and Plotinus, the question remains whether Athanasius’ 
promulgation of asceticism reflects a suspicion of the human body, given his 
exhortatory stance towards Antony’s harsh ascetic regime in his Life of Antony, a 
regime put forward as a model for all Christians to follow.201 If the body was capable 
of hindering the soul’s proper activity, should one therefore simply disregard the 
body, or even treat it harshly? Pettersen readily points out that the cultural and 
intellectual context of Athanasius’ theology required a substantially nuanced 
understanding of embodiment as the intellectual climate of Alexandria certainly 
allowed for varying stances toward the body.  
 
Certainly, any calls for harsh treatment of the body should justifiably arouse 
suspicions of an underlying alliance with philosophical traditions which deny the 
inherent goodness of the human body as created by God. Yet, several Desert Fathers 
called for harsh treatment of the body. A well-known quote from Dorotheus on 
bodily mortification confirms popular notions of asceticism as a repressive, 
imprisoning regime aimed at utterly subduing the fallen body: “It kills me, I kill 
it.”202 In some cases disdain for the body led to the desecration of the very food used 
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to nourish the body. Isaac of Cellia emptied the post eucharistic ashes from the 
censor over his food while Joseph of Panepho tainted his fresh river water with sea 
water.203 Contemporary Ethiopian ascetics whose lineage can be traced back to the 
Desert Fathers engage in self-flagellation with whips and sticks, including the 
insertion of sharp objects into the flesh, the donning of painful leather belts and the 
wearing of chains.204 Pettersen himself admits that the Desert Fathers’ “withdrawal 
from society and in their harsh disciplining of their bodies, seemed to be suggesting 
that matter was a hindrance to those seeking to be true soldiers of Christ.”205
 
There is no doubt that ascetic practices, like all practices, are open to abuse and 
misuse. Similarly, Antony’s asceticism cannot be so easily vindicated by simply 
condemning Dorotheus’ stance toward the body as a step ‘beyond’ that of Antony’s. 
Rather, such misgivings concerning the goodness of embodiment appear 
substantiated by a terse statement made by Antony himself in Apophthegmata 
Patrum, where he suggests that the body is indeed something to be disparaged and 
escaped: 
Hate all peace that comes from the flesh. Renounce this life, so that 
you may be alive to God. . . . Suffer hunger, thirst, nakedness, be 
watchful and sorrowful; weep, and groan in your hearts; test 
yourselves, to see if you are worthy of God; despise the flesh, so that 
you may preserve your souls.206
Moreover, in his letters Antony appears to echo Plato on corporeality when he refers 
to man’s body as ‘heavy.’207 However, as already discussed, while Athanasius and 
Antony do share some surface affinities with their Neo-Platonic counterparts, it 
could hardly be said that their ascetic regime stemmed from the fact that the human 
body was ‘more worthless than dirt.’ 
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Though Athanasius and Antony clearly held a high view of asceticism, it did not 
stem from a despisal of the body, much less from the body’s secondary status to the 
rational soul. Antony labeled those who treated their bodies harshly as foolish. 
“Some have afflicted their bodies by asceticism, but they lack discernment, and so 
they are far from God.”208 Antony himself says the Spirit who guides one in 
sanctification assigns a rule of “moderation after the power of the body.”209 Though 
undoubtedly influenced by Neo-Platonic thought, Rubenson notes that for Antony, 
“matter is at one and the same time the source of ‘the power of the devil,’ and the 
precondition for progress in virtue.”210 Indeed, Antony’s first letter spells out in 
some detail how the various members of the body can be purified, enabling one to 
move towards the fully-transformed body at the resurrection. The fact then that the 
body might be transformed presupposes, to some extent, its inherent goodness. 
Rubenson summarizes Antony’s view of asceticism: 
It is clear that he did not share the contempt for the body manifest 
both in Plotinus and in Gnosticism. The body is to him not an 
irrelevant piece of matter, nor a prison of the soul, but a home to be 
cleansed, a sacrifice to be purified. . . . . The body is to Antony not 
evil per se, nor is it responsible for its misuse; it is created for a good 
purpose, and only needs to be brought back to its original nature. The 
body is not simply to be discarded; it can be transformed.211  
Asceticism was supported and sustained by the belief that the body, created by God, 
could be transformed through various practices. Though Antony and Athanasius 
employed Platonic images in their anthropological distinctions, they did not share the 
philosophy behind such images. Rather, for Athanasius, the body as God’s good 
creation served as a protective against deprecation of the body.  
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Indeed, Pettersen observes that it was Athanasius’ striking doctrine of the body 
created ex nihilo which created and preserved a clear distinction between the Creator 
and the created, providing the basis for the goodness of the human body.  
All that exists then, the body included, is on the one hand the direct 
result of the fashioning of a God who cannot create anything that is 
evil; on the other hand it is such as only exists in and through the 
sustaining will of God.212  
While the body was of value to the soul, notes Pettersen, its primary value came from 
God, the body’s maker and sustainer. The goodness of the body is further 
emphasized by the incarnation. Though humankind was lead astray by the passions 
of the body, Christ’s coming in the flesh demonstrated the goodness of embodiment. 
Athanasius himself puts this eloquently in Against the Heathen: 
But the reason why the Word, the Word of God, has united Himself 
with created things is truly wonderful, and teaches us that the present 
order of things is none otherwise than is fitting.213
Athanasius believed the body to be of such significance, “that it was not 
inappropriate for the divine Logos to become incarnate by taking a body.”214 That 
God took on flesh can be none other than creation affirming. The goodness of 
embodiment itself sets a limit to both the practice of and motivation for asceticism. 
 
Insights from Kallistos Ware prove particularly helpful in discerning the motivations, 
and hence the moral standing of ascetic practices. In order to distinguish between 
proper and improper ascetic discipline, Ware borrows a distinction between ‘natural 
asceticism’ and ‘unnatural asceticism.’215 The former is creation affirming, while the 
latter is creation-denying. Generally, observes Ware, unnatural asceticism “evinces 
either explicitly or implicitly a distinct hatred for God’s creation, and particularly the 
body.”216 Unnatural asceticism, for instance, seeks out special forms of mortification, 
inflicting gratuitous pain on the body by wearing spikes to pierce one’s flesh, or by 
fastening oneself in chains or iron fetters. A contemporary example is found in 
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Tolstoy, where the hermit Sergius seizes an axe and lops off his left index finger in 
an effort to calm his lust.217 But natural asceticism, says Ware, seeks neither to maim 
the body nor cause it unnecessary pain, but rather reduces physical needs to a 
minimum. Unnatural asceticism involves starving the body and weakening it to a 
point where one could no longer serve another, or by intentionally making food and 
drink repulsive, while natural asceticism may simply mean limiting one’s diet to 
vegetables and water and avoiding such foods as wine or meat.218
 
This general stance on asceticism, claims Ware, has been adopted as the official 
attitude of the church from the fourth century onwards. He notes that the early church 
recognized the legitimacy of voluntary asceticism, not as a denial of one’s body, but 
as an affirmation of the goodness of both the body and of God’s creation in general. 
Abstaining from the things of material creation out of a loathing of such materiality 
was considered heretical, as pointed out in the Apostolic Canons (Syria, c. 400 CE): 
If any bishop, presbyter or deacon, or any other member of the clergy, 
abstains from marriage, or from meat and wine, not by way of 
asceticism (askēsis) but out of abhorrence for these things, forgetting 
that God made “all things altogether good and beautiful” (Gen. 1:31), 
and that “he created humankind male and female” (Gen. 1:27), and so 
blaspheming the work of creation, let him be corrected, or else be 
deposed and cast out of the Church. The same applies also to a lay 
person.219
Consistent with what has been observed in the early Egyptian eremitic context thus 
far, fasting is the means by which one learns to control his or her body. Moreover, in 
such a communal context, ascetic practices are not without social implications as 
well, a point which will be more fully explored in the final chapter. Ware concludes, 
We fast, not out of hatred for God’s creation, but so as to control the 
body; also fasting enables us to help the poor, for the food that we 
ourselves refrain from eating can be given to others who are in need. 
Natural asceticism, it can be argued, is warfare not against the body 
but for the body.220
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Interestingly, he traces the early church’s stance towards asceticism back to Antony 
and Athanasius, asserting that “the earliest and most influential of all Greek monastic 
texts, the Life of Antony, adopts a markedly positive attitude towards the body.”221 
This positive attitude calls for moderation with one’s body, even as it may be 
transformed by such practices.  
 
Though the body is good in itself as created by God, it is nevertheless also 
recognized as the source of passions that must be held in check.222 Yet, as is clear 
from the opening chapters of Against the Pagans and On the Incarnation, 
embodiment for Athanasius represents the possibility of a fall if Adam does not keep 
appropriate control of his bodily desires. Pettersen observes, “whereas Platonists 
regarded human materiality as the mark of the Fall, Athanasius saw such as granting 
its possibility.”223 From the very beginning of existence, Athanasius presents Adam 
as one who is already an ascetic of sorts, keeping his soul firmly in control of his 
bodily passions. Sin was born when Adam was turned away in his contemplative 
efforts towards his bodily passions. However, this original misuse of Adam’s free 
will whereby he turned his attention away from God towards his body and bodily 
sensations does not signal that the body is in some way inferior to the soul. Rather, 
asserts Pettersen, the problem lay in Adam’s assessment of the value of the body as 
independent from God.224 “Athanasius may associate sin and the body; but he never 
transmutes this into an equation. The body is the victim and not the origin of sin.”225 
In light of Christ’s incarnation however, there comes a way to transform one’s body, 
thereby undoing to some extent bodily corruption and decay. This transformation 
however, was unattainable without an ascetic regime by which the passions of the 
body might be brought under control. Even though it has been established that 
Antony’s ascetic regime as portrayed by Athanasius did not stem from a 
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disparagement of the body endemic to other philosophical systems at that time, the 
extreme images reflected in Antony’s discipline still suggest the idea of a bodily 
mortification that implicitly denies the goodness of the human body. If therefore, 
ascetic discipline is to be posited as an alternative to prolongevity via genetic 
engineering, the idea of mortification must be addressed.  
 
On Bodily Mortification  
Both Antony and Athanasius allude to mortification in their writings, citing the 
apostle Paul in support of such notions. Pettersen too acknowledges that there are 
references to bodily mortification in the Life of Antony, yet maintains that these 
references “do not however countermand the positive attitude to the body.”226 The 
clearest reference to mortification occurs in Life of Antony 7, where Athanasius 
claims that Antony “more and more . . . mortified the body and kept it under 
subjection, so that he would not, after conquering some challenges, trip up in 
others.”227 Athanasius alludes to 1 Corinthians 9:27 where Paul ‘pommels’ 
(uJpwpiavzw) his body and keeps it in subjection (doulagwgevw). But Pettersen notes 
that the context of this statement follows Antony’s victory over the spirit of 
fornication. Thus, Antony here is speaking of a withdrawal from the Tempter, and 
not a withdrawal from the body. Moreover, Pettersen astutely notes that just two 
chapters prior Athanasius records how the Lord helped Antony resist the temptations 
of the devil, asserting that it is the Lord “who for our sake took flesh and gave the 
body victory over the devil.”228  Antony also draws upon the mortification theme in 
his letters. His exhortation to subdue the body comes in the context of restricting the 
bodily movements—especially the desires stirred up by gluttony—so that one’s 
bodily members might be purified. Like Athanasius, Antony quotes Paul: “I castigate 
my body and bring it into subjection.”229 The second and more explicit reference to 
mortification occurs after his description of purification for one’s bodily members, 
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where he cites Colossians 3:5, “Mortify your members which are upon the earth; 
fornication, uncleanness, and evil desires, and so forth.”230 Yet, Antony here is 
speaking particularly of the bodily movements, and not the body itself. It must be 
remembered that the purpose of these mortifications was “so that the whole body 
may be changed and placed under the authority of the Spirit.”231
 
Another allusion to mortification is found in Life of Antony 46, where Antony is 
disappointed at not being numbered among the martyred in Alexandria. Antony had 
made the trip to Alexandria to comfort the Christians condemned to death, 
contending with them and if possible sharing in their fate. While Pettersen admits 
that Antony’s disappointment might imply anti-materialism, he suggests that it more 
likely reflects a desire to share in Christ’s passion. Another point which might have 
bolstered Pettersen’s claim is the fact that though Antony longed for martyrdom, he 
was “not willing to give himself up.”232 Here Pettersen detects a reference to Paul in 
his letter to the Philippians 1:20-24 where he wrestles with the tension between 
departure and presence with the Lord and remaining in his body, though his ultimate 
concern was that Christ be exalted in his body—whether by life or death. Even 
Antony’s apparent delight in his approaching death (Life of Antony 46, 89) should 
not be interpreted as a liberation from the body, notes Pettersen, given especially 
Antony’s hope for a resurrection body (Life of Antony 91). “The delight in the 
approaching death is rather that of joy in approaching a life lived in an incorruptible 
body, in the presence of God.”233 Thus, while there are reflections in the writings of 
both Athanasius and Antony which draw upon the idea of mortification, these 
extreme measures of reigning in the passions of the body were not pursued because 
the body was considered evil, or of secondary status to the soul. In fact, Pettersen 
suggests that an alternative interpretation of mortification might involve putting 
bodily abuse itself to death.234 Though the idea of mortification is present in both 
Athanasius’ and Antony’s works, such mortification is not the mortification of the 
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body itself. Pettersen here has realized a crucial and necessary distinction: while the 
body is indeed mortal, and while one is to put to death the sinful deeds of the body 
by acts of mortification, the body itself is not to be mortified.235 Though the body has 
suffered the consequences of sin, it is to be controlled and not annihilated.”236  
 
For Athanasius, mortification through an ascetic regime stems from the desire to 
conform oneself to Christ, the Logos, enabling the body to become a “media of 
incarnate expression”237 to a hurting world. Asceticism was not a simple denial of 
the body, “but of relating it to the lordly and enlivening Logos, (therein finding its 
truly creaturely status and role).”238 Thus, Pettersen claims that for Athanasius the 
body has a symbolic function of expressing the divine mind, and at the same time an 
instrumental function in effecting the purposes of God.239 “A person, as it were, 
brings God to mankind by interpreting God ‘incarnate’ in his or her own body, and 
the same person directs and offers that body to God.”240 As will be evident shortly, 
both are visible in Antony, who repeatedly exhorts his followers to offer their bodies 
as living sacrifices to the Lord.241 Pettersen refers to the body in this sense as a 
‘sacramental body,’ where the body itself is revered and recognized as the locus of 
God’s activity in the world, while at the same time directing such actions to God. 
Thus, on the one hand, “a person is to play a priestly role towards himself or herself 
as a body,”242 while on the other, “each [person] is to contemplate God’s purposes 
and intentions, and, in the light of such reflection, to be active through his or her 
body towards the created world.”243 In this way then, “a person’s body is created and 
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sustained to be one of God’s media of incarnate expression.”244 Thus, the idea of 
mortification is limited and reinterpreted by the inherent goodness of the material 
body as created by God, and as further confirmed by Christ’s incarnation, where 
Christ offered himself as the sacrifice for the sins of all. While the body certainly 
requires discipline, it is ultimately to accomplish God’s purposes in his world. 
 
If the idea of bodily mortification has been reinterpreted, so too must the idea that a 
return of the soul to its ‘natural state’ is a subtle form of Stoic thought. Athanasius’ 
asceticism is not a flight from the transient nature of the flesh and its turpitudes, an 
ajpavqeia that seeks to rise above the distractions of the body, for Athanasius’ 
theological anthropology inherently denies the common philosophical association of 
evil with mutability and good with the unchanging.245 Indeed, Pettersen notes that  
the ideal towards which Athanasius strove was not so much the rising 
above the suffering and sin of the flesh, as the transforming, through 
God’s grace, of the world and the flesh.”246  
There is no denying however, that Athanasius employs Stoic imagery in his depiction 
of Antony as he progresses in the ways of asceticism, noting that he was ‘calm in 
appearance’ possessing a marked ‘serenity of manner,’ neither inappropriately 
overjoyed nor depressed.247 This would not be unusual, as elements of Stoicism are 
visible in several of the Greek fathers, including Clement of Alexandria, Gregory of 
Nyssa, and John Climactus.248 While the exhortation to ‘kill the passions’ was not an 
uncommon theme among the Desert Fathers,249 Ware responds, “cannot even the 
passions be redirected and used in God’s service?”250 While acknowledging that 
asceticism has often been negatively construed as a subduing the passions stemming 
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from a hatred of the body, Ware avers that asceticism “can also be interpreted in 
more affirmative terms, as the reintegration of the body and the transformation of the 
passions into their true and natural condition.”251  
 
Thus, asceticism as practiced and taught by Athanasius and Antony represents one 
possible means by which humans are able to put on the bodily incorruptibility made 
possible by the bodily resurrection of Christ. The impulses of the body were not 
simply to be subdued so that the soul might focus on its own contemplative activity, 
but so that the body itself might be transformed. As will become evident shortly, 
ascetic practices—fasting in particular—was thought to effectively slow down the 
body in the hopes that the body might be remade.  
 
On Fasting and Remaking the Body 
That the body was somewhat malleable was a common viewpoint among the early 
Christians from at least the third century onwards. Peter R. L. Brown has carried out 
an extensive study on embodiment as interpreted by early Christianity, offering key 
insights to the perception of bodily functioning. That the body might be remade was 
wholly consistent with theories of bodily functioning and operation at this time, 
observes Brown, who describes the body’s operations as a closed or ‘autarkic’ 
system capable of conserving its own energy, a system most fully realized and 
identified with prelapsarian man and woman. 
The ascetics of late antiquity tended to view the human body as an 
“autarkic” system. In ideal conditions it was thought capable of 
running on its own “heat”; it would need only enough nourishment to 
keep that heat alive. In its “natural” state—a state with which the 
ascetics tended to identify the bodies of Adam and Eve—the body had 
acted like a finely tuned engine, capable of “idling” indefinitely.252
I have already demonstrated that Athanasius and Antony shared the belief that 
asceticism allowed one to remake the body, returning it to the ‘natural’ (fuvsi") state 
of Adam and Eve before the fall. According to Derwas J. Chitty, this theme was 
                                                 
251 Ware, “Way of the Ascetics?,” 12, emphasis mine. 
252 Body and Society, 223. He observes that this view of the body is espoused by Gregory of Nyssa, in 
On the Making of Man, 30. See also Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 241. 
  192
constantly taught by the East Christian ascetics.253 “Their aim is the recovery of 
Adam’s condition before the Fall . . . man’s fallen condition being paraV fuvsin—
‘unnatural.’”254  Thus, there is a widespread belief that ascetic practices were 
instrumental in the recovery of the Adamic state. Brown concludes that “the body-
image which the ascetics brought with them into the desert gave considerable 
cognitive and emotional support to their hope for change through self-
mortification.”255 In particular, the discipline of fasting held the most promise in 
transforming one’s body into a ‘finely tuned engine.’ 
 
Fasting 
Critical to the recovery of the Adamic state was the ascetic discipline of fasting. 
When discussing the importance of the body in Patristic thought, Brown can scarcely 
underestimate the importance of fasting for the Church Fathers, particularly those 
ascetics who endured the impossibly inhumane conditions of the nearly 
uninhabitable desert.  
Once they had faced out the terrible risks involved in remaining 
human in a nonhuman environment, the men of the desert were 
thought capable of recovering, in the hushed silence of that dead 
landscape, a touch of the unimaginable glory of Adam’s first state. 
Hence the importance of fasting in the world of the Desert Fathers.256
Here, Brown echoes the sentiments of both Athanasius and Antony; that fasting 
enabled one to return to the bodily state experienced by Adam in the garden, a bodily 
state often referred to as ‘natural.’ He notes that many believed that Adam’s sin was 
intimately and inextricably intertwined with his belly; hence, the denial of one’s 
stomach was on the pathway back to Eden. “To fast heroically, by living in the 
desert, the land without food, was to relive Adam’s first and most fatal temptation, 
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and to overcome it, as Adam had not done.”257 Even those who did not dwell in the 
desert were not exempt from periodic practices of fasting at different times 
throughout the year. “To fast for Lent,” for instance, “was to undo a little of the 
fateful sin of Adam.”258 But for those pursuing the life of asceticism were forced to 
endure what Brown calls the ‘Cold Turkey Treatment,’ where the ascetic drove 
excessive dependence on food and sex from the body.259 Indeed, such times of 
fasting proved beneficial for the body, giving it a rest from the work of digesting 
food, refining one’s soul and possibly aiding in recovering a measure of the bodily 
incorruption.  
 
Brown notes that through a drastic reduction in foot intake, the ascetic could 
essentially ‘retune’ or remake the body, transforming the body into that finely tuned 
engine of which he spoke earlier. Through the discipline of fasting, the ascetic   
. . . slowly remade his body. He turned it into an exactly calibrated 
instrument. Its drastic physical changes, after years of ascetic 
discipline, registered with satisfying precision the essential, 
preliminary stages of the long return of the human person, body and 
soul together, to an original, natural and uncorrupted state.260
Particularly interesting is the belief that fasting somehow retards the body’s decay, 
enabling the ascetic to ‘put on’ a little of that bodily incorruption initiated by Christ’s 
incarnation. Brown notes that the ascetic’s body “was slowed down by the long fasts 
and sleepless nights of the desert.”261 I have demonstrated how Athanasius believed 
that Christ’s incarnation has opened up the way for us to return to Eden. Brown 
observes that for the desert father “the myth of Paradise regained” was a “huge 
weight . . . placed on the frail bodies of the ascetics.”262 Athanasius’ belief that the 
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ascetic might actually remake his body through discipline represents “the myth of 
Paradise regained,” a remaking that enabled a prolonged life which may have 
involved slowing down the body’s very aging process.  
 
Indeed, as was shown earlier in the Life of Antony 14, the twenty years of solitude 
and fasting in the harsh desert left Antony’s body lean and unchanged. Athanasius 
records that Antony “had the same habit of body as before, and was neither fat . . . 
nor lean from fasting . . . but was just the same as they had known him before his 
retirement.”263 It has been well-noted that Athanasius’ language here is considerably 
conspicuous with Porphyry’s Life of Pythagoras, suggesting that he borrowed from 
this work.264 Just as Athanasius encouraged those believers seeking an advanced life 
of virtue to replace meat with vegetables, wine with water, and an abundance of food 
with sparse meals,265 Pythagoras too advocated the avoidance of wine and meat as 
part of the occult diet of Hercules. Athanasius could scarcely bring himself to 
mention Antony and ‘luxurious’ food in the same sentence. He quips that “of flesh 
and wine it is superfluous even to speak, since no such thing was found with the 
other earnest men.”266 Indeed, while Porphyry and Antony may have shared common 
ascetic practices and a recognition that a particular diet was beneficial to the body, 
their philosophical commitments were quite different.267 While Pythagoras’ diet 
predates Antony’s, this idea of a limited diet was not foreign to the Israelites. It is 
worth mentioning those four young deportees from Judah under Nebuchadnezzar’s 
reign who were allowed only vegetables and water that they might not defile 
themselves with royal food, whose healthy appearance outshone those who had 
feasted on the King’s choice food and wine (Daniel 1:6-15). While the text informs 
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us that God specifically granted these young men favor in the eyes of the king’s 
official (1:9), and that he greatly increased their knowledge and understanding 
(1:17), there is nothing to suggest that their enhanced physiological appearance was 
anything more than the outcome of a good diet.  
 
If fasting is a means by which one slows the body down, so to speak, one must 
understand exactly what such fasting involved. While there is little specific 
indication of Antony’s fasting regime in the Life of Antony, it is clear that his diet 
consisted of bread, salt, and water, and that he usually ate once daily, occasionally 
abstaining from food for up to several days at a time.268 Later on Antony planted 
corn and potted herbs, making his own bread, occasionally eating a frugal relish from 
palm trees.269 Thus, contrary to some modern notions of fasting, the practice did not 
involve starvation or even extended periods of complete abstinence from food. As 
was noted earlier, Antony’s exhortation to moderation applies equally to the 
discipline of fasting. Moreover, it has been noted that in the Apophthegmata Patrum 
the Desert Fathers regularly discouraged prolonged periods of fasting, exhorting 
instead that a little food be taken each day.270 For example, Barsanuphius of Gaza 
described fasting as leaving the table with only a little less hunger and thirst than 
before one began so that fasting might not lead to a weakened body thereby 
hindering reflection, prayer, and self examination.271 Thus, practices which might 
actually harm the body—fasting as starvation—were generally not found. Indeed, 
even Antony’s most severe fasting involved eating once every four days.272 Thus, in 
the tradition of the Desert Fathers in general, there is an emphasis on moderation in 
one’s discipline.  
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In order to grasp a fuller account of the physiological benefits of fasting, it is also 
instructive to consider the implications of gluttony. If fasting was thought to be a 
means of putting on bodily incorruption in slowing the body down, engorging the 
body with food was thought to do the very opposite. While Athanasius believed that 
fasting could effectively slow the body down by slowing the corruption that comes 
through aging, putting on that incorruption made possible by Christ’s incarnation, an 
equally common belief among the Church Fathers was that stuffing the body with 
food would actually shorten one’s life. Plying the body with food was even thought 
to bring on premature aging.273  
For gout soon fastens upon them, and untimely palsy, and premature 
old age, and headache, and flatulence, and feebleness of digestion, and 
loss of appetite, and they require constant attendance of physicians, 
and perpetual doseing, and daily care.274   
Chrysostom spoke disparagingly of those who “distend their stomach[s], and blunt 
their senses, and sink the vessel by an overladen cargo of food . .  . in some 
shipwreck of the body,” asking rhetorically whether or not those who live moderately 
are more vigorous, “fulfilling their proper function with much ease.”275 The man 
who lives in such a way, says Chrysostom, has been aptly described by Paul as “dead 
whilst he liveth.”276  
 
It is not only the body that suffers however, but one’s soul as well. The gluttonous 
person cannot therefore be counted as living, though bodily alive, because the soul 
cannot go unaffected by luxury. “Who can describe the storm that comes of luxury, 
that assails his soul and his body?”277 Were we to actually see our soul in this 
condition, says Chrysostom, it would certainly appear ‘wasted with leanness:’ 
If it were possible to bring the soul into view, and to behold it with our 
bodily eyes, that of the luxurious would seem depressed, mournful, 
miserable, and wasted with leanness; for the more the body grows 
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sleek and gross, the more lean and weakly is the soul; and the more 
one is pampered, the more is the other hampered.278
The Church Fathers recognized that such indulgence in luxury impaired one’s soul 
and hence one’s very understanding of Scripture. Gregory Nazianzen asserted that 
one cannot rightly understand Scripture apart from ‘keeping under the body’ by 
fasting, by submitting the dust (the body) to the spirit “as they would do who form a 
just judgment of our composite nature.”279 Brown has observed that it was after the 
fall when the twisted will of humankind lead to the condition where men crammed 
their bodies with food, generating a surplus of physical appetite, anger, and sexual 
urges.280 The life of the ascetic however, allowed no room for culinary luxuries. 
There was no need for the ‘perpetual doseing’ and ‘constant attendance of 
physicians’ in Antony’s case, who experienced a long life by even modern standards. 
The life of the ascetic called for nothing less than a re-ordering of body and soul.   
 
Re-ordering of Body and Soul 
Having discussed the psychophysiological enhancements associated with the ascetic 
regime, and the possibility of a contemporary expression of asceticism as a means by 
which one might effectively slow the aging process, it is critical to give a more 
complete account of asceticism as put forth by Athanasius and Antony lest their 
ascetic regime become distorted. For to speak only of remaking or reforming the 
body by denying the body is to miss the larger goal of which such bodily reformation 
is a part, namely, the reformation of one’s soul. For the desert ascetics, remaking the 
body by effectively slowing it down was subsumed under, yet integral to, the proper 
reordering of body and soul, where the soul, in submission to God, ruled the body. 
Both Athanasius and Antony espoused an ascetic regime whereby the body becomes 
the servant of the soul in a right relationship to God, even as the body begins to 
assume the state of Adam’s body in paradise.  
 
It has already been shown that Antony’s ascetic regime involved remaking the body 
in the transformation of one’s soul in order that both body and soul might again 
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assume the ‘natural’ state where the soul rules over the body.281 This theme accords 
Athanasius’ portrayal of Antony in the Life of Antony.282 Again, this original state is 
marked by some measure of bodily incorruptibility, where the impulses of the body 
are under full control of the soul. Athanasius makes this explicitly clear in his 
description of Antony’s harsh treatment of his own body. Compelled by Jesus’ 
admonition in Matthew 6:31 that one should not worry about what one will eat, 
drink, or wear, Athanasius observes that Antony advocated giving ‘short space’ to 
the body in order that the body might become subject to the soul. Thus, Antony 
used to say that it behoved a man to give all his time to his soul rather 
than his body, yet to grant a short space to the body through its 
necessities; but all the more earnestly to give up the whole remainder 
to the soul and seek its profit, that it might not be dragged down by the 
pleasures of the body, but, on the contrary, the body might be in 
subjection to the soul.283
It is also useful to remember that Antony advocated making an inventory of one’s 
thought life, so that one “may never think of what is unseemly.”284 But such 
exercises were not in exclusion to the body, but again so that the soul might maintain 
control over the body. For Antony concludes his instructions on creating a visible 
inventory of one’s thoughts by stating that such exercises enable one to make proper 
use of one’s body: “And if we conduct ourselves this way, we will have the power to 
make a servant of the body and please the Lord and trample on all of the deceptions 
of the Enemy.”285 Thus, both Athanasius and Antony understood that the purpose of 
asceticism was not simply to suppress bodily desires solely to remake the body, but 
to bring the body under control of the soul. 
 
A reordering of the body-soul relationship involves the tension of restraining the 
impact of the bodily desires upon the soul so that the soul might be the rightful 
master over the body. As Brakke notes, “life in the desert revealed, if anything, the 
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inextricable interdependence of body and soul.”286 But this relationship is more than 
mutual interdependence; the metaphor seized upon by Antony and others was 
enslavement, used by Paul in 1 Corinthians. Such enslavement involves a tension 
between togetherness and distance. This distance was also evident in Antony’s first 
letter, where he describes the mind, under the Spirit’s guidance, helps the ascetic 
discriminate between the body and the soul and learns how to purify them both 
through repentance.287 On the one hand, Brakke observes that for Athanasius the 
“ascetic behaviours knit the body and soul together in a relationship of 
enslavement.”288 At the same time, however, the ascetic regime ensures that the soul 
and the body ‘keep their distance.’ “The discipline of enslaving the body keeps it at a 
safe distance from the soul, protecting the soul from the dangerous movements and 
desires of the body.”289 The metaphor of death captures the idea of such a separation. 
As Athanasius understood natural death as a complete separation of the soul from the 
body, so he understood ‘ascetic’ death as the distancing of the soul from the body’s 
passions through renunciation.290 This distancing of the body’s passions from the 
soul enabled one to attend to the needs of one’s soul or will. Despite the notion of 
body-soul separation however, ascetic death should not be construed as a dualistic 
exercise. Athanasius urged those in his episcopate to fast in both body and soul, 
considering not only the food for the stomach, but also the virtues and vices that are 
food for the soul. 
Behold, my brethren, how much a fast can do, and in what manner the 
law commands us to fast. It is required that not only with the body 
should we fast, but with the soul. . . . For virtues and vices are the 
food of the soul, and it can eat either of these two meats, and incline to 
either of the two, according to its own will.291  
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Brakke contends that for Athanasius there is no opposition or dichotomy between 
bodily fasting and the fasting of the soul. Rather, “fasting was designed to focus the 
soul on the divine nourishment of the virtues and the Word of God; it brought the 
body under the control of the soul’s will.”292 Thus, the reordering of body and soul 
requires and even presupposes, that the heart or soul be appropriately directed toward 
God. The ‘natural’ state to which asceticism strives is not simply the soul in control 
of the body, but also the soul in communion with God as the rightful director of 
one’s body. Antony does not submit his body to his soul, but, in the words of Brakke, 
“subjects his body to his Word-guided soul . . .”293 In more contemporary terms, 
Dallas Willard has noted that fasting “reveals to us how much our peace depends 
upon the pleasures of eating. . . . to assuage the discomforts in our bodies by faithless 
and unwise living and attitudes.”294 Fasting “demonstrate(s) how powerful and 
clever our body is in getting its own way against our strongest resolves.”295 Willard 
echoes Athanasius’ instructions in his festal letters in observing that fasting is more 
than abstaining from food; fasting enables one to feast on God. 
Fasting confirms our utter dependence upon God by finding in him a 
source of sustenance beyond food. Through it, we learn by experience 
that God’s word to us is a life substance, that it is not food (“bread”) 
alone that gives life, but also the words that proceed from the mouth 
of God (Matt. 4:4). We learn that we too have meat to eat that the 
world does not know about (John 4:32, 34). Fasting unto our Lord is 
therefore feasting—feasting on him and on doing his will.296
Fasting involves abstaining from food so that the Christian might be equipped for 
God, increasingly enabled to do his will.  
 
When speaking of reordering the body and soul, it is not inappropriate to speak again 
in terms of mortification as “the regaining of self-control, even the return of the 
                                                 
292 Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 188. 
293 Brakke, Athanasius and the Politics of Asceticism, 244 
294 Dallas Willard, The Spirit of the Disciplines: Understanding How God Changes Lives (San 
Francisco: HarperCollins, 1988), 166.  
295 Willard, Spirit of the Disciplines, 166.  
296 Willard, Spirit of the Disciplines, 166. See also Dallas Willard, The Divine Conspiracy: 
Rediscovering Our Hidden Life in God (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1998), 195-200. 
  201
object self, the body, to a person’s own rational control.”297 Having already 
discussed the negative connotations associated with mortification of the body, 
Pettersen asserts that one can understand mortification—insofar as Athanasius’ 
thinking was concerned—as involving the whole self offered to the Logos so that the 
Logos might take over the self.298 This is evident in the opening chapters of the Life 
of Antony, where Antony “endeavoured to make himself fit to appear before God, 
being pure in heart and ever ready to submit to His counsel, and to Him alone.”299 
Such mortification involves a death to one’s self: 
Mortification here means a transformation of the will, a 
metamorphosis of one’s whole attitude and a radical shifting of the 
very centre of the personality from the self to God. In this sense 
‘death’ to selfishness is not too strong a description.300
This ideal of death to selfishness is also characterized as the right reordering of body 
and soul, as the “reasonable dominion of the body by the soul.”301 According to 
Athanasius’ understanding, says Pettersen, a disciplined body is no longer a 
hindrance to one’s soul, and becomes employable to one’s soul in one’s service to 
God. 
When the body is disciplined, its temptations cease to be temptations; 
its needs are met but not indulged; and its capacities are used in the 
service of God, through the guidance of the rational soul, and are not 
allowed to dictate and to rule the soul—which then irrationally 
connives with its body—to its own selfish ends.302
Pettersen stresses the unity of the body and soul—even as the soul leads the body—
through ascetic practices, concluding that the ascetic engages in a process whereby 
gradually she becomes ‘fully herself.’ Thus,  
Slowly but surely the rational soul is graciously allowed to play its 
proper role towards its own body, wherein a person becomes fully 
himself or herself in the unity of both the body and the soul, the body 
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being animated and the soul expressing itself through its body in 
obedience to God.303
If asceticism has as its goal the reordering of both body and soul in the 
transformation of the whole person, it must also be asserted that there is a particular 
order which begins with the body. 
 
Beginning with the Body 
Among the Desert Fathers there was general agreement that the first step in bringing 
the body under control of the soul involved disciplining the body. In Antony’s first 
letter he instructs his initiates to first begin with purifying the body before turning 
one’s attention to the soul (and finally the mind). 
First the body is purified by much fasting, by many vigils and prayers 
and by the service which makes a man to be straightened in body, 
cutting off from himself all the lusts of the flesh. . . . Then the Spirit 
that is his guide begins to open the eyes of his soul, to give to it also 
repentance, that it may be purified.304
Thus, for Antony, the purification of one’s soul requires that one first discipline the 
body, quieting the bodily desires that wage war upon one’s soul. Thus, “in the desert 
tradition, the body was allowed to become the discreet mentor of the proud soul.”305
 
In his study of the significance of the body for the early church, Peter Brown has also 
observed that bodily self-mortification for the desert ascetics was only a preliminary 
step, where the conquering of hunger and sexual drives along with past habits 
allowed the ascetic to focus on his heart and his private will.306 Brown notes that  
the ascetic had to learn, over the long years of life in the desert, to do 
nothing less than to untwist the very sinews of his private will. Fasting 
and heavy labor were important, in their own right, in the first years of 
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the ascetic life, and especially for young monks in their full physical 
vigor.307
Hence, the young Antony is ever increasing in his discipline of fasting and sexual 
abstinence, the same Antony who in his first letter encouraged his initiates to 
discipline and purify the body as an initial step in refining the soul. For when the 
bodily impulses are dealt with, says Brown, the labor of breaking up the hardened 
soil of one’s heart could begin in the hopes of attaining that blessedness enjoyed by 
the prelapsarian Adam in paradise.  
Once the florid symptoms of greed and sexual longing, associated 
with the ascetic’s past habits, had subsided, he was brought face to 
face with the baffling closedness of his own heart. It was to the heart, 
and to the strange resilience of the private will, that the great tradition 
of spiritual guidance associated with the Desert Fathers directed its 
most searching attention. In Adam’s first state, the “natural” desires of 
the heart had been directed toward God, with bounding love and open-
hearted awe in the huge delight of Paradise. It was by reason of 
Adam’s wilfulness that these desires had become twisted into a 
“counter-nature.”308
Indeed, these themes have already been observed in Athanasius’ and Antony’s earlier 
writings. Thus, the initial steps in returning to the soul to its rightful place as leader 
of the body involved disciplining the body and quieting its effect on the soul, 
enabling the ascetic to ‘untwist’ the tangled mess of his private will as his attention 
was directed towards God. Without the former, the latter hardly seemed possible.  
 
Thus, the importance of the body for refining the whole person can scarcely be 
underestimated. It has been shown that Antony recognized that the first step in re-
ordering body and soul was careful attention to the body through fasting and vigils. 
There could be no purification of the soul without first giving attention to one’s own 
body; there could be no purification of the soul without the purification of the body 
as well. Athanasius records that Antony’s harsh treatment of his body enabled him 
not only to slow his body down, but also helped him conquer his soul and the 
demonic forces that sought to assail him. Brown’s concluding assessment of the 
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importance of the body in the transformation of one’s self is not overstated:  
“Seldom, in ancient thought, had the body been seen as more deeply implicated in 
the transformation of the soul; and never was it made to bear so heavy a burden.”309 
If indeed the body had never been so heavily implicated in the transformation of 
one’s soul as Brown suggests, it has been shown that the body also reaped the 
benefits of having served in the soul’s transformation via a reduced diet, effectively 
slowing it down and affording it a measure of immunity from corruption.  
 
Over time however, the body reaped the benefits of a well-ordered soul. There are 
suggestions in the Life of Antony that the body is the direct beneficiary of a soul that 
is in tune with God and thus in control of the body. Athanasius observes that 
Antony’s very bodily disposition and movements reflected the state of his soul, 
namely Antony’s serene manner.  
Yet neither in height nor in breadth was he conspicuous above others, 
but in the serenity of his manner and the purity of his soul. For as his 
soul was free from disturbances, his outward appearance was calm; so 
from the joy of his soul he possessed a cheerful countenance, and 
from his bodily movements could be perceived the condition of his 
soul.310
Antony’s outwardly visible serenity revealed the purity of his soul, attracting others 
to him. Other ascetics “ran to him as if dragged by his eyes,”311 though there was 
nothing particularly attractive about Antony’s general physique. Athanasius 
concludes, “thus Antony was recognized, for he was never disturbed, for his soul was 
at peace; he was never downcast, for his mind was joyous.”312 This visible serenity 
has been variously described as “the physical byproduct of a spiritual state,”313 it was 
“human nature as it was made to be.”314
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Earlier in the Life of Antony there was evidence of this visible ‘stillness’ of Antony’s 
physical appearance when he appeared before several of his followers after twenty 
years of solitude. After observing that Antony was unchanged in body over this 
length of time, Athanasius infers the state of Antony’s soul from his attitude and 
general comportment as 
neither contracted as by grief, nor relaxed by pleasure, nor possessed 
by laughter or dejection, for he was not troubled when he beheld the 
crowd, nor overjoyed at being saluted by so many. But he was 
altogether even as a being guided by reason, and abiding in a natural 
state.315
Here again are elements of Stoic thought in Athanasius’ description of Antony’s 
‘natural’ state, though Antony is never described as attaining a state that could be 
described as passionless (ajpavqeia).316 This natural state as understood by 
Athanasius involved the soul in proper relation to God, rightly governing the body, 
enabling the body to put on that incorruption which will be fully realized in the 
eschaton. Oliver O’Donovan expresses what Athanasius and Antony found to be 
true, that “bodily life is not given us in order for it to collapse spectacularly under the 
weight of the spirit [or desires]; it is given to sustain spiritual life, and in turn to be 
renewed by it.”317
 
It will be useful in summarizing what has been covered thus far, and to offer some 
preliminary reflections before considering some more extended reflections 
concerning fasting and the current attempts to retard aging via genetic engineering in 
the next chapter. In examining the practices of asceticism as portrayed by Anthony 
and Athanasius, it has been shown that such practices were viewed as the primary 
means by which the Christian might regain in some measure, what was lost by 
Adam’s sin, namely, a heightened degree of bodily incorruptibility allowing for the 
possibility of extended life spans. Evidence of a reduction in the aging rate has 
recently been observed among contemporary Ethiopian ascetics and hermits, whose 
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prolongevity effects mimic those of caloric restriction among laboratory animals. 
Moreover, asceticism as espoused by Athanasius and Antony was distanced from 
other forms of asceticism motivated by and aligned with Platonic, Neo-Platonic, 
Stoic and gnostic understandings of embodiment in affirming the inherent goodness 
of the body, refusing even the idea that the body is good only as a vehicle for the 
reformation of one’s soul. While Antony and Athanasius utilized the language and 
images utilized by Greek philosophy, it was shown that a Christian understanding of 
asceticism, while certainly susceptible to abuse, affirms the inherent goodness of 
both the body and the soul as God’s good creation ex nihilo. Such an asceticism is 
not aimed at eliminating desires, but redirecting one’s desires under control of the 
Spirit, thereby restoring the soul as the rightful ruler of the body and the body’s 
impulses. Among the Desert Fathers, fasting was recognized as a crucial first step in 
the re-ordering of one’s body and soul. Only after one had effectively ‘quieted’ the 
impulses of one’s body could one most effectively deal with the more reticent desires 
of one’s heart and will. One’s body would thereby reap the benefits not only through 
caloric restriction, but as the visible expression of a well-ordered soul. In light of 
these findings, several preliminary reflections are offered with respect to asceticism 
and the retardation of the human aging process.  
 
First, there was certainly an awareness that fasting enabled the ascetic to remake his 
body, effectively slowing it down. Athanasius believed that an ascetic regime 
enabled one to put on a heightened degree of bodily incorruptibility. This fact is 
borne out in Antony’s extremely long life. While it is open to question whether 
Antony actually reached the age of one hundred and five, it is not unreasonable to 
conclude that he did actually live a very long life. As Bushell’s study has shown, the 
Ethiopian ascetics display many of the bodily characteristics shared by Athanasius’ 
Antony. Moreover, many of these ascetics were aware of the effects of their fasting, 
whether they attributed such effects to the regimen itself, or to God’s direct 
intervention. Thus, though it must be said that a heightened potential for longevity 
was more than an unintended consequence, longevity per se was not the desired 
outcome. Nowhere in Antony’s instructions does one encounter words mirroring 
Marcus Cato’s advice to the younger Laelius: 
But it is our duty, my young friends, to resist old age; to compensate 
for its defects by a watchful care; to fight against it as we would fight 
against disease; to adopt a regimen of heath; to practice moderate 
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exercise; and to take just enough of food and drink to restore our 
strength and not to over-burden it.318
One encounters such advice today in molecular biologist Dr. Roy L. Walford, author 
of The 120 Year Diet and outspoken advocate of a restricted diet based upon the 
findings of caloric restriction in the laboratory.319 Though Walford does not advocate 
genetic research in an attempt to uncover the genes activated by caloric restriction, 
his regime is squarely focused on maximizing one’s longevity to attain bodily health 
and put off death as long as possible, and represents the latest version of the hygienic 
method so popular during the Great Awakenings in trying to secure a longer, 
healthier life.  
 
But for Athanasius and Antony, the prospect of a heightened degree of bodily 
incorruption was a moral project whereby one’s soul became subservient to the 
Spirit’s guidance, enabling one to rule oneself in a manner that benefited one’s body 
as well. The remaking of one’s body by moderation in exercise and fasting was never 
carried out simply for the sake of longevity, but was infused with a profound moral 
significance. The desert ascetics believed that the body is indispensable in the 
formation of one’s soul or character, that there can be no transformation of one’s 
soul, no refining of the will, without attending to the body as well. The ascetic who 
was able to quiet his body was thus better equipped to deal with the depravity of 
one’s will or desires; over time the soul was able to submit to God through prayer, 
reflection, and bathing one’s mind with Scripture. Indeed, disciplining the body 
through fasting among other practices was the first step in self-transformation 
whereby “the body was allowed to become the discreet mentor of the proud soul.”320 
Thus, fasting was integral to, yet subsumed under, the reordering of both the body 
and soul.  
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Athanasius believed that one could to some degree retard the aging process through 
asceticism, even though this was not the primary goal. Indeed, it may be of 
significance that while both Antony and Athanasius saw asceticism as a return to 
Adam’s prelapsarian state, neither refers to a return to antediluvian longevities, as 
have many ethicists (notably, Michael J. Reiss, as discussed in Chapter 3). Three 
possible explanations for this silence are worth considering. First, and most simply, it 
suggests that how long the ascetic lived on this earth was not a matter of primary 
importance. This seems reasonable given that primary goal of asceticism was a 
proper reordering of soul and body, that the real benefit enjoyed by Adam was his 
intimate fellowship with God, though doubtless Adam’s body benefited from the 
intimacy of this relationship. In such a close relationship, the question as to how long 
one could live was to a large extent irrelevant. Moreover, it is important to remember 
that the lengthy life spans on earth were also accompanied by a pervasive wickedness 
which prompted the flood, and most likely shorter life spans. Second, and somewhat 
paradoxically, the ascetic lifestyle entailed hardships that may have made a longer 
life less attractive, even as it increased the chances of extending life, and hence the 
practice of discipline. The ascetic lifestyle increased the probability of a prolonged 
bodily life which, to some extent, would always entail a struggle against sin. Finally, 
the promise of a resurrection body may have limited any allusions to an extended life 
on this earth. For the desert ascetics the goal of returning to the ‘natural’ state of 
prelapsarian Adam, even if conceptions of this state were exaggerated or 
misunderstood, was equally tempered with a view to the resurrection. The narrative 
by which the ascetic remade his earthly body was firmly rooted in the context of 
creation, the fall, and redemption. Thus, common to both Antony and Athanasius is a 
tension between a return back to the natural state and a looking forward to a 
resurrection body. Antony observed that partaking of such ascetic disciplines was to 
already “take on something of that other spiritual body which will be taken on at the 
resurrection of the just,”321 that the Holy Spirit gives the ascetic works to constrain 
the soul and the body so “that both may be purified and enter together into their 
inheritance.”322 Athanasius too, while asserting that Christ’s incarnation enables one 
to return to some state of incorruptibility, observes that this ultimately occurs at the 
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resurrection.323 Thus, a recovery of the Adamic body had a distinctly eschatological 
component. A return to one’s natural condition was not harking back to Eden, but 
oriented towards the future resurrection. As Peter Brown notes, “the imagined 
transformation of the few great ascetics, on earth, spoke to them of the eventual 
transformation of their own bodies on the day of the Resurrection.”324 These are at 
least three possible explanations—the ultimate goal of asceticism as the refinement 
of one’s soul, the ascetic’s difficult life, and the promise of a resurrection body—
which may account for the diminished interest in the length of one’s life. 
 
I have argued that longevity via attenuated aging, while recognized as a feature of 
life in its ‘natural’ state, was not the primary goal of the desert ascetics. If however, 
asceticism may represent an alternative route to longevity—though posing the 
possibility in this manner is somewhat anachronistic—within the Christian narrative 
of creation, fall, and redemption, a question immediately arises concerning 
Athanasius’ rather elaborate description of prelapsarian life. Though fanciful 
exegesis concerning Adam’s life in paradise was common among the Church 
Fathers, it is worth noting that Athanasius never considered Adam free from death, 
but understood physiological decay as part of the natural order as God created it. 
What remains crucial however is the recognition that a refinement of one’s soul or 
will is intimately bound up with disciplining the body as well. Though Athanasius 
attributed this heightened bodily incorruption to the work of Christ, it is no less 
correct to attribute bodily enhancement to a limited diet, even as fasting is 
incorporated into the larger schema of the transformation of the entire self in the 
effective reordering of one’s body and soul, informed by the Christian narrative of 
creation, fall, and redemption.  
 
In the final chapter I turn from the Church Fathers to a modern theologian in the 
person of Karl Barth, whose focus on Jesus Christ as God’s elect represents an 
attempt to overcome the difficulties of individual election and assurance of salvation, 
the very concerns that made the Puritan way of death so troublesome and ridden with 
anxiety. Moreover, Barth’s christological emphasis locates the model of a perfectly 
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ordered body and soul not in the first Adam, but the second, the man Jesus Christ. 
With Jesus as the man by which humans are judged, he portrayed the disorder of 
body and soul as the sin of sloth that engenders among other things, a profound 
dissatisfaction with the length of one’s life, exposing the inadequacies of 







Chapter 6: Maintaining Order: Sloth, Care, and Life Extension 
 
“. . . we have sinned and grown old, and our Father is younger than 
we.”1
G. K. Chesterton 
 
“Who of you by worrying can add a single hour to his life?” 
Luke 12:25 NIV 
 
I have considered Athanasius’ anthropology, with particular reference the bodily 
incorruptibility and other psychophysiological enhancements attainable through 
ascetic practices. Moreover, it has been shown that the primary goal of such 
discipline was a proper re-ordering or reprioritization of one’s body and soul 
involving a restriction of certain bodily needs in the refinement of the soul, even as it 
is acknowledged that such practices enabled one to effectively ‘remake’ one’s own 
body. In this chapter I will argue that the Christian discipline of fasting offers the 
possibility of retarding the aging process which need not succumb to inadequate 
conceptions of embodiment inherent in retarding aging, by looking in particular at 
genetic engineering via pharmacogenetics. By turning attention away from the first 
Adam and looking instead more closely at the last Adam, Jesus Christ (1 Corinthians 
15:45-49), I will show how the desire to genetically engineer the body to extend 
one’s span on earth rests upon notions of embodiment revealing a disorder between 
the body and soul—the very disorder addressed by asceticism and the discipline of 
fasting—engendering a heightened fear of death and a dissatisfaction with the length 
of life.  
 
Certainly, while the ascetic regime as understood by Athanasius in relation to 
Adam’s body and soul offers a counternarrative to the current technological strivings 
for longevity which are underwritten by particular conceptions of the nature of 
embodiment, this ascetic regime must nevertheless be balanced by a more thorough 
                                                 
1 Orthodoxy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1959), 60.  
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account of the last Adam, Jesus Christ, in order to give an appropriately Christian 
response to life extension. The belief that one might put on a little of that bodily 
incorruption of first Adam entailing a longer life must be balanced by an account of 
the second Adam who willingly put on corruptible human flesh, taking upon himself 
the same earthly limitations to which we are subject, including a finite existence on 
earth. While it is true that the reality of Jesus Christ and our future bodily 
resurrection secured by Christ informed Athanasius’ accounts of fasting, the person 
of Jesus—particularly the relationship between his body and soul—is in greater need 
of explication. In this regard, Karl Barth’s theological insights regarding the real man 
Jesus, the second Adam, will provide the needed balance.2  
 
Barth’s account of the human person proves instructive in relation to life extension 
for several reasons. First, Barth’s understanding of the human being is thoroughly 
infused with a profound recognition of death and human limitedness. Fergus Kerr has 
rightly noted that “no theologian has written about the finite conditions of human 
existence more often or at greater length than Karl Barth.”3 Barth was acutely aware 
of our desire for long life in the face of its sheer brevity: “But is not long life in itself 
merely a fragment which cries out for continuation?”4 He struggled to come to terms 
with the fact that he would one day be buried as “a thing that is superfluous and 
disturbing in the land of the living.”5 Elsewhere he confessed that  
it is indeed unpleasant to think that some day I shall be a corpse who 
others will leave and go home chatting after they have heaped wreaths 
and flowers and poured out kind words and music upon me. It is 
indeed unpleasant to think that my place will then be in a coffin or urn 
a few feet below the surface of the ground. It is indeed an unpleasant 
thought that for a time I will then be missed up above in the daylight, 
but that I will be finally extinguished from human memory when the 
last of those who knew me has gone the same way.6
 
                                                 
2 Jesus Christ is so central in Barth’s theology, that he actually refers to Christ as the first Adam and 
the created Adam as the second, CD IV/1, 512 ff.  
3 Immortal Longings: Versions of Transcending Humanity (London: SPCK, 1997), 23. Barth takes up 
the discussion of our limitedness with regards to time in CD III/2, 437-640. 
4 CD III/2, 589.  
5 Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G. T. Thomson (London: SCM Press, 1949), 117-118.  
6 CD III/4, 589.  
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Secondly, while Barth’s reflections on the limited nature of human existence reveal a 
strong existential component, all attempts to make sense of death and finitude are 
firmly grounded in his Christology. Indeed, he was sharply critical of any Cartesian-
like anthropology rooted in the subjectivities of human experience in abstracto.7 
Rather, our existence and nature, insists Barth, must be explained and understood in 
light of Jesus,’ for to assert otherwise would inevitably lead to a docetic Christ.8 
Thus, when it comes then to our own finite existence, “we look at this man, who like 
us has lived a limited life in its restricted time, when we adopt our understanding of 
the nature of man in respect of his temporality.”9 This is no less true when 
considering the desire for more life. Once again, “we keep to the determination of 
man revealed in Him when we accept man’s craving for life as such.”10 Yet, while 
Jesus lived in ‘restricted time,’ his resurrection revealed his true identity as the ‘Lord 
of Time,’ the alpha and omega, a fact which will have considerable implications in 
considering our limited time in light of Jesus,’ who is both before and after us.11  
 
Finally, Barth presents his Christological anthropology in terms relating Jesus’ body 
and soul that could equally be described as anti-Cartesian in nature. Though Barth’s 
opposition to Cartesian thought relates primarily to epistemology, his anthropology 
challenges the very dualism that underwrites so many of the practices of modern 
medicine. Barth entertains no notions of the human as composed of an eternal 
thinking immaterial part (res cogitans) and a finite body (res extensa) which are 
essentially independent of each other,12 but rather speaks of a particular order of soul 
and body, derived once again from the order displayed in the real man Jesus, an order 
in unity which we often fail to maintain, revealing sinful attitudes toward our own 
limitedness, the very limitedness that anti-aging technologies are seeking to 
overcome. 
                                                 
7 CD I/1, 195 ff. See also Fergus Kerr, “Cartesianism according to Karl Barth,” New Blackfriars 77 
(July/August 1996): 358-368; Robert E. Cushman, “Barth’s Attack upon Cartesianism and the Future 
in Theology,” The Journal of Religion 36 (October 1956): 207-223.  
8 CD III/2, 132. “We should be thinking . . . docetically in Christology, if we proposed to ascribe to 
human nature as it exists in us and in Jesus a difference of constitution,” CD III/2, 54. 
9 CD III/2, 571. 
10 CD III/2, 571. 
11 CD III/2, 440 ff., 571. 
12 Discourse on Method, Part 5.  
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Barth on Asceticism and the Dis-integration of Body and Soul 
Karl Barth’s anthropology is relentlessly Christological. Particularly interesting is 
Barth’s discussion of the disorder or disintegration of body and soul as evidenced by 
the pervasive sin of sloth (Trägheit). Unlike Athanasius and the other Church Fathers 
however, such the determination of this disorder comes not from first Adam, but the 
last Adam, Jesus Christ. Thus, the proper ordering of one’s soul and body is not to be 
found in, or represented as a return to the primeval, prelapsarian state of Adam, 
which Barth compressed to a mere moment of pre-history or saga, but is found in 
Jesus Christ.13 This is not to suggest that Barth is in opposition to Athanasian 
christology. For though Athanasius emphasized the return to Adam’s prelapsarian 
state, it must be noted that his recognition of such a return had its basis in the 
incarnation. Thus, in Barth’s discussion of the disorder of body and soul there are 
parallels to Athanasius’ and Antony’s thought, but with added implications 
concerning desire for increased longevity. Hence, for an adequate understanding of 
the disorder of body and soul and the resulting maladies afflicting humankind, it is 
critical to consider the proper order and relationship between body and soul as found 
in the person of Jesus Christ. 
The Body-Soul Relationship in the Real Man Jesus 
For Barth, an adequate theological anthropology can be based on no one other than 
the man Jesus himself.14 Any attempt to understand humanity starting from 
observable human phenomena apart from Jesus Christ leads to a confused and 
vicious circle of understanding giving rise to a phantom man, for such phenomena 
are neutral, relative and ambiguous.15 Wary of the reductionist anthropology of 
                                                 
13 Barth, CD IV/1, 508 ff.  
14 CD III/2, 44. Therefore, “in our exposition of the doctrine of man we must always look in the first 
instance at the nature of the man as it confronts us in the person of Jesus and only secondarily—asking 
and answering from this place of light—at the nature of man as that of every man and all other men,” 
CD III/2, 46. An earlier, similar formulation is found in Barth, Ethics, ed. Dietrich Braun, trans. G. W. 
Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1981), 461. 
15 CD III/2, 76. “No definition of human nature can meet our present need if it is merely an assertion 
and description of immediately accessible and knowable characteristics of the nature which man 
thinks he can regard as that of his fellows and therefore of man in general. . . . who is the man who 
wants to know himself and thinks he can? How does he reach the platform from which he thinks he 
can see himself?” CD III/2, 75. See also Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. John Newton Thomas and 
Thomas Weiser (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1960), 56-57; Wolf Krötke, “The Humanity of the 
Human Person in Karl Barth’s Anthropology,” trans. Philip G. Ziegler, in The Cambridge Companion 
to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 159-160. It is 
not that Barth is opposed to what the social and hard sciences have to say about humanity, but that 
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scientific materialism on the one hand and the uncritical appropriation of Greek 
dualism throughout the history of Christianity on the other, Barth put forward what 
has been termed a ‘dynamic anthropology’16 or a ‘dialectical-dialogical’ with respect 
to the body and soul.17 To understand the relationship between body and soul, we 
must look to the one true man, Jesus. Thus, “the ontological determination of 
humanity is grounded in the fact that one man among all others is the man Jesus.”18 
The man Jesus is the one whole man, “embodied soul and besouled body [leibhafte 
Seele, beseelter Leib],”19 by whom we judge what it means to have a soul and a 
body.20 Unlike Antony and the rest of fallen humanity, in Jesus there is no war or 
“ascetic conflict” between the body and the soul, for the Spirit of God resting on this 
whole man Jesus renders asceticism “superfluous.”21 Thus, says Barth, there is no 
opposition between the body and the soul; in Jesus this meeting of the ‘willing spirit’ 
and ‘weak flesh’ (Matthew 26:41) operates in favor of the Spirit.  
The exaltation, the logicalising and rationalising of the flesh, which is 
the mystery of His humanity, does not permit His body to become the 
enemy and conqueror of His soul; nor does it consist in the soul 
masquerading as the enemy or conqueror of the body. . . . On the 
contrary, we are confronted by the picture of peace between these two 
moments of human existence.22
 
There can be no discussion of Jesus’ body without speaking of his soul, and of his 
soul without speaking of his body. Yet, in this order of peace there is a first and a 
                                                                                                                                          
such findings must be critiqued from a christological vantage point which by nature involves faith 
assumptions. See Stuart McLean, Humanity in the Thought of Karl Barth (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 
1981), 28-29. 
16 Daniel J. Price, Karl Barth’s Anthropology in Light of Modern Thought (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. 
Eerdmans, 2002), 9, 20-22, esp. 234-244. However, Price notes that this term primarily applies to 
Barth’s understanding of the imago Dei in view of the relational aspect of the Trinity, 9-10.  
17 McLean, Humanity, 13. That is, “no part [body or soul] can be understood without the other, 
although distinctions are made and priorities given. There is unity, difference and order,” 44. 
18 CD III/2, 132. 
19 CD III/2, 327, Die kirchliche Dogmatik, vol. III, Die Lehre von der Schöpfung (part 2) (Zurich: 
Evangelischer Verlag, 1948), 394 [hereafter KD III/2]. 
20 Barth derives this from Galatians 1:4; 2:20 where Jesus gave himself (eJautovn) for our sins, giving 
up his soul (yuvch) for us (Matthew 20:28; John 10: 11, 15; 1 John 3:16) and his body (sw~ma) for us 
(Luke 22:19; Hebrews 10:10), CD III/2, 328ff. 
21 CD III/2, 338; see also 336. 
22 CD III/2, 338. 
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second: his soul is first as the commander and controller of his body, and his body 
second as obedient and that which is controlled by his soul, and not vice versa.  
Jesus spoke and acted and suffered in obedience and omnipotence in 
and not without His body, so that He was also wholly this body. Yet 
His action and passion are first, a parte potiori, those of His soul, and 
in that way and on that basis of His body. His body is used and 
governed by Him for the purpose of a specific and conscious speech 
and action and suffering. It serves Him in the execution of His 
purpose. It is impregnated with soul, i.e., a body filled with this 
consciousness; but we obviously cannot say that his soul is 
impregnated with body, i.e., a soul filled by the needs and desires of 
His bodily life. This is the distinction and inequality to be noted 
within the oneness and the wholeness. The fulfilment, the willing and 
the execution and therefore the true movement of his body occurs 
from above downwards, from the soul to body and not vice versa.23
Hence, any theological discussion of humanity “must begin with the picture of this 
man.”24
 
Humanity in Light of the Real Man Jesus 
Based on the man Jesus, so too the human person is the soul of her organic, living 
body (Leib). That is, the soul enlivens a material body (Körper), making it an organic 
body (Leib). “The organic body [Leib] is distinguished from the purely material body 
[Körper] by the fact that . . . it is besouled and filled and controlled by independent 
life.”25 Apart from this ensouling, the person would be ‘subjectless;’ the soul is not a 
soul unless it has an organic body. At the same time, says Barth, “I cannot be myself 
without at the same time being my body.”26 Barth refers to this understanding of the 
human as “concrete reality” or “concrete monism,” where the soul and body are not 
understood as two ‘parts’ or ‘substances,’ but “as two moments of the indivisibility 
one human nature, the soul as that which quickens and the body as that which is 
quickened and lives.”27 This ordering of soul and body is sustained by the Spirit, 
                                                 
23 CD III/2, 339. 
24 CD III/2, 344. 
25 CD III/2, 378; Krötke, “The Humanity of the Human Person,” 170. 
26 Krötke, “The Humanity of the Human Person,” 170, observes that this sentence is missing in the 
English translation of CD III/2, and has therefore provided it. 
27 CD III/2, 393, 399, 417. 
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understood as “the immediate action of God Himself, which grounds, constitutes and 
maintains man as the soul of his body.”28 While man has Spirit, the Spirit is not 
identical to man.29 Any abstraction of the human from the Spirit abstracts the human 
from the relationship of the living Creator—whether or not he or she is aware of this 
relationship—and can only result in the “puzzling duality” between the mortal body 
and the immortal soul.30 As in the man Jesus the soul has a certain primacy to the 
body, so too the soul is superior in humanity. The soul is superior to the body 
because the Spirit stands in a “special and direct” relationship to the soul while in an 
indirect relationship to the body. Thus, “the soul is a priori the element in which the 
turning of God to man and the fellowship of man with God in some way take 
place.”31 However, “the same is to be said of the body, but only a posteriori.”32 
Therefore, the body and soul have functions or operations that, while not operating in 
exclusivity to the other, have their primacy in either the body or soul. 
 
Though the human person is a concrete monism, embodied soul and besouled body, 
there are two basic operations that find their primacy in either the soul or the body, 
but never in exclusion of the other. The human is (1) a percipient being and (2) an 
active being. As a percipient being, the human carries out the functions of thought 
and awareness. Though thought is related to the soul and awareness to the body, 
thought does not happen without the body. Similarly, awareness does not occur 
without the soul. The functions of thought and awareness cannot be distributed 
                                                 
28 CD III/2, 393. Earlier Barth defined the Spirit of God’s being as “an action and attitude of the 
Creator in relation to his creation,” 356. See also 359. Ray S. Anderson, “On Being Human: The 
Spiritual Saga of a Creaturely Soul,” in Whatever Happened to the Soul?: Scientific and Theological 
Portraits of Human Nature, ed. Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony 
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), 186, has perhaps identified “contingent monism” as a more 
appropriate term to describe both the unity of body and soul and the work of the Spirit in sustaining 
this unity, and hence life.  
29 Geoffrey W. Bromiley, An Introduction to the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. 
Eerdmans, 1979), notes that the English translation does not consistently capitalize ‘Spirit’ which 
would have helped emphasize that this is referring to the Spirit of God, given that Barth rejects a 
trichotomy in man, 132. 
30 CD III/2, 393. “So long as soul and body are spoken of as two independent and distinct substances, 
no real insight is possible,” 292-293. However, so long as one holds to the premise that “man is as he 
has Spirit,” one has a “Christian dualism of soul and body,” 394. 
31 CD III/2, 365. 
32 CD III/2, 365. 
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exclusively to the soul or the body.33 Rather, the man “as soul of his body is 
empowered for awareness, and as soul of his body for thought.”34 However, when 
considering man’s act in totality, the soul is primary in both awareness and 
thinking.35 Similarly, as (2) an active being, the human being desires and wills. 
While desiring and willing can only be separated conceptually, “there is indeed a 
special relation of desiring to the bodily nature of man, and of willing to the soul.”36 
Thus, while desire is an intrinsically bodily process which arouses likes or dislikes, 
“it is I who decide and determine my relation to my desiring.”37 To will is to make 
up one’s mind. Therefore, as with awareness and thought, “man desires as the soul of 
his body, and wills as the soul of his body,” though again the soul is primary in both 
willing and desiring.38 There can be no desiring without the soul, as there can be no 
willing without the body. Since all of humankind is called and claimed by God in its 
totality, says Barth, if a man properly understands himself in relation to God, he 
cannot understand himself as primarily soul, primarily body, or any form of dualism. 
Rather, he is to be understood as a single acting subject. 
If man understands himself in his relation to God as established and 
ordained by God, in relation to soul and body as the two moments of 
his being he can in no case understand himself as a dual but only as a 
single subject, as soul identical with his body and as body identical 
with his soul.39  
Thus, “man does not exist except in his life-act [Lebensakt],” where he is at every 
moment soul and body, “but always soul first and then body, always ruling soul 
[regierende Seele] and serving body [dienender Leib].”40 Having reviewed Barth’s 
christological anthropology, I discuss the disorder of the soul and the body as 
determined by the order of this man Jesus. 
 
                                                 
33 CD III/2, 401. 
34 CD III/2, 400. “. . . we must speak of the primacy of the soul in relation to the two functions of 
awareness and thinking. The soul—the soul of the body, but still the soul and not the body—is the 
man himself, the human subject.” 
35 CD III/2, 405. 
36 CD III/2, 408. 
37 CD III/2, 409. 
38 CD III/2, 416, 418. 
39 CD III/2, 426. 
40 CD III/2, 426-427 [KD III/2, 512]. 
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The Sin of Sloth: Trägheit 
Unlike Jesus, “wholly Himself, the soul of His body in its free control, the body of 
His soul in its free service,” we experience a disruption in the order between the 
body and soul.41 While the soul is always the leader of the body, the acting subject 
and life, in our fallen condition we allow the impulses of the body to exercise undue 
influence on our soul to the extent that we will what we should not, even as the body 
wills what it should not. Barth determines this particular sin or disorder in light of 
Jesus’ humanity, calling it sloth or Trägheit,42 alternately understood as 
sluggishness, indolence, or inertia, taking the form of both evil action and evil 
inaction.43 In his sloth man neither trusts nor loves God.44 In sloth we refuse our own 
reality as it confronts in Jesus Christ, refusing to have anything to do with God and 
refusing the freedom promised us in the man Jesus. This refusal affects (1) our 
relationship to God, (2) our relationship with humanity, (3) the relationship between 
the body and the soul, and (4) our relationship to our historical limitation in time.45 
Given the discussions thus far on the role of asceticism in reordering the body and 
soul, particular attention will be devoted to the effects of Trägheit on the (3) soul-
body relationship, and (4) our limited lifespan, before considering the project of life 
extension in light of our sloth as determined by the reality of Jesus Christ.   
 
Trägheit as Body and Soul Dis-integration 
God guarantees this ordered unity of soul and body in his creatures; however, 
Trägheit disturbs and disrupts this unity, resulting in a dualism between the psychical 
(geistig-seelischen) and the physical (leiblish-natrülichen) elements or moments of 
the human person.46 In considering the human being as soul of his body, says Barth, 
this particular form of Trägheit takes the form of dissipation, and is simply 
                                                 
41 CD IV/2, , 452; 460. 
42 “Wir antworten jetzt: des Menschen Sünde is des Menschen Trägheit,” Die kirchliche Dogmatik, 
vol. IV, Die Lehre von der Versöhnung (part 2) (Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1955), 452 [hereafter 
KD IV/2].  
43 CD IV/2, 403. 
44 CD IV/2, 405. 
45 CD IV/2, 409. Trägheit thus takes the form of (1) stupidity, (2) inhumanity, (3) dissipation, and (4) 
care or anxiety respectively. 
46 KD IV/2, 474. 
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indiscipline (Disziplinlosigkeit).47 Sin in the form of sloth means that man lets 
himself fall, lets himself go, lets himself be moved and pushed. By contrast, to live 
authentically means “to keep oneself disciplined, . . . to be what one is as a man even 
at the cost of severity against oneself.”48 However, we are vagabonds who refuse to 
accept and exercise discipline ourselves, though we freely impose it on others. By 
giving ourselves permissions rather than commands, the unity of the body and the 
soul suffers disruption and disintegration. The body and soul 
begin to go their separate ways. His soul will no longer control his 
body, nor his body obey his soul. The two not only contradict one 
another in their mutual relationship, but also, refusing their distinct 
function in this relationship, contradict their own essence as the two 
integrated elements of human nature. If the dissipated man wills, as he 
does, to be without spirit, he has entered on the irresistible way on 
which he will finally be soulless and bodiless; the way which can lead 
only to death.49
 
Barth says that we are lazy creatures who shun and hate discipline. We take pleasure 
in decomposing our human nature by either relieving our soul of its role “as the ruler 
and guardian and preserver of our body” by pursuing a spiritual or inward life, or we 
“release our body from the service of our soul and give it free rein to pursue its own 
impulses and needs.”50 In practice, says Barth, we hover like vagabonds somewhere 
between these two possibilities, doing even both at once. It is very easy, asserts 
Barth, to live under the illusion that releasing the soul from exercising its 
responsibility as the body’s keeper on the one hand, and releasing the body from the 
service and control of the soul on the other, is really a liberation from a twofold 
bondage. In reality however, either choice is a lapse into dualism, a ‘twofold 
Docetism,’ and is essentially choosing the flesh.51 Again, the vagabond in us wishes 
to view the discipline that guards against such release in either direction as an 
unnecessary and foreign rule that must be abandoned. “Is not the discipline which 
prevents these releases a kind of foreign rule which man does not need to accept, 
                                                 
47 CD IV/2, 454 [KD IV/2, 511]. 
48 CD IV/2, 454. 
49 CD IV/2, 454. 
50 CD IV/2, 456. 
51 CD IV/2, 459. 
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which—far from exercising—he can and must repudiate?”52 We are self-deceived by 
lapsing into a dualism whereby we come to believe that to be truly human is either to 
be liberated from the body, or to gratify and celebrate its impulses. If our sloth 
enables the body and soul to ‘go their separate ways,’ it also affects our perception of 
time.  
 
Trägheit and Our Limited Span of Life 
Trägheit not only involves a disintegration of body and soul, but impacts our attitude 
towards our limited lifespan. According to Barth, Trägheit means that “our allotted 
duration of human life will become quite unendurable.”53 This inability to accept our 
own limited lifespan is a “direct consequence of the destruction and disintegration of 
human nature, of being in the flesh.”54 As such, the dissipated man cannot accept 
death as the determination of human existence, and is therefore constantly seeking a 
flight from a unified and whole life, pursuing either an upward (idealistic) or 
downward (materialistic) path. Our desires know no limits; the desire of our every 
aim is infinity, whose satisfaction leads only to more desire. Whether one pursues the 
‘upward’ path or the ‘downward’ path, “it opens up magic casements with unlimited 
views which give us the thrill either of solemnity or of an arrogant rejoicing.”55 
However, notes Barth, the thrill afforded by these opening casements in the face of 
infinity is actually a thrill of horror when we realize our own limitedness. As such, 
the dissipated man seeks solace in the exclamation Carpe diem, which is nothing 
more than an expression of panic when faced with the closed door that he wishes to 
remain open.56 Moreover, this dissipated man of sloth whose body and soul are in a 
state of disintegration cannot understand that his desires cannot be satisfied.  
There is no infinite to satisfy our infinite desires. But this is something 
which the dissipated man, who has broken loose from the unity and 
totality of soul and body in which God has created him for existence 
in the limit of his time, cannot grasp, but must endlessly repudiate in 
his own endless dissatisfaction. In what he takes to be his successful 
                                                 
52 CD IV/2, 460. 
53 CD IV/2, 462. 
54 CD IV/2, 462. 
55 CD IV/2, 463. 
56 CD IV/2, 463. 
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hunt, he is himself the one who is hunted with terrible success by 
anxiety.57
History, Barth tells us, is testimony to our grasping of the infinite through politics, 
art, culture, and scientific achievements.  
 
But if Trägheit in the form of (3) the divided, dualistic, and dissipated human whose 
body and soul are in disorder, manifests itself in the dissatisfaction of our limited 
lifespan, so too Trägheit as (4) a dissatisfaction with our finite lifespan leads to a 
separation of the body and soul. Barth understands Trägheit in this final form as 
anxiety or ‘care’ (Sorge). Care is the fear of death without God, without hope, and 
inevitably the source of all evil. Care also “leads no less necessarily to the disorder 
which we have called the disintegration of the disciplined unity [der disziplinierten 
Einheit] of man as the soul of his body.”58 In fact, “so strong is the self-contradiction 
into which the anxious man plunges himself in his discontent with his finitude that it 
is inevitable that this unity [of body and soul] should be severely jeopardized.”59 In 
the fear of his impending and hopeless death, he simply cannot be a whole man, “he 
can no longer rule as a soul or serve as a body.”60 While Barth asserts that it is good 
that we should age and eventually die in light of the reality of creaturely existence as 
revealed in the real man Jesus, the dissipated man is gripped with fear.61  
 
When man is under the influence of care or Sorge, his soul flees to invented regions 
of his own making and his body reacts to this hopeless death in various forms of self-
assertion, renunciation, or sickness, acts which result in the dissolution of his body 
and soul. More generally, we seek to conceal the fact of our own death either by 
plunging ourselves into unceasing conscientious work attempting to make ourselves 
                                                 
57 CD IV/2, 463. 
58 CD IV/2, 477 [KD IV/2, 540]. For a further description of Sorge, see CD IV/2, 468, 477, esp. 472. 
59 CD IV/2, 477. 
60 CD IV/2, 477. 
61 “Rather than tolerating our own limitation with a sigh, we have every reason to take it seriously, to 
affirm it, to accept it, and to praise God for the fact that in it we are what we are and not something 
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masters in things great and small, or by sinking into a law of relaxation and passivity, 
adopting a lifestyle that mirrors the ‘lilies of the field.’62 It is certainly possible to 
construe the project of aging retardation as ‘unceasing conscientious work,’ an 
assertion of the naked will over against the passive, undisciplined, aging body. 
Moreover, it is not difficult to see this project as driven by a deep discontent of 
finitude under the influence of Sorge, that admixture of anxiety, apprehension and 
desire, whereby death and the decline preceding it are viewed as the ultimate threat. 
But the reality that Sorge suppresses, says Barth, is that Christ lives at the very 
frontier where our time runs out; our existence and our inevitable perishing is set in 
light of the man Jesus, who because he was mortal in his humanity, affirms our 
perishing and finite existence as part of the good order of God.63 While Barth admits 
that care will not work itself out so crudely or abruptly, it is clear that Trägheit as (3) 
the disintegration of the body and soul and Trägheit as (4) as a profound discontent 
with one’s limited lifespan (Sorge) are mutually reinforcing. Just as the 
disintegration of body and soul engenders dissatisfaction with our limited span and a 
fear of death, so too our dissatisfaction with our finitude and fear of death lead to the 
disintegration of body and soul. Sorge—“the disruption of the right relationship of 
man to his temporality”—is both the consequence and the cause of the disorder and 
disintegration of body and soul.64  
 
If, as Barth has suggested, the correct order of the body-soul relationship in man is 
one of a disciplined unity (der disziplinierten Einheit),65 a unity undermined by 
Trägheit which is simply indiscipline (Disziplinlosigkeit),66 then it would seem that 
applying discipline in the Christian life offers a means by which the believer might 
properly re-order the soul and body which in turn has implications for one’s view of 
one’s limited lifespan. Hence, discipline or asceticism, understood as a proper re-
                                                 
62 CD IV/2, 470. 
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ordering of body and soul, might significantly thwart our tendency towards the sin of 
Trägheit, and hence our desire to live on indefinitely. Before considering this 
argument further, an investigation of Barth’s view of discipline in the form of 
asceticism will prove useful. 
 
Barth on Discipline and Asceticism 
That Barth freely speaks of Trägheit as a lack of discipline (Disziplinlosigkeit) does 
not mean however, that he approves of ascetic practices. In his Doctrine of Creation, 
Barth discussed asceticism in the context of the body and soul. He readily admits that 
human life in its psycho-physical structure is a life of ‘primitive’ or ‘animal’ 
impulses—hunger, the need for sex, and sleep—which must be dealt with 
‘humanly.’67 Those who give free reign to their impulses are ‘sub-animal,’ as even 
animals instinctively know when their needs are adequately satiated, whereas 
humans are capable of engaging in ‘hypertrophies of satisfaction,’ to which 
unfettered impulses tend.68 Sounding very much like Antony, Barth says that our 
animal impulses are to be viewed as “the form of a physical process guided and 
governed by the soul as awakened by the divine pneuma, and therefore in the form of 
freely chosen and executed decisions.”69 Though one’s impulses are neither 
automatic nor given so that they might simply be suppressed, Barth concedes that 
serious, and sometimes radical restrictions, renunciations, abstentions 
and sacrifices may well be demanded from us by His decrees and 
commands in the whole field of our impulsive life.70
He refers to this legitimate suppression of one’s impulses as asceticism (Askese), 
which he defines as  
a form of a partial or complete renunciation of the gratification of the 
needs in question . . . as a means of disciplining the corresponding 
impulses, perhaps also for the sake of the higher necessities of life, 
and above all for the sake of one’s neighbours.71  
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68 CD III/4, 345. 
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70 CD III/4, 346. 
71 CD III/4, 346, Die kirchliche Dogmatik, vol. III, Die Lehre von der Schöpfung (part 4) (Zurich: 
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Barth acknowledges that the Bible actually encourages one to eat and drink and live 
‘naturally,’ observing that eternal life itself is represented as a great feast (Matthew 
22:10).72 Moreover, he notes that Paul’s command to mortify (nekrwvsate) one’s 
earthly members (Colossians 3:5) must be understood in the context of Paul’s earlier 
warning against false religious humility involving a harsh treatment of the body 
which is ineffective in restraining one’s sensual appetite (Colossians 2:23). Aware 
that “a powerful ascetic can be a vessel of much greater wickedness than even the 
most indulgent,” Barth is wary of both excessive repression and unrestrained 
liberality.73 Thus, with regard to the impulsive life there are two unacceptable 
extremes, “an abusus in excessu and an abusus in defectu” which are not to be 
compromised or combined, for “man cannot wish either to surrender to the power of 
his impulsive life or to rid himself of it.”74 The middle path avoids both extremes 
whereby one has freedom for life. The particular practices composing middle path 
however, are not specified.  
 
Barth appears to take a more skeptical attitude towards asceticism in his brief 
discussion on the development of monasticism in the opening of the second part of 
the Doctrine of Reconciliation in dealing with God’s reconciliation in Jesus as a 
movement from below to above. Barth’s brief look at the history of humanity’s 
various attempts to effect this reconciliation lead him to consider monasticism in its 
various early forms.75 Barth is critical of both the motives or intentions that gave 
birth to asceticism as well as the institutions to which such practices gave rise, 
reserving harsher criticism for the latter.76 Barth understands monasticism primarily 
as a flight from the world and other people, exemplified by that “quite unfounded 
and radical unrest” of those anchorites who fled to the deserts of Egypt in the late 
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73 CD III/4, 348. 
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third century.77 Barth is largely critical of these Egyptian anchorites, and notes that 
the early Christians’ flight away from the things of the world into the desert need not 
have anything to do with Christianity; much less is one required to flee ‘up and off 
into the desert’ to become a Christian. A flight from this world is not necessarily a 
flight to God. For, Barth asserts “one thing is for sure—that even in his hut or cave 
the hermit will never be free from the most dangerous representative of the world, 
i.e., himself.”78 True enough. But Barth seems to miss that this was precisely the 
point of fleeing: not to come face to face with the desolate landscape of the desert, 
but to come face to face with the far bleaker landscape of one’s own heart. Flight 
from the world was a flight to a place where one could not escape oneself, aware of 
how easy it is to immerse oneself in daily activities as a means by which to avoid or 
suppress the darker realities of our habits, thoughts, and inclinations. While Barth is 
critical of anchoritic monasticism for its flight mentality, he recognizes other early 
ascetics like Origen who did not withdraw from society. Moreover, he is also aware 
that many ascetics formed communities in a type of coenobitic monasticism, with 
Antony as the most notable exception.79  
 
Despite these objections however, Barth concedes that one must still face whether 
there might be a certain special, inward, withdrawal from the world apart from 
making it some sort of monastic law of practice, asking 
can there be either for the Church or for individuals any genuine 
approach to the world or men unless there is an equally genuine 
retreat? Has there not to be (not merely a healthy but a spiritually 
necessary) rhythm in this matter, in which there will always be a place 
for ajnacwrei~n [ascetic withdrawal]?80
                                                 
77 CD IV/2, 12. 
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In pursuing this question, Barth turns from monasticism as an organized system, to 
asceticism (ajvskhsi"), which he understands as “exercise or training for the 
successful attainment of a goal.”81 He asserts that asceticism that prohibits particular 
practices may serve to liberate one from those passions or ‘inordinate desires’ which 
are a constant threat, like the desires for sex, money, or possessions. Abstention from 
these particular practices are “meant to serve the liberation of man from the 
downward drag of sin.”82 Indeed, this ‘negative principle’ is the reverse side of the 
positive principle; namely, that “this liberation itself is to serve the redemptive and 
exclusively necessary freedom of man for God and his fellows, for the Church and 
therefore for the world.”83 However, Barth immediately questions the arbitrary 
nature of the aforementioned abstentions (a list which, incidentally, excludes 
abstention from food), acknowledging that it is possible to engage in such 
abstentions without affecting one’s character. 
Is not the ordering of these inordinate desires, and its goal of Christian 
freedom for Christian service, really a matter of the heart, which may 
still be lacking in spite of this sealing off, or may be there without it? 
Is there no passion or inertia of the heart which is not stronger and 
more influential than all the passion or inertia of sex or property, for 
all their rigid exclusion?84
Thus, Barth is concerned to point out that abstention from particular desires, and “the 
mechanical sealing off of these whole spheres,” will not provide sufficient relief 
from our desires, and may not leave us open to the commandment of God.85  
 
Though skeptical of the various forms of monastic theology, Barth asserts that the 
question regarding Christian perfection and dedication to an aim (teleiovth") cannot 
under any circumstances be suppressed—even by an appeal to the sola fides by 
which the Christian is justified (and sanctified) in the sight of God. Barth wonders, 
given our temptation to lose heart in the areas of sex and money and possessions, 
whether monasticism can be blamed for exercising such strictness. A more favorable 
scenario is the monk who unceasingly battles the lusts of his flesh while remaining 
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active in spiritual and physical labor, the arts and scholarship, social work and 
teaching, and ultimately the monastic opus Dei—the adoration of God in private and 
communal worship.86 Such a monk, “could and can positively attest something of 
that freedom for God and his fellows which is supposed to be the telos of monastic 
asceticism.”87 Barth asks how the Christian life of freedom for God cannot, to some 
degree, be an ascetic life. 
We have finally to ask whether there can be any Christian existence at 
all in Christian freedom, in that direction to the goal set for man by the 
grace of God, whether there can be any worship of God in Spirit and 
in truth or genuine service to our fellows, whether there can be any 
fitness for it, without an acceptance of the conflict in these spheres, 
without definite renunciations and abstentions, and therefore without 
asceticism [Askese]—not perhaps an asceticism in principle and 
subject to rule, but all the more serious on that account. This certainly 
seems to be an impossibility in the Gospels and according to the 
nature of the case, both individually and collectively. Only those who 
can and will sacrifice can and will serve and are free to do so.88
 
Barth’s primary concern with systematic or monastic asceticism is that particular 
practices still leave human beings free for God, and that such practices are never 
construed as means of attaining salvation, perfection, or even sanctification. The 
Christian must remember that such practices are made available for sanctification on 
account of God’s salvation and sanctification already opened up through Jesus 
Christ,89 for Trägheit is essentially a denial of our being in Jesus Christ. Because of 
our sloth, we “refuse to be those we already are in Him, hesitating to make use of the 
Spirit in the flesh which we are given in Him.”90 Thus the goal of asceticism is not 
freedom from desires (as if this were possible) in an attempt to gain God’s favor, but 
freedom for God and the obedience that such discipleship entails, and thus freedom 
for one’s fellow creatures. Unfortunately, Barth does not speak of asceticism within 
the context of one’s soul and body. It is also unclear how exactly asceticism (Askese) 
relates to discipline (Diszipline), though they are certainly related. Barth tends to 
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reserve the term asceticism when speaking of particular abstentions while he 
understands the exercise of discipline as “simply the obedience that we owe to 
God.”91 Certainly, there is little reason to doubt that the Christian life calls for 
abstentions, renunciations and hence for some form of asceticism. This has 
implications, as will be discussed shortly, for the formation of Christian character, 
including the sloth and care which hinder our obedience to Christ and create a 
dissatisfaction with our limited life span. 
 
The remainder of this chapter offers an analysis of the current attempts to retard the 
human aging process to extend the healthy lifespan in light of Barth’s conception of 
sloth and care—Trägheit and Sorge—in conjunction with the goals of ascetic 
practices as established by Athanasius and Antony. Specifically I will construe 
current efforts at life extension as the epitome of Sorge, driven by fear of death and 
decay and a dissatisfaction with one’s temporal limit, suggesting that the body and 
soul are already ‘out of order.’ Moreover, I will attempt to show that current attempts 
of life extension can be traced historically to just such a separation of body and soul 
(Trägheit), driven by anxiety over death and decay (Sorge). Against the backdrop of 
an ascetic ‘remaking’ of the body as understood by Athanasius and Antony in the 
Christian quest for holiness, the genetic search for the retardation of aging will be 
shown to be seriously deficient in failing to address the sin of Trägheit as a 
separation of body and soul. Finally, insofar as Trägheit may be characterized as a 
lack of discipline (Disziplinlosigkeit), it will be argued that the fear of death and 
dissatisfaction with our limited span of life (Sorge) can be mitigated by ‘reordering’ 
the body as the effective servant of the Word-guided soul, and that such reordering is 
best accomplished by the practice of discipline necessary for a Christian life of 
holiness before God. 
 
Life Extension As a Project of Care 
Though Barth understands Trägheit as a sloth that takes the form of Sorge or anxiety 
with respect to our temporal earthly existence, sloth hardly appears as an appropriate 
term to describe the current efforts to slow aging via genetic technology in such 
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terms. Even Barth acknowledges that “when it is translated into conscientious work, 
who can possibly recognize it as a form of human sloth?”92 The problem, says Barth, 
is that our sloth is frequently hidden under a veil of ‘conscientious work.’ Indeed, 
Jean Bethke Elshtain has recently reflected on the somewhat paradoxical notion of 
sloth, noting that “busyness, strangely enough, may constitute its own version of 
laziness, as acquiescence in cultural forms that promote slackness of purpose as 
every moment of every day is gobbled up in a frenzy of activity.”93 Particularly, in 
our sloth, “we fret at the inevitable realization that our existence is limited. We 
would rather things were different. We try to arrest the foot which brings us 
constantly nearer to this frontier.”94 This, says Barth, is our human care. The 
‘conscientious work’ of which Barth spoke has taken the form of scientific activity, 
particularly the genetics of human aging. Extending life by slowing the aging process 
is the latest attempt to ‘arrest the foot’ which carries us to death by substantially 
arresting the body’s aging process. Thus, the attempt to slow human aging through 
genetic technology may be seen as the epitome of an increasing dissatisfaction with 
our limited duration (at least in affluent western cultures), disguising the bitter fruit 
of Trägheit. Our frenetic search for longevity bears witness to our dissatisfaction 
with the current healthy lifespan which is as long as it has ever been in postdiluvian 
history. While this century has witnessed tremendous advances in medicine in 
treating and even curing diseases and disorders which have limited the human 
lifespan, this has not proved enough. The real longevity that many seek will not be 
achieved by defeating disease, but by defeating aging itself.  
 
In the literature surveyed earlier, the notion that our span of life is insufficiently short 
to meet our aspirations and desires was a common one. Christine Overall made what 
appears to be a very reasonable assertion, that, “other things being equal, a longer life 
is a better one, provided that one is in a minimally good state of health.”95 It is 
recognized that “a longer life is the prerequisite for almost everything else that one 
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might want.”96 This need not be construed as hedonistic attempt to secure a longer 
life in the pursuit of pleasure. But the sentiment expressed here captures a wider 
dissatisfaction with our limited span as healthy, autonomous beings. As one ethicist 
has put it, “the only concern with health is that the disposition of my body not 
interfere with my life plan.”97 The more one wishes to accomplish and experience, 
the more death becomes an enemy. Our aging and disintegrating bodies become 
forceful reminders that our desires and aspirations outstrip the longevity of our 
bodies, making an enemy of death. Our human existence becomes filled with 
anxiety, noted Reinhold Niebuhr, when death precludes the accomplishment of our 
goals, “when finis so capriciously frustrates the possibility of achieving telos.”98  
 
However, death is an enemy not only because it forecloses future possibilities, but 
also because it is frequently accompanied by physiological decline which threatens 
our autonomy, and hence one’s ability to pursue the things one desires. As Carl 
Elliott observes, 
we have become accustomed to the idea that the tragedy of aging is 
physical and mental decline: the soul of a young person trapped in a 
debilitated, traitorous body. Often it is not Death that we fear so much 
as the instruments of torture that he carries with him: the degeneration 
and disability, the creaking joints and aching bones, the loss of 
stamina and sexual attractiveness.99
As advances in science affords an ever-increasing level of control over the body, the 
loss of control becomes all the more fearful. In this situation the concepts of dignity 
and autonomy are nearly unequivocal, where a ‘dignified death’ becomes one’s last 
exercise of autonomy over the failing body. Thus, it is hoped that we might greatly 
extend the human lifespan and minimize the period of decline by manipulating the 
genes associated with aging. 
 
                                                 
96 Overall, “Longevity,” 287. 
97 Joel James Shuman, The Body of Compassion: Ethics, Medicine, and the Church (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1999), 83.  
98 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, vol. 2, Human 
Destiny (London: Nisbet and Co. Ltd., 1943), 303.  
99 Better Than Well, 276. 
   232
The search to uncover the mysteries of aging represent the newest form of the 
Baconian project understood as the mitigation of disease and even death itself, 
inspiring awe and increasing both the fear of death and our dissatisfaction with the 
limits our decaying bodies impose on us. Current attempts to lengthen the human 
lifespan by manipulating aging itself stem from Sorge, our fear of death and decay as 
evidenced by our dissatisfaction with the increasing average life spans already 
afforded by advances in science. Moreover, in light of our anxieties it appears that 
that the body and soul have ‘gone their separate ways.’ The will or soul and its 
seemingly insatiable capacity for new experiences asserts itself over against the 
disintegrating and decaying body that cannot ‘keep up.’ That it is now possible to 
view our bodies as passive material for genetic manipulation in order to add years of 
bodily health reveals precisely such a disintegration of body and soul, even as 
science methodologically eliminates this tension in the form of a reductionistic 
materialism whereby consciousness, thoughts, morals, and emotions are considered 
as mere epiphenomenona of the brain.100 Though Barth does not provide any specific 
examples of how the fear of death and decay (Sorge) contributes to the separation of 
body and soul (Trägheit), one key example can be found at origins of the modern 
biomedical project in the work of René Descartes.  
 
Trägheit and the Birth of Modern Science 
One finds an example of the relationship between Trägheit as the separation of body 
and soul and Trägheit as care or anxiety over one’s limited lifespan at the very 
foundations of modern science in Descartes. While earlier I focused primarily on the 
work of Francis Bacon and the ‘Baconian Project’ as dubbed by McKenny, Descartes 
too played a considerable role in the development of modern science in his 
aforementioned separation of the body (res extensa) from the intellect or mind (res 
cogitans).101 It has been suggested that this separation was motivated in part by a 
fear of death and decay, a fear which contributed to his desire to metaphysically and 
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methodologically separate the soul (or mind) from the body. Drew Leder has 
convincingly argued that Descartes’ motivation for extending the human lifespan 
through increasing knowledge of the body was his fear of death and decay.102 Leder 
points out that Descartes’ fear of death may have been established very early in his 
life, as he suffered from a perpetual sickness that had claimed the life of his mother. 
Moreover, his physicians condemned him to an early death throughout the first 
twenty years of his life.103 Leder points out that Descartes’ used a two-pronged 
approach in his attack against the fear of death whereby the body and soul were 
methodologically separated. On the one hand, in his Meditations Descartes hoped to 
philosophically establish the existence of God and “that the human soul does not 
perish with the human body.”104 Leder argues that Descartes’ metaphysical 
explorations are partially motivated by the threat of bodily decay and death. “The 
Meditations is a text inaugurated not only by a confrontation with error but with 
death,” namely, by showing that the soul is immortal.105 On the other hand, in his 
Discourse on Method Descartes hoped by increasing our knowledge of the health and 
function of the human body, that “we could avoid many infirmities, both of mind and 
body, and perhaps even the decline of old age.”106 As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
decline in old age was thought possible through aging retardation.  
 
Leder gathers further support for his thesis by drawing upon Descartes’ biographical 
material, which reveals more of his sentiments on death, aging, and extending the 
healthy lifespan. Descartes’ concern with death was no less of a concern as he grew 
older. Indeed, physiological changes remind him of his impending death, 
contributing to his experimental fervency. In a letter to Huygens, Descartes records 
that 
the fact that my hair is turning gray warns me that I should spend all 
my time trying to set back the process. That is what I am working on 
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now, and I hope my efforts will succeed even though I lack sufficient 
experimentation.107
It is this very anxiety which Barth attributes to the sin of Sorge: “In care [Sorge] man 
makes his future his own problem.”108 Other personal correspondence suggests that 
Descartes is firmly in the grips of Sorge, as evidenced by his increasingly desperate 
hope of prolonging his life despite the lack of any real progress: 
I have never taken such pains to protect my health as now, and 
whereas I used to think that death might rob me of thirty or forty years 
at most, it could not now surprise me unless it threatened my hope of 
living more than a hundred years.109
Leder concludes that the primary motivation for Descartes’ metaphysical and 
scientific investigations is the threat of sickness and death. According to Leder, the 
dualism on display in his Meditations whereby the body was treated as a corpse for 
study, while the soul was immortal, was a therapeutic response to the two-fold threat 
of sickness and death.110  
In proving that the body is a mechanical, mathematical entity, free of 
all soul attributes, he lays the groundwork for modern scientific 
medicine. In this way he hopes to discover the ways to indefinitely 
prolong embodied life. But such a life cannot go on forever. Hence, 
the necessity of proving the immaterial nature of the rational soul, and 
thereby its immortality. Body and soul, science and theology. 
Descartes’s schema serves to combat death on all fronts.111
 
Phenomenologically speaking, it is our own corpse, says Leder, that is always 
approaching from within yet never arriving, reminding us that we will die. One’s 
own corpse emerges when illness strikes, when our limbs feel exhausted, or, as in the 
case of Descartes, when one begins to notice that one’s hair is turning gray. Leder 
observes that Descartes takes the anticipatory corpse from within, which speaks in 
first-person language of death, and transfers it to the corpse of the Other in third-
person language. Thus, “the terror of the body inaugurated by the approach of the 
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first-person death is countered by the figure of the third-person corpse. For this body 
yields up all its secrets to the scientist/physician.”112 It is difficult to overstate 
Descartes’ contribution to the current scientific view of the body. What Leder has 
attempted to demonstrate however, is that the methodological foundation upon which 
much of science rests is the fear of death and decay. Moreover, it suggests that the 
treatment for such fears can be carried out on the body without raising any 
substantial moral questions. With the mapping of the human genome, the latest 
casement has swung open revealing attractive vistas of extended youth and delayed 
decay. It represents the latest ‘turn to the body’ in an effort to combat the Sorge 
resulting from and contributing to the separation of body and soul. The body is no 
longer connected, so to speak, with the soul. This is especially evident in 
contemporary anti-aging research, where Trägheit is concealed under a flurry of care, 
or, in the words of Barth, ‘conscientious work.’ Before evaluating current attempts at 
longevity in light of Christian ascetic practice, it will be useful to consider more 
closely the specific attitudes towards the aging body within the field of gerontology 
and evolutionary molecular biology itself. 
 
The Aging Body in Modern Biomedical Project 
As Leder has argued, the contemporary biomedical view of the body as a corpse 
(Körper) for material for manipulation (as opposed to the lived body, Leib), stem 
from Descartes’ separation of the body from the soul, a separation motivated by his 
fear of bodily decay and death. With this move, Gerald McKenny notes that 
Descartes has initiated a process that brings mortality and disease “into visible 
presence, and thus under the mastery of the seeing eye and the intervening hand, 
while also distancing the essential person, the soul, from the body that, despite the 
power of medicine, is destined to decay.”113 As such, the functions and operating of 
the body are described in reductionistic terms, whether at the organ, cellular, or 
genetic level, as if indeed the body were a functioning corpse. A striking description 
of the human body comes from within the field of gerontology itself in Dr. 
Kirkwood’s enormously influential evolutionary theory of aging, called the 
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disposable soma theory. In Chapter 1 it was shown that this assessment comes from 
the vantage point of our own germ cells which, unlike the somatic cells of which our 
bodies are largely composed, possess replicative immortality. Thus, Kirkwood posits 
a new dualism rooted firmly in the material. As germ cells propagate giving rise to 
human bodies, our very somas are disposable, and somewhat ‘incidental’ to the 
process. That is, our bodies serve as transport vehicles for the propagation of the 
essential germ cells. Kirkwood candidly notes that the name of his theory was 
prompted by comparing the human body “with disposable products like coats, cars, 
and washing machines.”114 While Kirkwood’s hypothesis carries considerable 
explanatory weight within the sphere of evolutionary biology, it fails to give an 
adequate account of embodiment. Moreover, this view of the body does not come 
without moral implications.  
 
When scientific accounts of the body are presented as the comprehensive story on 
embodiment loosed from the restrictions of teleological explanations, it is not 
difficult to see how the disposable soma theory leads quite naturally to treating the 
body as the soma at our disposal. In failing to give an adequate (or any) account of 
what the body is for, the body becomes another object for which we have devised a 
use.115 Several have noted this trend. Peter Scott has observed that “our world, 
including our bodies, is now plastic, to be shaped in our image. Some of us, at least, 
are sicut deus.”116 Through genetic advances the body becomes increasingly 
subservient to the unencumbered ‘naked will.’ 
Because of the triumph of the Cartesian view, most of us view the 
body as a biological substratum whose characteristics are best 
described in physical and biochemical terms. Fixed with regard to the 
naked will that stands over against it, the body is nevertheless 
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alterable by technology, which promises to bring the body under the 
dominion of the will.117
Indeed, Descartes’ influence on the perception of embodiment can hardly be 
underemphasized. Given the common premise in contemporary ethical discourse 
which states that ‘since life is good then more life is better,’ it appears perfectly 
reasonable to ask how one might alter one’s body to fit this premise, suppressing 
questions concerning the role of the aging, decaying body in the formation of one’s 
character.  
 
It appears that we are headed towards what Paul Ramsey called a redefinition of our 
understanding of ‘sloth’ against the messianic positivism of molecular biology, 
where righteousness is supplanted by the biological summum bonum. Ramsey asserts 
that “the new form of spiritual sloth will be not to want to be bodily perfect and 
genetically improved.”118 In terms of aging research, prolongevity activists have 
recently coined a new term embodying this sentiment—‘gerontologiphobia’—a 
pejorative term initially ascribed to a respondent in the New York Times who said 
“thanks, but no thanks” in response to prolongevity research.119 The desire to 
genetically refashion the body for longer durability suggests that the body is being 
held in contempt, not because the body hinders an ascent to things divine (e.g. 
Porphyry) or spiritual activity, but because the body all too quickly breaks down and 
fails to function properly long enough. Since one’s projects, desires and longings on 
this earth threaten to outstrip the longevity of one’s body, it is tempting to hold the 
body in contempt, even as it is asserted that the healthy, functioning body is a crucial 
prerequisite for autonomy and future flourishing. The very fact that the body is 
perceived as imposing unnecessary limits on one’s desire for more experiences, love 
interests, and intellectual or artistic quests, and that the body must be genetically 
redesigned to allow for these expanded possibilities, indicates that the body and soul 
are in dis-order, and have already ‘gone their separate ways.’ The most poignant 
example of this separation is found in the area of aging research which thus far has 
proven most promising at retarding aging, caloric restriction.   
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Trägheit and Caloric Restriction  
As discussed in Chapter 1, scientists are uncovering the mechanisms of aging by 
studying the effects of caloric restriction on laboratory animals. Caloric restriction 
serves as a particularly illuminating example of the ways technology can serve the 
slothful notion of separating the body from the soul. One such pathway involving the 
SIR2 gene has been identified in yeast, allowing scientist to replicate the aging 
retardation process by altering genes without altering eating habits. More recently a 
similar gene known as SIRT1 has produced reduced aging in mammals, holding 
more promise that similar genes in humans might be targeted with similar effects.120 
While there are still disputes between evolutionary and molecular biologists about 
the promise of such findings, the overall goal suggests that the frenetic search for 
aging mechanisms is a contemporary form of sloth. We are searching, quite literally, 
for ways to have our cake and eat it too. The impetus for such technology is clear: 
genetic alteration is more promising, and the dietary restrictions for longevity 
required are so repugnant that they severely undermine the desire to live longer in the 
first place. Olshansky and Carnes acknowledge that “the value of research on caloric 
restriction is not going to come from encouraging people to restrict their intake of 
food.”121 This is instructive, given that researchers estimate that the decrease in 
caloric intake is not inordinately large. Even so, the general consensus is that “the 
likelihood that people would willingly commit to a 20% to 30% caloric intake drop is 
extremely small.”122 Rather, suggest Olshansky and Carnes, 
future benefits to public health from this area of research will more 
likely come from identifying the underlying biological mechanisms 
that are responsible for the effect [of a restricted food intake on the 
body], rather than encouraging the adoption of diets that almost 
nobody wants to follow.123
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These insights have spawned a new field of inquiry referred to as ‘caloric restriction 
mimetics,’ with the recognition that the most attractive scenario for longevity is to 
engineer a pharmaceutical that triggers the type of gene expression activated by 
caloric restriction.124 The discovery of the genetic mechanisms that may be 
modulated to slow aging have spawned several companies intent on manufacturing 
such a pharmaceutical, in hopes of treating disease and ultimately retarding the aging 
process. Cynthia Kenyon, co-founder of Elixir Pharmaceuticals, has had considerable 
success in extending the lifespan of the nematode worm. While Elixir is also looking 
to treat disease by examining the genetic pathways of aging, she acknowledged that 
her primary goal is retardation of the aging process in order to greatly extend life. 
Her research with the nematode worm has resulted in a six-fold increase in healthy 
lifespan. Upon seeing the initial results she exclaimed, “I wanted to be those 
worms.”125 While the worm appears to hold the secret to our salvation, it is difficult 
to avoid offering a parenthetical remark that Scripture nearly always reserved the 
worm as a sign of death and decay, as that which feeds upon rotting flesh. Scripture 
too speaks of a place where the worm does not die (Isaiah 66:24, Mark 9:48). 
Kenyon notes that “if our company could make a pill, every one would want it.”126 
Similar efforts with higher order animals like rhesus monkeys are underway with the 
same goal in mind.127 Thus, the hopes of designing such a pill are now routinely 
considered as the most desirable form of ‘therapy.’128  
 
The search for caloric restriction mimetics offers a profound example of the ways in 
which it is possible to plunge into Trägheit, further distancing the body from the 
soul. Given however that humanity has been created by God as embodied souls and 
ensouled bodies, any such separation suggests that remaking the body to fit one’s 
limitless desires forecloses any possibility of utilizing and caring for the body in the 
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reparative process of one’s character, a process which in turn has beneficial effects 
on one’s body. The genetic search for the retardation of aging is deficient in that it 
fails to address the issues of Trägheit as a separation of body and soul. Indeed, it 
only exacerbates the separation. In light of the practice and goals of asceticism 
discussed in Antony and Athanasius in the previous chapter, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the genetic search for longevity effectively (1) negates the role of the 
body in refining one’s soul, and (2) fails to recognize that modifying the body to 
allay fears of death can never effectively mitigate such a fear that dwells in one’s 
soul. These conclusions I discuss in turn. 
 
Trägheit: The Loss of the Body’s Role in the Refinement of One’s Soul 
The life of St. Antony casts current attempts to extend the human lifespan into sharp 
relief. Certainly there are significant differences between the ascetic and genetic 
‘remaking’ of the body, apart from the more obvious differences of method (e.g. 
hygienic vs. genetic) and efficacy. As was demonstrated in the last chapter, it could 
hardly be said that the goal of the ascetic life was a prolonged existence in the body, 
even though it was thought possible to attain an ‘idling’ state. Yet, the desert ascetics 
recognized the moral force of the body that is largely absent within a scientific 
worldview.  No longer is the body implicated in the development of the whole 
person. As has been shown, the body is at best morally neutral, the object of one’s 
desires, rather than a key factor in refining both the body and soul. Where the body 
was once indispensable in the development of the whole person, the body has now 
become an object of genetic control in hopes that its deleterious or limiting effects on 
one’s desires might be minimized. For Antony, recognizing the body’s limitedness 
was critical to both bodily and spiritual development, a limitedness whose force 
stemmed from the resurrection body to come. Whereas Athanasius intimated that. 
Antony’s longevity was an indirect result of his ascetic life, efforts to genetically 
slow aging perceive longevity as more of a prerequisite for a good life. Caloric 
restriction mimetics merely reinforce our sloth. By such efforts, the body and the 
soul remain dis-integrated and disordered, as the moral force of the body itself is 
dissolved, divided into a myriad of genetic pathways which will one day succumb to 
our technological control. The sentiment that a restriction in food intake will 
adversely affect the quality of one’s life reveals that the body has nothing to say 
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about the development of one’s character, and merely underscores that the body and 
soul have already gone their separate ways.  
 
This new ‘genetic asceticism’ is likely to ensure that they remain separated. This is 
not to say that those who are able to effectively discipline their bodies by restricting 
their food intake are morally superior, much less that such dietary restrictions 
necessarily entail a recognition of the moral force of one’s body. The very public 
‘heroic fast’ recently carried out by David Blaine who, in neo-Stylite fashion encased 
himself in a Plexiglas cube forty feet above London is a case in point. It is only to 
acknowledge that the most common type of fasting which genetic engineering may 
one day overcome is hygienic fasting where one seeks to reshape one’s body through 
the hard effort of a disciplined diet. Caloric restriction mimetics is so attractive 
because it offers a potential escape from the type of fasting whereby one limits one’s 
food intake largely for physical purposes—to fit into particular clothes, to enhance 
one’s physique, or to slow down the aging process—a fasting which reveals a 
problem in one’s soul, and represents another form of the naked will over against the 
body in remaking it to fit one’s desires. Caloric restriction mimetics reinforce the 
assumption adopted by some in Corinth who mistakenly believed that “Food [is] for 
the stomach and the stomach for food” (1 Corinthians 6:13), a statement Paul 
countered with the reminder that the body is meant for the Lord, and the Lord for the 
body (1 Corinthians 6:14). In a similar vein, Paul also reminded those in Rome that 
both those who eat meat and those who abstain, do so to the Lord (Romans 14:6). 
Ingesting caloric restriction mimetics for greater longevity will enable us to continue 
in our sloth, living under the illusion of gained time as those who refuse to be wise 
rulers of our bodies in service for the Lord, masking over what failed diets ought to 
reveal about the stubbornness of our own recalcitrant wills and desires—even among 
those who are justified and sanctified by Christ.  
 
If caloric restriction mimetics promises to eliminate the need for hygienic fasting, no 
less do they mitigate the practice of fasting for higher purposes. By taking a pill that 
slows one’s aging while simultaneously allowing one to live under the illusion that 
food is only for the stomach and the stomach only for food, the pathway by which 
one ‘enters the desert’ and comes face to face with the haunted regions of one’s soul 
and begins to untwist the tangled web of desires initiated by fasting, is effectively 
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sealed off. The bodily hunger that reminds us of, and creates within us a deeper 
hunger for God and his will, the hunger that reminds us that God has food of which 
the world does not know (John 4:32), that Jesus Christ himself is the bread of life 
(John 6:35 f), and that fasting from food enables us to feast on God (John 4:34), may 
one day be mitigated by a pill. The following journal excerpt reveals both the 
stubbornness of the human will and how very different this type of fasting is from 
hygienic forms, and hence what might be sacrificed by taking a pill to slow the body 
down in hopes of enhancing our chance for longevity. 
(1) I felt is a great accomplishment to go a whole day without food. 
Congratulated myself on the fact that I found it so easy . . . (2) Began 
to see that the above was hardly the goal of fasting. Was helped in this 
by beginning to feel hunger . . . (3) Began to relate the food fast to 
other areas of my life where I was more compulsive . . . I did not have 
to have a seat on the bus to be contented, or to be cool in the summer 
and warm when it was cold. (4) . . . Reflected more on Christ’s 
suffering and the suffering of those who are hungry and have hungry 
babies . . . (5) Six months after beginning the fast discipline, I began 
to see why a two-year period has been suggested. The experience 
changes along the way. Hunger on fast days became acute, and the 
temptation to eat stronger. For the first time I was using the day to 
find God’s will for my life. Began to think about what it meant to 
surrender one’s life. (6) I now know that prayer and fasting must be 
intricately bound together. There is no other way and yet that way is 
not yet combined in me.129
This reveals that the very experience of hunger can serve as a powerful impetus to 
the refinement of one’s will. As Dietrich Bonhoeffer noted, “fasting helps to 
discipline the self-indulgent and slothful will which is so reluctant to serve the Lord, 
and it helps to humiliate and chasten the flesh.”130
 
One might suggest that taking a caloric restriction mimetic that bypasses the need for 
hygienic fasting need not preclude one from embarking on fasting for the spiritual 
purposes of refining one’s will. Indeed, one must grant this possibility, though it 
seems highly unlikely. For in this particular scenario there comes an increased threat 
to one’s character in that the wisdom gained by reflecting on one’s limited time on 
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earth—a reflection in which one is aided by the reminder of one’s very aging and 
disintegrating body—appears diminished. As will be shown shortly, this was an 
integral part of Antony’s asceticism. Barth too understood that a recognition of one’s 
bodily limits was integral to the Christian’s sanctification and the carrying of one’s 
cross. He speaks of the cross which the Christian must bear in sanctification, where 
one affirms and loves life as a gift from God and rightly tries to “ward off pain and 
death,”131 yet is also able to say ‘Yes’ to pain, suffering and death,  
because his sanctification in fellowship with Jesus Christ . . . 
ultimately includes the fact that he has to see and feel and experience 
the limit of his existence—even of his Christian existence engaged in 
sanctification—as the limit of his human and creaturely life, which 
leads necessarily to death, and proclaiming it, and finally involving 
it.132
The Christian is not to seek or induce death, says Barth, but rather affirm life as he 
approaches this frontier. The Christian will affirm both life and death for Jesus’ sake. 
“He will accept the fact that this limit or frontier is set, and that he has to note it. He 
will take up his cross.”133 For Barth, our cross includes natural death and the sickness 
and aging that accompany it, not according to the laws of nature, but based on our 
fellowship with Christ, who “endured that that limit should be set for Him in the 
negation of His life.”134 By Christ’s resurrection and defeat of death, the Christian 
need only fear the Lord. Thus, again it reveals that the process of sanctification is 
jeopardized to the extent that the Christian fails to recognize his own creaturely 
limitedness, which is ultimately affirmed by Jesus’ limitedness. 
 
An understanding of what might learned from the very limitedness of the body 
becomes increasingly important as advances in molecular and evolutionary biology 
promise to bring the human body under an increasing level of control, and are 
recognized as the best means by which a significant extension in the healthy lifespan 
might be attained. Though it is clear that there is much more to learn about the body 
through increasing knowledge of it’s functioning at the molecular, cellular, and 
                                                 
131 CD IV/2, 602. 
132 CD IV/2, 602-603. 
133 CD IV/2, 603. 
134 CD IV/2, 603, see also 611. 
   244
genetic levels, the body has nothing more to teach us. In searching for the genetic 
and molecular pathways that influence aging and designing pharmaceuticals which 
activate these processes, some hope to further refine the body, oblivious to the moral 
force of embodiment and proper understanding the role of the body in shaping and 
being shaped by one’s character.  
 
Trägheit: Treating the Body to Cure the Soul 
While Bacon and Athanasius both envisioned a return to prelapsarian paradise, they 
offered two very different methodologies. Bacon sought bodily incorruptibility 
through increasing knowledge for the “reinvesting (in great part) of man to the 
sovereignty and power . . . which he had in his first state of creation.”135 Athanasius 
believed that bodily incorruptibility was the result of a rightly ordered body-soul 
relationship, something appropriated by the One who defeated death and corruption. 
What Barth and the Desert Fathers have to say to Descartes and to those presently 
engaged in the ‘Baconian Project’ of extending human life via the genetic retardation 
of aging to extend life and postpone death, is that no increase in control over the 
body, no amount of knowledge gained of its functioning, no amount of attention 
focused on genetically or pharmacologically remaking the body for greater longevity 
will resolve the problem of Sorge in one’s soul. By such attempts science continually 
reenacts the ‘turn to the body’ by which Adam lost his intimate fellowship with God, 
resulting in the fear of death and a potentially shortened lifespan. Hence, Bacon and 
Athanasius offer two different pathways to a longer life. 
 
This is not to reassert the false dichotomy where science and medicine are best left to 
the care of the body and religion to the care of one’s soul. Nor does this mean that 
the body is irrelevant, or that the solution to death lies in a Stoic acceptance to the 
brute fact of its existence; it is to say quite the opposite. Rather, the fear and anxiety 
of our finite span cannot be adequately dealt with apart from acknowledging the very 
limitedness of our bodies. For Antony and the eremitic ascetics, remaking the body 
was subsumed under the larger goal of transforming one’s character, involving an 
explicit recognition of bodily limits—even as such practices slowed the body down. 
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On the other hand, those seeking to genetically remake the body are hoping to 
transcend these very bodily limits which are beneficial for instructing one’s soul. 
That the declining and disintegrating body is perceived as a threat reveals that one’s 
body and soul are in a sense, dis-integrated. But if indeed care both results from and 
contributes to the separation of body and soul, it has been shown that the resolution 
of this anxiety only occurs through practices which involve a re-integration of body 
and soul, practices which begin by allowing the body to “become the discreet mentor 
of the proud soul.”136 The Desert Fathers remind us that the process of refining one’s 
will and desires cannot occur without first attending to the body by limiting, to some 
degree, its everyday needs. This suggests that the extent to which science discovers 
how to genetically remake the body for more efficient metabolism, heightened 
durability and greater longevity, is the extent to which science undermines the body’s 
role in mentoring the soul. If, in the desert ascetics, the body was heavily invested in 
the transformation of the soul—even as the body itself was ‘remade,’ thereby 
enhancing one’s possibility of longevity—there is little evidence to suggest that body 
today under the Cartesian gaze carries any such weight. Given that the dissatisfaction 
with one’s temporal span stems not simply from one’s decaying and disintegrating 
body, but also reflects a disorder of one’s soul, I suggest that pursing practices that 
reorder the body and soul are the means by which to mitigate such a fear, the very 
means advocated by Athanasius and employed by Antony. 
 
Asceticism and Its Role in Countering Sorge and Trägheit 
Insofar as Trägheit—understood as anxiety over one’s limited existence (Sorge) 
which both contributes to, and results from, a separation of body and soul—is also 
characterized as a lack of discipline (Disziplinlosigkeit), it is reasonable to conclude 
that there are ascetic practices informed by a Christian narrative which help 
reintegrate and reorder the body and soul, allaying the fear and anxiety (Sorge) borne 
out by their separation. This goal of this reordering as understood by Athanasius and 
Antony was that the body might become subservient to one’s Word-guided soul, so 
that the whole person— ensouled body and embodied soul—might become a 
‘medium of incarnate expression.’ The real man Jesus reflects this perfect ordering, 
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who lived his life in perfect obedience to God as an embodied soul perfectly ruling 
his ensouled body. Thus, a form of Christian asceticism which minimally involves 
fasting, meditation, and prayer, offer the means by which the dis-integration and 
disorder of body and soul are reintegrated and reordered, thereby mitigating the fear 
of death and one’s limited lifespan that have resulted from the sloth of allowing the 
body and soul to go their separate ways.  
 
It was Athanasius who earlier argued that the death and resurrection of Christ 
enabled the Christian to defeat the fear of death, the very fear which originated in 
Adam’s ‘turn towards the body.’137 With Christ’s defeat of death through his 
crucifixion and resurrection however, our own death is no longer something which 
inspires fear. Though man is by nature afraid of death and the disintegration of the 
body, says Athanasius, “there is this most startling fact, that he who has put on the 
faith of the Cross despises even what is naturally fearful, and for Christ’s sake is not 
afraid of death.”138 The evidence that this is already the case, says Athanasius, is 
born out by those Christian martyrs who willingly face death for the sake of 
Christ.139 Thus, people of all sorts—men, women, and those “tender in years”—
display their readiness to die. These show their contempt for death, and “exercise 
themselves by bodily discipline against it.”140 Yet, this does not happen 
automatically. “We fast meditating on death, that we may be able to live,” says 
Athanasius, “hastening to announce the sign of victory over death.”141 Hence, a 
connection exists between discipline with the despisal of death as evidenced by the 
early Christian martyrs. Brakke observes that  
thanks to the Word’s victory on the cross, the monk’s consideration of 
death can increase his moral effort instead of making him fearful and 
morally disordered. . . . the monk can replace the disorienting fear of 
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death with an attitude toward death that results in moral courage and 
an intensified life of virtue.142  
Athanasius recognized that Christ had already defeated death by succumbing to it, 
removing its sting for us. Pettersen too notes that Athanasius “recognizes a close 
connection between the Christian’s everyday spiritual exercises and his death in 
Christ.”143 As might be expected, Athanasius expresses this point most forcefully in 
the Life of Antony.  
 
Though Antony served as Athanasius’ prime example of the Christian whose 
discipline enabled him to put on that bodily incorruptibility secured by Christ, the 
very brevity of life served as a motivating factor as he daily “increased in his 
discipline,” a brevity further punctuated by the promise of eternity. As briefly noted 
in the last chapter, Athanasius notes that Antony spent much time in his cell fixing 
his desires on heaven and continually “pondering over the shortness of man’s 
life.”144 Antony knew that a better embodiment awaited him after death, an 
embodiment that offered more than simply freedom from decay, but an embodiment 
where the struggle with sin was no longer possible. Hence, he advocated reflection 
on the words of Paul in 1 Corinthians 15:31—‘I die daily,’ living “as though under 
the daily expectation of death,” in order that sin might be avoided, a theme repeated 
in the Life of Antony.145
We have lived in the discipline a long time: but rather as though 
making a beginning daily let us increase our earnestness. For the 
whole life of man is very short, measured by the ages to come, 
wherefore all our time is nothing compared with eternal life. . . . For it 
is written, ‘The days of our life in them are threescore years and ten, 
but if they are in strength, fourscore years, and what is more than 
these is labour and sorrow.’ [Psalm 90:10] Whenever, therefore, we 
live full fourscore years, or even a hundred in the discipline, not for a 
hundred years only shall we reign, but instead of a hundred we shall 
reign for ever and ever. And though we fought on earth, we shall not 
receive our inheritance on earth, but we have the promises in heaven; 
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and having put off the body which is corrupt, we shall receive it 
incorrupt.146  
 
According to Athanasius, asceticism was firmly rooted in the reality that the body 
decays and eventually dies, for this reflects the good order of God by whom our 
limited existence is sustained. But it also reflects the victory over death won by 
Christ, whereby a limited degree of incorruptibility might be regained on this earth, 
though it pales in comparison to the absolute bodily incorruptibility to be received in 
the resurrection. This realization of the limited and troubled nature of bodily 
existence was heightened by reflecting on the fact that one day the incorruptible body 
will put on incorruptibility on account of the One who took on a corruptible body, 
surrendered to death, and rose from the dead thereby defeating it. Under such 
considerations, the length of one’s own life is subsumed under the desire to do God’s 
will and answer his call. So too, Barth, reflecting on Christian practice, recognized 
the benefit of a meditatio futurae vitae, where one’s absolute will for life “may 
perhaps in many ways be weakened, broken, relativised and finally destroyed.”147 
While the Desert Fathers did not consider the desire for long life as necessarily bad, 
the fear of long life marked by a slow bodily decline and dependence on others was 
credited to avarice. According to Evagrius Ponticus, “avarice suggests to the mind a 
lengthy old age, inability to perform manual labor (at some future date), famines that 
are sure to come, sickness that will visit us, the pinch of poverty, the great shame that 
comes from accepting the necessities of life from others.”148 It is precisely this 
scenario of prolonged senescence—a “lengthy old age” where one must accept “the 
necessities of life from others”—that the many gerontologists and geneticists hope to 
overcome. 
 
Antony believed that a daily reflection that each particular day may be one’s last 
helps one avoid sin and live properly. In the previous chapter it was shown that such 
a mindset enabled Antony to willingly face the possibility of martyrdom when he 
visited those Christians condemned to death in Alexandria. Brakke has astutely noted 
                                                 
146 Life 16, 200. 
147 CD III/4, 342. 
148 Praktikos 9, in The Prakiktos and Chapters on Prayer, trans. John Eudes Bamberger (Kalamazoo, 
MI: Cistercian Publications, 1981), 17. 
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that for Antony “the soul’s anxiety about death lies at the root of the human inability 
to lead a virtuous life,” as evident in the numerous horrific demonic appearances 
(Life of Antony 9, 23, 24, 28, 30, 32) designed to instill fear in young Antony and to 
dissuade him from following the life of virtue.149 For to lead a life of virtue meant 
bearing one’s cross. To bear the cross of Christ in the Christian life meant to be open 
to suffering, and to be free from fear of death. Antony did not hesitate to stress this 
point to the philosophers who visited him in his cave. “But concerning the Cross, 
which would you say to be the better, to bear it, when a plot is brought about by 
wicked men, nor [sic] to be in fear of death brought about under any form 
whatever?”150 Antony knew that the extent to which the Christian fears her own 
death is the extent to which she is unable to take up her cross and follow Christ 
(Hebrews 2:14-15).  
 
Douglas Burton-Christie asserts that the Desert Fathers practiced discipline to 
mitigate care and attain the freedom that enabled one to serve others, issues which 
were so critical for Barth.151 Indeed, while Barth understood that care puts one in 
bondage where one ‘makes the future his own problem,’ Burton-Christie observes 
that   
the telos of the monks’ life in the desert was freedom: freedom from 
anxiety about the future; freedom from the tyranny of haunting 
memories of the past; freedom from an attachment to the ego which 
precluded intimacy with others and with God. They hoped also that 
this freedom would express itself in a positive sense: freedom to love 
others; freedom to enjoy the presence of God; freedom to live in the 
innocence of a new paradise.152
The supposed ‘freedom’ to be found in genetically manipulating the aging process to 
ensure more opportunities for future flourishing is quite different from the true 
freedom which comes from surrendering one’s self, soul and body, to the One who 
surrendered Himself up to death in the sure hope of a future intimate fellowship with 
                                                 
149 Brakke, Athanasius, 222; see 118-223. 
150 Athanasius, Life 75, 216; Incarnation 24.3, 49.  
151 Recall that the second form of Trägheit was characterized as man’s inhumanity whereby his 
relationship to his fellow creatures is damaged, Barth, CD IV/2, 409 f. 
152 Douglas Burton-Christie, The Word in the Desert: Scripture and the Quest for Holiness (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1993), 222. The heading of the section from which this quote was taken is 
entitled “Freedom From Care.”  
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him in resurrected bodies incapable of decay. The fear engendered by the decaying 
body and hence the decaying self (Sorge) speaks of dissipation, and that the body and 
soul are out of order (Trägheit). Thus, no amount of genetic manipulation will secure 
that desired freedom from the fear of decay which comes from reordering the body 
and soul in recognition of the limitedness of the body, a limitedness confirmed as 
good and proper by the very man Jesus Christ who, as an embodied soul and 
ensouled body conquered death that his followers may have new life here and now. 
 
Through the disciplines of prayer and fasting, Antony was able to conquer his fear of 
death that may have otherwise hindered his service to God. The goal of this process, 
informed by Scripture and permeated with God’s will for one’s life, involved 
restoring the soul as the rightful leader of the body, to be offered in service to God as 
a ‘sacramental body.’ When one’s soul or will has been transformed by submitting to 
the body, concern over the length of one’s life is somewhat relativized, even as one 
recognizes that fasting offers the possibility of remaking the body for greater 
longevity on this earth. Thus, the Christian who first comes under the tutelage of the 
body will perhaps no longer find the prospect of an extended lifespan as alluring. As 
mentioned earlier, Paul expressed this relativization in Philippians 1:20-24, where he 
was anxious to depart and be present with the Lord, recognizing that “to die is gain.” 
Paul could hardly conceive of his lifespan in terms of years, but rather in terms of 
God’s tasks, hopeful in the knowledge that “Christ will be exalted in my body, 
whether by life or death.”153 So too, in his farewell to the Ephesian elders (Acts 
20:13-24), Paul, speaking as one who knew that only prison and hardship lay ahead, 
said that “I consider my life worth nothing to me, if only I may finish the race and 
complete the task the Lord Jesus has given me.”154 Yet, it is important to be 
reminded that it is not necessarily wrong to want a longer life, as long life is indeed a 
good gift to be used in fellowship with and service to God. Moreover, arguing for the 
practices of fasting as one of the Christian disciplines which enables one to mitigate 
the fear of death and decay, effectively relativizing the significance of one’s 
lifespan—even as it enhances the body and the possibility of living longer—by no 
means precludes the use of medicine to treat and cure diseases which would 
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otherwise cut one’s life short.155 Jesus did indeed extend the lives of those he healed 
and brought back from the dead (Luke 7: 1-10, 11-17; 8:41-42, 49-56, John 4:46-53; 
11:1-44), as did Peter (Acts 9:36-41), though none ultimately escaped aging and 
death.  
 
Equally important is a recognition that it is possible to have one’s life extended by 
the successful treatment or cure of an illness or disease, and yet desire such things for 
the wrong reason—out of a fear of decay, decline, and potential the loss of 
autonomy, because one has things left to accomplish—reasons which reveal that one 
is still in the grips of Trägheit, where life itself is one’s ethical lord.156 By God’s 
grace healing is made possible through the use of medicine and technology, even 
though extra time allotted might very well be put to selfish ends. Yet, that nine of the 
ten lepers healed by Jesus did not return to give him thanks did not prevent Jesus 
from healing all ten (Luke 17:12-18). It is equally important to recognize that bodily 
decay and illness can serve as moral projects. McKenny notes that the suffering that 
occurs from the decay of one’s own body can be used “for meditation on sin and the 
need for grace, and many of the disciplines . . .”157 At least some of the desert 
ascetics recognized this. While acknowledging that it is good to only discipline one’s 
healthy body, Barsanuphius of Gaza (d. 540 CE) asserted that “illness is greater than 
discipline, and is reckoned as a substitute for ascetic behavior.”158 Nevertheless, 
though it is possible to use medicine in curing the body from various illnesses 
resulting in an extended life, it may actually ‘distance’ the body from the soul. 
Physical healing of one’s body may in fact have a detrimental effect on one’s soul or 
character. One must remember how Hezekiah used his extended life unwisely, 
expressing relief that the punishment would be visited on his progeny. “Will there 
not be peace and security in my lifetime?”159 How different is Hezekiah’s response 
                                                 
155 The methods utilized of course need to be scrutinized by a Christian understanding of the human in 
light of the creation, fall, and reconciliation enacted by Jesus Christ, particularly research dealing with 
human embryos, cloning, and the possibilities of somatic and germ cell therapies.  
156 Barth, CD III/4, 326.  
157 McKenny, To Relieve, 221. 
158 Barsanuphius, “Letter 78,” Letters From the Desert, 80. We also find an acknowledgement that the 
ascetic rule concerning fasting is essentially useless when the body is unwell, “Letter 23,” Letters 
From the Desert, 66. 
159 2 Kings 20:19b, NIV. 
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from the Psalmist’s: “Even when I am old and gray, do not forsake me, O God, till I 
declare your power to the next generation, your might to all who are to come.”160 
Hezekiah’s life illustrates both the grace of God and just how dangerous some forms 
of knowledge can be. While science will never be able to assure one’s length of life 
with absolute certainty, living as though this were a guarantee is to live as a fool.  
 
To say however that fasting is an alternative to genetic manipulation for greater 
longevity is to overlook that fasting was subsumed under the larger moral project of 
sanctification, yet crucially integral to this process. It is more accurate to say that the 
Christian who integrates the discipline of fasting into her life as an aid to prayer and 
the meditatio scripturarum in the transformation of one’s character may indeed slow 
down the aging of her body, resulting in a potentially longer, healthier life. But for 
the person who has been transformed by submitting the soul and the body to the 
Lord, the length of life takes on less importance. Certainly, while fasting as a 
Christian discipline is widely ignored today, Scripture bears witness to the 
significance of fasting for the Israelites as God’s people—in various forms and for 
various reasons—a significance that is in no way marginalized in the New 
Testament.161 Jesus himself advocated the discipline of fasting. Though he refrained 
from issuing a command regarding fasting, he spoke with the presupposition that 
fasting was an integral part of being a disciple of Christ (Matthew 6:16;  {Otan deV 
nhsteuvhte . . .), and would continue to be so, especially upon his ascension 
(Matthew 9:15). In Antony fasting is taken to an extreme. Yet, contrary to 
Athanasius’ presentation of Antony as a model for all to follow, the ascetic life 
neither demanded a virtuoso performance of heroic proportions, nor did it require a 
flight to the desert in search of an extended solitude. Indeed, these Christian practices 
in the struggle to holiness are not to be carried out in isolation, and are deficient if 
separated from the community of faith. A brief examination of Athanasius’ Festal 
Letters is useful in this regard.  
 
                                                 
160 Psalm 71:18, NIV. 
161 Within Scripture there are various prescribed modes of fasting, from complete abstinence (Esther 
4:16, Acts 9:9) to avoiding certain kinds of food (Daniel 1:12-15, 10:3). Moreover, there were several 
reasons for fasting, including the corporate fast on the day of atonement (Leviticus 23:27), and 
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Fasting and the Body of Christ 
What life have you if you have not life together?                             
There is no life that is not in community,                                           
And no community not lived in praise of GOD.                              
Even the anchorite who meditates alone,                                            
For whom the days and nights repeat the praise of GOD,                
Prays for the Church, the Body of Christ incarnate.162
Athanasius’ Festal Letters are replete with exhortations indicating that prayer and 
fasting were to be a normal part of every Christian’s life, to be practiced with 
increased vigor during particular times of the year, especially during the forty days 
preceding the Easter feast.163 Writing to the churches in his episcopate he says, 
“behold, my brethren, how much a fast can do, and in what manner the law 
commands us to fast.”164 Athanasius urges that during Lent Christians ought to 
“increase the discipline [ajvskhsi"] all the more,” practices which include prayers and 
vigils, temporary renunciation of sexual relations, fasting, studying the Scriptures, 
restoring fractured relationships, and providing for the poor.165 Brakke rightly 
concludes that Athanasius’ promulgation of the ascetic lifestyle did not exempt 
‘ordinary’ Christians from participation, though advanced ascetic practice was not 
mandatory. Rather, the difference between the ordinary and advanced Christian was 
one of degree, and not fundamentally different in character.166 Indeed, other early 
church documents made it clear that fasting was important for all believers, 
implicitly denying that fasting is for those who are advanced in the Christian life. 
The Didache described fasting as integral to the pathway of life (in distinction from 
the way of death), a way marked by loving one’s enemies and fasting for the sake of 
persecutors (nhsteuvete deV uJpeVr tw~n diwkovntwn uJma~"), an apparent rewording of 
Jesus’ commandment in Matthew 5:44 (kaiV proseuvchsqe uJpeVr tw~n diwkovntwn 
                                                 
162 T. S. Eliot, “Choruses from ‘The Rock,’” in Collected Poems, 1909-1962 (London: Faber and 
Faber Limited, 1963), 168. 
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165 Brakke, Athanasius, 183. 
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Muhammad (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), 96, has observed that in Plotinus and Antony we 
have a parting of the ways by which one gains mastery over one’s body. While disciples of the former 
were intellectually groomed in literature and philosophy, those of the latter could simply open the 
Scriptures and take the command of Christ literally, as did Antony, which led to his flight to the 
desert. 
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uJma~").167 The Didache thus goes beyond Scripture in elevating fasting to a 
command, calling for fasting on Wednesdays and Fridays in distinction from the 
Pharisees, who fasted on Mondays and Thursdays.168 If the teachings of the early 
church did not limit fasting to the few spiritual elite, much less was there a 
requirement to take up a life of complete solitude.  
 
Particularly insightful in this regard is Athanasius’ letter to the monk Dracontius who 
turned down his newly elected post as Bishop, wishing instead to remain in the 
monastery. Athanasius reminded Dracontius that several monks had left the 
monastery to take up posts in the episcopate. Athanasius’ eloquence is on display as 
he informs Dracontius that his new position as Bishop would by no means preclude a 
cessation of his ascetic life—“for we know both bishops who fast and monks who 
drink”—but would actually serve to strengthen the community of believers: 
For it is possible for you also as a bishop to hunger and thirst as Paul 
did. You can drink no wine, like Timothy, and fast constantly too like 
Paul, in order that thus fasting after his example you may feast others 
with your words, and while thirsting for lack of drink, water others by 
teaching.169
Pettersen concludes that for Athanasius “it is most noteworthy that practicing the 
higher form of Christian life is not limited to those who withdraw from society; it 
may be embraced within society.”170 Recent scholarship from various quarters has 
revealed that the lines between the city and the desert, between isolation and living in 
a community, between those advanced in the ascetic life and those less so, are 
significantly blurred.171 Though the average Christian in Alexandria was expected to 
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fast as part of the Christian life, none were required to live the life of a hermit. 
Indeed, the Life of Antony itself attests to the presence of ‘village hermit,’ in an 
adjacent village who had an influence on Antony early in his life.172 The Life of 
Antony also records how Antony served and ministered to others who sought him 
out, effectively colonizing the desert with monks, a point recognized by Derwas 
Chitty whose borrowed phrase from the Life of Antony became the title of his own 
seminal work, The Desert a City.173 Brakke too has observed that the benefits of this 
body-soul reordering extend to the community of believers: “He [Antony] subjects 
his body to his Word-guided soul and thereby becomes the conduit for the Word’s 
bodily benefits to others.”174 Antony too seemed to recognize this. In the 
Apophthegmata Patrum, he is recorded as saying that “our life and our death is with 
our neighbor. If we gain our brother, we have gained God, but if we scandalize our 
brother, we have sinned against Christ.”175
 
Thus, while Athanasius holds out Anthony as the exemplary ascetic, he allows and 
even encourages ascetic practices—fasting in particular—for all Christians as part of 
their lives without demanding the drastic measures undertaken by Antony. There is a 
sense then in which all Christians are to be practicing ascetics. Paul Ramsey has 
alluded to the ascetic nature of the Christian life with respect to fasting, which might 
just as well be a summary Athanasius’ description of the Christian life. In contrasting 
the purpose of Christian fasting from that of Aristotle, he observes that 
through infused temperance, however, a Christian moderates his 
bodily appetites, . . . for the sake of his unqualifiedly enthusiastic love 
for God. To the degree that the human soul is loyally subject to God 
and perfectly obedient, a proportionately greater emphasis will, as a 
consequence, be placed upon subjecting the body to the soul. Thus, by 
infusion of moral virtue, a Christian is shifted slightly to the ascetic 
extreme, though he still engages in the moderate satisfaction of 
desire.176
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However, the other aspect of fasting most evident in Athanasius’ Festal Letters is the 
corporate aspect; Athanasius’ exhortations to fasting and prayer during Lent and 
other times of the year are undeniably communal in character. Before addressing this 
element however, it would be wise to acknowledge that there are certainly dangers in 
pursuing the discipline of fasting. 
 
The Dangers of Fasting 
While fasting was a discipline thoroughly inscribed within the larger moral project of 
the transformation of one’s soul, it will be useful to remember John Howard Yoder’s 
“positive doctrine of human fallibility.”177 The apostle Paul testifies to this ‘positive 
doctrine’ when he admits that he does the very things he hates, despite ‘knowing 
better’ (Romans 7:15). Indeed, it is clear that fasting can stem from numerous, and 
often conflicting motives, including an inadequate or disparaging view of one’s 
body. Intentions and motives are rarely, if ever, singular in nature and notoriously 
difficult to discern.178 For instance, to question the extent to which fasting may have 
impacted one’s longevity suggests ulterior motives may be at work, even as fasting 
may be simultaneously undertaken out of a desire to feast on God. Moreover, the 
undertaking any physiological regimen out of improper motives—through fasting 
and/or bodily exercise—can, in turn, have an adverse affect on one’s character. 
 
Carl Elliott, for instance, discusses Sam Fussell’s autobiographical account of his 
transformation from a skinny, pale, timid, bookish reserved intellectual to an 
enormous, bulging, steroid-enhanced world-class body builder.179 Having recently 
moved to New York City, Fussell found himself so afraid of being assaulted that the 
continual stress made him physically ill. An avid reader, Fussell stumbled across a 
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biography of the world-class bodybuilder Arnold Schwarzenegger, and shortly 
thereafter took up weightlifting routine which quickly developed into an obsessive 
regime, described as a “perpetual cycle of eating, dieting, and working out, buying 
seventy eggs a week and pumping his body to overflowing with enhancement 
drugs.”180 The gradual changes in Fussell’s personality mirrored the changes in his 
body. The formerly soft-spoken and diffident Fussell who once answered the phone 
in a polite “hello?” now barked “SPEAK!” at the first ring. “Thank you” was stricken 
from his vocabulary in favor of “no kindness forgotten, no transgression 
forgiven.”181 Lost in Fussell’s focus on physiological transformation, however, was 
the driving force of fear. Only much later would Fussell candidly say, “without being 
fully aware of it myself, I became the kind of man I once feared and despised. I 
became, in fact, a bully.”182 This account illustrates how both how difficult motives 
can be to discern, and how physiological regimes driven in part by motives which are 
not entirely unwarranted (e.g. fear) can be mutually reinforcing, and harmful to one’s 
body and one’s soul.  
 
If Fussell’s example illustrates the dangers associated with enhancing one’s 
appearance through a harsh physical regime driven by fear or lack of control, fasting 
is no less susceptible to similar abuse. If anchorites and monks could engage in 
fasting and self-flagellation out of a misguided hatred for the body, it seems more 
likely today that fasting can stem from of mild dissatisfaction over the condition 
one’s body in order to ‘take off a few extra pounds.’ In the United States there are 
numerous self-improvement ‘reality’ television programs dedicated to such concerns. 
One of the most recent programs, “I Want to Look Like a High School Cheerleader 
Again,” chronicles the intense work out routines of ten overweight women seeking to 
regain the physique they once enjoyed as high schoolers, with the unquestioned 
assumption that the ideal body type is that of an indefatigably nubile seventeen-year-
old girl. Dissatisfaction with one’s body is a trend that is increasing among both the 
young and old—girls and women, boys and men. Ellen Driscoll notes that we (girls 
and women in particular) are learning too well to be uncomfortable with our 
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untransformed bodies, uncritically adopting “the rhetoric of fitness [which] requires 
that we be unremittingly vigilant and penitent in liberating our bodies from fat and 
from the shame of our histories.”183
 
Particularly interesting is the research conducted by Joan Jacobs Brumberg, who has 
observed a gradual shift in American adolescent girls’ perceptions of their own 
bodies over the last century by investigating their diaries.184 She notes that the 
language and locus of self-improvement has shifted from one’s character to one’s 
body. A girl in 1892 resolved “to think before speaking. To work seriously. . . to be 
dignified. Interest myself more in others,”185 while a 1982 adolescent promised to 
maker herself better in any way she possibly could. “I will lose weight, get new 
lenses, already got a new haircut, good makeup, new clothes and accessories.”186 
Yet, both are moral projects. Indeed, it has been suggested that becoming thin is the 
new religion of our culture. “Slimming has become the national religion in America, 
and slenderness the measure of one’s moral caliber.”187  
 
While fasting among girls and women has been described as “the violence of 
narcissism,”188 the causes of fasting are complex and the influences numerous.189 
There is certainly a more pernicious form of extreme fasting among girls and women 
today closely related to the disorders of anorexia nervosa and bulimia nervosa, which 
are largely understood as ways of using food by starving oneself to mitigate tension, 
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anger, and anxiety and gain a sense of control.190 Several have noted similar 
behavioral patterns between these eating disorders and the fasting regimens valorized 
in Catherine of Siena (1347-1380), Teresa of Avila (1515-1582), and other medieval 
mystics.191 In her work Holy Fast and Holy Feast, Caroline Walker Bynum has 
noted the complex relationship between food and spirituality for medieval women 
mystics.192 These women often fasted to near starvation throughout the week so that 
they might literally enjoy a mystical union with Christ by feasting on Christ in the 
Eucharist—a feature largely absent among the holy men who fasted.193 Bynum 
asserts that eating the Eucharist was to become God, and to become that body of 
Christ which was rent, torn, and dying, and thus “to lift one’s own physicality into 
suffering and into glory.”194 By eating only the Eucharist, these women also acquired 
the discipline to refrain from food the rest of the week. To fast was to discipline the 
body and keep it from gluttony and lust and to gain freedom from the curse of Eve, 
as evidenced by the suspension of the menstrual cycle.195 Bynum’s research suggests 
that twenty-three percent of those women canonized as saints between 1000 and 
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192 Holy Fast and Holy Feast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1987).  
193 Holy Fast, 93, 105-106.  
194 Holy Fast, 251. 
195 “Fast, Feast, and Flesh: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women,” Representations 
11 (1985): 11.   
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1700 died from asceticism, while fifty-three percent considered illness as central to 
their sanctity.196  
 
Others have identified clear parallels between these mystic saints and contemporary 
anorectics. Gail Corrington, for instance, sees historical and psychological 
continuities between anorectic women and the mystic saints in that both view fasting 
as a form of self-control, including the search for identity and autonomy.197 The 
following statement from the diary of an anorectic woman, Gertrude, reveals an 
ascetic dimension to her disorder. 
I thought . . . that I was molding myself into that wonderful ascetic 
pure image . . . I felt that I had to do something I didn’t want for a 
higher purpose . . . I created a new image for myself and disciplined 
myself to a new way of life.198
Like Teresa of Avila who equated fasting with freedom and likened eating to the 
‘killing of the soul,’199 so too Gertrude views food as detrimental to that “wonderful 
ascetic pure image.” Ellen Driscoll too has observed that  
the macerations of the anorectic, the weigh-ins of the “weight-
watcher,” and the austerities of a Saint Catherine—all begin with . . . 
“the dream of a miraculous transfiguration, whereby the immolation 
of the flesh will be rewarded by its resurrection,” be that in the body 
of a model or of an angel (the two being indistinguishable in most 
representations, I might add).200  
 
 
While there are commonalities between anorectic fasting and ‘holy fasting,’ the 
causes and influences in both eras are exceedingly complex. While Rudolph Bell 
rightly asserts that “whether anorexia is holy or nervous depends on the culture in 
                                                 
196 Holy Fast, 76.  
197 Gail Corrington, “Anorexia, Asceticism, and Autonomy: Self-Control as Liberation and 
Transcendence,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 2 (Fall 1986): 51-61. See also Bell, Holy 
Anorexia, 17. 
198 Gertrude, in Hilde Bruch, Eating Disorders (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 16-17, 
quoted in Corrington, “Anorexia, Asceticism, and Autonomy,” 51. 
199 “This soul would fain see itself free and eating is killing it,” The Life of Saint Teresa of Jesus, 
trans. and ed. E. Allison Peers (Garden City, NY: Doubleday/Image, 1960), 165.  
200 Driscoll, “Hunger,” 99, quoting Ellmann, Hunger Artists, 14.  
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which a young woman strives to gain control of her life,”201 Caroline Bynum is also 
right to note that there is a clear distinction between choosing to renounce food and 
an inability to eat, and hence right to warn against identifying these phenomena as 
identical, given the theological meaning in one epoch and the more psychiatric, 
clinical pathological meaning today. In both cases such behavior “is learned from a 
culture that has complex and long-standing traditions about women, about bodies, 
and about food,” including exactly what kind of behaviors are in need of a ‘cure.’202 
Thus, that a contemporary label like anorexia nervosa might be applied to earlier 
fasting practices is not terribly helpful. Nevertheless, it would seem that fasting as a 
spiritual discipline is open to the possibility of abuse—especially among girls—
which may contribute, in some way, to the development of behaviors common to 
anorexia nervosa and bulimia, given again that motives are frequently numerous, and 
difficult to fully discern. Moreover, for those already struggling with an eating 
disorder, it may very well be that eating well becomes a form of spiritual discipline, 
where one learns to give up some element of control in learning to affirm one’s body 
as God’s temple (1 Corinthians 3:16).203 Given then the difficulty in discerning the 
motives of fasting and the potential abuses to which fasting may be put, it must be 
said that fasting is not a discipline that all Christians must follow, at least to the 
degree or regularity of the Desert Fathers or medieval spiritual mystics. Moreover, 
situating the discipline of fasting within the practices of the community of faith may 
also guard against the aforementioned abuses, a topic to which I now turn.  
 
Fasting and the Body of Christ: Baptism and the Lord’s Supper 
Athanasius’ Festal Letters reveal that fasting and feasting were shared disciplines 
within the larger life of the church body. In her work Holy Fast and Holy Feast, 
Caroline Walker Bynum asserts that the most important food practices for the early 
Christians were fasting and the Eucharist.204 With the development of organized 
                                                 
201 Holy Anorexia, 20.  
202 Bynum, Holy Fast, 198. See also Reineke, “This is My Body,” 254.  
203 After presenting a paper on fasting as a spiritual discipline, a young women who was being treated 
for anorexia whether asked me whether she should engage in fasting as a spiritual discipline. My 
response, however inadequate, was similar to that above.  
204 Holy Fast and Holy Feast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1987), 31, 33, 250. 
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monasticism, Bynum observes that “the third and fourth centuries thus witnessed the 
emergence of fasting and abstinence as extensive corporate practices among 
Christians.”205 She asserts that  
we must not forget that fasting was most basically something that 
brought Christians together—in gratitude for God’s gift of the harvest; 
in obedience to God’s command of abstinence, violated in the Garden 
of Eden but fulfilled on the cross; in charity toward the neighbors who 
would benefit from alms; and in foretaste of union with the saints in 
heaven.206  
Thus, fasting was intimately bound up with others in the body of Christ. To fast was 
to allow one’s freely forfeited food to be used to serve those in need. Bynum quotes 
Pope Leo the Great in his call for the December fast in thanks for a bountiful harvest: 
“Let the abstinence of the faithful become the nourishment of the poor and let the 
indigent receive that which others give up.”207 By fasting in this manner, “Christ is 
fed, . . . for what one denied to oneself in fast was given to Christ’s own body, his 
Church.”208 In most western cultures marked by a superabundance of food, it is as 
difficult to imagine corporate fasting as it is to imagine that there are others in body 
of Christ that might benefit from the food one freely forgoes. Thus, fasting need not 
be continual or solitary, though allowances must be made for those like Anna the 
prophetess who continually worshiped in the temple, “fasting and praying.”209 This 
suggests that a life lived in devotion to the Lord whereby one engages in a form of 
continual fasting may turn out to be a substantially extended life, though such a life 
may seem unattractive to those wishing to secure a longer life. Thus, any discipline 
of fasting—even with the recognition that it is possible to remake one’s body by 
retarding the aging process—should not be disconnected from the practices of the 
church which connect the Christian with Christ’s crucifixion, resurrection, and 
ascension; baptism and the Lord’s Supper.   
 
                                                 
205 Bynum, Holy Fast, 38. 
206 Bynum, Holy Fast, 39.  
207 Bynum, Holy Fast, 31, quoting Leo the Great, Sermon 20.  
208 Bynum, Holy Fast, 33-34. 
209 Luke 2:37 NIV. It may be no coincidence that Luke records that Anna was ‘very old.’ She was at 
least eighty-four, and possibly older, as there is ambiguity in the Greek text allowing for the 
possibility that Anna had been widowed for eighty-four years, which would likely put her age at near 
one hundred. 
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Baptism and the Lord’s Supper 
There is evidence that the early church maintained a relationship the discipline of 
fasting with baptism. In addition to the aforementioned fasts commanded in the 
Didache, was the command for both the catechumens and those baptizing to fast two 
days prior to baptism.210 Baptism reminds the Christian that he is baptized into the 
death of Jesus Christ, having been buried with him, bringing forth the inevitability of 
death (Romans 6:3). Perhaps the most forceful imagery is visible in communities 
engaging in baptism by immersion. For catechumen’s submersion under water and 
temporarily out of sight from witnesses, reminded observers that they too shall one 
day be lowered out of sight from those standing around their grave. The resurfacing 
of the catechumen attests equally to Christ’s resurrection (Romans 6:5, 8), pointing 
to his new life in Christ. Baptism reinforces the centrality of the resurrection, the 
very resurrection towards which Athanasius’ exhortations to fast, pointed. Thus, 
baptism “frees us from the power illness and death threaten to exert over our 
lives,”211 a power that might otherwise compel one to separate body and soul in 
pursuing genetic solutions to the problem of aging. 
 
If baptism reminds us of Christ’s death and resurrection, the Lord’s Supper or 
Eucharist focuses more specifically on Christ’s sacrifice, though it too has an 
eschatological component. In practicing the Lord’s Supper, the community not only 
engages in a life-shaping anamnesis, but simultaneously proclaims his death ‘until he 
comes’ (Matthew 26:29, 1 Corinthians 11:26). It is an act of committal, notes Carole 
Bailey Stoneking, and therefore ‘deadly work.’ 
Jesus commits himself into God’s hands. Likewise, Christian 
participation in the Lord’s Supper is an act of committal. It is deadly 
work. Receiving the cup of Christ is deadly work because it forms our 
lives not in terms of what we will do with them, but what God will do 
with our lives, in our living and our dying. Receiving the cup of Christ 
is deadly work because it forms us into a people ready to die for what 
we believe.212
                                                 
210 The Didache VII.4, in Oldest Church Manual, 187. 
211 M. Therese Lysaught, “Becoming One Body: Health Care and Cloning,” in Blackwell Companion, 
275. See also “Memory, Funerals, and the Communion of Saints: Growing Old and Practices of 
Remembering,” in Growing Old in Christ, 267-301. 
212 Carole Bailey Stoneking, “Receiving Communion: Euthanasia, Suicide, and Letting Die,” in 
Blackwell Companion, 379-380. 
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The Eucharist is intimately related to the goals of fasting put forward by Athanasius 
and Antony. The battles fought in the desert were to align one’s will with the will of 
God so that the body might serve as an instrument of God’s activity on earth. The 
discipline of fasting as practiced by Antony was concerned with making the body 
subject to his Word-guided will. Fasting and the Eucharist enable the Christian to 
bring the body into submission of one’s will in the act of committing one’s life to the 
One who fully entrusted his life to God. Fasting reminds the Christian that her body 
is not the instrument of her unexamined desires, but the instrument of righteousness 
(Romans 6:13).  
 
In tearing and crumbling the loaf and reciting ‘this is my body, broken for you,’ ‘this 
is my blood, poured out for many,’ the Christian is reminded of Christ’s body, 
offered up freely to God, yielding to death so that he might defeat death. The Lord’s 
Supper exposes how duplicitous we are, when, in digesting Christ’s broken body and 
drinking in his spilled blood, we entertain notions of putting off death by genetically 
slowing down our bodies to secure a longer healthier life, while claiming to follow 
the One who surrendered his life—body and soul—to God, the very One who bids us 
to come and die.213 The Lord’s Supper reminds the Christian that he is not his own. 
As Stanley Hauerwas has rightly noted, “Christians are not fundamentally concerned 
about living. Rather, their concern is to die for the right thing.”214 Thus, insofar as 
“the fear of aging, suffering, and dying so characteristic of our therapeutic culture is 
indicative of our refusal to die in Christ,”215 the Lord’s Supper and fasting, enable 
the Christian to foster what Alan Lewis has termed an ‘Easter Saturday identity,’ a 
life lived in conformity with the self-sacrifice of Christ, free from Sorge. For,  
theirs is a willingness—which may have little or nothing to do with 
martyrdom or the physical laying down of life for others, though that 
can never be excluded—to lead risky, unprotected, costly lives, open to 
others and committed to self-expenditure on their behalf. This they 
attempt in conscious but unambitious imitation—though never 
emulation, continuation, or displacement—of the life, and supremely 
the death, of Jesus.216  
                                                 
213 Bonhoeffer, Cost of Discipleship, 89. 
214 Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering Presence, 92. 
215 Meador and Henson, “Growing Old,” in Growing Old in Christ, 110.  
216 Alan E. Lewis, Between Cross and Resurrection: A Theology of Holy Saturday (Grand Rapids, MI: 
W. B. Eerdmans, 2001), 454. 
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The Eucharist reminds the Christian that she only finds life in taking up the cross to 
follow Jesus, a life that, paradoxically, can only be received by losing it for the sake 
of the One who freely gave his life for the sake of the world (Matthew 10:38-39). 
Jesus’ death and resurrection serve as a reminder that while death is indeed an 
enemy, it is a defeated enemy (1 Corinthians 15:54). Thus, while it is right to 
celebrate small victories against death in prolonging life through the successful 
treatment of disease as demonstrations of the in-breaking of God’s kingdom, Jesus’ 
sacrifice—besouled body and embodied soul—reminds the believer of the 
appropriateness of bodily decay, and that life is to be offered up in service to God. 
Finally, the Eucharist reminds the Christian that any fasting from food must involve 
regular participation in Lord’s Supper which proleptically points to the great banquet 
where people from all nations will gather together at the Lord’s table (Luke 13:29).  
 
The community of believers who gather around the Lord’s table also provides a 
context for evaluating the potential impact particular genetic ‘therapies’ like life 
extension might have on a community of faith. Just as Paul chastised those who 
undermined community by abusing the communal meal so intricately linked Lord’s 
Supper by feasting in the presence of the hungry (1 Corinthians 11:20-22), the 
church may be facing a new inequality between those who have genetically remade 
their bodies for longevity and those who do not. One must ask however, how 
relationships between the various members of Christ’s body might be adversely 
affected; particularly, whether a brother or sister would be as willing to serve or help 
another member who has genetically slowed the aging process in order to secure a 
longer and healthier life, and vise versa. One can’t help but wonder whether Paul 
might have responded with the sharp rhetorical tort he reserved for those Corinthians 
abusing the Lord’s Supper, “Shall I praise you for this?” (11:22)  
 
In this chapter I have evaluated current attempts to extend the human lifespan via 
caloric restriction mimetics with respect to Karl Barth’s conception of sloth 
understood as dissipation, or separation of the body and soul, and care, understood as 
anxiety over one’s limited lifespan. I have shown how life extension via genetic 
manipulation of the human aging process stems from a fear of death and is closely 
related to anxiety over the brevity of life, and how life extension fails to adequately 
address the role of the body in the formation of one’s soul. As such, I concluded that 
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life extension is the epitome of Trägheit understood as a distancing of the body and 
soul, a separation lying at the very root of the modern biomedical project as initiated 
by Descartes. I have also considered the role of asceticism in addressing this 
‘distance’ between the body and the soul, arguing that fasting provides a means 
whereby the Christian may reorder the body and soul so that she might better serve 
God, even as this enables her to remake her body for a greater longevity. Moreover, I 
have shown that historically the practice of fasting is not a discipline for the spiritual 
elite, nor does it demand a hermit-like existence. On the contrary, the early church 
recognized the benefits of corporate fasting and feasting, where individual fasting 
was regulated somewhat by the practice of the Lord’s Supper and communal meals. 
Finally, baptism may serve as an aid to fasting and spiritual development, where the 
Christian is reminded that she has indeed been crucified with Christ into a new life in 
which she is both called and enabled to fulfill God’s will for her life, for as long as 
God holds her body and soul together. 
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Conclusion 
In contrast to many of the philosophical, ethical, and theological approaches to the 
life extension via aging retarding offered thus far, I have situated the quest for 
longevity within the Christian struggle to holiness that recognizes both the 
significance of embodiment as part of God’s good creation and the benefit of the 
body in transforming one’s soul. I have shown how contemporary attempts at 
extending life by retarding aging are motivated by a fear of death which stems from 
the birth of the modern biomedical project as envisioned by Francis Bacon and 
Descartes. This desire to put off death by retarding aging found an ally in the 
theological upheavals of the Great Awakenings in America where the belief in the 
intractable nature of aging was eroded by theological convictions stressing the 
instrumental character of aging, depending increasingly on one’s hygienic and moral 
behavior. As science gradually exposed the inefficacy of hygienic approaches to 
longevity and belief in the afterlife gradually diminished, aging itself became a 
significant threat to a long, healthy life, engendering an increasing fear of bodily 
decay, disability, and dependence. This view reflects a profound change in attitudes 
towards aging and longevity as understood by early Christian thinkers—most 
especially Augustine—where the promise of a resurrection body rendered any 
concern or desire for a long or extended life superfluous. Though the Church Fathers 
regarded earthly life as short, difficult, and entailing a constant battle with sin, 
Athanasius believed that earthly life could be extended by remaking one’s body for 
longevity through an ascetic regime in re-establishing and maintaining the body as 
the servant of one’s Word-guided soul, the very condition enjoyed by prelapsarian 
Adam.  
 
Furthermore, it was shown that the ascetic must come under the tutelage of the body 
as a crucial element in the refinement of one’s soul, even as the body was effectively 
‘remade’ by fasting, enabling one to actually put the body into an idling state. I 
argued that the ascetic regime as inscribed within the Christian narrative informed by 
the death, resurrection, and ascension of Jesus Christ, represents one way to extend 
life, even though this was not the immediate goal of such a regime. The previous 
chapter explored the negative side of the disorder or dissipation of the body and soul 
by examining Karl Barth’s christological anthropology. Barth understands the 
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disorder of body and soul of which Athanasius and Antony spoke as the sin of sloth, 
Trägheit, a judgment determined by the man Jesus who is always an embodied soul 
rightly ruling his ensouled body.  In sloth the body and soul ‘go their separate ways,’ 
oscillating between relieving the soul of its office as the ruler of the body and 
releasing the body from the service of the soul. Ultimately, one comes to find one’s 
limited existence on this earth unbearable, becoming fearful and anxious (Sorge) of 
one’s finite span and ever-approaching death. This dissatisfaction with finitude 
suggests a disorder of body and soul, again as determined most definitively by Jesus’ 
being and action as embodied soul and ensouled body, who willingly faced death for 
the sake of fallen humanity. It was shown how the fear of finitude and bodily decay 
motivated Descartes to pursue a metaphysical and methodological separation of body 
and soul, giving birth to assumptions prevalent in science today, engendering the 
desire to genetically remake the body to fit one’s desires, particularly the desire for 
greater longevity in relative health and autonomy.  
 
Insofar as the current scientific project is a reflection of the anxiety over as limited 
lifespan, both driven by and leading to a separation of the body from the soul, I 
argued that the use of genetic engineering runs the risk of ‘short-circuiting’ the 
body’s role in refining one’s embodied soul, failing to recognize that no amount of 
bodily remaking will effectively deal with the anxiety of one’s embodied soul. While 
such a stance does not entirely prohibit the use of a life-extending pharmaceutical, it 
raises substantial questions with regards to one’s view of the body as well as one’s 
trust in one’s good future as secured by God. Moreover, insofar as Barth has 
characterized Trägheit as a separation of body and soul which stems from a lack of 
discipline, I have argued that ascetic practices such as fasting may be beneficial in 
effectively reordering the body and soul in restoring the soul as the rightful leader of 
one’s body, and that such practices counteract the fear of death.  
 
While Barth offers a relentless and rigorous christological anthropology in which the 
soul is to be the rightful leader of the body, Athanasius and the desert ascetics have 
offered an account whereby this order might be regained and established through the 
practice of fasting, a practice situated within the narrative of creation, fall, and 
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redemption. Thus, while Christian ethicists and theologians recently have been eager 
to stress that both testaments of Scripture speak of a unity of the body and the soul,1 
there has been comparatively little written about the practices by which the Christian, 
existentially or phenomenologically speaking, might keep them together. Athanasius 
and Antony recognized that the sanctification of the Christian involved a 
transformation of both body and soul, and how critical fasting and the ‘discipline of 
Scripture’ were to this transformation.2 Moreover, they offer an alternative to greater 
longevity that recognizes the unity of body and soul. In this unity the body is 
appropriately loved and respected as God’s good creation, serving as a means by 
which one’s soul might also be instructed, where the body in turn reaps the benefits 
of a soul which is in intimate fellowship with God. In this reordering the Christian is 
better equipped to use his body as a ‘media of incarnate expression,’ in recognition 
that the body, as the temple of the Holy Spirit, is meant for the Lord, and the Lord for 
the body (1 Corinthians 6:19, 13 respectively). Through the disciplines of prayer, 
fasting, and Scripture, the disciple of Christ becomes, paradoxically, one who may 
have one’s life extended, even as the significance attached to the length of life is 
mitigated by the death and resurrection of Christ.  
 
Opportunities for Further Research 
Finally, while I approached the problem of life extension as it fits within a Christian 
struggle to holiness focused primarily on the extension of life, there is ample room to 
approach life extension from the side of death. Given that aging retardation can be 
                                                 
1 Paul Ramsey, echoes Barth in asserting that a person “is an embodied soul or an ensouled body,” 
The Patient as a Person (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), xiii. See also Fabricated 
Man, 133, “man is as much the body of his soul as he is the soul of his body.” Ramsey also argues for 
the unity of body and soul in  “The Indignity of ‘Death With Dignity,’” Hastings Center Studies 2, 
(1974): 47-62. Others too emphasize the importance of the unity of body and soul. See Ray S. 
Anderson, “On Being Human,”193; Banner, Christian Ethics, 47-85; Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, 
First Touchstone Edition, ed. Eberhard Bethge, trans. Neville Horton Smith (New York: Touchstone, 
1995), 155; Joel B. Green, “‘Bodies—That is, Human Lives’: A Re-Examination of Human Nature in 
the Bible,” in Whatever Happened to the Soul?, 152-153; Gilbert C. Meilaender, Bioethics: A Primer 
For Christians (Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 1996), 4; Body, Soul, and Bioethics (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), chs. 1-3; O’Donovan, “Keeping Body and Soul 
Together,” 223-238; Allen Verhey, Reading the Bible in the Strange World of Medicine (Grand 
Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 2003), 68-98. 
2 This term is borrowed from the title of Chapter Four of Rowan Williams, On Christian Theology 
(Oxford: Blackwell Press, 2000), 63. 
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rightly construed as putting off death, it is equally possible to investigate the 
interplay between life extension and various theologies of death and life extension. 
One particular area for research might involve the interaction between process 
theologies of death and the kind of replicative immortality found in germ cells. 
Alternatively, it might prove fruitful to consider Barth’s christological conception of 
Jesus as Lord of time, and the implications for life extension construed as an attempt 
to become our own ‘lords of time.’ There is also room to treat life extension from the 
theological vantage point of justice.3 Finally, given the strong likelihood that this 
technology will only be available in the most developed nations where life 
expectancies are already the highest on the planet, second and third world 
perspectives on aging and old age and would prove equally rich, given especially that 
life expectancies are falling in many poorer nations currently experiencing epidemics 
and extreme famine.4 The limited theological attention aging research has attracted 
thus far leaves much room for further exploration.  
 
                                                 
3 See for instance Audrey R. Chapman, “Ethical Implications of Prolonged Lives,” Theology Today 60 
(2004): 479-496, reprinted in a slightly different form as “The Social and Justice Implications of 
Extending the Human Life Span,” in Fountain of Youth, 340-361. 
4 In Malawi, for instance, AIDS and extreme famine, and high infant mortality have reduced the life 
expectancy to 37 years of age. 
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